Media: Criminalization of the Profession, Threats to Big Tech, Loss of Information Sovereignty

Project MediaIQ

Summary

In 2022 the condition of Belarusian media continued to deteriorate. This affected not just non-State media, which primarily were forced to relocate their editorial offices outside of Belarus, but also state-owned entities. The latter ceased any pretense of professional journalism, becoming mere conduits of propaganda, including Russian militarism.

Non-state media that have found themselves abroad grappled with the challenge of discrepancy between the «external» delivery of content and its perception by the audience in Belarus. Those that retained the ability to work domestically were compelled into self-censorship, steering clear of not just political, but also social issues.

Consequently, a significant portion of the audience is deprived of information necessary to critically evaluate and understand the socio-political landscape of Belarus, including perceptions related to personal safety.

Trends:

Media market: depoliticization and resource scarcity

After the outbreak of the Russian war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, numerous exiled media outlets underwent yet another relocation, this time from Ukraine. Nevertheless, the majority of publishers acclimated to the new conditions, managing to restructure, retain their teams, and, most importantly, preserve the audience’s trust.

A Chatham House study revealed that 29% of Belarusian urban audiences have full or partial confidence in Belarusian non-state media. Trust levels are even higher (up to 70%) among this media’s specific target audience. Intriguingly, within the same demographic, trust in Belarusian and Russian state-controlled media stands at 38% and 40%, respectively.1

Despite attempts by the Belarusian authorities to obliterate non-state media, these outlets persevere. Not only do they continue their operations, but they are also exploring avenues to bolster influence over audiences in Belarus.

With that said, the regime has systematically dismantled the business models of non-state media at both national and regional levels: accounts were frozen, legal entities behind media publishers were liquidated, and the labeling of publications as «extremist» and subsequent website blockages deprived these media outlets of domestic advertiser support. Moreover, the prevailing structure of donors and their program priorities only partially meet the needs of Belarusian independent media. The challenges of operating editorial teams in exile come with their own set of challenges and associated financial burdens.

By the end of 2022, the Belarusian non-state media landscape comprised media in exile, distributed editorial offices (newsrooms) and domestic media, each adhering to varied editorial policies. The domestic media market is primarily characterized by niche publications, certain regional outlets, and some national platforms that, although not overly promoting a pro-government stance, have refrained from covering salient socio-political issues.

The media consumption of Belarusians is also undergoing a transformation. The diminishing demand for political content, which is primarily negative, is a result of repression, self-censorship, propaganda, and significant barriers to accessing information domestically.

Criminalization of the profession: repression and Internet censorship

In the «Press Freedom Index 2022», Belarus ranked 153rd out of 180, making the poorest performance among European nations (along with Russia). The repression of non-state journalists and media outlets is systemic in nature. The media sector witnessed extensive criminal prosecutions, detentions (43 recorded), raids (55), arrests (20), fines, and deportations from the country.

According to BWA monitoring, 17 criminal verdicts were passed in 2022. Journalists and media professionals were sentenced to jail terms ranging from 1.3 to 14 years.2 An additional 11 criminal cases were initiated but remain unadjudicated. The international NGO «Reporters without Borders» highlighted Belarus as one of the top five nations with the highest number of incarcerated journalists (33), holding fourth place in terms of the number of imprisoned women journalists.3

Media consumption too has been criminalized, with legislation outlawing possession and distribution of extremist content.

Indeed, Belarus practices Internet censorship. Official statistics from 2022 indicate that the state either wholly or partially restricted access to over 3,000 Internet resources - spanning non-state media websites, Telegram channels, and chats.4 Content from approximately 1,500 online sources was flagged as extremist, and 9 media outlets were branded as extremist entities. On May 14, the Supreme Court designated OOO «TUT BY MEDIA», previously Belarus' premier online platform, as an extremist organization. At the request of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office, the social network «VKontakte» proceeded to block several pages and groups linked to Belarusian independent media.

In October, Lukashenko's Decree 368 greatly eased the intelligence agencies’ access to online content. Communication providers and online resource proprietors are now required to enlist in a special electronic interaction system for intelligence agencies, ensuring their platforms provide unobstructed online access to law enforcement.

