Presidential Administration: the 2020 trauma, personalization of power, and imitation of elections

Valer Karbalevich

Summary

The unresolved “2020 syndrome” remained the dominant influence on the Presidential Administration. Instead of prioritizing the urgent issues and challenges facing the country, the authorities primarily focused on neutralizing perceived or fabricated threats to the regime.

The presidential election became an attempt to break free from this “syndrome” and grant renewed legitimacy to Lukashenko’s rule. He sought a new term, among other reasons, to reaffirm his strength to the public, elites, and himself — portraying himself as the Victor. Yet, his goal was only partially achieved. His victory over artificial, caricatured opponents did not genuinely reflect his political strength.

Trends

Role of the Presidential Administration in the power system

In 2025, the position and function of the Presidential Administration (PA) in Belarus’s political system showed no change. Its role has remained consistent throughout all of the 30 years of Lukashenko’s leadership. In a sense, the PA can be considered the political core of the Belarusian authority. However, this is only a nominal designation, because in reality, the PA does not craft state policy. It is Alexander Lukashenko himself who formulates it. The primary role of the PA is to serve as the initial link in the chain from Lukashenko to other state institutions.

The PA’s competencies encompass the preparation of state documents as well as monitoring their alignment with the overarching policy. In 2025, two directives were issued: Directive No. 11 “On improving the functioning of government and management systems, strengthening executive discipline,” on April 2; and Directive No. 12 “On implementing the fundamentals of the ideology of the Belarusian state,” on April 9. Within the Belarusian power structure, directives hold the status of top-level state documents. Over the course of 31 years under Lukashenko’s leadership, a total of 12 directives have been adopted.

The PA is also tasked with overseeing the implementation of documents, instructions, and both written and oral orders issued by Lukashenko. Last year, this oversight proved to be ineffective, with Lukashenko himself admitting that about one-third of his directives went unfulfilled in 2025.

Additionally, the PA is responsible for personnel policy and organizing political campaigns, including elections (see below).

In mid-2024, the senior PA officials were replaced. The position of the head of Lukashenko’s administration had remained vacant for nearly six months since January when Igor Sergeyenko became an MP.

Lukashenko took so long to choose because, within the Belarusian political hierarchy, the head of the PA is effectively the second most powerful figure after the ruler himself. It is crucial that this official combine political loyalty with strong managerial skills.

Additionally, the new head of the Presidential Administration faced a highly important task: to ensure the successful conduct of the 2025 presidential campaign with a guaranteed outcome.

On June 27, 2024, Dmitry Krutoi was appointed head of the PA. This choice was not surprising, as there are few influential figures within Lukashenko’s circle who possess the necessary managerial capabilities. Krutoi had climbed the career ladder through roles such as minister of economy, first vice prime minister, deputy head of the PA, and ambassador to Russia.

Lukashenko once remarked at a meeting that the Belarusian embassy in Russia functions as the second government of Belarus. Its head — the ambassador — is effectively the second-in-command of the government, and in case of Krutoi, the more so because he retained the powers of a vice-premier. Given his prominent status, the new PA head was tasked with overseeing Belarus’s policy toward Russia, giving him a better chance to secure Moscow’s support in Lukashenko’s upcoming re-election campaign.

Meanwhile, the reappointment of Natalia Petkevich as first deputy head of the Presidential Administration came as a surprise. Responsible for ideology, she had fallen out of favor after mishandling the 2010 presidential campaign. However, now Petkevich has an opportunity to redeem herself.

The overarching factor shaping Belarusian politics remained the unresolved “2020 syndrome.” The trauma inflicted on the leadership by the protests was so profound that it fostered a psychological complex within the ruling elites. Consequently, they began to interpret every issue through the lens of regime security. Lukashenko saw threats everywhere. Consequently, all policies focused on neutralizing real or fabricated threats, rather than addressing pressing issues and challenges facing the country.

