Belarus in European Union Policy: Sanctions, security, and the limits of pragmatism

Alexander Friedman

Summary

The EU’s approach to authoritarian regimes is typically guided by two primary considerations: normative principles and pragmatic interests. On one side, Brussels emphasizes its commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; on the other, it considers geopolitical realities such as energy security, regional stability, and strategic competition with other global centers of power. As a result, the EU’s stance can sometimes appear selective.

Accusations of “double standards,” including from Minsk, are partly justified: the level of pressure exerted on a regime depends not only on its internal policies but also on how strategically important that country is to Europe and whether the EU is actually capable of impacting its policies. For instance, pragmatism often guides the EU’s actions regarding Azerbaijan, while in the case of Belarus, the normative approach continues to dominate, enhanced by Europe’s limited ability to influence the country that remains politically and economically dependent on Russia.

Trends

Crime after punishment: an agent with limited agency

The August 2020 presidential election and the subsequent mass protests, which were harshly suppressed by the Belarusian authorities, sparked a deep crisis in Minsk’s relations with the European Union and shattered the hopes for rapprochement and cooperation that had emerged in the latter half of the 2010s. Widespread internal repression, the forced landing of a Ryanair passenger flight from Athens to Vilnius in Minsk, and later the migration crisis at the EU borders, orchestrated by the Lukashenko regime in late 2021, further severely worsened the situation.

Lukashenko’s short-sighted and likely Moscow-coordinated attempt to coerce the EU into engaging in dialogue and lifting sanctions through blackmail and provocation failed: in 2021, the EU’s sanctions regime against Belarus was substantially tightened. In 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — where official Minsk backed its ally — political and economic pressure from the EU reached an entirely new level. Although Belarus is not directly involved in the Kremlin’s “special military operation,” it continues to provide Russia with political, economic, and military support, including helping to circumvent Western sanctions and expanding military-technical cooperation.1

The Zapad joint Russia–Belarus military exercises, invitation extended to Wagner Group PMC fighters following the June 2023 mutiny, deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and ‘Oreshnik’ intermediate-range ballistic missile in Belarus, incidents at the border with the European Union — including the use of weather balloons for cigarette smuggling — and the aggressive rhetoric of Belarusian leadership have all reinforced the view of Belarus as an instrument of Russian policy against Europe — completely dependent on Moscow or, at best, highly constrained in its autonomy.

Scenarios of potential future Russian aggression against NATO member states prevalent among European experts regularly name Belarus a possible springboard for invasion.2 Consequently, the European Union harbors serious doubts about the sovereignty of the Lukashenko regime in making security decisions deemed crucial for the region.

Why can’t the Azerbaijani “pattern” be used?

Against the backdrop of the U.S.-Israeli military operation against Iran, on March 11, 2026, European Council President António Costa paid an official visit to Baku. During talks with President Ilham Aliyev, prospects for expanding economic and political cooperation between the European Union and Azerbaijan were explored. Costa described Azerbaijan as a “key partner” of the EU and invited the Azerbaijani leader to visit Brussels.

The heightened focus on Azerbaijan is driven by several factors: its increasing importance as an energy supplier to Europe, complicated relations with Moscow, its strategic position on the Iran border, and close ties with the U. S. and Israel.3 The conspicuously friendly tone of the contacts has elicited mixed reactions among Azerbaijani dissidents and European human rights advocates. Human rights concerns and authoritarian tendencies, which had previously been regularly highlighted by Brussels, were not on the table and did not impede the rapprochement between the two sides.4

The Azerbaijani example is relevant in the context of Belarus. At first glance, there appears to be no connection, but closer analysis reveals that Minsk is aiming to follow a similar model: normalize its relations with the European Union and leverage economic and political benefits without implementing domestic reforms that could weaken the authoritarian regime. Unlike Ilham Aliyev, his long-standing partner Alexander Lukashenko has been unable to achieve this. The reason lies not only (and perhaps not even primarily) in the repressive nature of the Minsk regime but also in its close ties with Moscow and the consistent perception of Belarus as entirely dependent on the Kremlin across several key dimensions.

This perception, combined with an unfavorable political environment — most notably the war in Ukraine — significantly restricts the prospects for normalizing the relationship between Minsk and Brussels. Although Belarus borders the European Union, it holds a secondary position in Brussels’ foreign policy priorities. The fact that the approach of sanctions pressure has not led to substantive changes in Belarusian policies, combined with the noticeable increase in Russia’s influence over the country in recent years, has sparked discussions about possible adjustments to the European strategy toward Minsk.5

Trump’s “template” as a new approach

The debate over revising the European strategy was also prompted by a shift in U.S. policy following Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025. Viewing Lukashenko as a potentially “useful” factor in resolving the war in Ukraine and aiming to weaken Belarus’s ties with China — not Russia — Washington embarked on normalization of its relations with the official Minsk regime. This approach led to the release of over 500 political prisoners, who were subsequently forcibly deported from Belarus.

