Regime and Society: Transition to totalitarianism and quiet discontent

Summary

In 2025, there were no significant shifts in the development of society, the regime, or their interactions. Even the presidential election in January 2025 had little to no impact on the country's overall situation. The trends observed throughout the year merely represented the continuation of existing processes that had been developing earlier.

Currently, Belarusian society can be characterized by a deep sense of emotional alienation from the state. The government’s repressive measures persist, albeit in a somewhat altered form. Key aspects include the systemic militarization of the education system, ongoing military integration with Russia, involvement in Western nuclear blackmail, and continued hybrid aggression along the borders with EU countries.

The regime began to conceal repression, and through a deal with Washington, released some of the political prisoners. The apparent ease of repression in certain sectors is a result of completed purges, while in other areas — particularly in the personal persecution of citizens — the scale of terror remains unchanged.

Trends

• The Belarusian regime persists in its gradual movement toward establishing a totalitarian state;
• The state’s repressive grip on society remains, albeit in a different format;
• The influence of the Russia–Ukraine war on public opinion is beginning to wane;
• Discontent with the actions of state institutions and emotional estrangement from the state are becoming increasingly evident;
• The image of authority is evolving from a “protector” to an “aggressor.”

Militarization as a foundation for Belarusian totalitarianism

Over the past few years, the Belarusian political regime has been steadily transforming into a “classical” form of totalitarianism. The unique aspect of this process is the conspicuous deficit of profound ideological underpinnings, which are mainly reduced to a cult of personality around Alexander Lukashenko. This ideological void is offset by widespread and enforced militarization of society. The process affects all aspects of social life, from education to foreign policy.

One of the signs of the regime’s growing harshness is the unprecedented intensification of military cooperation with the Russian Federation. Belarus is no longer merely an economic “rear” for the Russian military machine — it has become an immediate arena for nuclear escalation. The most notable development was the deployment of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons and its state-of-the-art Oreshnik missile system on Belarusian territory. This effectively renders Belarusian military facilities, and more broadly the country itself, legitimate targets for a powerful retaliatory strike in the event of a conflict.

The most concerning aspect is the total infiltration of military propaganda into the education system. Indoctrination starts as early as in kindergartens, where security forces (notably OMON) conduct master classes on assembling weapons for six-year-old children. Essentially, schools have transformed into factories for raising amenable followers, where military discipline and unquestioning obedience to orders have displaced critical thinking and personal responsibility.1

In addition to its internal military buildup, the regime has been utilizing migration flows as a form of hybrid warfare against its Western neighbors. The long-standing border crisis, which had been ongoing for years, reached a historical peak in 2025, with no signs of abating. Statistics revealed that the number of attempted crossings of the border illegally surpassed 43,000 (up from around 36,000 in 2024 and approximately 42,000 in 2023).

The migration pressure was further augmented by new forms of provocation — large numbers of weather balloons carrying contraband cigarettes were launched from the territory of Belarus. In 2025, this practice became so routine that it began to pose a significant threat to air traffic, causing a temporary closure of Vilnius International Airport. This led to a strict response: Lithuania temporarily closed the border, prompting Belarus to detain hundreds of Lithuanian trucks, which remained in its territory as hostages in the ongoing economic and political conflict.

In this manner, the Belarusian regime opted for a path of militarization, turning the country into a closed military enclave where ideological indoctrination of children is paired with the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons. This approach, along with hybrid attacks on neighboring countries, destabilizes regional security and threatens national sovereignty, turning Belarus into a hostage of external military gambling.

Continued repression — a shift in format

The events of 2025 in Belarus indicate a transformation in the state’s repressive machinery. While the post-2020 protest period (2020–2023) was marked by overt acts of repression — such as mass arrests documented on camera, the release of “confession videos,” and high-profile court cases — the current phase can be characterized as a strategy of “covert repression.” This shift does not suggest that the regime has become more lenient; rather, it reflects the government’s adaptation to evolving international conditions and its efforts to suppress civil society more discreetly.

The primary tool for masking the scale of persecution is the isolation of the judicial system from society. On March 5, 2025, the authorities stopped publishing court schedules, which had previously been a key resource for monitoring. Alongside the restricted access to registers of court rulings and the silence of official representatives, this brought about a data void. An external observer might have an illusion of a “thaw,” since human rights defenders find it increasingly difficult to document every arrest. However, this statistical “silence” is a direct consequence of government policies aimed at hiding repression, and coincides with a period of intensified unofficial contacts between official Minsk and the U. S. administration.

Phenomenon of release and violent expatriation

A notable event in 2025 was the release of 342 individuals from detention through the support of the United States. While the release of prisoners is always welcome, this year, the move was accompanied by the forced deportation of a substantial portion of the freed political prisoners: after the 2025 pardoning,189 political prisoners were forcibly deported from Belarus — many without passports. The authorities therefore use releases as a means of physically driving opponents out of the country, effectively transforming pardons into a form of expulsion.

Sector-wise “(over)supply” of repression

Statistics across different sectors reveal a varied dynamic that should be interpreted as “oversupply of the repression market.”

1. Civil society (NGOs): the number of dissolved organizations decreased from 385 in 2024 to 107 in 2025. This is not a sign of liberalization, but a result of the regime’s effort to crack down on nearly all dissenting groups. The civic sphere has become depleted, and consequently, the number of new closures has naturally fallen.
2. Media and “extremism”: the number of extremist materials and formations increased slower than previously. Courts find it more and more difficult to identify new organized entities: the share of personal social media pages among those recognized as extremist increased to 44 %. In 2025, educational platforms, think tanks, and even small substructures of earlier banned organizations were labeled as extremist, rather than major media outlets or political parties. This indicates that the repressive machine has started “devouring” small segments due to the absence of larger targets.
3. Personalized terror: unlike organizations, individuals represent an inexhaustible source for repression. This is where growth is observed both in the “extremist” and “terrorist” dimensions. In the first case, after years of decline, a 16 % increase was recorded in 2025 (1,335 people); in the second case, there was a 40 % growth over the year (219 people). This is an all-time high for the entire monitored period. Labeling someone as a “terrorist” has become a convenient tool for depriving citizens of their rights and increasing isolation.

