Belarusian-American Relationships: Broken Beyond Repair

Anton Penkovski

Summary

Over the past few years, Lukashenko’s regime has made several dramatic mistakes that have made a return to constructive relations with the United States nearly impossible. Stakeholders no longer regard any pragmatic Russia-West balance strategies offered by Minsk as credible. Active participation in the war in Ukraine deprived the Lukashenko regime of one of its primary bargaining chips.

The loss of a full-fledged US diplomatic presence in Minsk, combined with the forfeit of many markers of autonomy, increased sanctions pressure, and the ongoing wave of repressions, has driven official Minsk and Washington to their lowest point in relations, with no foreseeable path forward. Nevertheless, Washington continues to actively support the democratic forces of Belarus in exile, albeit to a somewhat diminished extent due to the priority focus on events in Ukraine.

Trends:

Diplomacy on the Brink of War

In early 2022, the bilateral relations between Belarus and the United States were incredibly strained. On the 30-year anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the focus wasn’t on commemorating the milestone but on the potential loss of decades of US diplomatic achievements in Belarus. Soon after the closure of the offices of the Public Diplomacy Section and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Belarusian authorities demanded a further reduction of the embassy’s administrative and technical staff. As a result, the American diplomatic mission found itself in a precarious position, with the remaining staff’s sole focus being to maintain the diplomatic mission itself.

Simultaneously, US officials consistently voiced their concerns regarding the potential escalation of the Ukraine conflict into a full-blown war involving Belarus. As early as January 2022, during open briefings at the US State Department, concerns were raised about the presence of the Russian military, which was deemed a highly volatile factor. 1 The US State Department openly questioned A. Lukashenko’s capacity to implement an independent policy, prompting his sharp reaction.

US citizens were repeatedly called upon to leave Belarus as soon as possible due to potential escalation risks. In response, Lukashenko dismissed such assessments as «a collection of fantasies and horror stories», attempting to accuse Washington of baseless alarmism. Shortly thereafter, the US diplomatic mission evacuated diplomats` families from Minsk, an action that Lukashenko’s Foreign Ministry labeled as fearmongering.

On the eve of the war, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried reached out to Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei, while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, spoke on the phone with Belarusian Chief of Staff Viktor Gulevich.

After the conflict had already begun, representatives of the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya stated that Washington officials had briefed them on potential war scenarios. In this context, American intelligence was precise in determining Moscow’s intentions.

Regrettably, it is unclear to what degree US officials demonstrated their knowledge of the Kremlin’s plans in their interactions with the Lukashenko regime. Similarly, it is uncertain how informed the regime itself was about the looming conflict. Judging by the public statements of the official Minsk representatives, the only thing of note was a complete lack of interest in a dialogue with the United States.

Strong reaction to complicity

The US strongly condemned both Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine and Lukashenko’s role in this martial misadventure. The US added a new, and arguably the most consequential charge to their long list of grievances against Minsk: complicity in the war. On the very day the conflict erupted, the US imposed sanctions against several banks, state-owned enterprises, and individuals within the country’s governance and Lukashenko’s inner circle. The speed with which the sanctions were imposed suggests that they were premeditated and approved by the US leadership in advance.

The charge of complicity in the war destroyed Minsk’s long-term strategy in relations with the West: positioning itself as a sufficiently independent buffer between the Kremlin’s expansion and the NATO frontier, thereby preventing an extensive military presence and independent actions of a foreign army on its soil. These developments also raised questions about Lukashenko’s ability to control the situation in the country, further confirming his inability to pursue an independent policy.

In late February, right after the conflict onset, the American diplomatic presence in Minsk was downscaled, and American diplomats were moved to the Belarus Affairs Unit based at the US Embassy in Lithuania, established in Vilnius a year earlier. Officially, the move was predicated on safety concerns and Minsk’s insistence on shuttering several embassy offices and trimming the embassy’s personnel. Predictably, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry reacted with vehemence, accusing the United States of escalating the situation.