Democratic circles are divided on the U.S. policy. Former political prisoners Maria Kalesnikava and Viktar Babaryka, released through contacts between Washington and Minsk, recommended that the European Union adopt a similar approach, believing that such steps could improve conditions in Belarus, help reduce Russian influence, and increase the chances of preserving Belarusian sovereignty.6 In contrast, Belarusian democratic leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya remains skeptical about engaging with the Lukashenko regime and advocates for maintaining, or even heightening, pressure — viewing sanctions and international isolation as the most effective means of countering the official Minsk regime.7

Although the Belarusian authorities will hardly embrace the proposals made by experts, including suggestions from Kalesnikava and Babaryka aimed at softening the repressive policies and partially revising Belarus’s foreign policy, as well as the idea for dialogue between democratic forces and regime representatives, the very fact that a discussion is ongoing about revising the EU’s current course offers Minsk a certain (though very limited) optimism about the future.

Point of stalemate: stubbornness that yields no reward

The Lukashenko regime continues to pursue a contradictory policy toward the European Union. Radical anti-European narratives remain prevalent in state propaganda, alongside sharp, often insulting statements by Lukashenko and some influential officials. However, these statements are frequently paired with calls for an “equitable dialogue,” which the Belarusian authorities claim could help address longstanding issues in bilateral relations.8

At the same time, Minsk openly states that its primary diplomatic goal is the lifting or significant easing of sanctions imposed by the EU after 2020. Contacts with the EU are maintained both publicly — such as with Hungary and Slovakia — and less visibly, mainly behind the scenes, including with Poland, Lithuania, and France. Nonetheless, it is premature to speak of any serious breakthroughs or fundamental shifts in the EU’s policy. A lack of trust in Alexander Lukashenko, his reluctance to change course, negative experiences of previous normalization efforts, the perception of his regime as a “Russian puppet,” and the ongoing war in Ukraine all severely restrict the space for meaningful dialogue.

In its efforts to improve relations with Europe, the Belarusian authorities rely on the United States and its influence on European partners. While the EU monitors Washington’s actions, it avoids making public assessments. For instance, in May and July 2025, members of the German Bundestag Stefan Keuter, Steffen Kotré, and Jan Wenzel Schmidt (all for the Alternative for Germany) submitted so-called “small inquiries” to the federal government, asking about Berlin’s stance on potentially applying the U. S. experience in Belarus. The German federal government reaffirmed that the liberation of all political prisoners in Belarus remains its priority but declined to comment on U.S. actions. Statements by Chancellor Friedrich Merz also suggest that Germany and the EU currently have no plans to follow Washington’s lead.9

The different approaches are due not only to Donald Trump’s “specific” political style and the fact that the U.S. has largely ceased promoting democratic values but also geographical and strategic considerations. For the U. S., Belarus is part of the Russian-Chinese “axis of autocracies.” In this context, contacts with Minsk are seen as a way to gather information on Moscow’s positions or as a communication channel with the Kremlin. For the EU, the situation is different: Belarus is a neighbor whose actions directly affect the security of member states, especially Poland and the Baltic countries.

The European Union is interested in maintaining good neighborly relations with Belarus but is uncertain that concessions from Lukashenko will help achieve this. Furthermore, key security issues are effectively beyond the scope of the Belarusian authorities, as final decisions regarding the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons or new missile systems are made in Moscow, not Minsk.

Brussels consistently stresses that sanctions can only be lifted once the fundamental reasons for their implementation are addressed, such as ending repression, stopping the use of migration as a pressure tactic, and halting support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. None of these conditions are currently met. This further diminishes the prospects for dialogue with Minsk and allows the EU, unlike in the case of Azerbaijan, to emphasize democratic values.

Conclusion

The constraints on the EU’s policy toward Belarus are driven not only by regulatory considerations but primarily by security concerns. Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine and the deepening integration between Moscow and Minsk, Belarus is viewed through the prism of Russian strategic interests. With this situation continuing, prospects for improving relations with the EU remain highly vague. Only drastic changes in the regional security framework — most notably the end of the war — could pave the way for a fundamental reassessment of the EU’s approach.

The Azerbaijani model for warming relations remains unrealistic for the Lukashenko regime. The EU adopts a pragmatic stance on Azerbaijan, expanding cooperation despite human rights concerns, while toward Belarus, a hardline approach persists due to its dependence on Russia and its role in the conflict against Ukraine. Minsk seeks to emulate the “Azerbaijani model” of normalization without implementing internal reforms, but this is hindered by sanctions, a crisis of trust, and perception of Belarus as the Kremlin’s puppet.

Even amid some easing of tensions between the U.S. and the Belarusian authorities, the EU is not ready to alter its position, tying any potential rapprochement to the end of repression and a change in Belarus’s political course. Under these conditions, a meaningful improvement in the relationship between Belarus and the EU remains unlikely.