Religious Sphere: “Subtle” pressure and “directed resilience”

Natallia Vasilevich

Summary

In 2025, repressive policies toward religious communities persisted, including the persecution of clergy and believers, although its presence in the public sphere became less visible. A key development and new context was the finalization of the re-registration process for religious organizations, which imposed additional pressure through opaque procedures of state oversight. This increased dependence on the authorities, heightened anxiety, and encouraged internal self-censorship.

Religious organizations increasingly operated in survival mode, lowering their political profile in order to maintain at least some limited space for activity, steering clear of anything that could trigger response from controlling agencies, and accepting necessary compromises.

Trends

Re-registration: not across-the-board “cleansing,” but blow to the vulnerable

In 2025, a significant administrative milestone was reached with the completion of the re-registration of religious organizations under the revised Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,” which was adopted on December 30, 2023. The deadline for submitting re-registration applications was July 5, 2025. However, after the process concluded, the government did not ensure full transparency regarding the outcomes: the Office of the Plenipotentiary for Religions and Nationalities under the Belarusian Council of Ministers has yet to release detailed, updated statistics on the religious landscape following re-registration.

The only official data on the number of religious organizations is contained in the report by the plenipotentiary for the current cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee (paragraph 208).1 According to preliminary figures in the report, the number of religious communities has decreased to 3,257, reflecting a 4 % decline.

The lack of comprehensive official statistics inherently became a factor of uncertainty. In the absence of clear and transparent data, greater dependence is placed on informal cues: “what can be perceived as indications of disloyalty?” In this context, re-registration appeared not merely as a legal requirement but also as a means of exerting control over the religious community. Consequently, religious organizations experiencing difficulties with re-registration due to political motives as a rule avoided publicly addressing these issues.

For instance, the Belarusian Greek Catholic Church, the most affected by repression during the political crisis, refrained from publicly voicing concerns about re-registration issues or targeted persecutions of priests and active believers, seemingly motivated by a desire to avoid exposing itself to even greater vulnerability.

Although the central authorities remain silent, some regional executive committees began updating regional registers. This sheds light on which denominations have declined and in which regions, and suggests that, in several areas, certain confessional groups effectively ceased their activities.

An overview of available data was prepared by Christian Vision.2 In the Grodno Region, out of 520 religious organizations across 16 confessions, 483 organizations representing 14 confessions remained after re-registration. In the Vitebsk Region, 492 religious communities from 17 confessions remained active out of 525 communities representing 18 confessions. In the Gomel Region, out of 422 religious organizations belonging to 16 confessions, 380 communities from 15 confessions were active following re-registration. In the Mogilev Region, out of 298 communities across 20 confessions, only 237 communities from 17 confessions remained.

“Natural” factors stood behind certain closures: some Roman Catholic parishes in the Mogilev Region existed only “on paper: and did not function due to a lack of active believers; in certain communities, the number of parishioners decreased because of deaths and migration; occasionally, communities had been registered with the minimum required number of believers in hopes of growth, which never materialized. And still, re-registration most severely affected small, local, and less organized communities, for which the formal requirements and specific focus of the administration posed a much greater burden.

In contrast to the situation with political parties, NGOs, and other forms of civic organization, the religious sphere did not experience one-time comprehensive liquidations. This suggests that religious communities remain among the most resilient and structurally advanced segments of civil society in Belarus. However, this resilience comes at a cost, manifesting as increased dependence, anxiety, and self-regulation.

Repression remains systemic but less visible

Since the onset of the political crisis in 2020, repression in Belarus has become systemic, and 2025 became no exception. A notable development in recent years has been the gradual loss of the religious sphere’s former partial “immunity”: whereas earlier, repressive actions mainly targeted Protestant denominations, post-2020 persecution expanded to affect Orthodox and Catholic clergy, including prominent and high-ranking figures. By 2025, this trend continued, evolving with some distinctive characteristics.

First, repression manifests a cumulative effect: those who have previously been targeted remain under heightened surveillance, and over time, the reach of repression broadens — from the most active and publicly prominent individuals to those who are less visible and relatively de-politicized. Often, these measures unfold in a cascading sequence: the detention of one person leads to the identification of their contacts, with repression subsequently extending to include the entire network. The “cascading effect” of the extremist legislation should be highlighted: designating materials on one platform as extremist frequently results in the listing of related channels and profiles. Moreover, criminal charges against a single individual can lead to the entire group being classified as an “extremist formation,” thus amplifying risks for others involved.

Second, a considerable share of public pro-democratic, anti-war clergy and religious activists had already left the country or been detained. Consequently, repression was more frequently carried out through “subtle” pressures that were more difficult to identify and publicly record than high-profile cases.

Third, those who remained in Belarus following public activism were subjected to heightened surveillance and control, often being coerced into “cooperating” with security agencies as an alternative to criminal or administrative charges. Increasingly, forced recruitment emerged as a tactic to pressure clergy and religious activists, eroding trust within their communities.

