Parties and Democratic Organizations: Ascending and descending tracks

Valeria Kostyugova

Summary

The dynamics of the party field is difficult to assess unambiguously. The differentiation of parties on the social base consolidated and they demonstrated institutional sustainability, having completed the change of leadership of organizations with no splits, while some of these parties relatively successfully mastered new possibilities and forms of work. “Tell the truth” movement developed and strengthened regional structures, the center-right ones confirmed the stability of the coalition. However, the parties failed to convince the state to at least slightly mitigate the discriminatory conditions of their activities, as well as to convert the real success of social groups in advocacy into recognition not only by the state, but also by civil society. Some parties continued structural degradation.

Trends:

To date, there is a situation in which the real mobilization capacity and effectiveness of advocacy significantly exceed expectations from the activities of the parties. While before, on the contrary, with extremely modest opportunities, expectations from the activities of party structures and public organizations were overstated and extended to the anticipation of a rapid change of power in the country.

Local election

For parties and political public associations, 2018 began under the sign of the election campaign to local councils, which became unsuccessful for them. The parties failed to convince the state apparatus of the expediency of expanding party representation in local councils. As a result, only two out of 1,830 deputies (both at the lowest level of village councils) are included in local councils from the opposition. Despite the virtually universal refusal of the authorities to include opposition representatives in election commissions, as well as obstacles to the work of observers accredited by democratic organizations, the opposition managed to organize a sufficiently convincing observation and identify many violations during the campaign.

However, the representation of Pro-government and government-loyal parties in local councils was almost doubled compared to the local councils of the previous convocation (2014) from 248 to 457. The number of parties represented in local councils also increased from 4 to 7.1 In Minsk City Council party deputies make up almost a third (29.8% against 15.8% in the city Council of the previous convocation). This success correlates with the growth of candidates from pro-government parties: the Communist party of Belarus nominated 401 candidates (277 – in 2014), the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus – resp. 219 (159), Republican Party of Labor and Justice – 173 (51). In total, all parties, including democratic parties, nominated 1,028 candidates.

As you can see, the dropout rate of even pro-government parties is extremely high, especially for the LDPB, for which 5 deputies in the local councils of the 28th convocation are a success in comparison with the councils of the previous convocation.2

The share of party deputies in local councils remains very small – 2.53% of all deputies (1.3% in 2014).3 And even in Minsk City Council, where party representation is the largest, we can say that belonging to a party rather served as an obstacle to the appointment of a deputy, because out of 248 registered party candidates there were 135, i. e. 54.4%.

In other words, the results of the elections showed that the campaign to increase the political weight of the parties did not convince the Central government, but had an effect on the mood of those who intend to make a career within the existing political system, prompting them to resort to the help of the parties in the nomination. Moreover, as the analysis of the activities of party candidates in the House of Representatives of the 6th convocation (elections in 2016), also a record one for party representation, the relationship between the parties and their candidates remains weak.4

In addition to the failure to soften the position of the state to include parties in the governance of the country at least at the local level, the campaign for elections to local councils has shown that the inertia of political decisions taken in the past is more effective than actual decisions. Thus, democratic organizations, as well as in the parliamentary elections of 2016, decided to participate in the election campaign – despite the invariably discriminatory conditions for nominees alternative to the authorities. However, the inertia of decisions not to participate in previous campaigns prevented the mobilization of assets for both the monitoring campaign and the nomination of candidates.

As a result of the “democratic organization” only 330 candidates managed to register, including 97 from the movement “Tell the truth” (“TT”), 59 from the leftist party “Fair world”, 55 from the United Civil Party (UCP), 54 from the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (“Hramada”), 27 from the Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD), 23 from the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF), 12 from "Movement for Freedom" (MFF), and 3 from the Green Party.5 “Tell the truth” put forward the largest number of candidates and, in addition, for the first time in Belarusian political practice offered a new form of mobilization – through online questionnaires and promotion of the campaign in social networks.

