Belarus – China Relations: Ambitious goals, dour achievements, uncertain outlook

Arseny Sivitsky

Summary

The Belarus – China relationship has been marked by intense diplomatic engagement, yet with limited economic gains. In 2025, Alexander Lukashenko visited China twice, the sixth meeting of the intergovernmental committee took place, several documents were signed, and both nations proclaimed an “all-weather strategic partnership.”

China is Belarus’s second-largest trading partner after Russia, surpassing the European Union, and continues to be a vital supplier of technological goods amid Western sanctions-driven isolation. At the same time, Belarus accounts for only a negligible fraction of China’s trade volume.

Although robust institutional connections and aligned political interests indicate considerable potential for expanding bilateral cooperation, Chinese assessments indicate that prospects are constrained by sanctions risks, heavy reliance on Russia, insufficient market reforms, and a tense, unstable internal political environment — challenges that demand immediate attention.

Trends:

Boisterous contacts and limited results

A defining feature of 2025 was the vigorous personal diplomacy with Chinese President Xi Jinping, with Lukashenko making two visits to China, thus bringing the total number of his visits to sixteen.1

On May 21, Minsk hosted Liu Guozhong, Vice Premier of the State Council, for the sixth session of the Belarusian–Chinese Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee. The visit was part of the preparations for the upcoming June summit between the two leaders. During the meeting, a memorandum on the digital economy and a protocol on flagship scientific and technological projects for 2025–2026 were signed, and both sides agreed to establish a new industrial cooperation commission within the intergovernmental committee, which Belarus considers a priority. However, all of the signed documents are primarily declarative and do not impose specific obligations on Beijing.

The June 3–5 visit was informal. The meeting between Lukashenko and Xi Jinping took place at the Zhongnanhai private residence in a one-on-one setting. No concrete economic agreements were announced afterward — the results were decided to be “kept under wraps.”

The August 31–September 3 visit coincided with Belarus’s participation in the SCO summit in Tianjin — the first such event for Belarus as a full member. Lukashenko held bilateral and expanded talks with Xi Jinping. In Beijing, a series of closed-door meetings were also held with leaders of Chinese companies in sectors including industry, automotive and engine manufacturing, greenhouse farming, and floriculture.2

The September 22 meeting with Li Xi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, did not clarify the prospects for implementing the agreements reached in Beijing.3 The context of the visit is notable: shortly before it, Poland suspended railway links with Belarus due to the joint Russia – Belarus strategic exercise ‘Zapad 2025’, a move that blocked the transit of Chinese goods along the China – Europe – China route. Official Minsk claimed that Poland’s action harmed China’s geo-economic interests in Eastern Europe, hoping to use Beijing to put Warsaw under pressure. However, its strategy failed: the outcome of the talks between Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was China’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Belarus and Poland, essentially pushing Minsk toward concessions.4

Additionally, Li Xi’s visit to Minsk formed part of a broader European tour that started in Greece — a crucial hub of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, where a smuggling operation involving Chinese containers had been uncovered. Polish customs officials had previously detected illegal Belarusian cigarettes in container trains moving from China to Europe. Evidently, this matter was likely included in the negotiations agenda.

Circumventing technical regulations also contributed to increased tensions, as Chinese customs discovered that Minsk was re-exporting Turkish and Ukrainian poultry to China disguised as Belarusian products. Between 2023 and 2024, China repeatedly revoked licenses from Belarusian suppliers; by 2025, 11 of the 13 certified poultry farms had been barred from the Chinese market, resulting in estimated annual losses of at least USD 140 million.

In the public segment of the meeting, Li Xi limited his remarks to rhetoric about the “all-weather strategic partnership” and opposition to unilateral sanctions. However, his emphasis on strengthening cooperation within the Belt and Road Initiative and advancing the China – Belarus ‘Great Stone’ Industrial Park appeared to serve as an implicit critique, since the joint project had not met expectations as an industrial and logistics hub with access to the European market.

Record trade turnover with widening structural deficit

In 2025, bilateral commodity trade between Belarus and China exceeded USD 8.85 billion for the first time (an increase of 5.5 % year-on-year), and overall trade, including services, reached USD 12 billion. Over the past decade, China’s share of Belarus’s external trade doubled, reaching 11 %. China imports 30 % of Belarus’s potash exports, 45 % of rapeseed oil, 50 % of linen fibers, 33 % of timber, and 37 % of milk whey.5 Consequently, China is Belarus’s second-largest trading partner after Russia, surpassing the total trade with the European Union by roughly USD 1 billion. In December 2025, monthly trade turnover between the two countries exceeded USD 1 billion for the first time.

