Democratic Forces: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya maintains leadership, idea of national dialogue hangs in the air

Aliaksandr Klaskouski

Summary

In 2025, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s team maintained its leading role within the Belarusian democratic landscape. However, the five-year anniversary of the 2020 mass protests marked a psychological milestone, fueling heightened criticism of the democratic leader, her allies, and their strategy. The release of Viktar Babaryka and Maria Kalesnikava from prison at the end of the year laid the groundwork for a stronger faction favoring a more flexible approach toward Alexander Lukashenko’s regime.

Trends

“No-Choice” Elections 2025: a campaign without the opposition

On January 26, 2025, Belarus conducted presidential elections that the opposition labeled as “no-choice” elections. The campaign took place after the liquidation of all opposition parties and amidst intense repression, with no participation by regime opponents (except for pseudo-opposition figure Hanna Kanapatskaya, who was registered as a candidate by the Central Election Commission (CEC) and thrown a bone of a negligible share of votes). There were also no opportunities for independent monitoring.

Due to the regime’s harsh suppression of any political alternatives, democratic forces were fighting a losing battle, unable to formulate a robust strategy for this election cycle. Opponents of the regime who still decided (or were compelled) to visit the polling stations were encouraged to “express their protest by voting against all candidates, who were stealing our right to vote.”1 Unsurprisingly, this had no effect on the official results announced by the CEC. Belarusian political émigré groups lacked the means to accurately gauge how many individuals genuinely expressed their dissent through such acts.

The primary focus was on delegitimizing the official results of the “no-choice” elections both domestically, in the eyes of Belarusians, and internationally. To this end, a broad campaign of protests and initiatives was launched outside the country. Notably, on January 26, as a symbolic alternative to the electoral farce, a forum and march titled “Belarusians Deserve Better” took place in Warsaw. The opposition emphasized that the European Union, dozens of countries, and several international organizations declined to recognize the outcomes of the 2025 elections.

Meanwhile, the narrative of this pseudo-electoral campaign highlighted the diminished influence of foreign opposition centers over internal Belarusian affairs. Pro-democracy citizens and remnants of the defeated political structures within the country also failed to make a significant impact within this campaign.

Keeping Belarus within international agenda

Given these circumstances, the efforts of the STO, UTC, Coordination Council, and several other organizations united around Tsikhanouskaya were primarily centered on maintaining Belarus’s presence on the international stage. Their goals included increasing sanctions pressure on the regime, advocating for the release of political prisoners, and protecting the interests of Belarusians abroad — such as legalizing their status internationally and preserving and expanding mobility for those inside the country. Proposals for Western governments and international organizations to impose sanctions on Minsk and hold Lukashenko criminally accountable — particularly for the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied territories — were the main focus of the National Anti-Crisis Management, led by Pavel Latushka.

In August, at the “New Belarus — 2025” conference held in Warsaw, a resolution titled “European Choice of Belarus and Preparation of a Roadmap for EU Integration”2 was adopted, reaffirming the democratic forces’ pledge for the country to eventually join the European Union. However, given the current circumstances, this commitment appears largely declarative. The regime’s opponents have only a limited range of tools to counter Belarus’s increasing reliance on Moscow and the growing pro-Russian sentiment among the population.

Although Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her allies urge the West not to conflate the Lukashenko regime with the Belarusian people, and despite the EU’s verbal backing of Belarusians’ European ambition, in practice, amid the Russia – Ukraine war — where the Belarusian regime acts as a co-aggressor — European political elites tend to prioritize securitization and favor isolating Belarus behind an iron curtain.

Several politicians and analysts argue that the mainstream democratic forces’ approach of advocating for continuous pressure on the regime may inadvertently increase society’s isolation from the democratic community and could even threaten Belarus’s sovereignty. This perspective is notably endorsed3 by veteran opposition leader Zianon Pazniak, head of the “Free Belarus” movement.

Embedding Belarus track into Trump’s game

Initially, the STO and UTC expected that with Trump assuming office, the United States would “maintain its policy of non-recognition toward Alexander Lukashenko,” as Tsikhanouskaya’s Deputy in the UTC, Latushka, noted in January 2025. However, contrary to these assumptions, the White House started engaging in dialogue with the regime. Trump even called Lukashenko “a deeply respected president,” gifted him cufflinks, and consistently demonstrated other gestures of respect.

A gradual process of releasing political prisoners in exchange for the partial lifting of U. S. sanctions was set in motion. Nonetheless, repression in the country persisted, and Lukashenko effectively deported those who had been pardoned. In other words, there were no indications that Washington was pressing Minsk for systemic reforms on the road to a so-called “big deal.”

