State’s Security Framework: “Hard” times call for simple and unambiguous solutions

Marlev Varashchuk

Summary

In 2025, the Lukashenko regime completed the institutionalization of repression, fully subordinating the judicial system and law enforcement agencies to the mission of persecuting its opponents. A key trend was the increased influence of the State Security Committee (KGB) within the security sector (and in the broader government structure). The KGB not only assumed the role of chief negotiator with Western countries from the Foreign Ministry but also became the main talent pool for senior leadership in the prosecutor’s office and investigative bodies.

Criminal legislation regressed to the point of legitimizing widespread repressive practices, including specialized court procedures, prosecution of citizens abroad, and systemic restrictions on the rights of those convicted under “extremist” articles.

The proactive involvement of security forces in the 2025 electoral campaign signified a major change in control tactics: instead of responding reactively to protests, security agencies shifted to preventive measures and exercised extensive oversight of the entire electoral process.

Trends

KGB and Foreign Ministry: replacing instead of collaborating

For the Belarusian authorities the year 2025 is primarily marked by vigorous negotiations with the U. S., resulting in the release of many political prisoners1 and partial lifting of the U. S. sanctions across various sectors. That said, Lukashenko repeatedly claimed he was unwilling to let political prisoners go, one reason being he believed there were none in Belarus, and asserted that such “acts of humanity” were part of negotiations with the U. S.

This ambiguous stance likely explains why KGB Head Ivan Tertel was involved in the negotiation process, wielding powers and functions beyond his usual remit. Replacing a civilian ministry with a security agency for diplomatic affairs signals its diminished role within Belarus’s government system. Notably, the Foreign Ministry’s negotiations with the U. S. are handled by the country’s Permanent Representative to the UN Valentin Rybakov, rather than the minister or their deputies.

Human rights groups report that in 2025, 342 political prisoners were pardoned, with 189 forcibly deported from Belarus.2 Nonetheless, repression continued, and over the past year, 509 individuals in Belarus were recognized as political prisoners.3 Experts conclude that the instrumentalization of political prisoners has become a routine practice.

The KGB not only compiled lists of individuals to be released for Alexander Lukashenko. Ivan Tertel personally took part in all stages of negotiations, overseeing the entire process — from arranging releases (prisoner transfers to the KGB detention center before negotiations) to deporting former political prisoners outside Belarus. These procedures were often overly harsh: prisoners were frequently transported in handcuffs and hoods, and were kept unaware of the purpose of their transfers.

By including the KGB chief in the negotiations, Lukashenko sought to somewhat “calm” the entire security apparatus, which has been engaged in systematic repression and persecution of dissenters against the authoritarian regime both inside and outside Belarus since 2020.

The enhanced role of the KGB as an agency also manifested in its broad involvement in the Lukashenko regime’s staffing decisions — both within the security services and in other state structures.

“Staffing December” and the ABPA

In 2025, the personnel policy in the security sector primarily adhered to a traditional model: regional and national leaders were typically selected from officials who had risen through the ranks within the same agency or ministry, or from related departments externally. Horizontal rotations — transfers to equivalent positions in different regions — were also frequently employed. This approach has been a consistent element of Lukashenko’s leadership in the security apparatus for many years.

For the first time, the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (ABPA) was involved in staffing decisions, making appointments of the heads of the Constitutional Court4 and the Supreme Court5. Whereas making someone without judicial experience chair of the Constitutional Court was not unusual in over three decades of Lukashenko’s rule, the appointment of Andrei Shved as chair of the Supreme Court (the third one in Belarusian history) marks an uncharacteristic move in the country’s personnel policy. For the first time, a person lacking judicial experience was appointed head of the Supreme Court, a role that is not merely administrative or ceremonial but involves the direct administration of justice.

In Belarus, considering the widespread use of fabricated cases, the system of general courts cannot be viewed as an institution of justice; instead, it primarily serves the interests of the security apparatus. Political loyalty to the regime and the lack of any judicial resistance to repressive practices since May 2020 indicate a shift from a “simulation” of justice to the execution of “departmental tasks.” Andrei Shved’s career path demonstrates that the top leadership trusts him with “difficult” cases — he was responsible for investigating the Minsk metro bombing in April 2011 — and also in “challenging” times. In September 2020, Shved was appointed prosecutor general, with the regime officially adopting the “sometimes law does not matter” pattern.

Other top-level appointments within the security sector follow a certain logic: replacing vacant positions with trusted, loyal personnel affiliated with the KGB. Dmitry Gora was appointed prosecutor general; he had headed the Belarusian Investigative Committee since 2021 and served as deputy prosecutor general since 2019. Gora’s career progression began in the KGB, where he served as head of the investigative department for a decade.