Weak extension – in addition to the inertia of non-participation and a reduction in the number of activists of the majority parties was facilitated by the fact that the party leaders after the election of Anna Kanopatskaya and Alena Anisim in the Parliament of 2016 decided that the authorities needed for some reason the inclusion of the opposition in legislative bodies.6 At the same time, the example of pro-government parties shows that it is necessary to convince the government of the need to include not only the opposition, but even quite pro-government-minded party members in representative bodies.

The invariability of the results of appointments to representative bodies casts great doubt on the statements of the central authorities about the plans for the transformation of the political system. On the one hand, these talks are intended to serve as a carrot for all those who have ambitions, on the principle of “support me today, and I will support you tomorrow”, while “tomorrow” never comes. On the other hand, democratic organizations themselves do not demonstrate their readiness to take part in the transformation of the current political system, still fearing accusations of its “legitimization”.

Institutional strengthening and advocacy

Despite the failures in the election campaign, the parties nevertheless managed to adapt to the new conditions and develop activities to protect the interests of social groups and local communities, as well as partially adapt to the unfavorable media environment through the use of social networks and the development of their own information capabilities.

The results of 2018 were ambiguous for parties: some democratic and pro-party organizations continued to deteriorate, and the centre-right ones (the United Civil Party, leaders Anatoly Lebedko/Nikolai Kozlov + “Movement For Freedom!”, leader Yury Hubarevich + organizing committee of the BCD, leaders Paval Sevyarynets, Vital Rymasheuski, Olga Kovalkova, Georgiy Dzmitruk) overcame the inertial trends and adapted to the new reality, increasing its impact on the domestic political agenda in a direct way and not only through international pressure. The “Tell the Truth” movement (leaders Tatiana Korotkevich and Andrey Dmitriev) continued to work with a new audience that had not previously participated in politics, and conducted a large-scale expansion in the regions.

The differentiation of the political field that had emerged in 2017 strengthened in 2018. Since 2016, parties and democratic organization have been divided both in terms of tactics of political struggle/participation, and in terms of orientation to the readiness of their supporters for political action.7 The Belarusian National Congress (BNC) of Mikalai Statkevich continued to work with supporters of street protests, but in 2018 it was not possible to consolidate the success of the protests against the “parasite” decrees. The authorities raised the price of the protest compared to the period 2014–2017, including more frequent and imminent detentions before and after the protests, as well as high fines for participation in them. In addition, the decline in protest activity was affected by the criminal case against the leaders of independent trade unions, as well as the dotted fulfillment by the authorities of some requirements or expectations of disgruntled citizens, including through advocacy of the interests of these groups by other party organizations.

The center-right ones continued to work with traditional supporters of the democratic opposition, that is, with people of liberal and pro-European views, but sought to expand the audience by including new groups, such as local communities opposed to the consolidation of development, or, for example, the movement “Mothers 328”. In its work the center-right coalition unites a combination of interaction with the authorities – in many respects due to cooperation with the deputy Anna Kanopatskaya (participation in round tables, parliamentary hearings and drafting bills) – with the willingness to protest activity, as in the case of the confrontation with the city authorities on the construction of the Brest battery plant, or protection of Kurapaty.

The center-right ones also took an active part in the organization of Freedom Day – the most striking event of 2018. In addition, each of the coalition members works with their own specific audiences. For example, the BCD conducted an active campaign to mitigate the anti-drug legislation in the framework of advocacy of the “Mothers 328”8 movement, achieved a reduction in payment for dormitories in Babruisk and continued the campaign of advocating the interests of employers. “MFF” conducted educational pro-European activities, especially focusing on young people; in cooperation with environmentalists, they defended the interests of local communities of the capital against the development and consolidation of residential areas. The UCP focuses on the interests of small and medium-sized businesses, developed amendments to the electoral legislation and the law on parties.

The “Tell the Truth” movement continued the policy of involving citizens who are ready to express dissatisfaction with their position or the position of their group only legally through participation in local actions and local self-government, signing petitions. As a rule, the principals of “TT” are not inclined to ultimatum, indifferent to national symbols and have pragmatic views on foreign policy. Accordingly, “TT” is most successful in non-confrontational interaction with the authorities, meeting with heads of departments and regions, participating in parliamentary hearings, inviting representatives of the authorities to their own events, making proposals for changing the legislation, presenting their position on national TV.

