Belarus – Russia: Fifty aspects of dependence

Yuri Drakakhrust

Summary

In 2025, Belarus’s dependence on Russia continued to intensify, including in the military-strategic sphere, where a prominent symbol of this was the deployment of Russian ‘Oreshnik’ intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missiles in Belarus at the end of the year. Another significant development was the ratification of the Agreement on Security Guarantees within the Union State, marking the first time Russia extended its nuclear security commitments to an ally beyond its own territory not only in the event of a nuclear attack against it.

In terms of institutional economic cooperation, notable advances included the creation of a unified electricity market and the establishment of a supranational tax committee.

Sociological surveys recorded a growing prevalence of pro-Russian sentiments among the Belarusian population.

Trends

Lukashenko’s election

In 2025, Belarus conducted its presidential election. For the first time in bilateral relations, Russia openly and decisively expressed its preferences early in the process. On October 23, 2024, Lukashenko announced his intention to run for re-election. Just two days later, Dmitry Peskov, Russian presidential spokesperson, stated: “I am confident that everyone in Russia will support Alexander Grigoryevich’s candidacy.” Russian President Vladimir Putin was among the first world leaders to extend congratulations to Lukashenko on his electoral victory.

Nuclear “umbrella” and potential military bases

Russia’s previous nuclear doctrine allowed for the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack on Russia and its allies, as well as a “conventional” attack that “threatens the very existence of the state.” The revised doctrine, adopted in 2024, expanded these guarantees to include Belarus in case of conventional attacks. This new framework was incorporated into the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the Union State, signed in 2024 and ratified in 2025.1

Under Article 5 of the treaty, “in the territory of the Republic of Belarus, military and other facilities of the Russian Federation may be established, and Russian military formations may be deployed.” This creates a legal framework for expanding Russia’s military presence in Belarus. Currently, only two Russian military facilities are operational in Belarus: the Volga Radar Station near Gantsevichi and the 43rd Vileyka Communications Center of the Russian Navy, both active since the 1990s.

As part of the agreement, Russia deployed an ‘Oreshnik’ missile system in Belarus. Official Minsk cited regional security concerns amid rising tensions as the rationale for this move. The missile complex became operational in Belarus in December 2025.2 Although the exact locations of the launchers were not disclosed, it was stated that they were situated in positions deemed “most advantageous” from a tactical perspective.

In 2023, Putin announced that Russia would deploy tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Belarus. In 2024, Lukashenko claimed that Russian TNWs were already stationed in the country. However, there has been no independent confirmation or verification from independent researchers, Western governments or intelligence agencies.

Belarus hosts Russian Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems and Sukhoi Su-30 fighter aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In March 2025, satellite imagery revealed expanded infrastructure at the Osipovichi base, including new fencing, loading platforms, and air defense systems — suggesting preparations for storing and potentially deploying TNWs.3

Overall, Moscow appears to be using the threat of deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus as a form of pressure, while stopping short of actual deployment or maintaining ambiguity. The possibility of establishing military facilities in Belarus is also employed as leverage. This tactic may be motivated by either Lukashenko’s reluctance or Moscow’s belief that the mere threat of placing TNWs is more beneficial than actual deployment.

Zapad 2025 exercise

Belarus hosted the Zapad 2025 Russian–Belarusian joint strategic military exercise between September 12 and 16. The event raised concerns in the NATO countries neighboring Belarus, as well as in Ukraine, amid fears they could escalate into an attack from the territory of Belarus on Ukraine or NATO members, similar to the 2022 Union Resolve Exercise.

In May, three months prior to Zapad 2025, the Belarusian authorities announced a revision of the original scenario, indicating that the exercise would now be conducted deeper within Belarus.4 They also reported a reduction in the number of troops involved, with approximately 6,000 Belarusian and 1,000 Russian soldiers participating.

On September 10, the day before the exercise began, nineteen Russian drones crossed into Polish territory, with some originating from Belarus. In response, Warsaw closed its border with Belarus, including rail links. The border was reopened on September 25, nine days after the conclusion of the drills.

Reports indicated that the exercise involved practicing the deployment of nuclear weapons and the use of ‘Oreshnik’ intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missiles. However, contrary to concerns, the maneuvers did not escalate into an invasion of neighboring countries, as had occurred in February 2022. It remains unclear whether Minsk deliberately shifted to a less aggressive scenario in coordination with Moscow or if this decision was made solely by the Russian leadership.

