Belarus – Ukraine: Into the cold

Summary

Belarus and Ukraine seemed to open new horizons for cooperation in all areas, as they stepped up dialogue at the highest level closer to the end of 2019. The first half of 2020 encouraged some optimism in the bilateral diplomatic and economic interaction. However, massive human rights violations during the presidential election campaign in Belarus forced Kiev to solidarize with the European Union and the United States, and support Belarusians that sought refuge from political repression.

The Belarusian authorities added fuel to the fire during the election by claiming that Ukraine was directly or indirectly involved in the incitement of the mass unrest in Belarus, pushing the leadership of Ukraine to support the democratic segment and civil society of Belarus.

The Belarusian-Ukrainian political crisis aggravated the situation, which was heavily influenced by the coronavirus pandemic, affecting the economic component of cooperation.

By the end of 2020, the bilateral political agenda was frozen completely.

Trends:

• Breakdown of Alexander Lukashenko’s years-long strategy of building trust-based personal relationships with Ukrainian presidents;
• Alignment of Ukraine’s position with that of Western partners regarding the assessment of the crisis in Belarus;
• A nearly 20% contraction of the bilateral trade turnover caused by anti-pandemic restrictions and the political crisis in Belarus;
• Putting of Minsk’s role as a regional peacemaker in question by Kiev, taking into account Russia’s growing influence on domestic political processes in Belarus and Lukashenko’s active involvement in disrupting the international operation to deliver soldiers of the Wagner Private Military Company to Ukraine.

Political dialogue

In 2019, the Belarusian-Ukrainian relationship was largely influenced by the presidential election campaign in Ukraine, while in 2020, it was entirely determined by the presidential election in Belarus and its aftermath.

Alexander Lukashenko and Volodymyr Zelensky maintained regular contacts in the first half of 2020. Their meeting in late 2019 in Zhytomyr heralded positive transformations of the bilateral agenda. The president of Belarus spoke flatteringly about his Ukrainian counterpart after the meeting, and stated his willingness to establish a mutually beneficial dialogue and enrich the bilateral agenda with new initiatives.

Institutionally, the heads of state were expected to at least keep up annual face-to-face communication during the Forums of Regions. The third annual Forum was scheduled for the autumn of 2020 in Grodno. Lukashenko saw the Forums as means to build trust with Zelensky, maintain the illusion of neutrality in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, and offer his assistance in ending the confrontation.

In addition to the efforts to be taken under the political consultations plan for 2020–2021, the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and Ukraine worked on the alleviation of the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. The ministers discussed this matter over the phone in April 2020.

A large Ukrainian government delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Oleksii Reznikov visited Minsk in June together with high-ranking representatives of the parliament and the Presidential Administration. An online meeting of the ad hoc group on cross-border cooperation was also held.

The situation changed fundamentally after the rigged presidential election in Belarus and the crackdown on the opposition, journalists, and participants in mass protest rallies during the election campaign.

Lukashenko’s refusal to meet Ukraine halfway by extraditing the soldiers of the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) was an alarming signal. President Zelensky asked him personally for that, and that was the last telephone talk between the two presidents in 2020.

The internal political crisis in Belarus in August 2020 and the intensified hostile rhetoric of the Belarusian leadership towards Ukraine forced Kiev to make an unprecedented diplomatic demarche. In mid-August, Ukraine’s ambassador to Belarus Ihor Kyzym was recalled to Kiev for consultations (he returned to Minsk in mid-September). The inspection of the Ukrainian ambassador’s car by Belarusian customs officers in September 2020 also attest to the heightened tension in the bilateral relationship.

The Ukrainian foreign minister announced in late August the suspension of official contacts with Belarus. All meetings and international events were put on pause, but the diplomatic relations were not severed.

To be noticed is that President Zelensky’s first reaction to the August 9–10 protests in Belarus was very restrained. He only called for tolerance and rejection of street violence. He was strongly criticized in Ukraine for his ambiguous and indecisive stand, while the foreign ministers of Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland (the so-called “Lublin Triangle”) were much more definitive, appealing to the Belarusian authorities to refrain from the use of force and release those detained during the protest actions.

Ukraine did not recognize the results of the presidential election in Belarus, but Kiev tried to minimize its open support for Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, and refrained from official meetings with representatives of the Coordination Council, on the one hand, because of Tikhanovskaya’s ambiguous statements, and, on the other hand, because Ukraine wanted to maintain economic and humanitarian cooperation with Belarus.

Zelensky’s decision to facilitate the relocation of Belarusian IT specialists to Ukraine had some underlying political reasons, though, which enraged the Belarusian president.