Fourth, many of those who did not take part in mass protests publicly retreated even further into obscurity.

Fifth, tracking cases of persecution became increasingly challenging, as reports like “confession videos,” court schedules, and judicial decisions largely vanished or were significantly diminished. The prosecution and emigration of human rights defenders and lawyers further hampered efforts to monitor such cases. Additionally, designating human rights initiatives as “extremist formations” elevated the risks associated with sharing information with these organizations. As a result, many individuals, even when facing persecution, opt to remain non-public in order to safeguard themselves and their communities from heightened danger.

Based on the Christian Vision monitoring, in 2025, the primary grounds for the persecution of members of religious communities included their involvement in the 2020 protests, possession of materials labeled as “extremist” on their mobile phones (including those discovered during border checks), providing support for political prisoners, and sharing information with independent monitoring organizations. Persecutions in absentia were most frequently linked to interviews with independent media, participation in activities of organizations designated as “extremist formations,” and public statements.3

As a result, repressions did not “vanish” altogether; rather, they became less visible — partly because publicity is increasingly seen as a factor that heightens risk.

Potential of religious organizations and their survival strategies

Despite the challenging environment, religious organizations and communities continue to carve out spaces for independent life by carrying out missionary, social, educational, and cultural initiatives. Faced with administrative pressure and persistent repression, these groups and individuals are compelled to reduce risks and avoid triggers for the state control agencies. Therefore, they often operate without media coverage, sometimes clandestinely, prioritizing safety.

Moreover, all religious communities maintain a protest core, alongside mutual support networks, kept as covert as possible. In the meantime, efforts to advance agendas on sensitive or potentially dangerous issues are carried out in a depoliticized and neutral manner. Ironically, this approach has the opposite effect: even neutral and depoliticized events are perceived by the authorities as potentially threatening, rendering depoliticization an insufficient marker of loyalty.

Organization of events and implementation of projects remain “unnoticed” by the independent media to safeguard participants and organizers against potential risks. Consequently, this fosters the illusion that nothing meaningful or noteworthy is happening within Belarus’s religious landscape. At the same time, events showcasing loyalty or support for the regime enjoy official coverage, resulting in a distorted portrayal of different facets of the religious community’s life. This often leads to an underestimation of their true potential and an overemphasis on their loyalty.

The authorities are instrumentalizing religious communities and compelling them to provide the state with their “voluntary” support. Clergy at various levels participate in ideological events, with pro-government priests being invited to appear in propaganda media outlets.

Participation in these events can be seen as a “moment of triumph” for especially controversial religious figures, who leverage their loyalty to gain social capital. Conversely, others may participate against their personal beliefs as a pragmatic survival strategy to safeguard their ability to operate and coexist in relative peace. This “pragmatism of participation” as a means of risk mitigation for the community became particularly pronounced during the re-registration period.

Belarusian Orthodox Church: closer to Lukashenko than to Moscow

In 2025, support for the Russian aggression within the Belarusian Orthodox community was predominantly driven by the same actors who, in 2020, positioned themselves as centers offering support for the Belarusian regime. Those primarily involved two women’s monasteries: the Saint Elisabeth Convent in Minsk, led spiritually by Protopresbyter Andrey Lemeshonok, and the Nativity of the Virgin Monastery in Grodno, headed by Mother Superior Gavriila (Glukhova). Both were awarded the Pushkin Medal at a November 4, 2025 ceremony in Moscow by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The Saint Elisabeth Convent stands out as one of the most prominent institutional centers backing the war effort, primarily through fundraising and “humanitarian” initiatives that effectively serve the needs of the Russian military and occupation infrastructure.4 As for Gavriila Glukhova, she was the sole representative of religious organizations to take part in the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly.

Within this framework, it is crucial to understand that pro-war loyalty goes beyond isolated “activist centers.” Concurrently, Belarus is increasingly militarizing its children and youth on a broader scale, with state authorities, security services, and, in some cases, church representatives — often through collaboration between the Belarusian Orthodox Church and schools, youth clubs, and educational initiatives — playing active roles in fostering “patriotic education.”

In 2025, the Belarusian Orthodox Church did not exhibit the forms of ideological hysteria and militaristic radicalization that emerged as prominent features in certain segments of the Russian Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Veniamin remains loyal to Moscow’s ecclesiastical leadership and publicly avoids endorsing Ukraine; however, Belarusian parishes did not recite the “Prayer for Holy Rus,” introduced by the Russian Orthodox Church, which sparked controversy and carried the threat of church sanctions in Russia for those refusing to incorporate it.

This cautious approach sparked irritation among certain radicalized Russian church activists. In response to the refusal to recite the prayer, they filed complaints with Patriarch Kirill, calling for “disciplinary action” and accusing the Belarusian church of harboring “hidden pacifism.” Nonetheless, the conflict remained contained and did not escalate into an open confrontation between the Belarusian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church.

