Belarusian-U. S. Relations: Paradigm shift and deal diplomacy

Anton Penkovsky

Summary

The year 2025 marked a significant transformation in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Belarus, set against the backdrop of Donald Trump’s second term and his focus on pragmatic realism and “deal diplomacy.” The White House revised traditional U.S. policy tools, cutting international aid and dismantling the infrastructure that supported democratic forces abroad.

The U. S. engaged in dialogue with the Lukashenko regime, exploring the possibility of pragmatic cooperation through mutual concessions. Throughout the year, a series of contacts led to the release of prisoners and steps toward normalizing relations, including discussions about restoring diplomatic presence and easing sanctions. Minsk leveraged this process to showcase a breakthrough in diplomatic isolation and sought to strengthen its relationship with the U. S. without compromising its strategic alliance with Russia. Meanwhile, the Trump administration mainly perceived these interactions with Lukashenko through the perspective of regional security.

Trends

Strategy shift and practical outcomes of deal diplomacy

The start of 2025 marked a crucial period of electoral cycles in both countries. In the U. S., Donald Trump and the Republican Party won the presidential election (with the latter securing a majority in the U. S. House of Representatives): all was set for the inauguration on January 20. In Belarus, amid repression, the Lukashenko regime was preparing for another presidential election scheduled for January 26.

The inauguration of the 47th U. S. president signaled significant shifts in the U. S. foreign policy, which pivoted toward pragmatic realism and deal diplomacy. This shift also impacted its policies on Belarus.

With his early executive orders, Trump started to dismantle the U. S. international aid system for developing countries, a key instrument of democratization for more than thirty years. This aid had been crucial for Belarusian opposition groups in exile, with U. S. funding covering approximately half of their operational needs. This marked the beginning of very challenging times for Belarusian émigré communities, many of which faced a struggle for survival.

A second, more symbolic, signal was the change in public rhetoric regarding Minsk. After the White House’s official website was transferred to the new administration, the pre-approved statement condemning Belarus’s undemocratic elections was removed.1 Although seemingly a minor technical incident, it proved prophetic of the broader policies of the 47th U.S. president’s administration toward Belarus.

On February 12, Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Eastern Europe, Policy and Regional Affairs Christopher W. Smith visited Minsk, meeting with Lukashenko and his officials. That was the first high-level visit to Belarus in five years, indicating a new phase of the U. S. adopting a more proactive stance toward Lukashenko. Following the talks, the Belarusian authorities released three individuals from detention, including U. S. citizen and ‘Radio Liberty’ journalist Andrei Kuznechyk, a move that was positively acknowledged by the U. S.2

Christopher W. Smith suggested that a “big deal” with the Belarusian authorities might be possible, alongside the exchange of political prisoners for the easing of sanctions on state enterprises. The U. S. showed a willingness to pave the way for an agreement through public gestures and other confidence-building measures, while also testing Minsk’s responses to increased engagement. The regime appeared interested in initiating dialogue with the West and gaining leverage to ease pressure, all without jeopardizing its vital support from Russia.

On February 27, Lukashenko gave an interview to U. S. blogger Mario Naufal, who belongs to a network of mid-ranking pro-Trump opinion leaders. In the interview, Lukashenko expressed his overt liking for the new U. S. administration and voiced hope for dialogue, claiming to possess unique expertise in the Eastern European region. His responses stood in stark contrast to his public rhetoric over the past five years and appeared aimed at garnering attention. The interview also conveyed a clear message: that Lukashenko, like Trump, views himself as a victim of unjust persecution by the Democratic Party and the “liberal elites” in the U. S.

On April 30, Belarusian and U. S. citizen Yuri Zenkovich was released from custody. He had been detained in 2021 for an alleged attempt to overthrow the government — an operation the Lukashenko propaganda claimed had been orchestrated by U. S. intelligence agencies. Zenkovich had been the last U. S. citizen imprisoned in Belarus for political reasons.

The practice of behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Belarusian authorities to secure the release of U.S. citizens was also typical of the first Trump administration in 2020. However, in 2025, this approach should be viewed within the broader context of the new U. S. administration’s efforts to free its citizens worldwide, including in Russia, the Middle East, and Asia.