The new head of the Investigative Committee — Konstantin Bychek — has a similar career trajectory; he previously led the KGB’s investigative department for nearly two years and previously worked there as an investigator. A notable aspect of Bychek’s career is his media activity: since mid-2020, he has regularly commented on politically motivated criminal cases (his first prominent appearance was connected to the Viktar Babaryka case in June 2020), participated in government media programs, and appeared in propaganda films. Such behavior is unusual for security officials, especially those from the KGB.

December 2025 introduced a new trend in the appointment of the security sector’s top officials: most are proven investigators from the KGB. Furthermore, in 2025, the complete subjugation of the judiciary to the dictator’s personal control was achieved: for the first time, the authority of the new constitutional body — the ABPA, of which he is the chairman — was actively exercised.

Era of lawlessness

Back in 2020, lawyer and attorney Maxim Znak spoke of a “legal default” in Belarus, and although the situation may have changed since then, it has only deteriorated. The authoritarian regime has codified the persistent persecution of the politically dissenting population segment, retroactively framing widespread repressive practices as lawful.

In 2025, the primary shift in repression tactics was linked to the amended Criminal Code: for the first time, a new discriminated group — individuals accused of committing “extremist” crimes6 — was introduced. Using law as a cover for repression is not a new phenomenon in Belarusian political reality: for more than thirty years, Lukashenko has been battling both his direct opponents and all citizens who disagree with his policies. “Political” articles in the Criminal Code, politically motivated criminal cases, and political prisoners existed in Belarus prior to 2020, but the scale and demonstrative brutality of repression had never been as extensive.

In March 2025, amendments to the Criminal Code came into effect, imposing systemic restrictions on the rights of individuals accused of so-called “extremist crimes.” A new term — “crimes of extremist nature” — was coined, a highly vague concept that covers not only “extremism” but potentially any violation. Some provisions that could improve the legal standing of the accused or allow for more lenient sentences for certain crimes could no longer be applied. Additional aggravating circumstances were added, increasing liability for crimes committed during wartime or martial law. New components of crimes were introduced, related to the unauthorized dissemination of information about the deployment and movement of military equipment (Article 375-3 of the Criminal Code), etc.

Furthermore, systemic cross-border persecution of Belarusians abroad continued: the Investigative Committee opened criminal cases against Belarusians participating in protests overseas, conducted searches, and seized property.7 Sentencing in absentia (via special procedures), involving lengthy prison terms and hefty fines that effectively result in the confiscation of all seized assets, persisted. Repression of relatives of political prisoners also continued.

As a result, by the end of 2025, an unprecedented legal framework had been established, allowing for the persecution of Belarusians both inside and outside the country. This effectively legalized the repressive practices carried out by security agencies.

Special operation “Election 2025” orchestrated by security officials

In January 2025, during the Belarusian presidential “election,” the electoral “special operation” conducted by the security apparatus demonstrated a transformation of their core functions. Whereas in the previous 2020 electoral campaign, security forces were involved retroactively to suppress mass protests and retain Lukashenko’s grip on power, in 2025, a different approach was taken: proactively neutralizing all potential risks before and throughout the election process.

Their focus encompassed the following:

  1. Dismantling of potential protest through preemptive detention of individuals associated with the 2020 protests and subsequent events, summoning of citizens who could potentially incite a recurrence of protests for “conversations”;
  2. Militarization of the electoral process, transformation of polling stations into special security areas with bans on photography, open voting booths, presence of not only police officers but also mixed armed groups, along with rapid response units across multiple precincts;
  3. Digital blocks and information barriers: Belarusian security services (primarily the Operations and Analysis Center and the KGB) launched a consistent campaign to limit access to information, including internet throttling, blocking VPN services, and restricting access to certain websites. Together with propaganda pundits, they spread a narrative that foreign intelligence agents were planning terrorist attacks during the election campaign. This message justified the deployment of special equipment and security forces in urban areas.

At this point, the Belarusian regime dreads even the slightest possibility of protests. In 2025, security forces went beyond merely safeguarding the authorities and suppressing protests — they actively participated in imitating electoral procedures seeking to legitimize the Belarusian regime.

Conclusion

By 2026, the security forces had completely solidified an unprecedented legal framework that formally codified the existing repressive practices of persecution both within the country and abroad. The KGB broadened its scope beyond conventional intelligence and security duties.

The security agencies positioned themselves as key players in external political bargaining over political prisoners and in internal political control by ensuring an uncontested electoral process and asserting dominance in personnel decisions.

Looking ahead, we expect further consolidation of persecution against dissenters, “technologization” of repression — from detention through to release after serving sentences, “normalization” of persecution via legal codification of repressive practices, expansion in cross-border persecutions, and the use of political prisoners in negotiations with the United States.