The regime’s uniform approach to threat neutralization was brute force. The authoritarian rule continued to evolve into a totalitarian system. Not only was the opposition dismantled as an institution and civil society structures shattered, but dissent as a fundamental principle was also criminalized. A classic police state took shape, with security forces becoming the central pillars of the political system. A comprehensive purge of the public sector was conducted, dismissing all individuals deemed disloyal. Contrary to many expectations, political repression did not wane. The regime’s consolidation relied heavily on the ideological narrative of “people’s unity,” which entailed uniting Lukashenko’s supporters, repression, and marginalizing all dissenters — effectively excluding them from the concept of “the people.”

Personnel policy

As noted above, one of the primary responsibilities of the Presidential Administration is the recruitment and appointment of personnel, including placing officials in high-ranking positions. However, in 2025, for the first time during Lukashenko’s rule, this function of the Administration was called into question. The criticism of the PA’s personnel policy was voiced publicly. Essentially, Lukashenko expressed a lack of confidence in the PA leadership’s handling of this aspect of state policy.

Following the presidential election, the government, as mandated by the Constitution, resigned, and according to the applicable procedure, the newly elected president was to form the new executive body. Traditionally, this task falls to the Presidential Administration.

However, this time, things unfolded differently. For the first time in history, Lukashenko announced during a meeting with his authorized representatives that a commission would be established to propose candidates for the new government.1 Later, in a meeting with Natalya Kochanova, the chair of the Council of the Republic, Lukashenko again mentioned the unusual commission and revealed that Dmitry Krutoi, the head of the Presidential Administration, had been appointed as its chair.

If the commission had genuinely operated and made decisions, it would have been logical to review its findings and proposals before finalizing the composition of the new government. However, no such process appears to have taken place. There is no available information about the commission’s work or any reports being presented to Lukashenko. It remains unclear whether the commission was actually established, whether it was functioning, or what the true purpose of that game was.

On November 20, during discussions on personnel matters, Lukashenko openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the work of PA Head Krutoi. He stated: “There must be no voluntarism. You can’t do whatever comes to your mind, whether you’re a presidential aide, head of the Administration, or anyone else. We need to consult before proposing any appointments. This way, we won’t be shuffling this deck every year or every two or three years.”2

So, what does Lukashenko suggest in order to address this issue? He proposes: “We need to strengthen this area within the Presidential Administration. I don’t even know how — I’ll leave that to you… Maybe [establish] some kind of council or something.”3

Lukashenko’s instruction reflects a bureaucratic cliché — a standard response by an official to a problem: to strengthen, to increase, to expand, and to deepen. And, as with the challenge of forming the new government, to create a commission to tackle the matter.

Another example is the longstanding Commission for Pardons under Lukashenko, chaired by Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Olga Chupris. In 2022, a migrant readmission commission was established, led by former prosecutor general Andrei Shved. Last year, its scope was expanded to include advising Lukashenko on the possible release of political prisoners. In essence, Shved’s commission duplicates the functions of Chupris’s commission. Once again, this raises the question: is this a sign of distrust in the structure led by the deputy head of the Presidential Administration?

Moreover, these examples highlight that procedures grounded in the Constitution and laws are being disregarded; they appear to hold little real significance in Belarus. Everything seems to depend solely on the will, desire, and often the whim of a single individual. This is a clear manifestation of a personalistic regime in its purest form.

Presidential election

The presidential election took place on January 26, 2025. Each Belarusian presidential campaign has its unique characteristics. The 2025 election, however, was notably the most uneventful in the country’s history. Lukashenko justified the lack of excitement by claiming that, unlike in the United States, there is no need for spectacle.

The main objective of that election, from the authorities’ perspective, was to move beyond the so-called “2020 syndrome.” They sought to demonstrate that something odd had occurred at the previous election — some anomaly, absurdity — and that everything was returning back to normal.

Lukashenko ran for another term not only for practical reasons but also to prove — perhaps even to himself — that the syndrome had been overcome. It was an opportunity to demonstrate his strength to society and the elite, and to present himself as the Victor.