Cooperation in the military-industrial complex

According to the Prism UA think tank, 99 Belarusian defense companies supply around 1,900 components to 255 Russian military manufacturers.5 Belpol, the union of former Belarusian security services personnel, estimates that at least 287 Belarusian companies contribute to Russian military production. In 2025, Belpol released a list of 120 Belarusian enterprises engaged in supporting the Russian military-industrial complex.6

Oleh Luhovskyi,7 the first deputy head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, stated that over 80% of Belarusian companies were involved in fulfilling Russia’s State Defense Order and the Russian State Armament Program for 2025–2034.8

Supranational tax committee: administrative integration

Researcher Rosa Turarbekova reports that “the implementation of the agreement to establish an integrated system for managing indirect taxes is advancing fully. Notably, the Supranational Tax Committee has been created and is operational. Its members were appointed, and its inaugural report was published on May 28, 2025. An examination of the report revealed that most exemptions pertain to Lukashenko’s decrees concerning specific legal entities that are either exempt from VAT or benefit from reduced tax rates.”9

Researcher Hanna Liubakova observes that “the unified tax system encompasses a common policy, a supranational committee, and a digital platform developed by Russia that grants access to centralized taxpayer data. While Lukashenko insists that Belarus retains control over its decisions, Moscow now has unprecedented access to Belarus’s economic infrastructure.”10

According to Liubakova, “the same dynamics is evident in the customs sector. The joint customs group proposed by Lukashenko, which bills itself solely as an advisory body, potentially paves the way to additional dependency — the more Russia shapes Belarus’s regulatory, legal, and administrative framework, the less independent Minsk becomes.”

Turarbekova highlights the growing infrastructural reliance of Belarus on Russia: “In 2023, shipments of Belarusian goods to Russian seaports surged by 130%, and in the first half of 2024, they further increased by 22.5 %. This mainly involves transshipments of petroleum products and potash fertilizers. The figures for petroleum products are as follows: 2023 — 6.3 million tons; 2024 — 4.3 million tons; 2025 — 16 million tons (this covers all commodities, most of which are petroleum products).”

However, experts also highlight Russia’s growing dependence on Belarus in certain sectors. Ukraine’s successful attacks on Russian oil refineries disrupted domestic fuel supplies in central Russia and temporarily increased demand for Belarusian petroleum products. This has resulted in a form of “reverse dependency,” where Russia relies on Belarusian refineries — operating at full capacity — to meet its petroleum needs, as Belarusian facilities are unable to fully satisfy Russia’s demand for petroleum products.

Common electricity market

In December 2024, Belarus and Russia signed a treaty to establish a unified electricity market, which became operational in December 2025. Originally, the plan was for a single market to be functional by 2024, encompassing not only electricity but also natural gas, crude oil, and petroleum products.

Belarus was expected to be the primary beneficiary of this integrated market for gas, oil, and petroleum products, aiming for potential price reductions or at least assurances that rates would remain low. However, Russia did not proceed with the development of these integrated markets as initially planned.

Russia’s share in Belarus’s foreign trade turnover expands

Russia’s share in Belarus’s commodity trade continued to grow. In 2021, bilateral trade in goods between Belarus and Russia made up 49 % of Belarus’s total foreign trade turnover; in 2024, the figure rose to 57 %, and in 2025, it further expanded by an additional percentage point.11

Preliminary data indicates that two-way trade in volume terms increased to approximately USD 51.9 billion in 2025. Belarus remains heavily reliant on Russia for logistics related to its trade with other countries. Some estimates indicate that, due to transit through Russian ports and railways, Moscow may control over 90 % of Belarus’s foreign trade.

Unified mobile communication space

The Union State of Belarus and Russia launched “easy” mobile communication tariffs on March 1, 2025, effectively abolishing roaming charges. Subscribers now enjoy 150 free incoming minutes per month, 150 outgoing minutes within packages, and affordable internet access — up to 5 GB at discounted rates. In 2025, over 13 million citizens of Belarus and Russia were reported to benefit from these reduced tariffs.