On May 5, Representatives Smith, Keating, and Wilson submitted an updated version of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act to the U.S. Congress, condemning the rigged 2025 presidential elections and the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children.3 Nevertheless, by the end of the year, that version had not passed a legislative vote and was not enacted into law. Consequently, the 2020 version of the Act remained in force.

On June 21, U. S. Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg visited Belarus, meeting with Lukashenko along with accompanying diplomats. While the details of the negotiations were not publicly disclosed, the Lukashenko administration sought to present the visit as a strategic victory and a breakthrough in diplomatic isolation. The following day, Belarus released 14 political prisoners, including Siarhei Tsikhanouski and Nobel Peace Prize winner Ales Bialiatski.

Therefore, it would be fair to assume that in the first half of 2025, the U. S. tested the hypothesis of leveraging Lukashenko to address security issues in Eastern Europe, as well as Minsk’s capacity for broad dialogue. As subsequent developments demonstrated, the U. S. was satisfied with the outcomes. Both official and independent American sources interpreted this as the beginning of a public phase of dialogue, during which U. S. diplomats employ sanctions and releases of individuals as tools of pressure and negotiation simultaneously.

Meanwhile, the Belarusian authorities signaled their readiness to cooperate through symbolic gestures, while maintaining strict control within the country and avoiding the most sensitive sphere — the relationship with Russia. At the same time, Belarusian democratic forces were bolstered by the 2020 opinion leaders who had been released from prisons.

On August 15, en route to his meeting with Putin in Alaska, Donald Trump made a phone call to Lukashenko. This marked the first known direct contact after many years of no communication between the U.S. leadership and the Lukashenko regime. On the Truth Social, Trump publicly stated that he expected the release of 1,300 Belarusian prisoners, without clarifying the conditions for reaching such an agreement.

In an interview with TIME magazine, Lukashenko described himself as a possible mediator in international negotiations and expressed his willingness to utilize the new U.S. policy to break free from international isolation.

Diminishing support for democratic forces

While relations between the Trump administration and the Lukashenko regime showed some signs of development, when it comes to democratic forces, the policies of the 47th U. S. president dealt a severe blow to sources of support that had seemed inviolable for decades. Following the announcement of an embargo on international assistance in the first half of the year and the closure of the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other organizations supporting pro-democratic movements outside the U. S., Belarusian exile groups were even left without the support previously approved by the prior administration.

According to official sources in the U. S. government, in 2025, financing of the Belarusian segment decreased by more than 30 times from the previous year and barely reached USD 1 million.4 Even this amount was largely allocated before Trump’s inauguration or spent on administrative expenses of the agency, which was soon disbanded.

The efforts of Belarusian democratic forces to engage with the U. S. centered on keeping the Belarusian issue prominent in U. S. foreign policy and maintaining their role as Washington’s primary partner on Belarus. They adjusted their demands in response to shifts in U. S. policy, even considering the possibility of negotiations with Lukashenko through a roundtable format facilitated by the U. S. government.5 However, some exile representatives expressed concerns about the new U. S. approach toward Belarus, clearly recognizing that the previous consensus of applying pressure and isolating the Lukashenko regime was no longer practically applicable.

Beginning of détente and mutual concessions

September saw a turning point, featuring several key events: the release of dozens of political prisoners, easing of sanctions, statements about restoring diplomatic missions, and military-diplomatic contacts.

On September 11, a U. S. delegation, this time led by Kellogg’s deputy, John Cole, visited Minsk again for talks with Lukashenko. The discussions covered prospects for normalizing relations, Russia’s war in Ukraine, economic cooperation, and the issue of political prisoners. Lukashenko expressed gratitude to Trump for his efforts to resolve international conflicts and indicated openness to discussing prisoner releases as part of a potential “big deal.”

In turn, Cole delivered a letter and a souvenir from Trump to Lukashenko, announced that the U. S. had decided to suspend sanctions against the national airline ‘Belavia’, allowing authorized maintenance, repair, and procurement of spare parts for its fleet, and called this a first step toward normalizing relations. Cole also briefly mentioned, without providing details, plans to reopen the U. S. embassy in Minsk.

The visit concluded with the release of political prisoners. The group of 52 included media figures, key opposition members, and 14 foreign nationals. Following their release, both the detainees and diplomats left the country for Lithuania, where since 2021, the U. S. State Department’s Belarus Affairs Unit has been operational at the U. S. Embassy in Vilnius.