However, these record figures conceal a significant structural imbalance. Chinese exports to Belarus amounted to USD 7.19 billion (up by 9.3 %), while Belarusian exports to China were only USD 1.66 billion (down by 8.4 %). Belarus’s trade deficit with China thereby reached USD 5.53 billion, expending by 15.9 % over the year and more than fivefold from 2019 (when it was below USD 1 billion). In 2025, all growth in two-way trade was driven solely by Chinese exports, while Belarusian shipments to China declined for most of the year.

Import structure vividly illustrates Belarus’s reliance on the Chinese market. Three main product groups constitute roughly 70 % of imports: vehicles and components (30 %), industrial and agricultural equipment (25 %), and electrical and electronic goods (15 %). The swift increase in Chinese supplies in these categories aligns chronologically with a decline in European imports due to sanctions, clearly highlighting China’s role as a substitute for essential technological products under Western sanctions pressure.

Belarusian exports to China mainly consist of raw materials: fertilizers (45 %, with exports decreasing from USD 844 million to USD 747 million), fats and oils (17 %), timber (14 %), and meat and by-products (7 %, sharply dropping from USD 272 million to 108 million following the withdrawal of export certificates for Belarusian poultry). The decline in major exports coupled with increasing imports is more structural than caused by the temporary market situation, reflecting that the Belarusian economy does not produce enough goods that are in demand in the Chinese market.

This deficit has been recorded monthly throughout 2023–2025 without exception. For China, the Belarusian market accounted for a negligible share of 0.191 % of the country’s total exports and 0.064 % of imports in 2025. Economically, relations with Beijing are critically important for Minsk, whereas for China, Belarus is a barely noticeable entry in trade statistics.

The ratification of the Agreement on Service Trade and Investment between Belarus and China in February 2025 represents a major milestone.6 This arrangement creates a supportive framework aimed at attracting Chinese investors to Belarus and provides Belarus with access to the Chinese market under conditions comparable to those granted by China to its key Southeast Asian partners. Belarusian officials expect that this will help reverse the ongoing trade deficit in commodities.

However, experts from relevant agencies note that, despite the progressive provisions of the agreement, its practical implementation faces considerable challenges. China benefits from broader access to the Belarusian market, while Belarusian suppliers continue to face barriers, particularly when operating through commercial presence (Mode 3). Additionally, many of Belarus’s commitments are marked as unbound, which diminishes transparency and the actual prospects for market access. Restrictions on the physical presence of specialists — such as limits on duration, citizenship requirements, and labor tests — remain strict. Additionally, the agreement falls short in covering key areas such as public procurement, e-commerce, and investment protection. It also lacks dispute resolution mechanisms grounded in the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle, mutual recognition of electronic signatures, and China's commitments to establish branches, thereby placing Belarus at a relative disadvantage.

In this context, the official forecasts of a 12–15% growth in service exports and a 30% increase in investments appear overstated: experts from relevant agencies project only an 8–8.5% annual growth in service exports under current conditions. More ambitious targets (14–14.5%) could be achieved only through liberalization and further legal adjustments in Belarus and China. Without substantial expansion of commitments and removal of regulatory barriers, the actual impact of the agreement will remain limited. Only by adding a free trade zone for goods — making it a “deep” agreement — can Belarus realistically expect a 3.45 % increase in gross exports and 0.45 % GDP growth.7

A similar outlook applies to investment cooperation. Notably, in 2025, for the first time in bilateral relations, China ranked second among the largest investors in Belarusian economy (up from fifth place in 2015).8 As of the nine months of 2025, Chinese investments totaled USD 443 million — an increase of 160 % compared to the same period in 2024.

Over the past decade, total Chinese investments in Belarus have exceeded USD 2 billion. The number of enterprises with Chinese capital grew 240 % — from 67 in 2015 to 230 in 2025. However, within the EAEU framework, Belarus’s share remains modest: according to EDB estimates, direct Chinese investments in Belarus over ten years amounted to USD 550 million, compared to USD 17.45 billion in Russia and USD 11.41 billion in Kazakhstan.9

Structural constraints and unfulfilled potential

The overall situation forced Lukashenko to acknowledge the failure of Directive No. 9 dated December 3, 2021, “On the Development of Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Belarus and the People’s Republic of China” through 2025.10 Despite the proclaimed special status of Belarus – China relations, economic cooperation remains modest. In 2025, Belarus’s exports to China surpassed its deliveries to the European Union, but represented only 4 % of Belarus’s total foreign supplies.

The failure is also evident in the attraction of Chinese investments: in the first nine months of 2025, they expanded 150 % to USD 443 million, but this is still well below the targets set in the directive (at least USD 500 million annually and a minimum of USD 150 million in direct investments in each region).

The extent of the shortfall becomes even clearer when examining the indicators of the three-year regional cooperation program with Chinese provinces for 2023–2025: by early 2025, 17 of the 35 planned activities had been removed from oversight and canceled, including key projects for Belarus such as the potassium fertilizer terminal in Tianjin, a pharmaceutical cluster, and joint fertilizer production, indicating a failure to achieve key objectives.

