Think Tanks: a Significant Contraction of the Sector
Natallia Rabava
Summary
For Belarusian researchers the year 2022 was tarnished by the war in Ukraine. Think tanks operated mostly abroad, whereas individual researchers who stayed in Belarus were subjected to repression. The sector shrank to five consistently working centers, and its overall productivity declined. Belarusian society, both inside the country and abroad, remains a hard-to-reach object of study.
Trends:
Operation from abroad due to repression and persecution in Belarus, as well as restrictions imposed on Belarusians abroad;
Narrowing of the sector to five main working think tanks and resulting decrease in its overall productivity;
Impact of the war on the work of think tanks.
International context: the war
2022 was a challenging year, marked by the war in Ukraine. Think tanks, not unlike other civil society organizations (CSOs) in Belarus, were affected by the repercussions of the war, which took the form of:
Multiple restrictions imposed on Belarusians in various countries as citizens of a co-aggressor country;
The need for a new relocation for those who originally went to Ukraine (both individual researchers and think tanks, for example, BEROC);
Removal of Belarus from the international agenda focusing on political crisis, repression, and political prisoners amid the newly sparked interest in Belarus as a co-aggressor. Opinion polls covered inter alia the attitude of Belarusian citizens to the war. Social studies, including those non-public, were conducted by foreign institutions as well;
Partial refocus of the agenda towards international relations and security issues.
Belarus context: relocation and repression
In 2022, the sector of Belarusian independent think tanks was primarily represented by entities operating from abroad, where such organizations were faced with staffing issues, consistent development challenges, and inevitably lost their live connections with the object of their research. In Belarus, not a single registered independent operating think tank remained, while individual researchers (both independent and representing a specific think tank) who stayed in the country were regularly subjected to repression.
Analysts Tatsiana Kuzina and Valeria Kostyugova spent the entire year behind bars (they were sentenced in March 2023 to 10 years in prison each). In June 2022, philosopher and methodologist Uladzimir Mackievic was handed a sentence of five years in prison. In December, military analyst Yahor Lebiadok was sentenced to five years in prison for his expert activities, and in June, sociologist Tatsiana Vadalazhskaya was given a sentence of 2.5 years of restricted freedom.
In September, sociologist Yauhen Merkis, who collaborated with the Center for New Ideas, was detained and charged with assisting extremist activities.
Sociologist Aksana Shelest and urban researcher Kiryl Malchau were detained for 15 and 13 days, respectively.
Key actors and research
During the reporting period, the productivity of the sector as a whole dwindled and was even more concentrated within just five think tanks. Whereas six years earlier, there used to be fifteen operating think tanks, which were even ranked,1 currently the sector relies on those few that have survived.
The Ideas Bank has served as a joint platform for publishing and discussing ideas for possible reforms, as well as expert opinions on various issues and findings of surveys. Overall, however, think tanks lacked a system of peer review and discussion.
The Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC) published about 50 policy briefs, studies, and working papers — more than in 2021. BEROC’s products include reviews and monitoring of Belarus' economy and finance, studies focusing on social and pension policies, impact of the political crisis on the private sector, effects of sanctions, green economy, digital and cryptocurrencies, economic reconstruction of Belarus, activities of business associations and businesses abroad, reform of state-owned enterprises, leasing, professional mobility, etc. The think tank also published findings of surveys of businesses and households on their economic well-being and expectations.
BEROC’s educational activities were conducted online and narrowed, compared with the 2021 level: it organized the Tenth International Conference in Economics and Finance, launched a Green Economy school project for journalists, and conducted courses as part of the XII Student School in Economics and Finance, as well as an online seminar on the digital currency market.
In 2022, the Center for New Ideas (CNI) proved more active and visible. The CNI published studies and articles with a focus on society (collective trauma of Belarusian society, horizontal connections, perception of events in Ukraine by residents of Belarusian regions and protesting Belarusians, consumption of media products by the protesting part of society); foreign policy (studies on degradation, Belarus and international law); regional development (materials on the restoration of Belarusian regions in English); and the media image of Belarus abroad in 2021–2022. Furthermore, the CNI released the Belarus Resilience Index 2021, having introduced a new methodology to estimate the country’s status in the following areas: politics, economy, society, and media environment. The think tank continued with its podcasts “In the Context” and “Idea Podcast”.
