Belarus-United Nations: Further Disengagement from Human Rights Mechanisms

Summary

The priority of Belarus’ foreign policy within the UN system has been to boost its reputation, tarnished by the crackdown on post-2020 election protests. Diplomatic activism focused on highlighting the country’s progress in reaching the Millennium Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and building support for its bid to join the UN Security Council. However, these efforts have yielded limited success due to the role played by Belarus in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

In 2022, Minsk withdrew from a key UN treaty on environmental rights and from the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, thus preventing Belarusian citizens from filing complaints with the Human Rights Committee. Belarus continued its policy of selective engagement with the Human Rights Council (HRC), taking no notable steps in the follow-up to the 3rd cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).

Trends:

• Belarus is abandoning key international human rights obligations, including in withdrawing from the Aarhus Convention and denouncing the optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

• Belarus’ priority in the UN is to build a reputation as a champion in the implementation of SDGs, albeit in a selective manner, – emphasizing mostly its high Human Development Index;

• Belarus’ support to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine undermined its diplomatic efforts and diminished its chances of being elected to the Security Council as a non-permanent member.

Belarusian politics at the UN: focus on the SDGs, attempts to enter the Security Council

For the past decades the focus of Belarus’ activism within the UN system has centered on showcasing the country as a champion in the field of human development. Belarus enthusiastically embraced the agenda set by the General Assembly, first with the eight Millennium Development Goals and then with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Belarus has achieved commendable results in eradicating extreme poverty and hunger and reducing child mortality. This allowed Belarus to improve its Human Development Index, despite difficulties in fighting tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.

In 2022, Belarusian diplomats in New York sought support for their application for non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council (Belarus has been a candidate since 2007). However, this effort was hampered by the post-2020 human rights crisis, which made Belarus a subject of concern within the Security Council. Two informal “Arria formula’’ meetings were held at Estonia’s initiative: one on September 4, 2020, addressing the human rights situation in Belarus following the August 9 election, and another on January 22, 2021 discussing media freedom in Belarus.

The dire human rights situation in the country, however, never made it to the Security Council’s formal agenda due to the veto power of Russia and China, permanent members that consistently support Minsk in condemning international attention to human rights as undue interference.

Another factor tarnishing the Belarusian government’s image at the Security Council is the enabling role Belarus played in Russia's aggression against Ukraine since February 2022. This significantly undermined Belarus’ election bid, especially after Slovenia decided to run as well for the only available seat at the Council representing the Eastern European regional group.

The UN: did not help to lift the sanctions, but did not recognize as co-aggressor either

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) “deplored” the involvement of Belarus in the “unlawful use of force against Ukraine”, in its resolution ES-11/1 (paragraph 10), adopted on 2 March 2022, to condemn Russia’s aggression. The resolution, which received historic support, called on both countries to abide by their international obligations. However, the UNGA refrained from officially labeling Belarus as a “co-aggressor” for permitting its territory to be used as a launchpad for military aggression against Ukraine.

Throughout the year, the UN Secretary General in his recurring calls for a peaceful settlement of the conflict consistently reminded of Belarus’ enabling role in Russia’s aggression. In response, the Belarusian leadership attempted to showcase its concern about global food safety, but made little headway in New York during negotiations over a so-called grain deal.

In June 2022, Minsk offered to let Ukrainian grain shipments transit through Belarus by rail to reach Baltic Sea ports. In exchange, Belarus sought permission to export its own potash fertilizers through those ports, which had been targeted by EU sanctions in response to Minsk’s support for Moscow’s aggression. Ukraine, however, opposed this option, and in July the grain deal brokered by the UN and Turkey without Belarus.

In August 2022, Aleksandr Lukashenko wrote to the UN Secretary-General a letter asking him to facilitate the easing of Western sanctions against Belarus, and in December Deputy Foreign Minister Yury Ambrazevich reiterated this demand during a meeting with Antonio Guterres – to no avail.

Selective engagement with human rights mechanisms

Situation at the Human Rights Council

At the 49th session of the HRC in March 2022, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights presented a progress report on the human rights situation in Belarus in the context of the 2020 elections.1 The report resulted from an investigation conducted by a group of experts under the Coordinator for the OHCHR examination of the human rights situation in Belarus (OEB) from 2021 to 2022, including interviews with hundreds of alleged victims of human rights violations.2

The Belarusian authorities do not recognize this mandate, refuse to cooperate with the team and deny the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) access to Belarus. Representatives from the Belarusian diplomatic mission participated in these interactive dialogues solely to contest the legitimacy of this mandate.