On September 15, a report was published regarding the participation of a U. S. military attaché as an observer in the ‘Zapad 2025’ military exercise held in Belarus. Previously, inviting U. S. military personnel to take part in such events seemed impossible, as the Belarusian regime portrayed the U. S. as an unfriendly country that directly threatened national security. In fact, the regime had previously cited threats by the U. S. when trying to account for some of its arrangements to tighten internal controls. However, by mid-2025, the Lukashenko regime had become so emboldened in its desire to improve relations with the U. S. that it was willing to demonstrate transparency even in such sensitive issues as military cooperation with Russia and the training of its own armed forces.

At the end of September, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya paid her last year’s only visit to the U. S. to participate in the UN General Assembly, where she met with U. S. politicians and diplomats.

On September 30, during his speech at the Warsaw Security Forum, Kellogg stated that Washington’s discussions with Lukashenko mainly centered on regional security concerns and on establishing a communication channel with the Russian leadership to seek resolutions to end the war with Ukraine. He also mentioned that the release of political prisoners was a secondary outcome of this process. Kellogg further implied that the Trump administration was aware of the potential for new arrests but regarded even isolated releases as a significant accomplishment.

On October 14, Lukashenko told a meeting with representatives of the state apparatus that he was ready to strike a “big deal” with the U. S. as long as Belarus’s interests were taken into account.6 He clarified that the U. S. had not yet completed the process of easing sanctions against Belavia, emphasized the need for the full removal of sanctions on the airline, and noted the sluggishness of the U. S. in meeting the agreed conditions.

Soon after, on November 4, the U. S. Department of the Treasury indeed issued the relevant license7, allowing the airline to conduct transactions and purchases, including for Lukashenko’s private aircraft. On November 9, Trump announced on Truth Social the appointment of Cole as his special envoy to Belarus, a position that had been vacant since mid-2022.

On November 22, the Belarusian authorities released 31 Ukrainian citizens and handed them over to Kyiv. According to Lukashenko’s press service, this step was made in pursuance of the agreements between Minsk and Washington. At the end of November, reports8 began to circulate that Washington was negotiating with Lukashenko a new release of a large number of prisoners.

On December 13, another U. S. delegation visited Minsk, after which the Lukashenko regime released 123 prisoners and transferred them to Ukraine. The U. S. announced its decision to suspend sanctions against Belarusian Potash Company.9 The exchange of concessions was unprecedented, as key figures of Belarusian civil society, such as Viktar Babaryka, Maria Kalesnikava, and Pavel Seviarynets, were released, while the regime benefited from a relaxation of the U. S. sanctions targeting one of the country’s key export sectors.

Trade relations

In 2025, the trade turnover between the two countries remained very low. According to U. S. Census Bureau, two-way commodity trade came to USD 39 million.10 Compared to 2024, the overall trade turnover expanded (by approximately 20 %) due to an increase in deliveries from the U. S., while Belarusian supplies declined.

The trade structure was dominated by niche and small-volume categories of commodities. Belarus exported certain food products, linen items, textiles, and small industrial products. Imports from the U. S. included pharmaceuticals, medical and laboratory equipment, and chemical products. Strategic Belarusian exports, such as potash fertilizers or petrochemical products, were virtually absent due to sanctions restrictions.

As a result, the U. S. accounted for a small share of Belarus’s foreign trade, and economic ties between the two countries were minimal. These figures reflect only trade in goods and do not include services, which are recorded separately and are not detailed in current U. S. sources.

Official Belarusian statistics on non-CIS countries for 2025 show an increase in total imports, but no specific data on the U. S. are presented in open publications.

Conclusion

Throughout 2025, a framework of limited de-escalation was developing, centered on exchanges of political and economic concessions. At the same time, Belarusian democratic forces were considerably weakened due to decreased U. S. financial support and gradually lost their previous role as the primary partner in U. S. – Belarus relations.

In 2026, the most likely scenario is the continuation of cautious dialogue and non-recurring deals between Washington and Minsk, including further exchanges of political prisoners for limited economic concessions in conditions of Belarus’s persistent strategic dependence on Russia and absence of deep institutional changes in bilateral relations.