The Chinese authorities have consistently demonstrated limited interest in Belarusian initiatives, declining to engage in the development of a pharmaceutical cluster, industrial sub-parks, assembly of HONGQI vehicles, or the launch of the Chongqing – Minsk air route due to concerns over sanctions risks. The Great Stone Industrial Park, often touted as a flagship project of Chinese–Belarusian economic collaboration, has produced minimal tangible outcomes, mainly consisting of negotiations and memoranda, with only a few successful operations, such as the assembly of Midea refrigerators.

A survey of 164 leading Belarusian industrial enterprises indicates that, despite claims of a strategic partnership, Belarus – China economic cooperation remains asymmetric and predominantly import-oriented.11 More than half of Belarusian industrial firms collaborate with China, which is limited to the procurement of Chinese components and equipment, while reciprocal investments and technological exchanges are minimal. Joint investment initiatives are virtually absent, with only 2.2 % of enterprises involved in projects with Chinese capital, and Chinese loans accounting for no more than 1.3 % of the total investments attracted by Belarusian industrial companies.

For Belarusian organizations, setting up assembly production of Belarusian goods in China is considered unappealing. Just 0.8 % of respondents report benefiting from this, as China boasts a well-developed machinery industry and does not need Belarusian components for domestic assembly of finished products.

“Connected” lending channels funds exclusively towards the purchase of Chinese goods, equipment, and labor, sidestepping the Belarusian labor market and reducing the local multiplier effect. The mismatch of standards, settlement restrictions due to sanctions, and the absence of institutional frameworks for financing joint projects further reinforce an imbalanced, one-sided cooperation model.

According to industry experts, under an active diversification strategy, Belarusian exports to China could grow from USD 1.84 billion in 2024 to USD 3.1 billion by 2030. However, unlocking this potential depends on aligning products with Chinese technical standards and deploying targeted marketing strategies.

Belarus lags considerably behind China in the development of infrastructure and institutions for the digital economy. Collaboration with Chinese technological ecosystems is confined to isolated agreements and lacks comprehensive institutional backing.

Belarus-specific risks: China’s perspective

As early as 2015, while recognizing positive aspects of Belarus’s business environment, Chinese experts also pointed out potential political and economic risks: dominance of a planned economy, lack of structural reforms, unstable economic policies, worsening economic crisis, and heavy reliance on Russia; threats of unpredictable leadership changes and power transitions; the potential for a “color revolution”; and negative repercussions from the Ukraine crisis.12 Since 2020, and especially after 2022, these risks have materialized.

In the 2025 Belarusian investment climate report, China’s Ministry of Commerce highlighted five main risk categories for Chinese investors: secondary sanctions imposed by the U. S. and EU; payment channel disruptions caused by financial sanctions and increased caution among Chinese banks; shortages of qualified workers and technical experts; elevated logistics costs and unpredictable timelines due to reliance on land transportation, complicating cost control and project implementation; and a deteriorating reputation of certain Belarusian companies, as evidenced by cases of prepayments received without subsequent delivery.13

A survey of twenty companies with Chinese capital in Belarus identified several deterrents: limited capacity of regional markets; inadequate skill levels of the local workforce; the significant impact of sanctions, including challenges in international payments and logistics; restricted access to Western European markets; and the dominance of the state sector in the Belarusian economy.14

Despite the country’s unique advantages — such as its geographical location, industrial and scientific infrastructure, human resource potential, and internal political stability — Xinhua Silk Road, the Belt and Road (BRI) portal, assesses the overall investment risk within the BRI as high.15

In the political arena, the concentration of power in Lukashenko’s hands ensures apparent stability but also introduces systemic risks: corruption, public discontent (notably during protests and strikes in 2020), and uncertainty regarding leadership succession. The system is highly personalized, with weakened independence of parliament and government, suppressed opposition, and economic decisions enacted through presidential decrees that bypass legislative procedures. Institutional development remains insufficient.

The administrative model, centered around the dominance of state-owned enterprises, ensures continuity and strict enforcement of operational discipline; however, the private sector is limited, barriers to foreign capital are high, and labor and tax laws lack transparency.

Investment projects require political endorsement and approval from the Presidential Administration, the KGB, and specialized ministries. Land use, profit repatriation, mergers and acquisitions, foreign investment approval, and government procurement are high-risk areas prone to corruption due to the absence of transparent regulations, excessive centralization of authority, weak oversight mechanisms, and controlled media.