Furthermore, Lukashenko’s participation indicates that the transition of power was put on hold, postponed, or perhaps even taken off the agenda altogether.

However, the goal of demonstrating “Victory” was only partially realized. Following 2020, the authorities began to view elections as a threat and a source of danger, developing a deep-seated fear of the electoral process itself. For Lukashenko, the word “elections” became associated with revolution, coup, and protests rather than simply voting. Naturally, within this logic, the authorities treated the election as a military operation, fearing the ghosts of 2020. Lukashenko frequently referenced his opponents — whom he called “fugitives” — at nearly every meeting, thereby amplifying their perceived agency and influence.

To suppress any protests, the entire state apparatus was mobilized — not just security forces. Opposition participation was blocked, voting abroad was canceled, and invitations to OSCE/ODIHR observers were arranged in a way that ensured their rejection. The composition of election commissions was kept secret, as was the strength of the opposition’s initiative groups. Lukashenko had imprisoned his main opponents or forced them into exile.

The regime’s insecurity was further reflected in the decision to hold the presidential election six months earlier than the constitutional term, which stipulates a five-year presidential mandate. An election conducted only four and a half years after the previous one is legally classified as an “early election,” which is only permissible if the current president is unable to perform his duties for some reason. The authorities offered no explanation for the need to hold the election prematurely, nor did they justify Lukashenko’s decision to run again, despite his numerous promises not to seek another term.

Most likely, Lukashenko aimed to swiftly “turn the page” in his relationship with the West by scheduling the election ahead of the usual timeline. As part of this strategy, he pardoned 115 political prisoners and announced plans for further releases. The objective was to have the West recognize his regime, thereby legitimizing Lukashenko and delegitimizing Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. This was significant because it would allow him to argue to Western politicians that, even if they viewed her as an elected president, her five-year term had ended with the new election. Lukashenko’s participation in Ukraine peace negotiations would also depend on Western recognition of his legitimate authority.

The propaganda campaign under the slogan Nado! (You Must) initially started as a flash mob, seemingly encouraging Lukashenko to run in the election. Over time, it evolved into the central slogan of the entire presidential campaign, emphasizing obligatory support for the incumbent leader. The slogan carried a coercive undertone, effectively mandating participation and stripping away any semblance of voluntary choice — even at the level of official propaganda. This presidential election marked a pivotal turning point, reflecting the regime’s development and transition into a new phase.

On December 23, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Belarus registered five presidential candidates: Alexander Lukashenko, Oleg Gaidukevich, Sergei Syrankov, Hanna Kanapatskaya, and Alexander Khizhnyak. Among them, three candidates represented registered political parties.

The pre-election process was a complete sham. For instance, the collection of signatures in support of the candidates was orchestrated. Very few people approached individual pickets in the cities, and there were no reports of initiative group members going door-to-door to gather signatures.

Meanwhile, the selection of several candidates other than Lukashenko was aimed at giving the false impression that this election was no different from those in the past. Essentially, everything remained familiar: multiple contenders would collect signatures, appear on Belarusian Television (BT), and the ballot would feature numerous names.

Having sparring partners and spoilers for Lukashenko during the presidential elections is nothing new. Typically, Sergey Gaidukevich played this role. However, there was a different plan for him — he was kept in reserve in case Lukashenko’s genuine opponents unexpectedly withdrew their candidacies during the campaign. Such a scenario would have left Lukashenko as the sole candidate, potentially disrupting the narrative the authorities had crafted. In that case, Gaidukevich could have served as a manufactured alternative to maintain the illusion of competition.

In the 2025 campaign, however, the spoilers took on a different role. They were intended to appear as Lukashenko’s opponents while simultaneously endorsing the existing regime and its policies. In other words, they ran for president to support the sole, irreplaceable leader. While this practice is common in some Central Asian countries, it was a completely new experience for Belarus.

