Divided yet Unbroken: Belarusian civil society organizations

Natallia Rabava

Summary

In 2025, Belarusian civil society persisted amid a deepening divide: some organizations operated in exile — primarily in Lithuania and Poland — while others remained within Belarus under tight government control. A number of organizations maintain staff on both sides of the border.

Within Belarus, the government employs a dual strategy: a repressive approach — shutting down organizations, targeting activists, and extending extremist lists; and a co-optation approach — integrating loyal civil society organizations (CSOs) into the state machine.

Exiled organizations faced a severe financial crisis following the withdrawal of USAID support and banking restrictions imposed by sanctions. The gap between domestic and exile CSOs continues to grow. Overall, the environment for Belarusian CSOs is deteriorating.

Trends

External environment changes impacting CSO within Belarus

According to the Eastern Partnership Index 2025, Belarus continues to be one of the poorest performers in the region in terms of civil rights.1 As of 2023, it ranked lowest among Eastern Partnership countries when it comes to freedom of opinion, expression, assembly, and association; in 2025, the situation has worsened even further.

The CSO Meter Index 2024,2 published in 2025, provides the following assessment for Belarus: Freedom of Association — 2.3 out of 7.0, Access to Funding — 2.2, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly — 1.5, and Freedom of Expression —1.8. These scores are on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents an extremely unfavorable environment for civil society and 7 indicates an extremely favorable one. In all these areas, law enforcement considerably lags behind legal standards, indicating that actual practices concerning CSOs fall short of existing legal norms.

Another metric, the CSO Sustainability Index 2024,3 indicates a slight deterioration in Belarus’s overall score, which moved from 6.0 in 2023 to 6.1 in 2024 (with 7.0 representing the worst possible situation). The Legal Environment indicator reached its lowest point of 7.0 as early as 2021 and, in theory, cannot decline further. Two other indicators — Financial Stability and Advocacy — are also above 6.0. However, following a sharp decline in 2020–2021, the index scores have stabilized at a relatively steady level, suggesting a tentative new equilibrium.

The external environment for CSOs in Belarus is influenced by government policies that, according to the CSO Meter classification, operate along two parallel tracks: repression and co-optation.

Repressive track

Under this repressive approach, the Belarusian authorities employ a wide range of measures, including legislative amendments to restrict the scope of and possibilities for CSO activities, the liquidation and inspection of organizations, persecution of individual activists, information and smear campaigns, as well as informal pressures such as targeting activists’ families.

The campaign to cleanse civil society, initiated in 2021, continues unabated. According to Lawtrend, by February 28, 2026, at least 2,012 non-profit organizations had been either liquidated or compelled to close voluntarily. While the rate of closures slowed somewhat in winter 2025, it intensified from summer onward.4 There have also been instances of forced re-registration of public organizations as agencies (non-membership organizations), likely aimed at tightening control.

In June 2025, the government issued Resolution No. 319,5 which expanded the list of crimes classified as extremist activities. Under this resolution, criminal convictions for violations related to receipt of foreign aid now serve as grounds for placing individuals on the extremist list. This has resulted in substantial restrictions on civic participation, which continue even after the sentence has been served. Additionally, the Interior Ministry’s authority was extended to enhance oversight of foreign aid.

In June, the bill “On State Registration and Liquidation of Entities” passed its first reading. Experts contend that the document not only fails to enhance the current framework but, in some areas, actually worsens the operational environment for CSOs.6 Notably, it introduces a requirement to scrutinize founders for “threats to national security,” aiming to “eliminate risks associated with destructive activities financed from abroad.”

