Religion: War as a Matter of Conscience

Alexander Shramko

Summary

Throughout 2022, the regime continued its efforts to achieve ideological unification and total control of all sectors of public life, including religion. Having ensured almost complete subordination of the Orthodox Church hierarchy, the authorities refocused their work towards the less compliant Catholic Church. Believers were expelled from the Red Church in Minsk, which turned into a sort of bargaining chip in the regime’s haggling with the Vatican.

Repression against clergymen and active believers who participated in the 2020 protests continuedSince the war in Ukraine started, persecutions for anti-war activity were added.

Trends:

Before the war

The brief two-month pre-war period of 2022 saw three landmark developments concerning the three Christian denominations.

When it comes to the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC), the amendments to the Constitution of Belarus are indicative. Deceived by the trust and ostensible benevolence of the regime, the church hierarchs willingly responded to the call to put forward its amendments. As a result, none of the modifications proposed by the BOC were adopted. The BOC was therefore clearly given to understand its entirely subordinate position as an ideology valet with no independent ideology component whatsoever. As Natallia Vasilievič notes, “you [the BOC] will not have any alternative ideology, other than that of the Belarusian state — be it Litvinism or Western-Russianism.”1

The outcomes of the “normalization” of the Catholic Church seem to look more ambiguous. On the one hand, both the Vatican and the local hierarchs had to make reluctant compromises, which in 2022 mostly concerned the terms of lease of some state-owned churches by believers. Hopes for the promised relaxation of these crippling conditions made both the Vatican and the local hierarchs turn a blind eye to the expulsion of believers from the Church of St. Simeon and St. Helen in Minsk.

The Catholic leadership cut a poor figure when Aliaksandr Zaitsau, a businessman close to the leader of the regime, was awarded the Pontifical Equestrian Order of St. Gregory the Great on behalf of Pope Francis. Moreover, they tried to hide the conferment of the order from the general public.2 Not all Catholics happen to support this servility of the Vatican in its relations with the regime.

On the other hand, according to the Rerum Novarum channel, the situation in the Catholic Church in Belarus is many times better than in the BOC. The role of dismissed Metropolitan Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz as a de facto leader and spiritual authority remains significant. Moreover, “other bishops and priests here have never been purged, and every here and there Catholics of various levels continue to voice their dissent.”3

The third significant development is associated with the escalation of the situation with detained Protestant philosopher Uladzimir Mackievic. The refusal to grant him a meeting with a Protestant pastor, which is a direct violation of his freedom of religion, is a way to put him under pressure.

These three incidents reflect the general attitude of the regime towards the main Christian denominations: to subdue the Orthodox Church, to make an arrangement with Catholics, and to crack down on Protestants.

Reaction to the war

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine provoked an immediate response from both official church hierarchs and regular believers. On the very next day after the war broke out, the head of the Conference of Catholic Bishops in Belarus published a statement saying “the tragic news... has filled our hearts with sorrow” and calling for a prayer “for a speedy end to the ongoing conflict and least possible casualties.”4

On the following day, Metropolitan Veniamin, the head of the BOC, made a similar statement, calling for church members to pray and for the warring sides “to take steps to meet half way.”5

A common feature can be observed in both statements made by the top hierarchs of the two leading confessions: it is as if the question is not about the aggression committed by one side and repelled by the other, but about the involvement of two equals in a “conflict between the countries.” Reactions of foreign hierarchs of the Catholic Church, as well as some Orthodox Church leaders (for example in Finland and Lithuania) are much more explicit and, as a rule, contain unambiguously condemnations of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Anyway, during the initial phases of the war, the official Vatican, too, sought to maintain a “war of equals” approach.

Private reactions by priests and regular churchgoers were much more categorical and a lot more varied — especially in the BOC. Russia’s aggression was mostly criticized by the same priests and laypeople who were on the people’s side during the tragic events of 2020. Almost any sort of public anti-war statement immediately triggered persecution by the authorities. Priest Mihail Maruha, detained as he was carrying flowers during an anti-war protest and eventually sentenced to 13 days in jail, was among the first victims. Some of the women who came to the Minsk Cathedral at the call of the Union of Mothers of Belarus to pray for peace were also detained.

Those members of clergy who supported the regime during the Belarusian protests also spoke in favor of the war. Homiel Archimandrite Savva (Mazuka) voiced his support for aggression on the Russian Spas TV channel. Notorious Archbishop Antonij (Daronin) of Hrodna forbade his priests to pray for peace in Ukraine during their services.

The St. Elisabeth Convent in Minsk, headed by its director Andrey Liemiasonak, clearly stood out in this respect. The monastery had been providing humanitarian aid to the Donbass for many years, its support being declared as aid to “civilians”. However, in August 2022, the monastery stopped hiding its involvement in fundraising campaigns to support the Russian military as well. “Helping Brothers” is the name of the monastery’s volunteer group led by nun Aliaksandra, which is responsible for raising money for the needs of the military.

The St. Elizabeth Monastery is known for its overseas fundraising network and sales of ceremonial articles. Many people in Europe therefore believed they were helping the monastery, but in fact were indirectly financing Russia’s aggression. The dissemination of facts about the actual operations of the monastery eventually evoked some response, which was additionally supported by the Belarusian diaspora. Following the exposure, Europeans denied the monastery participation in a few European fairs, such as the famous Winchester Cathedral Christmas Market in the UK.

