Parliament: Failed Constitutional Bargaining, Increased Subservience

Summary

Although the newly adopted version of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus (referendum in February 2022) formally broadens the powers of the Parliament, in reality, its influence and operations remain largely unchanged. Only a few MPs, like Natalia Kochanova, Chairman of the Upper House of Parliament, have a noticeable public presence.

In its international endeavors, the Parliament is still oriented towards Russia as well as other non-democratic countries. The war in Ukraine has further demonstrated the tendency of MPs to echo Russian propaganda.

Trends:

• The new version of the Constitution extends parliamentary powers in name only, without affecting its actual functionality;

• the Parliament exists to mainly to rubber-stamp repressive initiatives by the authorities, solidifying its subservient role;

• An evident lack of legislative initiatives originating from the Parliament;

• Public addresses by deputies are increasingly characterized by propaganda-filled rhetoric, often mirroring Russian propaganda;

• Despite minimal interactions with Western democracies, there is an evident push to diversify inter-parliamentary relations and explore new platforms for dialogue.

The New Constitution and Old Modality in Law-making

Since the beginning of 2022, the Belarusian Parliament has put on a show of public discussions concerning the new constitution. They have organized dialogue platforms and public receptions, reminiscent of the traditions of the Soviet era. The proposed referendum to amend the Constitution was pitched by the authorities as a remedy to the political crisis- a solution that seemed far-fetched from the start. The war, initiated by Russia, including from Belarusian territory, during the early voting, utterly dashed any hopes tied to the referendum.
Nonetheless, the referendum proceeded, and the revised constitution was adopted. For MPs known for their strong subordination to the political leadership of the country, this indicated a shift in focus: aligning existing laws with the adopted changes. By their own accounts, MPs believe that over a hundred legislative items require revisions within two years. This includes laws regarding the existing government divisions, as well as the drafting of new laws, like the one on the All-Belarusian People's Assembly (ABPA).1

There have been notable, though largely symbolic, changes to laws that govern the functions of MPs. Now the President of the country can opt to be a member of the upper house for life. Additionally, the power to convene extraordinary parliamentary sessions has shifted to the Heads of the House.

In turn, some of the Parliament’s powers have been passed to the ABPA.2 In a move reflecting a repressive logic, the mandate of MPs can be terminated if they hold foreign citizenship, a residence permit, or a Polish Card.

Historically, MPs have scarcely spearheaded legislative proposals. In 2022, only four out of over fifty bills passed were introduced by MPs themselves. This list includes the ABPA Bill, which - similar to the legislation on a controlled civil society - was only adopted by parliamentarians after Lukashenko’s specific instructions.

Thus, although formally the Belarusian Parliament’s powers appear expanded, its modus operandi remains the same.

Deputies: in service of repression and propaganda

Historically, members of both Houses actively worked to service the repressive apparatus, enacting legislation that either jeopardizes the wellbeing of citizens or ushers in new punitive measures. These include:

• Instituting special proceedings for the trials of accused individuals residing outside Belarus;

• Intensifying the penalties for alleged act of terrorism, up to and including death penalty;

• Stripping Belarusians living abroad of citizenship if found by the courts to be engaged in extremist activities. Additionally, introducing new stipulations for Belarusian nationals holding foreign documentation;

• Voting to withdraw from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to prevent Belarusians from lodging complaints with the UN Human Rights Committee3

In the fall, the Parliament conducted what appeared to be a sham debate on the amnesty law. The MPs themselves, including the head of the lower house, Vladimir Andreychenko, trod cautiously on the subject. They seemed to oscillate between the potential of amnesty of political prisoners and actual repressive practices. As further events have revealed - with the ratification of an amnesty devoid of provisions for political prisoners, such balancing was pragmatically driven.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, MPs adopted a rhetoric brimming with Cold War undertones and Russian propaganda. They spoke of a «collective West», ostensibly seeking to destabilize the post-Soviet territories, and particularly singled out the United States, allegedly starting “an economic war”.4

MPs were also active participants in the propaganda campaign surrounding the migration crisis - orchestrated by Belarusian authorities along the EU borders In collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they expressed concern about the death of forest mammals on Polish razor wire and sent «materials on the refugee genocide by Poland» to European structures.5

Furthermore, MPs contributed to further obscuring state statistics by sanctioning additional restrictions in the event of a national security threat. They refused to endorse standards for the treatment of rare genetic diseases using budget funds, as petitioned for by the public.6

International engagements

With reduced interactions with democratic nations, Belarusian parliamentarians have been navigating available international avenues and bodies to advance their perspective on the situations in Belarus and the region. A notable figure in this endeavor is the Chairman of the Commission on International Affairs, Andrei Savinykh. Before the onset of the war, he made representations at the «Constitutional reform in Belarus» hearings during the winter session of the PACE Commission on Political Issues and Democracy. There, he reiterated the usual narrative of the “West’s double standards”.

