Former Soviet Union Countries and the “Far Arc”: A geopolitical and economic counterbalance to Western isolation

Summary

Amid the pressures of isolation and Western sanctions, Belarus persistently sought to diversify its partnerships primarily through economic engagement with countries in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. These efforts aim to secure political support and explore new markets for potash fertilizers, machinery, and agricultural products, offsetting the loss of access to the European market.

Nonetheless, relations with these partners are still largely influenced by their internal political contexts, which often result in inconsistent cooperation. Moreover, the overall scope of interaction remains limited due to considerable geographical distances and high logistics costs.

Despite strong diplomatic rhetoric, the political and geographical realities of 2025 continue to restrict intercontinental connectivity.

Trends

• Belarus primarily approaches cooperation with countries on other continents as an economic strategy to compensate for the loss of European markets;
• Despite vigorous diplomatic efforts, growth in alternative markets has yielded limited results and has not significantly diminished Belarus’s economic dependence on Russia;
• Strategic alliances with Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and other regions remain heavily affected by the internal political situations within partner countries, making long-term collaboration vulnerable to leadership changes and internal instability.

Belarus within the regional framework of relations

In 2025, relations with Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries remained a central element of Belarus’s foreign policy. This focus was regarded as a strategic approach to securing economic and geopolitical benefits. Nevertheless, relations with individual countries continued to be heavily influenced by the broader geopolitical environment and the internal political stability of those nations.

In Belarus’s trade, the FSU countries (excluding Russia) rank second among macro-regions, competing with China in trade volume (bilateral trade with China reached approximately USD 8.8 billion in 2025). Kazakhstan emerged as the top partner within the region, with bilateral trade totaling USD 1.2 billion in 2025, reflecting a 29.6% increase compared to the previous year (see Table 1).1

Belarus and the South Caucasus: priorities and key areas of cooperation

The relationship between Armenia and Belarus was at a low point, evident in overt tensions between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Alexander Lukashenko. Although both nations remained formal members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), their ties were affected by Armenia’s pivot towards Western integration and provocative statements made by Lukashenko. In response to Belarus’s remarks, Pashinyan stated that he would limit his participation in the EAEU summit in Minsk to online presence.

Additionally, Armenia chose not to participate in the ‘Zapad 2025’ joint military exercises conducted by Russia and Belarus. Nevertheless, the deterioration of official relations with Minsk prompted increased engagement between Armenia and the Belarusian democratic opposition, including high-level meetings between Pashinyan and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.2

Belarus, for its part, maintained amicable relations with Azerbaijan, underpinned by longstanding personal connections between Ilham Aliyev and Lukashenko. This bond facilitates ongoing political dialogue, characterized by frequent high-level visits and mutual support on the international stage. In October 2025, a Belarusian delegation led by a deputy prime minister visited Baku, resulting in the signing of a protocol aimed at expanding economic cooperation, particularly in the sectors of agriculture and specialized machinery.

Furthermore, Belarus and Azerbaijan exhibit mutual political support, with both countries expressing their readiness to host peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. Their cooperation also encompasses the Nagorno-Karabakh region, where Minsk is actively involved in reconstruction efforts in territories captured by Azerbaijan during its war with Armenia — a conflict in which, according to reports,3 Belarus supplied arms to Azerbaijan.

Relations between Belarus and Georgia can be described as pragmatic engagement, prompted by the Georgian Dream party’s shift away from the West, which resulted in the development of a shared anti-Western rhetoric and mutual support for “sovereignty” in the face of external pressures. Georgia declined to participate in the main sanctions against Minsk, maintained active aviation operations, and remained one of the top tourist destinations for Belarusians. Belarus, in turn, continued to follow its policy of non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite Lukashenko’s visit to Abkhazia in 2022.

Central Asian focus

Central Asia was viewed as a strategically vital market for diversifying political and economic relations, with the goal of breaking the isolation imposed by the Western sanctions. Leveraging its role as the chair of the EAEU in 2025, Minsk sought to position itself as a key partner in regional stability, as well as in economic and logistics cooperation.

The primary areas of collaboration included exporting agricultural products, developing joint logistics initiatives, and active engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Commission. For instance, in 2025, Belarus’s leading logistics company, Beltamozhservice, announced the launch of an express container rail service dedicated to cargo shipments to Iran.4 This new route, passing through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, was designed to provide a high-speed alternative to traditional sea freight.

Interactions with individual nations and regional strategic goals varied. Trade between Belarus and Uzbekistan increased by 34 %, mainly driven by exports of industrial and agricultural goods. Meanwhile, Belarus’s collaboration with Kazakhstan concentrated on industrial cooperation, including joint projects in machinery manufacturing, agriculture, logistics, and industrial engineering.