Nevertheless, Tsikhanouskaya and her allies opted not to openly criticize Washington’s new Belarus policy, instead choosing to align themselves with its trajectory. Democratic representatives emphasized their close contact with Trump’s team, which was engaged in negotiations with Minsk. A considerable effort was undertaken to facilitate the reception of former political prisoners who had been taken abroad with the assistance of U. S. diplomats. Tsikhanouskaya explained in September that the primary aim of the democratic forces was to “provide those released with legal, psychological, and medical support; address issues related to their legalization and documents.”

Simultaneously, Tsikhanouskaya and her allies continued to press the U.S. authorities to demand that Lukashenko halt repression and the practice of forcibly deporting pardoned prisoners abroad. Some criticism of the U.S. leadership was also voiced. In an interview4 with Politico, Tsikhanouskaya urged Trump: “We must not normalize the trafficking of political prisoners, when people are released for some concessions from your side, softening of sanctions or publicity … Lukashenko has to be punished, not rewarded.”

Ultimately, Tsikhanouskaya’s team devised a compromise approach: U. S. sanctions in exchange for the release of people, and European sanctions for the liberation of the country — meaning systemic reforms in Belarus. There was a consistent plea for European leaders not to replicate the U. S. approach, but rather to maintain the strategy of pressure on the regime.

Siarhei Tsikhanouski’s release from prison in June 2025 marked a significant milestone for democratic forces. After five years of imprisonment, mostly incommunicado, his political perspective appeared to remain rooted in the realities of 2020. As a result, his declared plan to “deal a decisive blow to Lukashism” within three weeks seemed naive. Tsikhanouski struggled to secure the necessary funds, eventually lost a large portion of his hastily assembled team, and ultimately moved to the U.S. to connect with local politicians and improve his English. His suggestion of “Finlandization” for Belarus faced strong criticism from various opposition figures.

Tsikhanouski therefore failed to step into the same river twice — to regain his popularity as a leading figure or rally like-minded supporters. It ultimately boiled down to an informal alliance with former restaurateur Vadim Prokopyev, one of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s critics.

This narrative once again underscores how dramatically the prospects for the struggle for change in Belarus have evolved since 2020, also reflecting the shifting sentiments among supporters of change.

Roundtable with the authorities: a utopian idea or a viable future step?

In mid-year, the STO and UTC began to actively advocate for a national dialogue, with a key stage being a roundtable discussion with the authorities. On July 15, at the 107th Rose-Roth seminar in Brussels, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya declared: “Many individuals within Lukashenko’s system, his officials, support our course and do not want Belarus to become Russia. We offer them a roundtable, similar to the one held in Poland in 1989.”

However, some analysts challenged this analogy, pointing out that the current situation in Belarus is fundamentally different from Poland’s at that time. Despite this, the concept has remained a recurring motif in Tsikhanouskaya and her allies’ rhetoric. On August 9, the UTC officially announced its initiative to hold a national dialogue, seeking a peaceful resolution to Belarus’s deep political and social crisis.

Why has this proposal gained increased promotion? First, it is likely a result of efforts to develop a constructive concept that complements the call to escalate pressure on the regime. Second, there appears to be hope that the U.S. may play a role in advancing this idea.

Valery Kavaleuski, head of the Euro-Atlantic Affairs Agency, strongly criticized attempts to incorporate this concept into negotiations between Washington and Minsk. He stated that “there are currently no objective reasons for Lukashenko to initiate dialogue with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.” Additionally, Kavaleuski warned that such efforts might even obstruct the further release of political prisoners. Meanwhile, Radio Liberty political analyst Valer Karbalevich commented, “For now, the idea of a roundtable remains a beautiful dream.”

In any case, by the end of the year, there were no indications that Washington was lobbying for the roundtable proposal in negotiations with Lukashenko. This topic had noticeably receded in the rhetoric of democrats. Nevertheless, political scientist Piotr Rutkowski praised the concept, remarking: “The well-known Russian saying, ‘Prepare the sled in summer and the cart in winter,’ encapsulates the essence of strategic planning. The idea of a roundtable represents one of the possible avenues for change — one of the ‘cart wheels’ to be prepared during the political winter.”5

Conditional “doves” vs. conditional “hawks”

During 2025, a debate unfolded within democratic forces regarding strategies toward the Belarusian regime, contrasting supporters of a conditionally hard approach with those favoring a conditionally flexible stance. The hardline approach envisioning continued pressure until the authorities commit to systemic reforms was championed by Tsikhanouskaya’s team, with Latushka emerging as its most ardent proponent.