The movement is most active in the regions. It registered 6 regional and 31 district organizations, combining many regional initiatives for the improvement of the environment in the national campaign “Do Together”, as well as organizing a “School of the owner”. “TT” works not only with Western politicians and international organizations, but also with Russian ones. The innovation was the holding of regional forums in a form of “idea fairs” for local opinion leaders and activists, which were attended by national media stars, leaders of business associations, experts and representatives of the authorities.

As part of advocacy campaigns, the asset of “TT”, the center-right, as well as the Brest regional organization of the BSDP (“Hramada”) is constantly training in collecting signatures and working to expand its base of supporters, which is important for success in registering their candidates for the presidency. The decrease in media interest in the activities of democratic organizations after the “BelTA case” required them to develop their own communication network, and the center-right, “TT” and the Brest regional organization of the BSDP (“Hramada”) succeeded in this, expanding their presence in social networks and improving mailing-lists.

The Belarusian Popular Front failed to take advantage of the relatively favorable conditions of 2018. Despite the fact that BPF has played a significant role in the decision of the organizing committee for the anniversary of Freedom Day (the holiday, not the protest), the bloggers-organizers of the festival (E. Palchis, A. Motolko and P. Belous) and the centre-right managed to extract more out of the holiday. The success of the member of the Belarusian Popular Front Pavel Belous in the promotion of national symbols is also not reflected in the party's capabilities. Cooperation with the deputy Alena Anisim on the agenda of “soft Belarusization” rather lowered the participation of the BPF in the development of the domestic political agenda, as A. Anisim is much more active in the media. Some success in crowdfunding to pay for the organization’s office at the same time demonstrates serious problems in the party.

The other organizations – the Belarusian National Congress, the Party of the left “Fair World”, the Belarusian Social Democratic party “Hramada” (leader Sergey Cherechen), the Conservative Christian party – the BPF, the Belarusian Social Democratic party “Hramada” (excluding the Brest regional organization) – hardly master new opportunities and continue to lose influence on the political agenda.

The institutional strength of parties, whose one important indicator is the ability to hold a change of leadership without the split,9 cannot be assessed as high. Yes, all organizations have managed to change leaders, and at the moment only the Party of the left “Fair World” is ruled by the permanent Sergei Kalyakin. But the change of leaders of the UCP and the BSDP in 2018 is not a good example. In the former case, the elected chairman of the party V. Polyakov could not fulfill his duties and left office two months later, in the latter – the party had to attract a “Legionnaire” (businessman S. Cherechenya) and judging by the actions of the party and the interview of the new chairman, the state of its structures requires considerable time to participate in political campaigns.

Nevertheless, the institutional strengthening10 of party organizations should be noted, at least with regard to the “Tell the Truth” movement, the center-right and the Brest regional organization of social democrats. The preservation of the center-right coalition – despite the change of the leader in the UCP and the complex relations of the UCP with the deputy A. Kanopatskaya in close cooperation with BCD and MFF – is an example of a truly sustainable and productive political union. It should also be noted that the LDPB, which is not considered as “its” neither by the government nor by the democratic society, also strengthened last year – the number of structures and members rose, the influence on the political agenda increased.

Conclusion

The events of the beginning of 2019 show the preservation of two tracks in the development of the democratic segment of the party field: the ascending for the center-right movement “Tell the Truth” and the Brest regional organization of the BSDP(H) and the descending for all others. At the same time, on the eve of two election campaigns – parliamentary in 2019 and presidential in 2020 – the state declares its readiness to increase the role of parties in the political system and even takes very timid steps in this direction, for example, towards the initiative of the UCP to jointly prepare amendments to the law on parties.

The parliamentary election campaign gives the party organizations a chance to consolidate the social base and increase their weight in the political system due to the greater sensitivity of the state in such periods to the arguments of both internal and external lobbyists. However, it is likely that most party organizations will not be able to take advantage of this opportunity for fear of losing the sympathy of the democratic community.