Golovchenko’s Cabinet: the Era of Reactions

Polina Makarova

Summary

In 2022, the government's primary responsibility was to address the challenges arising from Lukashenko’s own policies, such as sanctions and labor outflow, as well as the actions of its closest ally, Russia (particularly the co-aggression against Ukraine). The government of Roman Golovchenko, heavily influenced by the security bloc, did not focus on strategic objectives. The emergency mode of operation, which became the norm for the state apparatus, suggests that even if conditions turn favorable—like ending the war in Ukraine or lifting certain sanctions—it will require time to rebuild the eroded export infrastructure and regain the trust of lost partners. This trend extends to other government sectors such as education, social services, and sports. High-ranking officials have adapted to an environment where long-term planning is both non-existent and impossible.

Trends:

War and Isolation

At the start of 2022, the Belarusian government had relatively unambitious plans. PM Roman Golovchenko vaguely mentioned priorities like "enhancing economic competitiveness" and "increasing population incomes" without offering specific targets.1 However, these plans were jeopardized in February 2022 when Russia initiated its "special military operation" in Ukraine. The shock of Putin's decision likely resonated more profoundly within the Belarusian government.

The onset of the war has severely tainted the reputation of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, previously perceived as liberal and somewhat independent. The ministry's credibility eroded further due to then Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei's2 assurances about Russian troops vacating Belarus, which went unfulfilled. Efforts to rejuvenate the Minsk format of Russia-Ukraine negotiations quickly fizzled out, underscoring Belarus' inability to secure international guarantees. Increasingly, international partners recognized the futility of discussing Belarus' foreign policy with its Foreign Ministry.

With Belarus implicated in Russian aggression, a deeper alignment with Russia became inevitable, including sport and education ministries. One significant repercussion of the country's international isolation was the barring of Belarusian athletes from the Beijing Paralympic Games in March 2022—a decision announced as the athletes were en route to China.

As the year progressed, more international sports federations either banned Belarusian athletes from participating in competitions or faced boycott threats from Ukraine and its western allies if participation was allowed. The Ministry of Sport's response was largely to celebrate Belarusian successes in regional Russian competitions. Similarly, the Ministry of Education saw its international collaborations restricted to Russia, China, and Central Asian nations. Partnerships with Western universities, already strained after 2020's repressive measures, were terminated following the co-aggression against Ukraine. However, the Ministry itself actively gets rid - and purges educational institutions - of «wrong» partners.3

Sanctions: Emergency Countermeasures Unveiled

Following the war, the Belarusian government's response to the cascade of sanctions was marked by unwarranted optimism. Plans that were established prior to the war, including the Social and Economic Development Program for 2021-2025 (adopted mid-2021), seemed forgotten, with no government official referencing them publicly throughout the year.

Amid the plummeting exports to Western countries and Ukraine after 2020, the Belarusian government pinned its hopes on Russia (as its main ally) to compensate for both the moral and financial setbacks experienced by Belarus.4 The challenge, however, was that the Belarusian budget largely depended on exports to Western nations or the production of goods that were now sanctioned. Consequently, immediate measures were employed to redirect exports towards Russia and the Eurasian Economic Area. This involved rapid infrastructure development and legal adjustments.

To stabilize the economy, the government was granted additional powers, such as the ability to alter tax rates (including for the Belarus Hi-Tech Park), modify terms for foreign loans, and impose restrictions on foreign business divestments in Belarus.5 Interestingly, many details of this decree were labeled "for official use" indicating a growing trend of secrecy in the operations of the Golovchenko-led Cabinet both in terms of the powers of the government and in the availability of official statistics. This obscurity rendered long-term planning for businesses impossible.

Despite these measures, A. Lukashenko dismissed government proposals aimed at alleviating private business burdens through tax cuts or deferrals. Conversely, a seemingly populist approach—price freezing backed by the threat of legal consequences—was endorsed by the government, even if such a move was economically counterproductive. This policy led to a surge of reports and subsequent detentions nationwide.

In light of a diminishing workforce, the government nevertheless saw an opportunity to strengthen its revenue sources by increasing fees for notary services and apostille registrations, essential procedures for many.6 Those employed overseas were now deemed "parasites", and from March onwards, they had to cover full (as opposed to subsidized) utility bills for any real estate they owned in Belarus. Additionally, threats to dismantle double taxation agreements with sanction-imposing countries hinted at a potential new revenue stream via taxes on Belarusians working abroad.

