Government’s Staff Shuffle: New positions for old faces

Olga Evseeva

Summary

In 2025, Belarus experienced a formal government renewal, while the existing management framework remained intact. Following the presidential election, Alexander Lukashenko conducted a limited personnel reshuffle, appointing Alexander Turchin as the new prime minister and transferring former premier Roman Golovchenko to the role of the governor of the National Bank. Throughout the year, officials were repositioned, economic policy controls were tightened, and the distinctions between government agencies gradually blurred. At the same time, competition among influential elite groups intensified.

Together, these developments underscore a key characteristic of the Belarusian political system: the consolidation of Lukashenko’s personal authority over the state apparatus, even as formal institutions of power remain in place.

Trends

New prime minister, same old vertical

The year 2025 began with the formal conclusion of the presidential electoral cycle. On January 26, Lukashenko was declared the winner once again, securing 86.8% of the vote. The election did not trigger any significant upheavals for the regime and marked the start of a formal reshuffle within the executive branch.

However, these changes were largely symbolic. Lukashenko himself referred to the new cabinet as the “new old government.”1 Most officials retained their positions, and the key appointments primarily represented a rotation rather than a genuine renewal of the elite. Of the 42 government members, more than thirty were simply reappointed.

Official rhetoric emphasized the notion of a “succession of generations” in leadership. State media highlighted efforts to rejuvenate the government, yet the average age of ministers remained around 49, and gender parity was virtually unchanged — men still accounted for over 90% of the cabinet.2

The most notable personnel development of 2025 was the appointment of Alexander Turchin as Belarus’s new prime minister. Officially, this move was framed as part of a broader effort to renew the government following the presidential election and as a key element of the so-called “generational shift.” In reality, Turchin’s appointment underscored how Belarusian public administration balances cautious personnel rotations with the tight personal control that Lukashenko maintains over the executive branch.

Turchin exemplifies the Belarusian administrative elite, bringing a diverse range of experience within the state apparatus. He previously served in the Ministry of Finance and regional authorities. In 2015, he became an aide to the president and an inspector for the Gomel Region. A significant milestone in his career was his role in Sergey Rumas’s government. Between 2018 and 2019, Turchin led the Central Office of the Council of Ministers and served as first deputy prime minister. During this period, he gained a reputation as a relatively liberal official, open to business interests.3

His name was linked to advocating for the decriminalization of certain economic offenses, efforts to ease pressures on entrepreneurship, and a supportive attitude toward developing the IT sector. Following the government reshuffle in 2020, Turchin served as head of the Minsk City Executive Committee for over five years.

Despite his prominence, Turchin’s appointment did not lead to significant shifts in the country’s economic policy. He publicly emphasized that the government had no intentions of implementing radical reforms. The limited moves to relax price controls were met with critical comments from Lukashenko.

Shortly after Turchin’s appointment, another politically significant event occurred: a new role for the former prime minister, Roman Golovchenko. He did not exit the political scene or fall out of favor. On the contrary, Golovchenko was appointed governor of the National Bank of Belarus. This move was somewhat unexpected: Golovchenko lacked experience in banking, unlike his predecessor Pavel Kallaur. Kallaur had led the central bank for over ten years and was widely regarded as successful — an assessment shared by both independent and pro-government experts. Therefore, Golovchenko’s appointment seemed to be driven more by political considerations than by professional expertise.

Nevertheless, this type of personnel rotation is typical of Lukashenko’s approach to staffing: officially, a key figure leaves the government, but in reality, they often maintain considerable influence and high status. Lukashenko removed Golovchenko from the prime minister’s office without giving the impression of a political defeat or an intra-elite conflict. Furthermore, this appointment allowed Lukashenko to install a manager personally loyal to him, rather than an independent technocrat, at the helm of the financial regulator.

To address the lack of specialized experience in the new National Bank governor, Alexander Egorov was appointed as the first deputy governor. Egorov brings banking sector expertise, having previously led the Belarusian Development Bank and worked on economic issues within the Presidential Administration. His responsibilities include providing institutional and technical support to the new leadership of the National Bank and ensuring the stability of monetary policy management.

Nonetheless, the political message behind this appointment remains central. It is less about enhancing the independence of the central bank and more about integrating it more closely into the power structure. Lukashenko explicitly conveyed his expectation that the new leadership of the central bank would actively influence commercial banks and coordinate financial policy with the government. In this context, Egorov serves more as a technocratic counterbalance to Golovchenko’s political leadership: offering professional expertise within the institution while the National Bank itself acts as a tool for executing the regime’s economic strategy, as directed by the Presidential Administration.