CNI’s Pavel Matsukevich released new issues of the 19 Lenin Street Pulse review of Belarusian foreign policy, and Henadz Korshunau posted articles clarifying takeaways of social studies. CNI’s educational and outreach functions (mostly online, but not only) gained more visibility as it conducted the Re-shape conference, courses at the School of the Young Reformer, the Belarus Urban Fellowship 2022 educational course, organized Case Club events, lectures, and expert discussions.
The Belarusian Institute for Public Administration Reform and Transformation (BIPART) published studies on reforms of public administration and civil service, reviews of the socio-demographic portrait of the civil servant and the new law on civil service, and prepared monitoring reports on the status of civil society organizations. BIPART released infographics, analytics and commentaries for the Kosht Urada (Cost of the State) project. The Institute resumed courses and experience exchange sessions at the SYMPA School of Young Managers in Public Administration.
The Center for European Transformation (CET) published a report on the findings of its study on the practices of “professional ban” in 2020–2022, participated in the publication of the book “Civil society in Belarus 2015–2021: from stable development to new challenges”, and posted comments.
The Institute of Political Studies Political Sphere issued regular analyses and commentaries. On September 30–October 2, 2022, the Institute held the Tenth International Congress of Belarusian Studies, which brought together about 300 participants (200 visited the congress in person and 100 participated online). The Congress named winners of the Congress Prize for the best research papers of 2021. In the run-up to the Congress, the Institute organized a series of discussions on the status of individual sciences in Belarus amid the war and political crisis.
Belarus Security Blog issued reports on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), released the Eurasian Security Digest, national and economic security monitoring reports, commentary and analyses.
The Belarusian expert network Nashe Mnenie (Our Opinion) apparently had a very hard time following the imprisonment of its editor Valeria Kostyugova. The network’s updated website was re-launched at the very end of 2022, with only 10 original materials posted in the usual Nashe Mnenie format. Nevertheless, the Belarusian Yearbook (in Russian and English), a monitoring of developments of the hard year 2021, was published and presented. Nashe Mneniye, together with the Press Club, Belarus in Focus and BISS, also organized monthly online meetings of the Belarusian Expert-Analytical Club.
The Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) published two studies centered on the language policy and value transformations in Belarus.
The International Strategic Action Network for Security (iSANS) expert network issued reports and articles on the referendum in Belarus, early year developments in Kazakhstan, disinformation and justification of the war by Belarusian state-controlled television, crackdown on the third sector in Belarus, European integration of Ukraine and Moldova, Russian military propaganda, and energy.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published the report entitled “Belarus in the Co-Aggressor Trap: Getting Out of it and Resolving the Political Crisis of 2020” and offered commentary to the media.
In 2022, a team of experts launched a new joint product, the Belarus Change Tracker,2 an overview of the main trends in foreign and domestic politics, economy, and public opinion in Belarus.
Some think tanks completely or partially ceased their operations. CASE Belarus became part of the parent organization CASE. At the time of this review, the think tank’s individual website was not active. In 2022, there were no publications on the Eurasian States in Transition Research Center (EAST) website. The IPM Research Center worked inconsistently, either in a state of “warm ashes” or issuing ad hoc commentary. The Regional Expert Club, which emerged in Mahilyou in 2020, produced only a handful of brief podcasts.
Black box sociology
Most of independent sociology’s work continued online, with an increasing use of panel studies instead of other methods, which can be attributed to concerns that answers to political and even social questions may not be straight due to the fear factor, as well as general difficulties in engaging respondents. Both “non-public” sociological surveys and “people’s polls” were conducted as part of various — often political — campaigns, such as the “People’s Poll”, “Honest People”, etc.