In the geopolitical arena, there remains a potential for Belarus to be passively drawn into the Russia – Ukraine conflict. The presence of Russian troops, deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, and transit of munitions position the country — despite its non-participation — as a rear base for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and as a staging ground for confrontation with NATO. Ukraine has not ruled out launching strikes against Russian military targets on Belarusian territory. NATO is expanding its presence in Poland and Lithuania, increasing the risk of miscalculations and regional escalation.

Support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the “weaponization” of refugees, information warfare, and geopolitical pressure have strained relations with neighboring countries. Belarus faces strict sanctions from European nations and the U. S., with prospects of further tightening, raising doubts about the China – Europe container train route passing through Belarus as a logistics hub. The economy, financial sector, foreign policy, and military sphere are deeply integrated with Russia, with dependence on Moscow steadily increasing.

Since the 2020 protests, Belarus has carried out a comprehensive purge of the opposition, and public space is tightly controlled. The risk of violent protests and terrorist attacks is low; however, quasi-military opposition groups might serve as a “provocative trigger.” At the same time, latent instability and “silent radicalization” are building among the large émigré youth population.

Economically, the private sector remains suppressed, the investment climate is unfavorable, and Lukashenko shows little interest in implementing economic reforms. Despite modest and declining growth rates — from 2.1–2.4 % down to an expected 0.8 % by 2029 — structural economic risks are increasing due to the high dependence on the Russian market, with over 50 % of combined trade turnover, reliance on supplies of raw materials and energy, prolonged effects of international sanctions, limited external financing options, and a restricted space for monetary, credit, and fiscal policy. Sanctions hamper the development of high-tech industries; the economy lacks long-term internal growth drivers. Budget deficits and high social spending aimed at maintaining political stability further constrain investments in development, infrastructure, and modernization.

Belarus’s deep involvement in the Russia – Ukraine conflict increases the likelihood of geopolitical tensions impacting its economy. Western sanctions, including disconnection from SWIFT, stringent currency controls, and chronic devaluation of the Belarusian ruble lead to currency losses when subsidiaries repatriate profits to parent companies. Consumer inflation remains elevated, foreign reserves are limited, and external debt is substantial at 42.9 % of GDP, further worsened by “junk” credit ratings.

In the legal domain, Belarus’s investment climate is hindered by opaque enforcement practices, significant administrative interference amid a weak rule of law, and insufficient guarantees for the enforcement of contractual obligations. Corporate legislation, presidential decrees, and government resolutions impose substantial restrictions on foreign investors. Environmental regulations are strict: violations can result in project suspensions, as seen with a Chinese battery plant in Brest that sparked mass protests in 2018–2019.

Operationally, Belarus’s infrastructure is relatively developed; however, its modernization has decelerated in recent years. Railway and road logistics, warehouse facilities, and parts of the energy network face risks of physical deterioration and obsolescence. In the context of geopolitical conflict, railway and road logistics chains are vulnerable to disruption, which increases production and transportation costs.

The country is experiencing rapid population aging, a critical shortage of skilled labor, and significant outflows of technical workers and highly qualified specialists due to mass emigration to Poland, Lithuania, and Russia. Labor costs are rising. The process of recruiting foreign workers is complex and requires approval from the Interior Ministry, complicating cross-border management and staffing for Chinese enterprises.

Overall, Chinese assessments indicate that the investment climate is worsened by Belarus’s involvement in the Russia – Ukraine war, Western sanctions-related isolation, complete dependence on the Russian economy, low political predictability, lack of reforms, and shrinking government financial resources.

Instead of a conclusion: deadlock or gateway of the Silk Road?

Since 2013, when Belarus and China declared a comprehensive strategic partnership, it has taken a decade to achieve one of the highest levels of cooperation with Beijing — the “all-weather” comprehensive strategic partnership in 2022. Robust institutional collaboration and shared political interests underscore the significant promise for deepening bilateral ties. Nevertheless, as the last ten years have shown, potential by itself does not ensure automatic progress or substantial economic benefits.

The primary reason for this is Belarus’s deviation from the agreements made with Beijing during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Belarus in May 2015. At that time, the plan was for Belarus to serve as a substitute for Ukraine — destabilized by Russia through the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Donbas in 2014 — within China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Eastern Europe. According to these plans, Belarus was supposed to become an industrial and logistics hub for high-tech industries utilizing Chinese technologies and investments, with access to European markets.16 The political crisis of 2020 and Belarus’s involvement in Russia’s conflict against Ukraine effectively wiped out these prospects.

Consequently, Belarus’s vision and outcomes within China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the broader outlook for China – Belarus cooperation, will largely hinge on Minsk’s ability to align with Beijing’s expectations regarding risk mitigation — both internally and externally.17 Ultimately, this entails distancing from Russia’s war against Ukraine, reducing critical reliance on Russia, stabilizing the domestic political landscape, pursuing reforms and policies of openness, as well as restoring relations with Western countries, and gaining access to their markets.