Local Authorities: Renewal of the deal with Lukashenko

Dzmitry Kukhlei

Summary

At the start of 2025, local authorities demonstrated their unwavering loyalty to Alexander Lukashenko, as evidenced by the smooth conduct of the presidential election across all regions. In response, the state leader reaffirmed his agreement with regional elites, empowering basic-level executive committees with additional staffing, financial resources, administrative authority, and oversight capabilities.

For years, discussions have been underway within the ruling establishment regarding the redistribution of power within the governance framework. These efforts to delegate authority have finally begun to take shape, primarily through republican governing bodies rather than at the presidential level.

Following the election campaign, Lukashenko replaced approximately one-third of district and city authorities. The significant rise in personnel turnover — 34%, compared to 20–25% in previous years — signals an effort to promote greater initiative among local authorities, who are now endowed with delegated powers to support regional economic development.

Amid ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine and regional tensions, the ruling circles persist in strengthening the Grodno Region with security officials. Meanwhile, in other regions, civilian officials are regaining influence and positions, indicating a limited return to normalcy after the political crisis of 2020.

Trends

Personnel rotation in districts: a third of leaders replaced within a year

In 2025, the primary focus of personnel policy was on rotating leadership at the basic level of the vertical hierarchy, where direct administrative management of territories takes shape. Of the 67 regional appointments, 44 were made for chairpersons of local executive committees. Additionally, Lukashenko replaced two regional governors (in Grodno and Minsk), four of his aides-inspectors, and approved 17 senior officials within regional executive committees and city administrations.

The professional backgrounds of appointed officials reveal a noticeable skew, with nearly half (34) originating from the agricultural sector — such as agronomists, zootechnicians, heads of agricultural enterprises, and other former agro-industrial complex employees. Belarusian agriculture remains the most state-dependent sector, fostering a talent pool loyal to Lukashenko.

The next most prominent group comprises personnel from construction, utilities, and infrastructure sectors (11 officials). Representation from economic and industrial backgrounds is less prominent, with only nine officials, underscoring the limited role of economic expertise within the decision-making hierarchy.

In 2025, the pace of personnel rotation among district leaders was on the rise. Specifically, 44 local executive committees (or 34%)1 appointed new leaders — 42 districts and two cities. By the crisis year of 2020, Lukashenko had replaced about 20–25% of district and city heads annually. In Belarusian autocracy, such rotations serve as a substitute for electoral cycles, which are typical of democratic countries. Over a span of four to five years, leadership was changed in nearly all districts, sometimes multiple times.

This acceleration in staff turnover is driven by several factors, including the completion of the electoral cycle and Lukashenko’s seamless reappointment as president at the beginning of 2025.

Another contributing factor is the delegation of greater powers from the central authorities to local administrations — districts and cities with region status. The expanded competencies are intended to encourage local executive committees to achieve greater economic efficiency. Power delegation proponents expect increased initiative from local officials in regional development, rather than relying solely on administrative directives coming from the top. Most likely, these new powers, combined with funding under the “One District – One Project” program, will stimulate the growth of private businesses close to local officials.

It is also noteworthy that personnel rotations within regions are coordinated with Alexander Lukashenko himself. However, regional elites often initiate personnel reshuffles within their respective territories independently.

In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine and worsening relations with Western countries, Lukashenko continues to appoint individuals from the security sector to oversee the Grodno Region. Yuri Karaev, the former interior minister, was appointed head of the regional executive committee. Since 2020, Karaev had served as Lukashenko’s aide-inspector for the Grodno Region. He was succeeded by another former security official, Konstantin Burak.

When appointing Karaev as governor of Grodno Region, Lukashenko openly acknowledged that one of the reasons was the “situation on the western borders” and Karaev’s security background. Traditionally, Lukashenko has been cautious about this northwestern region due to the significant Polish minority, including in leadership roles, and concerns regarding the loyalty of the local population.

In contrast, the newly appointed presidential aides-inspectors in other regions do not possess security backgrounds. Lukashenko’s aides for Brest, Vitebsk, and Gomel Regions — Alexander Lomsky, Vladimir Yurgevich, and Ruslan Parkhamovich, respectively — come from agriculture or construction rather than security services.

Notably, in Brest Region, Valery Vakulchik, a security official who served as KGB chief from 2012 to 2020, was replaced by an agricultural specialist as the presidential aide-inspector. These personnel changes indicate that Lukashenko is gradually “turning the page” on 2020, perceiving the regional political crisis as having been resolved.