Throughout March, the United States continued to expand its sanctions against Lukashenko’s regime, including a ban on luxury goods exports. 2 The US House of Representatives endorsed the termination of the «most-favored-nation» trade status for both Russia and Belarus. At the same time, the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya positioned itself as the representative of the Belarusian anti-war movement, voicing its stance during a meeting with the US Ambassador to the OSCE, Michael Carpenter. Via its diplomatic mission in Vilnius, the US government clarified its perspective, delineating between Lukashenko and the people of Belarus.

In Vilnius, American diplomats set aside Minister Makei’s invitation for a dialogue which was extended in a private letter to a number of Western diplomats. The United States, in line with other Western nations, treated this appeal of the head of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry with open disdain, publicly reminding the Belarusian regime of the prerequisites necessary for initiating a dialogue.

In late April, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya traveled to Washington to attend the funeral of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The leader of the Belarusian democratic forces met with officials of the US State Department and USAID, along with the US Senate and Congress representatives. The democratic forces pressed the United States to increase pressure on the Lukashenko regime, in particular by condemning its participation in the war in Ukraine, while furnishing the American side with a plethora of documents substantiating the regime’s illicit activities.

On 18 May, the US embassy in Kyiv resumed its work, a revival not mirrored by the diplomatic mission in Minsk. Thus, while the US State Department deemed Kyiv, embroiled in an armed conflict, a safe place for its diplomats, Minsk did not receive such an assessment. While the obvious physical threat to diplomats in the beleaguered capital of Ukraine was found justified, the maintaining an American presence in Minsk was simply deemed non-essential.

The Potassium Dilemma and Trade Turnover

In the late spring of 2022, Western media outlets reported that the US was considering the suspension of sanctions against the Belarusian potassium industry, 3 imposed in 2020 in response to the Lukashenko administration’s suppression of peaceful protests and violations of fundamental human rights. The media suggested these restrictions could be suspended for six months in exchange for providing rail transit for Ukrainian grain to the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda. According to these accounts, both the UN and the United States were deeply concerned with the issue of global food security. Consequently, concessions to the Lukashenko regime could have been offered to ensure food accessibility for countries in Africa and the Middle East.

On May 20, during a press briefing4 by the US Department of State, official spokesperson Ned Price neither confirmed nor denied the journalists' interpretations, allowing further discussion of such a strategy in political and media circles. This potential strategic pivot instigated heated debates regarding the United States’ unwavering stance towards the Lukashenko regime and the ethical considerations of engaging in negotiations with it. Regardless of these rumors, the US persisted in amplifying its sanctions measures, continued voicing support for the democratic forces of Belarus, and maintained regular dialogues with the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya across various platforms.

Trade relations between the US and Belarus have deteriorated significantly. Based on the open data available at the time of writing this article, it is possible to note a significant downturn in bilateral trade. Historically, imports from the United States had overshadowed exports from Belarus. However, this dynamic shifted dramatically in early 2022. While January’s trade patterns mirrored those of 2021, by March, the trade turnover collapsed significantly, following the conflict onset in Ukraine.

This shift can be attributed to the American sanctions regime, which has significantly curtailed the potential for collaborations between American and Belarusian businesses. Throughout the year, the US Treasury Department continued adding new entities to its sanctions list. As a result, 2022 stands as the most challenging year for US-Belarus trade relations in the past decade.

Nuclear blackmail and staff shortages

In mid-June, US Special Envoy to Belarus Julie Fisher announced her resignation from her post in Vilnius due to her appointment as the US Ambassador to Cyprus. 5 Before her role in Belarus, Fisher had served as the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Her exit from Vilnius deprived the democratic forces in Belarus of a strong advocate for the nation’s interests at various levels in Washington.

As of the end of 2022, no replacement for Fisher was announced. This suggests that the Special Envoy for Belarus position may not follow the typical rotation practices of the State Department. It might be perceived as either not being of high priority or not sufficiently appealing for potential candidates. 6

Some factions within the democratic forces, particularly Pavel Latushka’s People’s Anti-Crisis Administration, have pushed for the US to recognize Belarus as an occupied country. However, American diplomats refrained from adopting such a characterization, pointing out that the term «occupation» carries a specific definition and should be used appropriately. In August, after the establishment of the United Transitional Cabinet (UTC), part of the dialogue between the consolidated democratic forces and the US was assigned to the Foreign Affairs Cabinet representative, Valery Kovalevsky, who is also the head of the Tsikhanouskaya Cabinet.

