Parliament: Security officials, ideology, and the western front

Tatsiana Chulitskaya

Summary

In 2025, the Belarusian National Assembly (parliament) solidified its role as an auxiliary institution under a personalist regime. The newly assembled parliament, created following the 2024 “elections,” maintains a sense of continuity but is progressively made up of more members from security forces and the state’s ideological structures.

Legislative activities continue to be primarily technical and carry repressive connotations, while the parliament is gradually being leveraged as a means for ideological rallying, integration of loyalists into personnel, and garnering external political backing for the regime.

Trends

What’s new in the parliament?

Following the 2022 “constitutional reform,” the Belarusian parliament — the National Assembly — retained its fundamental powers. Simultaneously, the creation of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (ABPA) as the “supreme representative body of popular rule” has somewhat reshaped its role and the distribution of formal authority within the political system. Nevertheless, there is predictably no visible competition, at least publicly, between the parliament and the ABPA. Throughout 2025, parliamentary representatives repeatedly highlighted the significance of the ABPA as a “unique form of people’s power” and described it as “the most important institution of Belarusian statehood.”

The year 2025 marked the first full year of activity for the new composition of the National Assembly, established following the “elections” — or more accurately, the appointment campaign — held on February 25, 2024. Similar to its predecessor, it is made up entirely of loyalists, despite the formal inclusion of representatives from various structures in the lower chamber — namely, the four remaining pro-government parties registered in the country: Belaya Rus, the Communist Party of Belarus, the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus, and the Republican Party of Labor and Justice — as well as loyal public organizations, government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs), and a significant number of non-party deputies connected to the state apparatus and the budget sector.

A key feature of the 2024 parliament was the rise in representation of former intelligence and security officials, highlighting the broader trend of securitization and militarization of governance in Belarus.1 There are at least seven such deputies — six in the lower chamber and one in the upper — with most of them serving their first term. Among the most prominent are Igor Sergeyenko, a former first deputy head of the KGB and ex-head of the Presidential Administration; Ruslan Kosygin, a former military intelligence chief; and Alexander Barsukov, a former deputy interior minister.

Significantly, Sergeyenko subsequently assumed the role of speaker of the House of Representatives, while Valery Gaidukevich, representing the veteran security elite, maintained his seat in the Council of the Republic. Unlike earlier convocations, where security officials participated intermittently, their presence in the current parliament has become more institutionalized, particularly within the national security committee of the lower chamber.

Another notable characteristic is the greater representation of individuals from the state ideology and propaganda machinery in the 2024 parliament. The new composition of both chambers includes pro-government media personalities, ideologists, and propagandists such as Igor Lutski, Vadim Gigin, Alexander Shpakovsky, and Alexander Lukyanov, most of whom are serving their first term in parliament.

One exception is Igor Marzalyuk, who has served multiple terms in parliament and exemplifies an earlier approach of integrating a dedicated ideological loyalist into the system. The inclusion of propagandists and ideologists in parliament suggests that, after 2020, the realms of state journalism, ideology, and propaganda have developed into more than just instruments of authority — they have also become the parliament’s talent pool.

Legislative process: speed and repression

In 2025, Belarus’s parliament primarily maintained a procedural role in the legislative process. The executive branch largely determined the agenda and key priorities, with parliament mainly serving to formally review and approve those initiatives. Most laws were proposed by the government, ministries, or the Presidential Administration. A notable aspect of the legislative process was the swift adoption of laws, with many bills passed rapidly, often unchanged and unanimously. Debates over socio-economic policies, including the budget, seldom resulted in public disagreements, indicating a broader trend of power consolidation within the system.

Meanwhile, the parliament continued to institutionalize repressive policies. The most notable changes were made to the Criminal Code: under the guise of “humanization,” these amendments de jure broadened the possibilities for extraterritorial prosecution on “extremist” and political charges, while also establishing new grounds for liability related to criticizing the regime and spreading information about the military sector.2

Special focus was given to strengthening societal control and preserving system secrecy. Legislation was enacted to ban individuals convicted under “extremist” charges from working in the education sector or participating in activities related to children. The 2025 amnesty law did not extend to political prisoners sentenced under “extremist” or “terrorist” accusations.3

Laws were progressively designed to protect the current power hierarchy. MPs adopted measures that provided additional guarantees of inviolability for the former president and his family, while also toughening penalties for actions deemed threats to the state or attempts to discredit the political system. Concurrently, they approved initiatives aimed at increasing state control across multiple sectors:

Furthermore, the parliament engaged in more routine legislative activities, such as drafting new codes on healthcare and environmental protection, revising banking operations, cross-border payment regulations, and tax proposals aimed at strengthening economic stability under sanctions. It also tackled certain socially significant matters, including the regulation of vape sales.

Parliament as a tool for ideological mobilization

Throughout 2025, the parliament continued to serve as a venue for advancing state ideology and encouraging political mobilization. Legislators from both chambers actively participated in “dialogue forums,” gatherings with workplace groups, patriotic seminars, and numerous other events. This pattern was especially prominent surrounding the January 2025 “elections” of the head of state, where MPs repeatedly stressed the legitimacy of the electoral process and underscored the need for national unity in support of the current leadership.