One of the few points of contention between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Belarusian Orthodox Church was the latter’s self-identification. Since the early 1990s, the name “Belarusian Orthodox Church” had been used publicly and officially as a symbol of local identity within the broader church hierarchy. In July 2025, the Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate exerted significant pressure on Minsk, insisting on the exclusive use of the designation “Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church” and public emphasis of the church’s affiliation with the Moscow Patriarchate. This prompted a wave of renaming and adjustments to official titles and signatures; for a certain period, even the Church’s official website reflected ongoing discussions about possible compromises. Ultimately, a consensus was reached: the traditional name “Belarusian Orthodox Church” was retained, supplemented with the clarifying note “(Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate)” in parentheses.

Catholic Church and the growing influence of the Holy See

The year 2025 marked a significant turning point in Vatican–Belarus relations: Pope Francis passed away on April 21, and on May 8, the conclave elected his successor — Leo XIV. Remarkably, the Holy See invited not only officials from the Belarusian regime to the funeral Mass but also Belarusian democratic leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

In this context, official contacts between Minsk and the Holy See took on a more distinct diplomatic tone and were increasingly exploited by the regime as a channel for international maneuvering. A significant milestone in this evolution was the formalization of diplomatic ties: as early as December 2024, a decision was made to open Belarus’s embassy to the Holy See, and on March 27, 2025, Yury Ambrasevich was appointed as Belarus’s inaugural ambassador.

In 2025, Belarus welcomed a new apostolic nuncio — Archbishop Ignazio Ceffalia — whose appointment was marked by his first official meeting with Belarusian Catholic bishops in Minsk on June 26. His background is particularly noteworthy given his experience in Venezuela, a major authoritarian crisis area where the Holy See has long maintained a delicate political dialogue and emphasized a humanitarian agenda. This included addressing the plight of political prisoners and advocating for their potential release as “gestures of trust.” His appointment therefore holds importance not only from a church perspective but also in diplomatic and humanitarian contexts: a nuncio with such experience enhances the Holy See’s capacity to engage in cautious yet impactful dialogue, particularly in a setting where internal church affairs are intertwined with wider issues of security, repression, and international negotiations.

Nevertheless, former political prisoner Andrey Krylov, who had contact with incarcerated priest Henrykh Akalatovich, revealed that the latter was offered “freedom” in return for participating in a provocation designed to undermine the apostolic nuncio in Belarus — specifically, to plant a flash drive with damaging information. This indicates that the Lukashenko regime still relies on coercion in its diplomatic interactions with the Holy See.

The prospect of a papal visit was employed as a prominent public signal of “normalization”: in October 2025, Archbishop Jozef Staniewski presented Pope Leo XIV with an official invitation to visit Belarus “on behalf of the episcopate, clergy, and all believers in Belarus” during an audience at the Vatican. Alexander Lukashenko also officially extended an invitation to the Pope. However, a procedural requirement — obtaining approval for the visit from Patriarch of Moscow Kirill — was never met, meaning that, at this stage, such a visit remains more hypothetical than realistic.5

The most tangible outcome of this diplomacy manifested in the humanitarian sphere: on November 20, 2025, political prisoners and Catholic priests Henrykh Akalatovich and Andrzej Yukhnevich were released — a move linked to the Vatican’s ongoing contacts and in the wake of the October visit of a papal envoy. The Pope’s special envoy, who visited Belarus between October 24 and 27, was Cardinal Claudio Gugerotti. During the visit, Gugerotti met with Lukashenko, and to date, the cardinal — who served as nuncio in Belarus during the 2010 political crisis — remains the most effective religious representative in negotiations with the regime.6

Conclusion

Based on current trends, it is likely that in 2026, Belarus’s religious environment will still function within a “managed stability” framework — maintaining institutional activities amid a landscape characterized by rigid asymmetry and ongoing self-regulation.

First, the administrative dependence, reinforced through re-registration, will continue manifesting through inspections, approvals, and informal loyalty demands. Even now that the legal registration process is finalized, there will be a lingering perception of vulnerability, with activities outside official registration still viewed as criminal. Repression is expected to remain a systemic feature, but take “subtle” forms. This will further deepen the discrepancy between the actual scope of persecution and what is known to the public.

Second, the survival strategy will become more pronounced: diminished public visibility, heightened self-censorship, and greater caution in interactions and cross-border communication. Inside communities, a moral dilemma will endure between the obligation to speak out and the responsibility to safeguard individuals and institutions.

Third, the religious sphere will largely be influenced by external factors — most notably the ongoing war in Ukraine and the broader international context. “Windows of opportunity” for change are unlikely to stem from internal liberalization, but rather from external diplomatic considerations and shifts in the risk balance.