The flexible approach, which involves making certain concessions to the regime — primarily to secure the release of political prisoners — was supported by Kavaleuski and his allies from the Coalition for the Release of Political Prisoners in Belarus (former UTC social policy representative Volha Harbunova, activist Anastasia Kostyugova, and Tatsiana Khomich, co-founder of the Association of Relatives and Former Political Prisoners and Maria Kolesnikova’s sister) and members of Viktar Babaryka’s team (Coordination Council executive secretary Ivan Kravtsov and others). Notably, Kavaleuski and Harbunova had previously left Tsikhanouskaya’s team, likely due to disagreements over these issues.

In March, during a meeting with Volkert Turk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kavaleuski remarked that securing the release of Belarusian political prisoners “requires shifting away from unrealistic, maximalist demands and ultimatums.”

Meanwhile, Latushka emphasized that no agreements with Lukashenko could be reached until “he puts in place genuine political reforms that serve the interests of Belarusian society.” In August, during the “New Belarus — 2025” conference, Latushka responded to critics who considered the goals of democratic forces overly ambitious, stating: “Those who lose their battles, abandon their goals, or lower their standards — they exit the race. The marathon isn’t for everyone; you’re free to step aside, but do not try to slow down or halt others.”

Meanwhile, supporters of a more flexible, compromise-oriented approach capitalized on the momentum and arguments sparked by Washington’s unexpected stance toward Belarus. They contended that the maximalist tactic of maximum pressure to the victorious end, pursued over the past five years, had not succeeded in securing the release of a single political prisoners. However, when Trump’s administration started combining sticks with carrots, the process gained traction.

The December release of Viktar Babaryka and Maria Kalesnikava, two central figures of the 2020 protests, paved the way for the strengthening of the “dove” faction. In early 2026, Kalesnikava urged Europe to engage in dialogue with the Belarusian authorities in an interview with the Financial Times6, stating: “As someone with a European mentality, I don’t understand why Europe didn’t start talking to Lukashenko sooner than the U. S.” Babaryka’s first political statement on Facebook also reflected a tendency toward relatively more moderate rhetoric and a general reluctance to directly address the issue of sanctions.

Several analysts predicted that, with Babaryka and Kalesnikava a having relocated to Berlin, a new hub for democratic forces could emerge, potentially heightening competition within the democratic movement. As of this writing, no official statement has been issued about the establishment of such an organization. However, Babaryka has indicated his intention to give an impetus to his party initiative, ‘Razam’.

Tsikhanouskaya’s team took several strategic steps to foster understanding with Babaryka’s supporters and prevent potential conflicts. The democratic leader and her associates held meetings with Babaryka and Kalesnikava, where they “discussed strategic priorities, efforts to strengthen democratic forces, enhance unity, and improve coordination on the international stage.” According to insider sources, Tsikhanouskaya’s team is considering a reorganization of the democratic movement, with the goal of integrating Babaryka into their ranks in a position that reflects his political capital.

Conclusions

In 2025, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya solidified her position as the uncontested leader of the democratic forces, despite efforts by several opponents to challenge her legitimacy in light of the five-year anniversary of the 2020 elections. Tsikhanouskaya and her team successfully maintained robust contacts with Western political stakeholders.

The mainstream democratic movement, unified behind her leadership, persisted in its strategy of applying increasing pressure on the regime in hopes of securing systemic concessions. However, critics of this uncompromising approach gained ground and voiced stronger opposition.

One of the most pressing issues for democratic forces remained the challenge of influencing Belarusians within the country, particularly amid ongoing repression and societal depoliticization.

Forecast

It is highly probable that, as a result of U. S. diplomatic efforts, additional political prisoners will be released. Democratic forces will emphasize their involvement in this process, concentrate on supporting those released abroad, and offer assistance to them.

Given Kyiv’s new policy toward Belarus, it is anticipated that relations between democratic forces and the Ukrainian authorities will evolve actively.

Belarusians’ participation in the upcoming Coordination Council elections in May 2026 is unlikely to be widespread, as the organization continues to face a prolonged crisis. It has yet to build a compelling and appealing reputation among a broad coalition of change advocates.

If Russia and Ukraine reach a peace or ceasefire agreement, the conditional “doves” faction of democratic forces may have additional arguments to press the EU for a more flexible approach to Minsk and negotiations with Belarusian authorities.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s team will seek to incorporate Viktar Babaryka into their ranks to prevent the emergence of a competing political exile hub.

The likelihood of a roundtable with the authorities materializing before a significant crisis within the regime is low. Such a crisis might be sparked, for instance, by Lukashenko’s physical withdrawal from power. However, in that situation, the risk of Moscow taking drastic measures — such as installing a puppet leader in Belarus or fully annexing the country — would rise considerably.