Savinykh maintained a similar stance in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Following the outbreak of the war, however, opportunities for Belarusian representatives to voice their views at these forums diminished. Savinykh accused PACE and OSCE PA for their perceived biases and their alleged disregard for «alternative opinions». He emphasized their declining relevance for fostering an «open, equal, inclusive dialogue»7.

Generally, Belarusian deputies displayed an ambivalent stance concerning inter-parliamentary engagements with democratic nations While they voiced indifference, there was a palpable dissatisfaction about the lack of avenues available to them. For instance, in September, V. Andreychenko lamented the challenges faced by Belarusian delegations «in the parliamentary structure of the Central European initiative to implement contacts with PACE, the Parliamentary Conference of the Baltic Sea and the Nordic Council». Yet, when presented with an opportunity, both house leaders were swift in meeting the Swiss Ambassador during his mission to facilitate the release of political detainee Natallia Hersche.

Belarusian deputies explored alternative foreign policy avenues, engaging with countries of the far East, the Non-Aligned Movement, and other non-Western parliamentary platforms. At the leadership level, this included interactions with ambassadors from India, Cuba, Iran, Syria, Mongolia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UAE, Armenia, Sudan, and others. Significant importance was attributed to relations with Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Belarusian MPs held meetings with parliamentarians from nations like the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Colombia, Viet Nam, Tajikistan, with themselves visiting Tajikistan and Iran.

A consistent ally for Belarus in sculpting an alternative international relation vector has been Cuba. Active collaborations between the two countries were evident, including mutual visits between officials like the Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, Valery Mitskevich, and Cuban delegates. Additionally, in 2022, Belarusian parliamentarians liaised with the Latin American Parliament, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, the Pan-African Parliament, and others.

Simultaneously, Belarusian MPs were consolidating their already robust ties with Russia and its affiliated entities. While definitive assessments of the depth and quality of these relationships are elusive, official outlets from both Chambers regularly featured events related to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), promoted by Russia as the «oldest international parliamentary organization» and the international parliamentary assembly of the CIS, the Parliament of the Union State. Within the framework of the last one, for example, topics like “spiritual security” were deliberated.8

Bilateral meetings between the heads of the Belarusian Parliament and their Russian counterparts were frequent, culminating in an agreement on cooperation between the upper houses of both nations in November.9

Denying War Amidst Ideological Battles Against Perceived Threats

Belarusian parliamentarians explain the war in Ukraine through the lens of Russian propaganda. Dominant narratives include blaming it on the United States, the need to protect the people in eastern Ukraine, and claims about the existence of biological weapon production facilities in Ukraine. Various deputies, including Chamber heads Andreychenko and Kochanova, as well as Oleg Belokonev (the chairman of the lower house’s National Security Commission) and Sergei Rachkov (Chairman of the Commission on International Affairs and National Security of the Upper House), have echoed the rhetoric of a “collective Western blame.” Furthermore, A. Savinykh promoted a discourse on the importance of the Minsk Agreements as a working tool for resolving the crisis in Ukraine.

Another narrative propagated by Belarusian MPs is that the war could have been prevented had Western countries denounced the war in Serbia. They also stressed that Belarus does not participate in the war; hence any attempts to hold it accountable are groundless.

At the same time, the Belarusian parliamentarians actively combat what they consider to be misrepresentations of events in Belarus and unwarranted actions against the authorities. The MPs have adopted statements denouncing the decisions like cutting ties (e.g., with PACE) or excluding the official Belarusian delegation (as seen during the OSCE PA session in Birmingham). They have also criticized the failure to allow memorial events in Europe, such as the 77th anniversary of the liberation of the Buchenwald and Mittelbau-Dora concentration camps, as well as the prohibition of Belarusian athletes from performing under their national flag in global events.

Thus, in 2022 - particularly after the outbreak of war in Ukraine - the rhetoric of the Belarusian parliamentarians consistently echoed the narratives decrying the «collective West», which, under the negative influence of the United States, supposedly misreads the events in Belarus. With that said, the war in Ukraine and the actual position of the Belarusian administration on the matter remains conspicuously absent from their propagandist statements.

Conclusion

Historically, the role of Parliament within the political system of Belarus was minimal, even before the recent political upheavals. Its appointees have largely remained on the periphery of the nation’s political landscape, rarely taking the initiative.

The parliamentarians mainly supported top-down presidential directives, and their legislative endeavors have centered on formalizing political repression and its associated mechanisms. Regrettably, this trend became even more pronounced in 2022.

Russia’s war against Ukraine demonstrated the willingness of Belarusian parliamentarians to embrace and reproduce both domestic and Russian propaganda narratives.

Lawmaking seems almost ancillary for Belarusian MPs, with their international activity largely revolving around the expansion of contacts with undemocratic countries, as well as intensifying their association with Russia.