At the same time, some experts insist that the current studies (even though there are more of them now) poorly reflect and cannot properly account for the real status of Belarus' society, which is increasingly becoming a “black box”. However, even attempts to study the diaspora — seemingly more accessible — cannot help the ambiguity. Belarusian society, both inside the country and abroad, remains a hard-to-reach object to study.
Other researchers: from CSOs to politicians
Once in a while research products are published by civil society organizations (CSOs), which are not think tanks, or organizations close to certain political actors. For example, ACT, an outreach NGO, annually prepares and publishes its CSO Sustainability Index (jointly with USAID). The Office for European Expertise and Communication (OEEC) published the findings of its research “Belarusian Women in Emigration”, presented the takeaways of the survey exploring the pressures on Belarusian CSOs during the repression period, conducted together with the Legal Transformation Center Lawtrend, and monitored the liquidation of NGOs.
As part of its core activity the Legal Transformation Center Lawtrend published reports and results of monitoring of the situation with CSOs, along with a study on repression of female activists and gender organizations.
The Human Constanta human rights organization published a chronicle of the struggle against “extremism” in Belarus, reviews of new laws, materials on hate speech, and educational articles. The Belarusian Helsinki Committee published reports and articles.
The Baltic Internet Policy Initiative published the findings of its study Disinformation in Belarus and monitored the consumption of media products by the Belarusians. The international CSO EuroBelarus contributed to the material entitled “The analysis of cultural policy models and funding mechanisms of the culture sector in Eastern Europe” (in Belarusian and English).
The project Fifth Republic3 (implemented by the Education Office for New Belarus in partnership with the media) developed and published a series of materials and discussions dedicated to various aspects of public life in Belarus: from the development of the new Constitution to social policy. Some experts from CSOs were involved in the publication of the “Belarusian Civil Society Report on Sustainable Development Goals Implementation”, prepared by the Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya Office.
Some of the studies produced by both think tanks and CSOs and quasi-political structures are non-public.
As before, the state research sector hardly published the results of its studies on public platforms. However, the Minsk Dialogue expert initiative and the Northern Eurasia center for continental integration studies and development posted their analyses, articles, and podcasts.
Impact on policy making and relations with stakeholders
State
As in 2021, cooperation between independent think tanks and the Belarusian state was virtually nonexistent. On the other hand, the research sector interacts with the proto-state — alternative democratic forces. Engagement with foreign stakeholders (diplomats, international organizations) grew stronger mostly in the form of consultations, requests for analytical products, conferences and other events.
Civil society organizations
The number of studies commissioned by CSOs shrank back in 2021 and never recovered in 2022. However, CSOs remained one of the objects researched as part of studies of the current situation: the status of civil society was in the focus of an unprecedented number of papers, and this trend continued in 2023.
Media
Just as CSOs, throughout 2022, media outlets were subjected to repression, were labeled as “extremist” and as a result were losing their readership. However, the multiplatform operation of some outlets notably made up for some of the losses. The media continue working and keep collaborating with think tanks: they request commentary and analysis, while think tanks, for their part, benefit from media platforms to post their materials, columns, and findings of studies.
Political parties and movements
Looking to maintain the status of independent entities, think tanks as a rule choose not to engage in systemic cooperation/consultation with any political force on an institutional basis. Results of research and individual projects that may attract political actors (e.g. the Bank of Ideas) are presented to all democratic forces. However, individual analysts/experts have acted as consultants working with particular political forces or leaders, which is perceived as their personal initiative and responsibility.
Conclusion
The operation of think tanks and CSOs in general becomes increasingly dependent on external factors, and especially on how the war in Ukraine progresses. The war is the paramount factor to reckon with by anyone making forecasts for 2023. If we assume that the war will be protracted, the think tank sector will likely remain at the same level or even further contract. If the war should end in 2023, a lot will depend on its aftermath and the effects on the internal situation in Belarus and repression. If the conflict escalates even more, we should expect the sector to narrow, all the way to the point when research topics are limited to international relations and security.