Education as a tool for expansion

The process of Russification in Belarus continues amid unprecedented efforts by Russian “soft power” institutions. The Rossotrudnichestvo Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation established five representative offices in Belarus. Since 2019, the number of scholarships for Belarusians studying at Russian universities has increased 18 times, reaching 1,300 annually. Furthermore, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund and the Russkiy Mir Foundation are actively engaged in these initiatives.

Experts estimate that over the past two decades, the percentage of university students studying in Belarusian has decreased from 0.9 % to just 0.09 %, while the share of secondary school students has fallen from 23.0 % to 10.7 %. They argue that the Belarusian-speaking population has become a marginalized minority. Following 2020, the Belarusian authorities also closed all educational institutions serving Polish and Lithuanian minorities, including schools and language courses.

Hanna Liubakova reports that the jointly produced Belarusian-Russian history textbook portrays Belarus as a subordinate branch of Russian civilization.12 In sync with other experts13, she emphasizes that Belarusians are actively encouraged to pursue education at Russian universities, with a record-breaking quota of 30,000 places available through Rossotrudnichestvo. A joint history commission, led by Russian presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky and Belarus’s lower house speaker Igor Sergeyenko, oversees these efforts.

Media policy

In 2025, efforts to establish a media holding for the Union State continued. Belarusian Minister of Information Marat Markov stated that the media holding had largely been formed: its articles of association and supervisory board were approved, and Russian journalist Ekaterina Abramova was appointed as its director.

However, by 2026, the media holding had not yet begun operations. In February 2026, Russian presidential spokesperson Peskov announced that the union’s media company would start functioning within a few months.14

Cultural policy

As noted by experts, specifically Alexander Klaskovsky15, Russia and Belarus emphasize a shared unique historical path, an intimate development model, and a distinct set of values — often referred to as “spiritual bonds.” These are contrasted with what is characterized as the “decayed” Western democracy and moral decline, with both nations praising the strength of a firm leadership. A recurring theme is the reverence for the Great Patriotic War, with authorities in both countries positioning themselves as “heirs of the Great Victory.” Anti-Western sentiment is a prominent element in both narratives, with Minsk additionally highlighting anti-Polish rhetoric.

In 2025, numerous joint cultural events took place across Belarus and Russia, including commemorations of the 80th anniversary of the victory in World War II. Notably, in April, the Great Heritage — Common Future forum was held in Volgograd, and in December, Moscow hosted the ART-PANORAMA Russia – Belarus International Festival-Competition, supported by the Belarusian parliament, along with the Slavianski Bazaar Festival and the Istoki festival of Russian culture.

Increase in pro-Russian sentiments

A November 2025 survey of the urban population in Belarus, carried out by the Belarus Initiative at Chatham House (UK), recorded a historically high level of support for the union with Russia.16 Forty-four percent of respondents expressed support for the union — marking the highest level since September 2020, when the Belarus Initiative first began its research in the country.

Additionally, a September 2025 survey conducted by the iSANS international network17 confirmed an uptick in pro-Russian geopolitical attitudes. Sociologist and professor Andrei Vardomatsky attributes this rise in pro-Russian sentiments to two main factors: the widespread dissemination of Russian propaganda within Belarus, and the impact of sanctions and mobility restrictions imposed on Belarusians by the European Union.18

Conclusion

When evaluating Belarus’s level of alignment with Russia through what did not happen in 2025, it is notable that the Belarusian military was not involved in any conflicts, and Russia did not launch attacks on Ukraine from Belarusian territory. There is no evidence to suggest that Russia had direct control over Belarus’s civilian administration or its Armed Forces.

Nevertheless, our analysis indicates that in 2025, Belarus’s reliance on Russia intensified across multiple domains — ranging from military and political spheres to education and culture. This increasing dependence was also reflected in shifts within public opinion in Belarus, which showed a growing preference for closer integration with Russia.

Simultaneously, several events indicate that the Belarusian authorities at least sought to project an image of some independence from Moscow. These include the shift of the 2025 military exercise to a less threatening scenario for the West, as well as a warning issued to Poland on September 10, 2025, regarding a large-scale deployment of Russian drones directed toward the Polish territory. However, these actions, along with other gestures of supposed autonomy, could have served as a “smokescreen” deliberately coordinated with or even orchestrated by Russia.