A system comprising eight different extremist and terrorist lists is actively used against CSOs and activists. These lists are continuously updated and serve as tools for repression. Some are directly employed to target CSOs, activists, their informational materials, and products. These include:

  1. The Republican List of Extremist Materials (maintained by the Ministry of Information)7, which contains over 9,000 entries.8 This is one of the most comprehensive lists, encompassing various materials recognized as extremist through closed court proceedings. It covers websites, books, videos, audio recordings, scientific works, publications, social media pages, and even individual photographs. This process targets both historical and cultural assets as well as contemporary publications and social media pages, many of which belong to different CSOs;
  2. The list of citizens involved in extremist activities (maintained by the Interior Ministry)9, which includes 6,402 individuals, predominantly Belarusian citizens. This list is regularly updated to incorporate those convicted under the so-called “extremist” articles of the Criminal Code;
  3. The list of organizations and individuals involved in terrorist activities (maintained by the KGB)10, comprising 1,424 persons, of whom around 700 are Belarusians;
  4. The list of extremist formations (compiled jointly by the Interior Ministry and KGB)11, which includes 340 organizations; most of these are Belarusian CSOs, including local communities and media outlets.

Engagement with individuals, organizations, and materials on these lists can result in various penalties, including long-term imprisonment. The authorities explicitly warn citizens against participating in operations of foreign and international organizations and networks — for example, advising not to accept travel funding from the European Bridge initiative.

Unwanted online content is blocked to restrict access from Belarus. The list of such materials is compiled and regularly updated by BelGIE, the state inspectorate responsible for overseeing telecommunications.12 In the summer of 2025, the minister of information estimated that approximately 18,000 resources had been blocked, including sites involved in fraud (such as drug sales, gambling, and phishing) as well as those belonging to independent CSOs and media outlets.13

As of March 18, 2026, out of 1,136 political prisoners, at least 100 are CSO leaders and activists.14 Several individuals have been released during waves of amnesty for political prisoners mediated by the U. S.

Co-optation Track

The co-optation track aims for maximum control over registered CSOs and, ideally, their integration into the government apparatus — similar to Soviet-era organizations like Komsomol communist youth league. Some developments within this approach can be viewed as positive for CSOs operating in Belarus, though subject to certain limitations.

Opportunities for state social orders have been modestly expanded, and the requirement for mandatory co-financing has been removed. There are documented instances of participatory budgeting: Article 36-1, titled “Civil Initiatives,” in the Law “On Local Governance and Self-Governance in the Republic of Belarus” (introduced in 2023) allows for the implementation of community improvement projects.15 In 2025, Minsk selected 14 such projects through a competitive process, mainly related to installing playgrounds and sports facilities.

According to officials, around 90 civil initiatives aimed at community improvement are ongoing across Belarus.16 However, human rights advocates and experts argue that the selection process lacks transparency, citizen participation is limited, and the mechanism, judging by the nature of the winning projects, appears to be merely a façade of genuine civic engagement.

Changes in the external environment for CSOs in exile

Belarusian CSOs in exile operate within the legal and political frameworks of their host countries. In EU member states, legislation generally remains favorable toward non-profit organizations; however, in practice, sanctions-driven restrictions are often imposed. In 2025, banks’ excessive caution (overcompliance) regarding sanctions and anti-money laundering laws caused issues for Belarusian-registered organizations, including audits, account freezes, and closures.

The most significant shock of the year was the withdrawal of USAID and its affiliated implementers. Experts estimate that civil society lost up to 50% of its funding, a blow particularly severe for media outlets and organizations working within Belarus. While European donors helped partially bridge this funding gap, their resources proved largely insufficient.

Competition for funding within the sector has become significantly more intense. Many organizations have been compelled to shut down projects, lay off staff, and give up physical spaces — such as the Creative Culture Hub, the Free Belarus Centre coworking space, and Tbilisi’s Kropka, which ceased operations at the end of 2024.

Systemic problems in the external environment for CSOs in exile include:

Cross-border repressions, including trials in absentia17 against politically active Belarusians and CSO staff, as well as the use of anti-extremism and anti-terrorism legislation for these purposes;

Administrative obstacles faced by Belarusians abroad, such as challenges with identity verification and complications arising from Belarus’s status as a co-aggressor in the ongoing war;

Limited access to target audiences inside Belarus, along with barriers faced by invited Belarusian citizens attending international events;

Difficulties in obtaining visas for Belarusians outside the European Union;

Challenges in balancing visibility with security considerations;

Burnout and the loss of staff and expertise.