As a result, the parliament gradually took on a greater role in endorsing the regime’s political and ideological agenda. Leaders from both chambers frequently made statements emphasizing the importance of safeguarding historical memory, resisting “foreign interference,” and strengthening patriotism. Igor Sergeyenko and Natalya Kochanova were especially prominent in promoting similar ideological themes related to external threats, historical awareness, and social cohesion.

Council of the Republic and Natalya Kochanova as a public figure of the Belarusian establishment

The renewal of the House of Representatives and the Council of the Republic involved limited personnel changes while maintaining a core group of loyalists. The new composition featured several symbolically important figures, including former head of the pro-government sports foundation Dmitry Baskov and Irina Abelskaya, whose name is publicly associated with the personal circle of Alexander Lukashenko and his youngest son, Nikolai. Their inclusion is directly connected to their political and personal closeness to the Lukashenko family. Abelskaya’s public role goes beyond the medical field, where she heads the elite medical commission of the Presidential Property Management Directorate and wields considerable administrative influence.

Meanwhile, the Council of the Republic maintained a strong level of personnel continuity, with at least 15 senators from the previous term remaining in the new roster. This approach exemplifies the management strategy typical of the post-2020 period: the regime favors limited elite renewal and avoids widespread rotation that might undermine internal stability.

Natalia Kochanova, who once again assumed leadership of the upper house, remains one of the most publicly visible figures within the Belarusian official circles. In 2025, she repeatedly conveyed messages to society about the permissible boundaries of political loyalty, stressing the importance of “order,” executive discipline, and patriotic education. Simultaneously, Kochanova actively promoted the agenda of “traditional values,” with many of her statements resonating with official Russian rhetoric. As before, her public speeches highlighted her personal loyalty to Lukashenko.

Throughout her activities, N. Kochanova displayed the typical Belarusian approach of top-down governance. Both state and independent media consistently depicted her as an official directly engaged in resolving social and everyday issues, as well as implementing Lukashenko’s orders. When citizens raised concerns, she publicly took questions “under control,” called for “order,” and reported the results to the president. In this manner, Kochanova acted as a sort of lightning rod for public dissatisfaction, channeling social grievances from the political arena into individual appeals to authorities.

Parliamentary diplomacy amid isolation

Parliamentary diplomacy has long been a key aspect of the National Assembly’s activities. In the context of Minsk’s continued international isolation by democratic nations, the parliament served as an additional channel for foreign policy engagement. However, this role was not autonomous; as before, MPs mainly reinforced the government’s existing foreign policy rather than actively shaped it.

Meanwhile, the resumption of contacts with the U. S. President’s Executive Office encouraged Belarusian authorities to pursue a thaw in relations, including with European nations. However, deputies mostly played a symbolic role, engaging primarily in ceremonial events. For example, they took part in the III Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security, which the government utilized as a platform to demonstrate its commitment to international openness.4

In 2025, further symbolic “breakthroughs” in the diplomatic blockade occurred, such as a delegation led by Sergeyenko participating in the inauguration of the new Pope. Belarusian parliamentarians also maintained their involvement in a select few international forums, including the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, providing Minsk with opportunities to showcase its ongoing international agency despite ongoing political isolation from Western countries.

Another significant activity for Belarusian MPs centered on advocating for a multipolar world order and enhancing relations with countries in the so-called Far Arc. Their primary emphasis was on collaboration with China, Cuba, and various nations across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Delegations from the House of Representatives and the Council of the Republic engaged in meetings with representatives of “friendly states,” addressing topics related to trade and economic cooperation, industrial partnership, and support on international platforms like the United Nations.

Nonetheless, the primary focus of MPs’ international efforts remained, as in previous years, cooperation with Russia. They actively engaged in events organized by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union State, underscoring the strategic significance of their alliance and the need to deepen integration. In 2025, the allied parliamentarians outlined plans for joint efforts in multiple areas and engaged in discussions on security issues and historical remembrance.

Members from both chambers took part in initiatives endorsed by Russia on various international platforms, such as the CIS and CSTO. They contributed to the activities of the expert council under the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS and participated in the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly. Additionally, Belarusian parliamentarians maintained ongoing regional contacts with their Russian counterparts, negotiating cooperation and joint projects. However, the National Assembly did not develop a separate international agenda; rather, it served as a tool to support the government’s diplomatic initiatives.

Conclusion

The emergence of the ABPA in Belarus’s political system has further solidified the parliament’s hierarchically subordinate role within the power structure. Overall, in 2025, both chambers continued to operate within a personalist management framework, exerting minimal influence on the political agenda. The National Assembly demonstrated no indications of political autonomy and mainly served to support executive decisions, promote ideological mobilization, and represent Belarus externally.

The inclusion of former security and law enforcement officials in the 2024 parliament highlights wider patterns of militarization and securitization in Belarus’s political environment. These ex-security personnel and military members occupy senior positions, actively participate in international contacts, and collaborate with Russia and associated international organizations and initiatives, particularly the CSTO.

The parliament remains a key component of the regime’s institutional framework. It offers a façade of formal stability, helps legitimize government decisions, and contributes to administrative and ideological mobilization efforts.

In the foreseeable future, this pattern is expected to persist. The National Assembly will continue to function as a subordinate body, primarily supporting Lukashenko’s initiatives and the executive branch, with little real impact on decision-making. It will remain a mechanism for sustaining controlled authoritarian stability and ensuring the regime’s legitimacy.