Rotation without renewal

In 2025, alongside major personnel shifts such as the appointment of a new prime minister and governor of the National Bank, several other government reshuffles took place across various sectors. These affected both economic departments and social and administrative agencies. Most of these changes were modest in scale and adhered to the traditional Belarusian practice of managed personnel rotation within the political system.

The economic bloc of the government did not undergo a radical overhaul. Nikolay Snopkov remained the first deputy prime minister and continued to supervise economic policy. Finance Minister Yuri Seliverstov was reappointed to his previous role. Artur Karpovich was appointed as minister of antimonopoly regulation and trade, Dmitry Kiyko assumed leadership of the Ministry of Taxes and Duties, and Yuri Chebotar became minister of economy. These shifts primarily involved rotations and promotions of officials already within the government, rather than the introduction of new managers from outside the system.

Denis Moroz was appointed as new minister of energy, having previously served as deputy minister. His predecessor, Aleksey Kushnarenko, was reassigned as the chairperson of the Minsk Regional Executive Committee. Such movements between central and regional levels of authority continue to be a common feature of Belarusian public administration.

Meanwhile, personnel reshuffles also occurred in other parts of the government. One of the most notable decisions was the appointment of Natalya Petkevich as deputy prime minister for social affairs. Many experts interpret her return to the government as an effort to strengthen social sector management amid economic challenges. Petkevich was granted broader powers and began overseeing education, healthcare, and cultural policy.4

Vladimir Karanik, who previously served as minister of health during the COVID-19 pandemic and later led the Grodno Regional Executive Committee, was appointed deputy prime minister. However, after only ten weeks, he was reassigned as chair of the presidium of the National Academy of Sciences. This move can be viewed as a demotion, highlighting Belarus’s flexible personnel policy: officials, even those who make mistakes, rarely exit the public sector entirely; instead, they are often swiftly transferred to different roles.

Changes also impacted the government’s central office. Valery Vakulchik, a former KGB chief and aide to Lukashenko for the Brest Region, took the position of head of the secretariat of the Council of Ministers. The appointment of security officials to civilian administrative roles has become increasingly common since the events of 2020. This trend underscores another persistent feature of Belarusian politics: the growing influence of the security apparatus within the state management system.

Alongside these decisions, additional reshuffles occurred among deputy ministers and department heads. These changes were seldom accompanied by public explanations and generally represented routine administrative rotations within the government hierarchy.

Overall, the personnel reshuffles of 2025 reveal that the fundamental structure of personal relations in high places remains stable. Shifts of officials between various positions are used to create an illusion of change, maintain system controllability, and simultaneously prevent the emergence of independent influence centers within the elites.

National Bank versus Council of Ministers: a new power configuration

By autumn 2025, signs of intra-systemic competition had become increasingly evident. Notably, relations between the new Prime Minister Alexander Turchin and the former head of government Roman Golovchenko, who now leads the National Bank, garnered attention.

Lukashenko ordered the central bank to create a special working group to analyze the economic situation. Led by Golovchenko, this group reports directly to the president. This effectively creates a parallel center for economic policy assessment outside the government. Later, Golovchenko was also appointed head of the working group responsible for preparing the country’s socio-economic development plan for the next five years — a task traditionally handled by the Council of Ministers.

Overall, the gradual erosion of the functions of state institutions emerged as a defining trend of 2025. Lukashenko increasingly delegates tasks beyond the traditional scope of various agencies. For example, diplomatic negotiations with the United States are now handled by the head of the KGB, the prosecutor’s office has assumed additional roles in ideology and education, and the police have taken on oversight of certain economic issues.

Simultaneously, the impact of various commissions and working groups created directly under the president has increased. This approach enables bypassing formal institutions and reinforces personal control over the state apparatus.

Conclusion

The developments of 2025 suggest a straightforward conclusion: the structure of personal relations within the Belarusian authorities remained largely unchanged despite numerous personnel shifts. The new government is more “new” in appearance than it is in substance. Most officials either retained their positions or transitioned to other roles within the existing system.

The appointment of Alexander Turchin as prime minister did not bring about a significant shift in the country’s economic or political trajectory. His scope for independent decision-making remains limited, despite his reputation as a relatively flexible and pragmatic manager.

Throughout the year, there was a clear erosion of the roles played by formal state institutions. Decision-making increasingly occurs outside traditional authority frameworks, primarily through special commissions and working groups that report directly to the president.

At the same time, competition within the elites is getting more fierce. An example is the situation surrounding Prime Minister Turchin and Governor of the National Bank Golovchenko, where some economic decisions are increasingly made outside the government. This internal rivalry does not indicate controlled “pluralism,” but rather reflects Lukashenko’s personal trust in Golovchenko.5

The events of 2025 demonstrate that the Belarusian administrative model remains resilient and largely unchanged. Personnel reshuffles are used to maintain control over elites and showcase government activity rather than implement genuine reforms.