Status of civil society inside Belarus

According to Lawtrend, as of March 2026, Belarus had 1,924 registered CSOs: 1,347 NGOs (membership organizations), 464 agencies (non-membership organizations), and 113 foundations. Associations are not included in this analysis. Of these, 257 CSOs were registered after 2021, with agencies being the most numerous among recent registrants (136), followed by NGOs (108), and foundations (13). In 2025, 38 new CSOs were registered. However, registration does not necessarily equate to active operations.

The most common thematic categories among registered CSOs are sports and dance, charity and social services, professional and service organizations, education, animal protection, and culture. At the bottom of the list are human rights groups, with only three registered organizations. The distribution of new registrations (after 2021) mirrors this pattern, as organizations tend to emerge mainly in sectors that the government deems safe.

Information about the actual activities of organizations operating within the country is almost entirely unavailable. CSOs are constantly faced with a dilemma: publicity is crucial for their work, but it also exposes their participants, staff, and members to risks. This forces most CSOs to operate in “invisible mode.” Nonetheless, some announcements and invitations suggest that strictly non-political events are still held — especially under the auspices of government agencies or “authorized” international organizations, such as UN agencies. However, even non-political initiatives can be labeled as extremist by the authorities, as was the case with the Borisov-based ‘Sklad Butelek’ art space in December 2025.

Civil society in exile: status and developments

The precise number of organizations established by Belarusians abroad remains unknown, with estimates being challenging for several reasons. Experts suggest there are between 400 and 600 CSOs, primarily registered in Poland and Lithuania, as well as in Germany, Sweden, the UK, Estonia, Ukraine, Georgia, the U. S., and other countries. However, a significant portion of these entities operate as unregistered initiatives, leveraging partner organizations for funding or are registered as sole proprietorships, despite engaging in public activities. Some organizations are registered in multiple countries simultaneously.

In 2025, CSOs published several studies on civil society, including CSO Sustainability Index, Lawtrend monitoring reports and reviews, a study18 by ‘The Others BY’ organization, and a youth-focused study in Belarus titled “Ha-ha, we’re still here.”19

Among the achievements of CSOs in exile are advocacy campaigns (notably, the Association of Belarusian Parents in Lithuania), participation in international platforms (such as the Council of Europe Contact Group on Belarus), and the preparation of alternative reports within mechanisms where Belarus is officially represented. For instance, in 2025, Belarusian CSOs presented an alternative review of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals,20 highlighting a systemic crisis of rights and freedoms, questioning the credibility of official reports, and describing the data collection system as closed and manipulative.

Human rights organizations conducted expert monitoring of the January 2025 presidential “election,” despite the inability to observe them within the country.

The connection between CSOs in exile and people inside Belarus remains structurally weak. It is not uncommon for relocated CSOs to covertly retain staff or volunteers within Belarus. However, more often, Belarusians inside the country remain beneficiaries — consuming content or services — rather than active participants or partners. This is primarily due to security concerns, though the question of the agency and role of those who stay is still unresolved.

The activities of organizations in exile are diverse: some focus solely on the Belarusian agenda, others target the diaspora or the local population in the host country, and some pursue a combination of both. Overall, the gap between CSOs inside the country and those in exile — in terms of legal status, focus, and operational methods — continues to grow wider.

Conclusion

Over the coming year, both repressive and co-optation strategies by the Belarusian authorities are expected to continue. If efforts are made to normalize relations with the West, the authorities may supplement the co-optation approach with a “simulacrum” of active presence and operations of civil society organizations within Belarus, as well as incorporation of their opinions.

Domestic CSOs will likely continue operating discreetly, focusing on sectors considered safe by the state. Exiled organizations will need to function amid financial instability and fierce competition for resources. Structural issues — including personnel loss, burnout, declining expertise, and the broadening gap with their audiences inside Belarus — are unlikely to be resolved in the short term.