The personnel reshuffle in 2025 is distinctly different from the measures implemented during the political crisis triggered by the post-election protests of 2020. For instance, in 2021, Lukashenko sought to tighten control over the regional elite by appointing security personnel to key positions within regional executive committees nationwide.2

Most of the individuals appointed as district executive committee heads have backgrounds in agriculture. However, some come from diverse sectors, including security agencies — though such cases are relatively rare. For example, Nikolai Budnevich, head of the Shumilino executive committee, graduated from the Belarusian State Agrarian Academy and the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. His career began in agriculture, followed by work in the department combating economic crimes, and he eventually led the district’s criminal investigations department. Out of the 44 heads of local executive committees appointed in 2025, only one has a purely security background — Vladimir Antonenko, head of the Zhitkovichi District, who was transferred from the Narovlya District executive committee, which he had led since 2021.

Additionally, among those approved by Lukashenko as district executive committee heads in 2025, there are no women. The head of state has only authorized the appointment of four women to secondary leadership roles within regional and city administrations. Lukashenko has publicly expressed concerns about appointing women to high-ranking positions.3

In this way, Lukashenko has adapted the late-Soviet-style administrative and personnel system to fit his personal governance model. The main goal of regional staffing policy is to maintain manageability, predictability, and stability of the regime. Despite efforts to promote and stimulate business activity in the regions, this approach has led to economic stagnation.

Lukashenko’s alliance with the local elite: consolidating staffing at the expense of Minsk officials

In 2025, there was a noticeable increase in the control exerted by local authorities over all aspects of regional life. Following the presidential campaign, Lukashenko issued Decree No. 74 on February 21, 2025, titled “On Strengthening the Role of Chairpersons of Basic-Level Executive Committees in Regional Development.”4 The key innovations introduced by this decree include:

Through his decree, Lukashenko empowered local executive committee chairs with additional personnel authority. This includes the power to approve leaders of organizations of all ownership types, as well as state territorial organizations (excluding the KGB). This represents a significant expansion of the powers granted to local authorities by the Belarusian leader. On the one hand, this increases their influence in dealings with businesses and reduces the role of ministries and agencies in shaping the personnel policies of local enterprises and organizations. On the other hand, these measures heighten officials’ accountability to the central government in managing subordinate territories and strengthen political loyalty, including among local businesses.

Notably, small and medium-sized enterprises were among the primary drivers of the 2020 protests. After suppressing large-scale rallies, the Lukashenko regime introduced a series of restrictive measures targeting this social group. For example, in Minsk, the opportunity to register individual entrepreneurs only resumed on October 1, 2024. Between August 17, 2021, and September 30, 2024, registering this type of activity in the capital was impossible “due to technical reasons,” mainly as a response to the support for the protest movement).5

It should be highlighted that Decree No. 74 effectively establishes a mechanism of semi-coerced civic participation and social obligations for businesses in urban beautification. Specifically, cleanliness and order are regarded as Belarus’s defining features — traits that propaganda seeks to promote as a result of Lukashenko’s leadership.

In this manner, the autocrat is refining the existing political structure, where he positions himself as an intermediary between local authorities and national governing bodies — including the government, ministries, agencies, and the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. Lukashenko himself emphasizes the increased independence of district and city elites: “We’ve learned: no matter who comes from Minsk — they issue directives to district executive committee chairs. But they are not subordinate to them. Therefore, proper order must be maintained.”6 These measures relate to Lukashenko’s longstanding commitment to shifting powers between the central government and regional authorities.

In turn, Lukashenko aims to preserve the long-standing tested governance system in which district and city leaders are controlled by the “trio” of regional overseers: the chair of the regional executive committee (the top official in the region), envoys, and aides-inspectors. All are appointed by and directly report to the head of state.

Lack of initiative within the vertical: “One District — One Project” program, investments, and Decree No.74

A new mobilization initiative launched in 2023 had already begun to lose its relevance in the eyes of the Belarusian leadership by 2025. The primary objective of the project, as understood by authorities, was to boost employment in small towns and settlements. However, by 2025, unemployment had reached historically low levels. It was rather the other way round: regional labor shortages were becoming increasingly acute.

At the same time, the administration anticipated grassroots initiatives — active proposals from executive committees. Yet, the government publicly recognized that, when compiling the project list, it received few proposals from many districts and was compelled to impose projects from the top down. This reflects the longstanding cautiousness of the Belarusian elite within Lukashenko’s established power system regarding taking initiative. This tendency was further exacerbated by the prolonged authoritarian crackdown, which involved extensive purges and repression.

Despite these challenges, the government managed to assemble a package of 129 investment projects based on the “One District — One Project” principle, totaling BYN 4.3 billion. In February 2025, the first deputy prime minister announced that small and medium-sized businesses were responsible for executing more than half of these projects (116 out of 208).7

The ruling elite is compelled to support the development of the private sector given the decline and unprofitability of the state sector, despite the head of state’s cautious stance on private entrepreneurs. Simultaneously, Lukashenko seeks to reinforce the loyalty of local businesses through additional oversight by local administrations — by empowering them to approve heads of private enterprises and increasing their personal responsibility.