Also in August, a new narrative emerged from Minsk, seemingly directed towards Washington. Reports began circulating about the information on the movement of supplies for land-based missiles into Belarus. Additionally, claims surfaced about the conversion of some Belarusian SU-25 aircraft by Russia to carry air-launched nuclear missiles. Lukashenko has repeatedly mentioned nuclear weapons in his interactions with both international and domestic audiences.

Throughout the second half of 2022, discussions revolved around Lukashenko’s remarks on nuclear weapons and their geopolitical implications. These conversations ranged from Poland’s alleged push for the US to utilize nuclear arms, to the potential deployment of nuclear weapons in a hypothetical Third World War. Makei also spoke about the growing nuclear threat at the UN General Assembly in New York. Doing so, the regime used its own nuclear-free status as another tool to attract the attention of Western politicians. The nuclear weapons rhetoric remained on the regime’s agenda until the end of the year.

During the second half of 2022, the United States Federal Government assessed the possibility of the armed forces of Belarus’ entry into the war in Ukraine. The assessment suggested that this eventuality was unlikely, stating that there were no signs of Belarus preparing to take part in hostilities on foreign soil.

The 77th session of the UN General Assembly in September saw both Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Vladimir Makei in attendance. While other meetings of American officials at the conference were declared openly, engagements with Makei were kept under wraps, reflecting the evolving nature of diplomatic relationships with Belarusian officials. Despite the strained relations, the United States was among the first to offer condolences to Makei’s family after his unexpected passing on 26 November.

The year concluded with the UTC announcing V. Kovalevsky’s visit to Washington to discuss increasing support for Belarusian civil society. For its part, the US State Department reiterated its commitment to holding the Lukashenko regime accountable for its support of Russian military aggression.

Conclusion

In 2022, despite numerous warnings from the United States, the Lukashenko regime sided with Russia in its military aggression against Ukraine. This move not only abandoned the remaining avenues for dialogue with the United States but also demonstrated Lukashenko’s lack of independence, paving the way for tougher sanctions. This action appears to mark the final choice of the Lukashenko’s regime in the matter, eliminating any potential for a diversified foreign policy. The US government's previously enduring patience with the regime’s eccentric actions seems to have reached its limit.

The sanctions imposed on Belarus intensified, and the trend of increasing restrictions persisted. The few remaining issues of concern that the United States held regarding Minsk were related to potassium fertilizers and the possible deployment of nuclear weapons.

The Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya further solidified its stance as the primary interlocutor for the United States. In contrast, official Minsk has assumed a role resembling that of a Kremlin satellite, albeit with a unique form of autonomy. Recent foreign policy actions have shown that the most severe political and economic pressures are applied not in response to violations of the rights and freedoms of citizens inside the country, but due to the regime’s actions in the international arena - be it the forced landing of a Ryanair flight or aiding and abetting an invasion of a neighboring country.

Currently, it is challenging to envision any scenario in which Washington would re-engage in dialogue with Belarus' official leadership. In 2023, we can anticipate further economic sanctions, rendering the Belarusian market increasingly unappealing to American businesses. Sanctions will be implemented more to align with those imposed on the Kremlin and to prevent Belarus from being used as a loophole to bypass these restrictions rather than to directly impact the Lukashenko regime.

As we approach the fourth decade of relations between the United States and a nominally independent Belarus, the situation seems rather grim. Official Minsk is no longer regarded by Washington as an autonomous partner, and the democratic factions in Warsaw and Vilnius lack the necessary influence inside the country to solidify their status as the primary representative of Belarus in their interactions with the United States. Notable shifts in this dynamic are conceivable only if the democratic forces assume power in Belarus. Any other outcome or stasis in the situation would likely hold little interest for the United States. From Washington’s perspective, the current sovereignty of Belarus is in great doubt.