Lacking any substantial influence over Western countries imposing sanctions, Belarusian representatives voiced their opposition exclusively at the United Nations, conveniently sidestepping the causes for these sanctions. Instead, the narrative focused on portraying sanctions as punitive measures against nations that defy hegemony, alluding to a looming unipolar world order.7

Domestically, however, the government orchestrated a different narrative throughout the year, suggesting sanctions were beneficial for state-owned enterprises.8 The decline of pivotal sectors like IT, oil processing, and wood processing, despite significant investment, was downplayed. Even as year-end economic data painted a grim picture, the government continued to enthusiastically plan for 2023.

Consolidation of the State Apparatus: Prioritizing Loyalty Over Competence

In the initial stages of the war, top Belarusian officials displayed remarkable composure, continuing with their regular tasks, from holding grand openings of new clinics to participating in events like the "Minsk Ski" and preparing for sowing campaigns. It wasn't long, however, before propaganda campaigns became a part of their roster. As part of the monthly "Single Day of Information", officials visited working teams to boast about Belarusian accomplishments, following a standardized script.9 Local authority websites documented these visits of ministers and their deputies, telling the school administration about the Belarus IT export successes.

As Belarus' closest ally, Russia, deepened its involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, narratives began to incorporate themes of foreign policy threats. Officials spoke of sinister plots by Ukraine and NATO, and of external conspiracies against Belarus. Interestingly, these tales of Western threats were not linked to their area of expertise, but, traditionally, most persuasively delivered by security bloc representatives.

A new law on public service, introduced in the summer of 2022, resonated with this narrative of unifying the state apparatus against perceived external threats and instilling military discipline. This legislation no longer acknowledges the division of powers—legislative, executive, or judicial. Instead, the civil service is projected as a monolithic entity, expected to adhere unquestioningly to top-down orders. This alignment brings the working criteria for civil servants closer to those for military and paramilitary personnel, for which the notion of "service discipline" was introduced.

Remarkably, the new law says nothing about promoting the initiative, public accountability, or professionalism of civil servants. In a telling move, a cohort of potential civil servants—those belonging to the personnel reserve of the Head of State—no longer need to undergo professional tests. The method of selecting this reserve remains obscure, left entirely to Lukashenko's discretion. Meanwhile, stringent measures ensure that officials ousted post-2020 find it challenging to re-enter public service. Those dismissed under "discrediting circumstances'' face a two-year ban from civil service roles, extending to five years for more critical positions.

Consequently, the longstanding informal practice of favoring loyalty over professionalism in civil service, especially at senior levels, has now gained legal backing.

During the relatively peaceful interlude between the 2010 and 2020 elections, the government occasionally championed progressive economic policy decisions. However, the period under review reveals a state apparatus operating under a militaristic logic that stifles initiative. While professionals remain within government circles, especially in economic sectors, their primary function now revolves around crafting short-term emergency solutions, often at the expense of Belarus' long-term economic progression.

Conclusion

Since Belarus’ gained sovereignty, the government's capacity for initiative and the advocacy of long-term national interests, particularly in the economic realm, has been markedly curtailed. The primary objectives of the Golovchenko-led Cabinet have been twofold: to secure maximal export preferences from its sole remaining ally and to legitimize its policies in the public eye.

The government's shift to an entirely reactive mode reflects a broader trend in Belarusian state administration. This trend became especially pronounced after the initiation of Russia's full-scale aggression in Ukraine, wherein the political regime lost its foreign policy autonomy. It's plausible to predict this diminished autonomy will persist, given the ongoing exodus of skilled professionals from the administrative apparatus, the suppression of innovative thinking, and the imposition of stringent military discipline. This includes using threats like the death penalty for treason amongst officials as a tool of intimidation.

In essence, the government's reactive strategies in economic and social policy are part and parcel of a broader effort to maintain a semblance of stability in Belarus, even as the repressive apparatus plays a dominant role in this endeavor. This precariously maintained stability is likely to plateau at a modest benchmark, especially considering the potential waning of Russia's support for Belarus in the foreseeable future.