Belarus–Poland: in the Shadow of the Regional War

Anna Dyner

Summary

Amid the escalating security crisis in the region caused primarily by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, supported by Minsk, the year 2022 turned out quite challenging for Belarus–Poland relations. The Lukashenko regime continued to exploit the border meltdown scenario, kept accusing Poland of wishing to attack Belarus, persecuted members of the Polish minority, and impeded the operation of Polish diplomatic and consular services.

Belarus pursued a highly confrontational historical policy on Poland — all the way to the destruction of Polish memorials. Since the above factors will likely remain in place as the main drivers of the Belarus–Poland relationship, there will hardly be any improvements in the near future.

Trends:

Political relations

The deterioration of the Belarus–Poland relationship as a trend that became visible more than two years ago was further consolidated throughout the year 2022. The reasons were as follows: Belarus' support for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; offensive historical policy; ongoing repression against civil society, including the Polish minority.

Belarus' hostility towards Poland was manifested, among others, in Minsk’s toughening official rhetoric. On September 17, the Day of National Unity, celebrated since 2021, Aleksandr Lukashenko suggested that the period of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth should be viewed as the occupation of the Belarussian land by Poles and treated as the ethnocide of the Belarussians. He went on to say that Poland not only failed to remember that its liberation in 1945 was largely due to heroic sacrifices of the Belarusians, but also pursues an anti-Belarus policy.1

The Belarusian authorities staged a series of pickets in front of Polish diplomatic offices. On April 19, a protest against the “anti-Belarus” policy of the Polish authorities was organized in front of the Polish Embassy in Minsk, and on April 26, a picket was held to condemn the construction of a fence on the border. On October 12 and November 11, anti-Poland protests were also staged near the Consulate General of Poland in Hrodna.

The authorities started destroying Polish memorials as part of their historical campaign. In July, the tomb of the Armia Krajowa soldiers killed in 1944 in the vicinity of Mikuliski in the Hrodna Region was demolished. Acts of vandalism and destruction of burial sites were also registered in Jodkavicy, Vaukavysk, Kacycy, Stryjouka, Surkont, Pieskaucy, and Pliebaniski. The Katyn cross at the military cemetery in Hrodna was damaged.2

Belarusian official media released reports that back in the 1920s and 1930s, Belarus suffered significant losses due to the fact that its western lands were part of the II Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Those statements explicitly hinted that in the future Belarus might consider demanding compensation from Poland for that period.3

Propaganda started to promote the image of Poles as Nazis who persecuted Belarusians during the two decades between the world wars. This approach borrows a portion of Russia’s anti-Poland historical policy model. It is also suitable for highlighting allegedly revanchist and imperialist forces in Poland, which, according to propagandists, aspire to reclaim Belarus' western lands.

Polish politicians, for their part, support the Belarusian opposition and insist that the Lukashenko regime is responsible for the military aggression against Ukraine. The incidents and facts listed above clearly indicate that all official political contacts were suspended.

At the same time, Warsaw maintained active communications with Lukashenko’s opponents in exile. In 2022, President Andrzej Duda had three meetings with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in Warsaw to discuss the situation in Belarus, Minsk’s support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, and repression of the Polish minority in Belarus.4 Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau and Minister of the Interior Mariusz Kamiński also met with Tsikhanouskaya and members of her transitional cabinet. The Polish politicians unanimously emphasized that a democratic and free Belarus was an essential security guarantee for Poland.

Military relations and security issues

Throughout 2022, Belarus offered its unconditional support for Russia in its aggression against Ukraine, providing its territory, ensuring logistics, training soldiers, making transfers of equipment and ammunition, and taking care of the wounded. Poland expressed clear criticism of these actions. Warsaw consistently refused to carry out any military inspections under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as well as the Vienna Document. The only manifestation of cooperation in security was the involvement of the Polish military attaché in the presentation of the Belarusian checkpoints on the border with Ukraine.5

As in 2021, the Belarusian authorities kept accusing Poland of waging a hybrid war, preparing for the annexation of Belarus' western territories, and supporting entities that wish to seize power in Belarus. Minsk continuously referred to the allegedly unambiguous facts of the militarization of Poland.