Despite Lukashenko’s regular efforts to mobilize local leadership, the current power system constrains initiative within the local vertical. This is evident in the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI): regions demonstrate minimal interest in attracting FDI. Minsk accounts for nearly half of the total — USD 7.085 billion. This is understandable, given that the capital remains the primary economic hub, hosting banks, IT firms, corporate headquarters, and the main financial flows.

In contrast, regions significantly underperform in FDI attraction. The breakdown of FDI by region in USD million is as follows: Brest — 592.2, Gomel — approximately 768.2, Vitebsk — 818.8, Mogilev — 1,240, Grodno — 1,523, Minsk — 3,807.8 The higher investment volume in the Minsk Region is mainly due to its proximity to the capital.

The government intends to encourage local leadership initiatives by decoupling the level of budget subsidies from the amounts of revenues of local budgets in 2026. Consequently, in drafting the republican budget for 2026, the authorities are expected to allocate regional subsidies at least at the level of 2025.

Furthermore, district and city executive committees (basic level) gained expanded financial powers under Decree No. 74. This includes the ability to allocate accumulated local budget reserves without regional approval under certain conditions.

These measures represent a positive step toward encouraging local executive bodies to find sources and opportunities for increasing local revenues. However, they are unlikely to significantly alter the motivation of the local elite, which, after years of Lukashenko’s rule, has become accustomed to strict vertical control. An increase in personnel turnover is unlikely to substantially improve economic efficiency locally.

Cross-border cooperation of regions: Russia’s dominance

Prior to 2020–2022, Belarusian regions benefited from significant investments through participation in European cross-border cooperation programs. Beyond financial gains, these initiatives promoted experience exchange and fostered contacts between European and Belarusian officials. The ruling elite, especially in western regions, gradually aligned with European standards of transparency and citizen engagement.

However, following the events of 2020 and especially February 2022, cooperation with Europe minimized. Consequently, EU projects valued at tens of millions of euros in sectors such as utilities, healthcare, and environmental protection were frozen in the regions. The closure of border crossings caused a sharp decline in tourism and contacts with Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine, along with the suspension of cultural and educational exchanges — especially impacting Belarus’s border regions.

Belarusian cities lost their ties with European partners primarily after the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, rather than as a response to internal repression. The same applies to cross-border initiatives and European assistance.

In 2025, local authorities failed to restore cross-border cooperation and contacts with European cities. Moreover, city leadership organized activities in line with the foreign policy priorities of official Minsk, thus showing no noticeable activity in the European track amidst ongoing isolation and sanctions against Lukashenko’s regime.

Belarusian cities compensated for losses in the European dimension by strengthening ties with Russian regions. In the context of wartime hysteria, Z-propaganda increasingly penetrated Belarusian provinces through expanded contacts with Russian partners.

Official Minsk emphasizes that regional integration with Russia helped resist the pressure of sanctions and facilitated import substitution. However, Belarus–Russia cooperation created other risks and negative implications for Belarus.

In place of European influence, a network of pro-Russian clubs, organizations, and media has expanded across Belarusian regions. Nearly all regional centers host Russian cultural centers known as “Russian Houses” — Brest, Gomel, Grodno, and Mogilev (where its status remains uncertain) — along with the capital city. These operate under the auspices of Rossotrudnichestvo, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation. Through its regional branches, the agency seeks to shift the loyalty and cultural identity of Belarusians toward Russia.

The cooperation frameworks between Belarusian cities and regions and their Russian partners are expanding, including:

The enhanced cooperation between Russian and Belarusian regions, coupled with the spread of Russian propaganda, is yielding tangible results. For instance, the head of the Lida District executive committee openly voiced support for Russian aggression in Ukraine and demonstrated allegiance to Russia.9 Similar patterns are emerging in other parts of the country, though unevenly. Through the use of “soft power” and cross-border cooperation, the Kremlin seeks to strengthen the ties of Belarusian regions to Russia.10

Conclusions

In 2025, personnel and institutional policies reflected an adaptation of the authoritarian regime through the controlled reinforcement of the local administrative hierarchy. Following the resolution of the political crisis, the influence of regional elites has returned to pre-crisis levels. The expansion of authority for district and city executive committees is balanced by heightened control and accountability to central authorities.

The current model of relations between the regions and the central government enables the regime to maintain short-term stability and manageability. However, this approach contributes to socio-economic stagnation in the regions, increased reliance on Russia, and a gradual decline of the state management system. These trends could prompt the Kremlin to intervene effectively in the event of a new political crisis, potentially leading to the disintegration or paralysis of Belarusian governance.