Turkmenistan and Tajikistan were instrumental in expanding transit and technical infrastructure, with Turkmenistan joining the railway connection for the new freight route to Iran. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan remained highly engaged in regional integration efforts, participating in economic alliances and joint CSTO military exercises to bolster security coordination.

Overall, although these strengthened ties with Central Asia created a certain economic buffer, they did not enable the regime to achieve a decisive strategic breakthrough.

Belarus’s relations with Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America

In response to Western isolation, Minsk persisted in its Far Arc diplomacy, emphasizing trade and industrial collaboration with countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America (see Table 2).

A key motivation was to circumvent Western sanctions and lessen their impact, while also seeking new market opportunities. This approach yielded mixed outcomes: although it resulted in some local successes and growth in certain sectors, it was unable to fully compensate for the loss of Western markets, nor did it reduce Belarus’s severe economic reliance on Russia.

Diversification efforts with African countries

Belarus persisted in its strategy to engage with African nations, aiming to establish political alliances and access new markets for sanctioned goods. The core focus of Belarus’s Africa policy was on securing a lasting economic presence on the continent and expanding into new African markets. By offering agricultural machinery and defense equipment without the typical political conditions demanded by Western donors, the regime actively positioned itself as a pragmatic alternative in infrastructure development and food security initiatives.

In 2025, several high-level visits by African leaders to Minsk took place, including by Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa (May 2025), Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (July 2025), Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan (September 2025), and Angolan President João Lourenço (October 2025).

Belarus’s total trade with African partners in 2025 was approximately USD 500 million. This includes agricultural and industrial equipment, as well as transportation. As for security and arms trade, Belarus sought to position itself as a supplier for military modernization and internal security needs. As part of these efforts, Minsk promoted the Sapsan mobile, multifunctional counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (C-UAV) system, designed to safeguard critical infrastructure from smaller drones. This system integrates detection, electronic warfare, and kinetic engagement capabilities into a single mobile platform and was reportedly offered to two African countries.5

At the national level, Zimbabwe remained one of Belarus’s key partners. On December 15, 2025, during Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin’s visit to Harare, the two defense ministries signed a military cooperation agreement.6 This cooperation encompasses military education and healthcare, operational and combat training for personnel, military R&D, as well as electronic warfare systems, information systems, and equipment for military communications.

Equatorial Guinea became a focal point for health initiatives and construction projects. Ethiopia was used as a testing ground for Belarusian unmanned aerial systems and military radio-electronic equipment.

India

In 2025, relations between India and Belarus significantly intensified, marked by deeper strategic coordination and enhanced military cooperation. India actively supported Belarus’s integration into the BRICS framework, where Belarus has held the status of an official partner since 2025. This partnership also extended to security cooperation: India deployed a military contingent for participation in the ‘Zapad 2025’ Russian-Belarusian exercises.

Additionally, India remains a key market for Belarusian potash fertilizes. The strength of these bilateral ties was underscored by high-level diplomatic contacts between Lukashenko and Indian Ambassador Ashok Kumar.

Relations with Middle Eastern countries

In its efforts to diversify international partnerships, Belarus sought to bolster political and economic ties with Middle Eastern nations. A notable milestone in 2025 was the strategic engagement with the United Arab Emirates, exemplified by the visit of the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince to Minsk in June 2025. This visit led to over USD 4 billion in investment agreements, focusing on digital innovation, smart city initiatives, and logistics hubs.

Furthermore, a substantial USD 1.4 billion contract was signed with Oman for the development of a forestry and paper manufacturing complex. As part of its broader effort to diversify exports, representatives of Lukashenko’s regime also visited Oman and Algeria in December 2025.

Relations with Latin American countries

Belarus’s pursuit of new markets to compensate for the decline in Western trade influenced its relations with Latin America. A key development in 2025 was the abolition of the visa regime with Colombia, aimed at facilitating business trips and expanding access to the Pacific regional market. Simultaneously, Minsk upheld its longstanding political stance by continuing to support the Maduro regime in Venezuela, focusing on revitalizing abandoned joint industrial projects and assembly plants. In November 2025, Nicaragua officially expressed interest in knowledge exchange and expanding cooperation with the China – Belarus Industrial Park.

However, despite these efforts, interactions remain limited due to geographical distance and high logistics costs, which continue to impede deeper economic collaboration.

Conclusion

In 2025, Belarus sought to forge partnerships with countries in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, viewing this strategy as a geopolitical and economic response to its isolation from the West. While Belarus’s main interest remains economic — focused on accessing new markets for exports — these relations often involve mutual political support in the face of Western pressures. Nevertheless, these partnerships lack the potential to replace the nearby Western market.

Looking ahead to 2026, Belarus is anticipated to continue its efforts to establish connections with other continents. Despite the U. S. policy shift in 2025, the European Union remains firm in opposing the Lukashenko regime and maintaining strict sanctions, prompting Minsk to seek alternative avenues both economically and politically.