Repression against clergymen and their families

In 2022, the regime’s persecution of the clergy, just as repression of the nation as a whole, continued on a new scale. However, in the context of the war, an additional category of persecution came about — for anti-war speeches and aid to Ukraine. For example, seven Roman Catholic, one Greek Catholic, and three Orthodox members of the church were held administratively liable for their anti-war stance.

The persistent persecution of Uladzislau Bahamolnikau, an Orthodox priest and lecturer at the Minsk Theological Academy, drew a particularly strong response. Over a period of 100 days he served seven consecutive administrative arrests. A criminal case was opened against him eventually, and he was released on his own recognizance. He is accused of not only donating money to help Ukraine, but also of participation in “mass riots” for what was in fact a requiem service for Raman Bandarenka, a protester killed by security forces, as well as a hunger strike in support of political prisoner Ihar Losik.

The leadership of the BOC never came to the priest’s defense, but Bahamolnikaŭ came back to serve at his parish and was not subjected to any church penalties. Perhaps his release on his own recognizance — instead of placement in custody, which would be usual practice in such cases — became a result of behind-the-scenes negotiations between the BOC and the authorities.

In 2022, the Mikalai Autukhovich case was tried in court. He and other defendants were charged under twelve articles of the Criminal Code, including the “act of terrorism”. Involved in the case were 12 persons, including Orthodox priest Siarhei Rezanovich from Brest, his wife Liubou and son Pavel. Liuboŭ, 57, was kept in a separate cage confinement as “especially dangerous”. They all were handed huge sentences of 15 to 19 years and received no support or petition from the church leadership.

The Christian Vision group monitors all instances of persecution.6

Expulsion from the temple: the case of the Red Church

In 2022, the situation around the Church of St. Simeon and St. Helen in Minsk, also known as the Red Church, became a new landmark in the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church. In the early morning of September 26, in a small annex to the church, the fire, which parishioners referred to as “odd and ambiguous” was happened. After that the church was forcibly shut down. On October 5, Minskaya Spadchina, a state-owned enterprise that acts as the proprietor of the church building, addressed a notice of termination of the uncompensated use agreement to the leadership of the parish and demanded that assets should be removed from the church within a week. The officials cited the urgent need for the renovation of the church, which, as it turned out later, they were in no hurry to perform. No dialogue with the parish was held, and neither was any joint appraisal of the building.

In the fall, the church members kept having services in the priest’s house next to the church, but on December 30, that humble place of prayer was also taken from the congregation. The leadership of the Catholic archdiocese sought to keep in check the parishioners who had petitioned against the arbitrariness of the authorities. Great hopes were most likely pinned on negotiations involving the Vatican Nuncio Ante Jozic (which in itself is an indication that the renovation of the building had nothing to do with the decision). By all appearances, the regime had caused the whole situation with the church to have leverage to bargain with the Vatican or even to blackmail it.

Similarly, on September 25, the police forbade members of the New Life Protestant Church to gather for Sunday services in the parking lot outside the building, from which the church had been expelled by the authorities in February 2021. Pastors were detained, tried and sentenced to administrative fines.

All churches to serve the state

Attempts were ongoing to not only bring the major churches under control, but also turn them into accomplices in the ideological indoctrination of citizens. Naturally, the BOC showed the most compliance in this regard. According to the official BOC website, during the joint lighting of Christmas candles with the dictator, Metropolitan Veniamin “voiced his willingness to further collaboration with the state in addressing challenges to contemporary society.” He immediately confirmed this commitment by distorting the biblical concept of the holiday as he claimed that Christ’s mission on earth was for people to live “for the benefit of our neighbors and the good of our Fatherland.”7

The “willingness to further collaboration” materialized into an emblematic ceremony — a copy of the miracle-working Zhyrovichy Icon of the Mother of God was delivered to the headquarters of the Minsk riot police8, tarnished by blood during the protests, although the official BOC website was too embarrassed and kept quiet about it.

Cases were reported when crowds were drawn to various propaganda events through the effort of churches gathering their audiences. For example, a diocese in Homiel brought together young people for a compulsory quiz on the Great Patriotic War, celebrating the Independence Day of Belarus.9

Attempts were made to enlist the less obedient Catholic Church for ideology service as well. For instance, Hrodna bishop Aliaksandr Kaskievich wrote letters to parish leaders asking them to organize commemoration of victims of the Great Patriotic War “because of the request of secular authorities.”10

In some cases, Catholic hierarchs turned out to be a lot suppler. For example, Vitsebsk bishop Aleh Butkievich disallowed priest and blogger Vyachaslau Barok, who had left for Poland following repression, to make media publications and online posts. The bishop substantiated the ban by saying that Barok “is paying too much attention to the political situation in Belarus” and his statements allegedly “cause confusion among believers.” The prohibition is in line with the measures taken against the priest by the official authorities, which included many of his videos in the list of extremist materials.

Conclusion

The Christian Vision group was very active throughout 2022, operating from abroad, as were virtually all other civil society organizations. Christian Vision was monitoring the religious component of persecution, assisting political prisoners and their families, and facilitating the relocation of those threatened with repression. Christian Vision’s proclamations and messages reflect the general position of those Belarusian Christians who are independent from the regime.11

Amid suppression of any initiative and independent action, in 2023 we should expect a further decrease in parish activity and narrowing of church life exclusively to the ceremonial component. On the other hand, growing migration from Belarus rekindles hopes for a shift of church activity to foreign countries. The establishment of an exarchate of the Constantinople Patriarchate in Lithuania may give additional impetus to this activity, encouraging the clergy and lay people to move to an alternative jurisdiction and promoting the national religious infrastructure within the diaspora.