However, the authorities failed to develop a clear strategy for how to present these candidates or integrate them into a new narrative for the election campaign. The problem arose when the regime itself inadvertently introduced a contradiction: by allowing several additional candidates into the straightforward, somewhat primitive Nado! campaign — focused on the cult of personality of Lukashenko — they unleashed a virus. This resulted in a dissonance — a paradox: totalitarian regimes do not permit any form of pluralism, not even superficial diversity or variability. There is only one nation and one leader. As a result, ordinary citizens struggled to understand the underlying logic. If Lukashenko’s candidacy is portrayed as the only viable choice within the propaganda-driven rhetoric of political unity and cohesion, then by definition, no genuine alternative can exist. The presence of other candidates in this system is therefore nonsensical. Additionally, the public was well aware that many individuals had been punished in 2020 for supporting alternative contenders.

It is no coincidence that Lukashenko himself admitted, “people are somewhat reluctant to sign in support of another candidate.”4 To manage this awkward situation and implement the original plan involving multiple presidential contenders who needed to gather signatures, the authorities were forced to resort to coercion, mobilizing the state apparatus to support these other candidates. From an outsider’s perspective, all of this appears quite comical.

Regarding the substance of Lukashenko’s so-called “pre-election program,” it remains straightforward and unpretentious. No significant changes are anticipated; the government intends to continue with its existing policies. New external threats have emerged — Western adversaries and their satellites are attempting to embroil Belarus in a conflict — making constant mobilization essential. Nonetheless, Lukashenko positions himself as the guardian of peace and security, assuring citizens they can sleep peacefully.

During visits to regional communities, his promises and plans appeared more pragmatic. His visions for the future often echoed reflections on the past — such as the revitalization of land reclamation projects and similar initiatives.

Lukashenko began celebrating his election victory as early as election day, January 26, during a press conference with the media. He continued to express his jubilation on February 4, after the official results were announced (according to the Central Election Commission, he received 86.82% of the votes), during a meeting with his authorized representatives. He did not hide his satisfaction, perhaps relieved that the mass protests of 2020 had not recurred: “The election went quietly and peacefully. They [opponents] are still wandering around with their mouths open, wondering how this was possible… Overwhelming support — unprecedented in history… Be sure that more than 90% of the population unequivocally supports us.”5

How much of these claims are strategic PR, and how much genuine confidence is there in this so-called “overwhelming support”? Does Lukashenko truly believe he has once again become the “people’s president,” as he styled himself in the 1990s and 2000s?

It is doubtful he harbors any illusions about widespread popular affection. What he calls a “normal compromise with the people” was achieved at the expense of forcing around half a million Belarusians to emigrate and sending tens of thousands to prison. The supposed “unity” was maintained through unprecedented repression, comparable to Stalinist times. There is nothing “original” about this election; such electoral processes are characteristic of all authoritarian regimes.

It’s no coincidence that Lukashenko’s inauguration was scheduled for March 25 — on Freedom Day — carrying symbolic significance as a display of his victory over political opponents.

However, the legitimacy of this victory is highly questionable. In previous elections — aside from 2020 — Lukashenko managed to defeat serious challengers through various means. This time, he secured victory primarily over fabricated, somewhat caricatured figures, which does not reflect genuine political strength.

Conclusion

The process of the Lukashenko regime evolving toward a new, more overtly totalitarian form, along with the accompanying totalitarian tendencies, has been closely overseen by the Presidential Administration. Political repression and violence — broadly defined — have become the main tools for consolidating power. The escalation of Lukashenko’s cult of personality and the personalization of authority have objectively contributed to a decline in the status of all state institutions, including the Presidential Administration itself.

The presidential election, conducted as a complete sham of the electoral process, failed to heal the wounds left by 2020. Efforts to incorporate Lukashenko’s formal opponents into a new electoral narrative were ultimately futile. The outcome of the vote served primarily to forcibly legitimize the existing regime.

As long as Lukashenko remains in power, it is likely that the political system will stay fundamentally unchanged. The president will continue to consolidate power by replacing the functions of other government institutions — particularly the Presidential Administration, which he distrusts. Genuine change can only occur after Lukashenko leaves office.