Security

The failure of the international operation that involved Ukrainian security agencies which tried to bring the Wagner PMC soldiers to Ukraine was kind of a breaking point in bilateral personal contacts. The soldiers previously fought in Donbas on the side of the separatists, and Belarus was a transit point to their destination.

According to the information leaked to the press, the operation had been prepared by Ukrainian security services backed by their partners since 2018. It was expected that the plane with the Wagner soldiers on board, would fly from Minsk and urgently landed on Ukrainian territory, where the soldiers would be arrested and criminally prosecuted. However, the 32 mercenaries, nationals of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, were arrested in Belarus on July 29, which was widely covered in a massive media campaign.

This came as a surprise to Ukraine. Its Prosecutor General’s Office requested the extradition of 28 persons suspected of involvement in war crimes in Ukraine. Zelensky called the Belarusian president in early August, asking to hand the suspects over to Kiev. Lukashenko promised he would think about granting the request.

Lukashenko, certainly, wanted to use the situation with the presence of mercenaries in Belarus as a vivid demonstration of external actors’ attempts to influence the outcome of the election, a real threat to his personal security, and an attempt to overthrow him by force. This situation also gave him an extra bargaining chip in talks with Russia before the voting day and expected disorder in the country, since few would believe in the flawlessness of the vote count.

It became known as soon as August 14 that Lukashenko returned the detained mercenaries to Russia, showing once again that Kiev was right doubting Belarus’ deal making capacity and its independence from Russia. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry reacted harshly to the frustrated extradition deal, speaking about mutuality. (Belarus ranks second in Ukraine in terms of the number of legal assistance and extradition requests.)

Lukashenko’s political invectives against Ukraine and accusations of preparing and supporting mass protests in Belarus addressed to Kiev foregrounded the discussion in Ukraine of moving sessions of the Trilateral Contact Group for the resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine from Minsk elsewhere, among other things, taking into account Belarus and Russia’s stepped up military cooperation, in particular, intensified joint military exercises and the idea of setting up a separate military district at the borders shared with the European Union and Ukraine. This was a point of consideration by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.

Trade and economic cooperation

Trade and economic cooperation in 2020 were largely affected by anti-COVID-19 restrictions and curtailed Belarus-Ukraine political dialogue in the second half of the year. The 2^nd Forum of Regions of Belarus and Ukraine was the major economic event in 2019, while in 2020, the Forum became impossible, mainly due to the suspension of official contacts between the countries since August.

Minsk hosted a meeting of the Belarus-Ukraine High Level Group on Mutual Trade in February, but the meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation did not take place.

According to official statistics, Belarus was Ukraine’s second major trading partner among the CIS member states and sixth largest in the world after China, Germany, Russia, Poland, and the United States. Belarus’ trade turnover with Ukraine stood at USD 4.4 billion, down by almost USD 1.1 billion or 20.7% against the pre-crisis year 2019. Imports of Ukrainian goods and services decreased during this period by 14.6% to around USD 444.3 million.

Exports of Belarusian goods and services to Ukraine amounted to USD 3 billion, down 23.4% year on year.

Conclusion

The sharp deterioration of Belarus’ relations with its Western partners and the growing political dependence on Russia changed the Belarusian-Ukrainian relationship pivotally. Kiev did not recognize the results of the presidential election in Belarus, and its political stand towards Minsk has been based on this henceforth. Despite the strategic importance of trade to both parties, Kiev will not take a wait-and-see attitude to the political processes inside Belarus, but will adhere to the official policy of the European Union and the United States both verbally and by taking measures to force the Belarusian leadership to respect human rights and democratic principles.

Kiev will further solidarize with Washington and Brussels in imposing tougher personal and sectoral sanctions on Minsk. Given the situation with the extradition of the Wagner soldiers to Ukraine, it is unlikely that Lukashenko and Zelensky will resume personal contact. The degree of trust between the two presidents is at its lowest point ever.

In terms of national security, Belarus will increasingly pose a threat to Ukraine in the medium term, among other things, by strengthening military cooperation with Russia, using hostile rhetoric in relation to Ukraine, accusing it of organizing and sponsoring the mass unrest in Belarus. The Belarusian-Russian West 2021 strategic exercise will aggravate the situation as well.

It is highly probable that Minsk will no longer host sessions of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which will be transferred to another country. So far, as the sessions are held online, this issue does not top the agenda for now.

Although Belarus and Ukraine are equally interested in de-politicized trade, it is quite possible that Belarus will use its exports of strategic commodities, for example, oil products, as leverage to put political pressure on Ukraine, or as a tool of retaliation in response to additional EU and Ukrainian sanctions.