Statistical trap of “political prisoners”

In 2025, the count of “officially recognized” political prisoners fell to 448 from 593 in 2024. However, experts caution that this number no longer reliably reflects the level of repression. First, relatives of detainees, intimidated by law enforcers, are increasingly hesitant to turn to human rights advocates. Second, the verification process itself is severely delayed due to the information blackout surrounding courts. Consequently, the true number of individuals imprisoned for political reasons may be substantially higher than the figures reported by human rights groups.

Repressive policies have entered a phase of systemic consolidation. The regime effectively combines tactical concessions to the West — such as releasing some detainees — with their simultaneous expulsion. Consequently, reduced numbers in certain sectors are merely the result of their complete cleansing, while in other areas — especially in the personal persecution of citizens — the scale of terror continues to grow. Repression remains an integral part of state governance, changing only in visibility but not in their fundamental nature.

Regime’s image is changing

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine became the key game changer in the relationship between Belarusian society and Lukashenko’s regime. It was precisely this event, or rather the anticipation of military and economic apocalypse, that shaped societal consciousness for several years.

However, a few years after the war’s onset, concerns about security began to decline. Surveys suggest that in 2025, only 28 % of people voiced their worry about Belarus’s involvement in the conflict (compared to 57 % in April 2022). The demand for security as the primary service provided by the state also started to diminish.2

Devaluation of the “protector” role

The regime’s perceived role as a protector, guarantor of security and stability — which gained prominence in 2020 — has been gradually eroding. Empirical evidence shows that society no longer knows what the authorities do or in whose interests they act. Half of those surveyed believe that the state primarily defends the interests of the ruling elite; 23 % are completely unaware of whose interests are served.

The image of the regime is becoming more dynamic and contradictory. On the one hand, citizens continue to regard security as a valuable asset, especially women and young people. On the other, awareness is growing that the regime itself increasingly acts as a threat to security: in 2024, nearly half of Belarusians stated that regular citizens were unprotected from the arbitrariness of those in power. In 2025, 42 % identified the primary task of the state as “ensuring citizens’ rights and freedoms” — a position that for the first time topped the priority rankings, particularly among men, those with higher education, and individuals aged 45 and older.3

Economic autonomy and social contract

Tensions are also intensifying in the economic dimension. Although the regime continues to portray itself as a guarantor of stability, the reality is quite different. Over time, an increasing number of people believe that their well-being depends on themselves rather than the state; the standard of living in Belarus is perceived as lower than in most other countries. Furthermore, economic factors now occupy the top positions in the list of main issues (see Table 1).

These processes translate into a clear demand for political change: competitive elections, liberalization, and a reduction of state control. Opposing these reforms are only 10–14% of respondents.

Despite this, Belarusians do not exhibit hope that their expectations will be fulfilled. Importantly, the call to diminish the state’s role in society is not a random reaction to recent events but a consequence of the gradual evolution of social independence over the past decades.

And still, a segment of society clings to the “remnants of the social state.” The logic of “he may be an aggressor, but he pays pensions” allows the regime to maintain the loyalty of part of the population. Meanwhile, expectations have significantly declined: people are satisfied with the mere existence of free healthcare and education, even though they acknowledge their poor quality.

“Pact of silence” as a coping strategy

In the public perception, the Belarusian regime continues to be seen largely as a protector, but increasingly, it is also viewed as a threat to the safety of ordinary citizens — essentially as an aggressor. This environment fosters a strong desire among many in society to detach themselves from the traumatic situation, to distance themselves in order to survive, avoid further harm, and restore stability to their lives. This response can be understood through the framework of emotionally driven coping strategies, which at the community level manifest as a “pact of silence” approach.

This tactic appears as a quiet refusal to discuss personal experiences or form opinions about issues beyond daily life. Consequently, Belarusians generally steer clear of politics, and a large portion of the population either remains silent or chooses not to openly support any specific economic strategy. Two-thirds of Belarusians are unable to respond to questions regarding the country’s achievements or shortcomings.

Notably, this tendency to silence traumatic experiences of the past five years is supported and even encouraged by the regime itself (specifically through the use of “anti-extremist” legislation). Contrary to this recent traumatic experience, the regime continues to systemically implant its version of the chosen trauma — the so-called genocide of the Belarusian people during the Great Patriotic War.

The current status of Belarusian society can be characterized as a deep emotional alienation from the state. The image of authority shifts from a “protector” to an “aggressor,” making social stability in the country fragile despite outward silence.

Conclusion

In the near future, unless a new significant “game changer” emerges, the Lukashenko regime is likely to continue advancing toward establishing a totalitarian state. It will also likely rely on hybrid aggression — ranging from border crises to nuclear blackmail — as a tool of foreign policy, which will further restrict Belarusian sovereignty.

Economic challenges such as low wages and inflation will remain the primary sources of potential social discontent. The authorities will try to address these by promoting the “trauma of the past” and sustaining repressive control over society, although in certain areas, their capacity for repression is already nearing its limit.

In 2026, emotional alienation between society and the government is expected to deepen. The regime will be increasingly perceived as an aggressor, and society’s primary survival tactic will continue to be the “pact of silence.” This will create an illusion of stability despite mounting internal tensions.