The regime took advantage of the supposed threats from NATO in order to deepen its military integration with Russia, specifically to deploy a regional grouping of troops. Poland criticized that initiative as an element contributing to increased tensions in the region.

Throughout 2022, Poland — along with Lithuania and Latvia — was making efforts to curb the border crisis triggered by the Belarusian and Russian authorities. The instrumentalization of migration — mostly from the Middle East and Africa — by the latter countries caused Eastern European nations, including Poland, to bear additional costs. Warsaw made up its mind to build a fence (which was equipped with electronic systems in the middle of the year once the construction had been completed) and provide border service with some military support.

On February 11, Emil Czeczko, a member of Poland’s 16th Pomeranian Mechanized Division who had deflected to Belarus, filed a petition to the court in The Hague through the Belarusian pro-government organization Systemic Advocacy Centre, claiming that the Polish services had committed genocide of migrants on the border. However, on March 17, Czeczko was found dead in a rented apartment in Minsk. According to the Systemic Advocacy Centre, the Criminal Court in The Hague refused to hear the case.

Economic relations

The volume of bilateral trade decreased; however, no radical changes were reported. Deliveries from Belarus to Poland went down by a third, but the flow of commodities from Poland remained at the pre-war level. In January–November 2022, Poland’s trade with Belarus came to $2.5 billion. Belarus imported more than $1.5 billion worth of commodities and services, whereas its export supplies totaled more than $1 billion.6 A trade deficit of $0.58 billion was reported for Belarus.

The sanctions imposed by the European Union will naturally produce a negative impact on mutual trade in the coming years, especially on operations with crude oil and oil products, as the restrictions will come into effect only after the previous contracts have expired.

Migration of Belarusians to Poland brought about an increase in the number of companies with shareholdings controlled by a Belarusian company or individual with Belarusian citizenship. At the end of 2022, there were 4,980 such companies in Poland, of them 35% were registered in 2022. This increase was to a great extent due to the Business Harbour program, which facilitates relocation to Poland of Belarusian startups and IT specialists. In 2022, 50 companies were able to relocate to Poland thanks to this program.7

Socio-cultural relations

In 2022, Polish consular services issued over 278,000 visas to Belarusians. More than 3,000 Belarusians applied for international protection in Poland.8 The Poland–Belarus border was crossed 3.358 million times — an increase by 54% from 2021. The Belarusian Border Committee reported that in 2022, more than 20,000 Polish citizens benefited from the visa-free regime to enter Belarus.9

Poland spent almost $50 million on scholarships and other educational initiatives, support for independent media, and other projects to help Belarusians.

In 2022, official bilateral cultural contacts were suspended, like the year before that. However, independent Belarusian culture was represented in Poland. In November, Warsaw hosted the VIII Bulbamovie festival, which screened Belarusian films depicting the realities of the country, where persecution of independent communities is a routine practice. References to Belarusians’ life abroad, as well as stories related to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine were also on display. Work continued in Warsaw to build the Museum of Free Belarus, which was announced in 2021.

Conclusion

Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Lukashenko regime’s repression against Belarusian citizens (including the Polish minority), destruction of Polish memorials, and persistent border crisis had a profoundly negative impact on Belarus–Poland relations. The year 2022 saw no cooperation between the two countries, not even on the local and technical levels, let alone official political contacts. Bilateral relations deteriorated even in comparison with the truly hard year 2021.

Poland consistently supported the activities of the United Transitional Cabinet formed by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, hoping that in the future it would contribute to democratic transformations in Belarus. Migrants from Belarus also enjoyed assistance — both international protection and opportunity to work legally.

Given the progressing integration of Russia and Belarus and the increasingly hostile policy of Minsk towards Poland, no improvements in Belarus–Poland relations should be expected any time soon. Ukraine’s victory in the war against Russia could become a breakthrough to trigger political changes in Russia and give hope for a change in Belarus.