Belarus is not a member of the Human Rights Council (HRC): Belarus had applied in 2009 for membership but failed and has not made subsequent attempts to secure a seat in the HRC. A mandate for a Special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus was created in 2004.

Universal Periodic Review

Like other countries with a questionable human rights track record, Belarus prefers to engage with the UN through the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a mechanism of the HRC run by member States themselves.

Belarus, however, has not yet submitted a follow-up report nor evidenced significant progress towards implementing the 266 recommendations received during its third UPR examination cycle in 2020, even though it accepted 137 of them (according to Belarussian data, even more, 156).3 Most commitments made during previous cycles (2010 and 2015) remain unfulfilled, such as the establishment of a National Human Rights Institution (appointing an ombudsperson) and the implementation of dispositions listed by the government in its National Human Rights Action Plan (2016-2019).

In 2022 Belarus took no positive steps regarding the recommendations it endorsed during the third UPR cycle. Among them: aligning its legislation with its international obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and notably adhering to its Optional Protocol, which allows individuals to submit requests directly to the Committee Against Torture (CAT) when their rights under the Convention are violated. Belarus also failed to implement a national plan of action related to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a core treaty that it ratified in 2016.

International instruments and cooperation with treaty bodies

In 2022, Belarus denounced the first Optional Protocol to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and in November, notified the UN Secretary-General of its withdrawal from the individual complaints mechanism. Thus, the Human Rights Committee, which had examined hundreds of complaints from Belarusian victims of rights violations under the ICCPR, can no longer accept complaints from Belarusian citizens.

In the same year, Belarus withdrew from the Aarhus Convention, a key UN treaty on environmental rights, which covers access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters.

Cooperation with other treaty bodies has been sporadic and selective. In 2022, Minsk held a dialogue with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Belarus had accumulated a 20-year delay in fulfilling its reporting obligations to the Human Rights Committee, responsible for monitoring the implementation of the ICCPR. Minsk resumed reporting to the Committee in 2018, but never complied with the interim measures requested by the Committee to withhold executions until it completes its review of death penalty cases.4 Belarus has not joined the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (on the abolition of the death penalty), and the 2022 constitutional amendments did not abolish capital punishment either.

As a result of Minsk's actions, Belarus' commitment to its international human rights obligations has been questioned even further. Since February 2023, Special Procedures are the only mechanism left for Belarusian individuals to report violations of their rights to the Human Rights Council.

Selective engagement with Special Procedures

The Belarusian authorities maintain a policy of non-recognition and non-engagement with the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus. The mandate-holder (Miklos Haraszti from 2012 to 2018, and Anaïs Marin, since then) has never been granted access to Belarus for an official visit. Since 2021 the Belarusian delegation enforces an “empty-chair” policy during interactive dialogues held when the Special Rapporteur presents yearly reports to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly. In 2022, UN member states supportive of Belarus’ stance in these forums, such as the Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries, also boycotted these sessions.

In its national report submitted to the HRC in the framework of the third UPR (2020) Belarus issued a standing invitation to nine out of 45 thematic Special Procedures mandates.5 However, the respective mandate-holders have not received follow-up information about possible opportunities for an official visit to Belarus. The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe Gonzáles Morales, conducted a visit to Belarus and Poland from July 12 to July 25, 2022, to monitor the situation with third-country migrants at the border of both countries. It was the first time in 12 years where a Special Procedures mandate-holder was granted access (the last being the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human trafficking in 2009).

Belarusian authorities continue to cherry-pick which mandates to cooperate with. In 2022, they replied to only one of the 10 Communications (allegation letters or other letters) sent by Special Procedures mandate-holders that year, resulting in a significant drop in the response rate from 80 percent in 2021 to just 10 percent in 2022.6

Conclusion

In 2022 Belarus exhibited a consistent trend of disengagement from UN human rights mechanisms and essential instruments meant to ensure due protection and promotion of the fundamental rights and freedoms of Belarusian citizens within the UN system. This trend began after the human rights crisis in 2020 and considerably accelerated in 2022, the year when the jailed human rights defender Ales Bialiatski received the Nobel Peace Prize. This augurs ill of the willingness of the current Belarusian leadership to comply with its international obligations. Instead, it is likely to continue focusing on the economic components of the Sustainable Development Goals, the only area in which it can report progress.