Consequently, in the global ranking of Internet freedom charted by the human rights group Freedom House in 2022, Belarus received only 28 out of 100 points - the lowest score since 2016.5

Digital platforms as an opportunity - and a serious threat

In light of website blockages and targeted technological repression from both Belarusian and Russian states, independent media have diversified their content distribution channels. Consequently, they’ve become heavily reliant on the algorithms of major tech companies. This is particularly evident in search engines, where, following the silencing of prominent platforms like Tut.by, Belarusians now come in search of news. However, Belarusian public-political news stories remain elusive.

Belarusian independent media have limited visibility on Google services. When the services do cover international events, Belarusian media are largely overlooked.6 Google neither distinguishes Belarus as a unique region nor facilitates searches for news in the Belarusian language. As a result, searches concerning Belarus often yield results from non-state Russian media. The blocking of non-state media websites by the Belarusian authorities depresses these sites’ search rankings even further, reducing their visibility.

Surprisingly, the policies and algorithms of the Russian search engine «Yandex» are comparatively more amenable to Belarusian independent media than American Google, despite still suppressing the distribution of independent content.7 «Zen. News», for example, prioritizes news from Belarusian state sources and those non-state outlets practicing self-censorship.

On platforms like YouTube, Belarusian independent media are overshadowed by Russian and Ukrainian content. Default settings associate the region «Belarus» with the Russian language.8 Search results for «news» are dominated by Russian content; «news of Belarus» yields primarily Ukrainian content; and «war in Ukraine» offers a mix of Russian and Ukrainian perspectives. Searching for «навіны» (Belarusian for "news") produces largely irrelevant results. In all cases, non-state Belarusian media rarely feature prominently.

In 2022, many media outlets grappled with challenges related to promoting their content on Facebook and Instagram.9 The page of the «Belsat» TV channel faces potential deletion, and advertising opportunities dwindle. These hurdles can be attributed to policy changes introduced by Meta in July 2022. The company expanded its definition of political and public-political advertising to encompass content related to war, politics, and elections, as well as mentions of specific politicians. To place a political advertisement tailored for Belarus, advertisers are required to be Belarusian residents. As a result, state propagandists can advertise unhindered, while independent media are sidelined.

Organic promotion suffers due to widespread repression: out of the concern for their safety, users hesitate to engage with content deemed extremist, refusing to “like,” comment on or share such posts. These limited interactions negatively impact the content’s algorithmic ranking.

The mouths of propaganda betray information sovereignty

In 2022, the state grounded its information policy in the public escalation of violence, the promotion of Russian narratives about the war, censorship, disinformation, and slander.10 The propaganda strategy focused on «participation in the information war», with the propagandists themselves identifying as «media front fighters». In comparison with 2020 and 2021, conspiracy theories and narratives, as well as hate speech, were employed more frequently. According to MediaIQ, more than 50% of the examined messages of Belarus-1, ONT, and STV TV channels contained propaganda (67.55, 64.27, and 55.64%, respectively).

Since February 24, state-owned media abandoned the information sovereignty, stipulated in the Information Security Concept of Belarus, in their coverage of Russia-Ukraine relations, opting instead to echo Russia’s stance. It was reflected in the choice of topics, prevailing narratives, and the vocabulary used.

The war events were either selectively presented in line with Russia’s interests (highlighting Russian military achievements and omitting retreats or civilian casualties) or were presented from an overtly pro-Kremlin perspective, with Belarusian media voicing support for the Russian army. Amplifying Russian narratives conflated Belarus’ interests with those of the Putin regime, aiming to legitimize in the court of public opinion the inclusion of Belarus in an all-out war against Ukraine.11

As such, throughout 2022, the state media was more involved in selectively covering regime-important topics - like opposition to sanctions, economic triumphs, the constitutional referendum, and Belarus’ peacekeeping role in the war - than in traditional journalism and reporting.

At the same time, state media found themselves in fierce competition with Russian media for the Belarusian Internet audience. To promote their propagandistic narratives, state media turned to platforms like YouTube and Instagram. Baltic Internet Policy Initiative’s monitoring effort has recorded a significant surge in the audience of YouTube channels belonging to Belarusian state media.

Conclusion

The Belarusian media space is a place of fierce confrontation. As state-owned media transform into mouthpieces for both Belarusian and Russian propaganda, non-state media strive to maintain journalistic standards, no matter how difficult it may be for them.

A new category of media is emerging: officially non-state, but working within Belarus and restricted by self-censorship. Such media might become more appealing to neutral audiences or those who, out of fear for their security, steer clear of media labeled extremist

Coupled with the growing disconnect between exiled media and their audience in Belarus, this further deepens the rift in Belarusian society.