Belarusian-American Relations: A wreck again

Andrei Fyodorov

Summary

The first half of 2020 saw continued positive dynamics in the Belarus – U. S. relationship, which had been observed in the past few years. Political contacts intensified, and headway was made in economic cooperation. Bilateral relations showed the best progress over a quarter of a century.

Almost everything was ruined after the presidential election in Belarus held on August 9, 2020. The Belarusian-American relationship was down to the lowest point ever with little hope for normalization.

Trends:

The frigid period is over. Not for long, though

The two countries had been raising the bar in the bilateral relationship since early 2020. The third person in the U.S. Administration – Secretary of State Mike Pompeo – went to Minsk on February 1 for the first time since January 1994. The high-ranking visitor had a talk with Alexander Lukashenko, who described the Belarus – U. S. relationship as the end of the “frigid period.”1 Pompeo also spoke with Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei, visited the High Technology Park (HTP), and met with a group of civil society representatives.

Importantly, apart from the very fact of the visit, Pompeo stated America’s readiness to satisfy 100% of Belarus’ crude oil demand “at a competitive price.” Experts were rather skeptical about the economic benefits of this, but, amid the heated disputes with Russia over the oil price, Belarus showed genuine enthusiasm about this alternative. Expectations increased when the first sea tanker with Texas oil arrived in Klaipeda on June 5.

Perhaps, the only negative aspect of the visit for the Belarusian leadership was that Pompeo called it premature to lift the sanctions previously imposed on a number of Belarusian former and sitting top officials, although he acknowledged a certain improvement in the human rights situation in Belarus. Therefore, the extension of the sanctions by the U. S. President did not come as a surprise.

Cooperation in other areas continued, albeit less fast-paced. On February 25, the State Forensic Examination Committee of Belarus and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency signed a memorandum of cooperation for combating drug trafficking. The U. S. Department of Energy provided Belarus with equipment for border protection. The United States allocated USD 1.7 million for Belarus’ COVID-19 pandemic response program.

Neither the report by the State Department that criticized human rights violations in Belarus, nor the U. S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty strongly affected the bilateral relationship, so it was not extraordinary that Donald Trump congratulated Lukashenko on Belarus’ Independence Day.

On May 5, the U. S. President nominated Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Europe and the European Union in the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Julie D. Fisher for ambassador to Belarus. On July 20, Minsk responded with the expected appointment of Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Kravchenko as ambassador to the U.S.

Clouds began piling up when the presidential election campaign started in Belarus. Massive popular support for opposition candidates was very disturbing for the Belarusian authorities. Out of all possible response strategies, they chose the forceful one with mass detentions of peaceful protesters and arrests of the presidential candidates.

The U. S. Department of State repeatedly released statements, voicing concern over the detention of presidential candidate Viktor Babariko and repressions against participants in protest rallies. The United States called on to respect human rights, rules of democracy, and commitments that Belarus took on as an OSCE member, including to hold free and fair elections.

On July 22, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale called Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei, which analysts interpreted as an attempt to warn the Belarusian regime against heavy-handed actions. Minsk apparently disregarded those warnings.

Washington puts pressure, Minsk strikes back

The United States immediately responded to the events in Belarus, which began right after the election. As soon as August 10, Pompeo called the elections unfree and unfair, and urged the Belarusian authorities to respect the right of peaceful assembly and to abstain from the use of force.

Three days later, the state secretary once again voiced “keen disappointment”, and said that oil supplies to Belarus might be discontinued. Supplies did stop, though. The second oil tanker (which, symbolically, arrived on August 9) turned out to be the last.

The U. S. kept releasing all kinds of appeals, admonitions and warnings regarding the situation in Belarus. Importantly, it warned Russia against direct interference with processes in Belarus, threatening with new sanctions if this warning was ignored.

The State Department played a key role in this, while President Trump responded only once, saying, “It’s terrible. That’s a terrible situation, Belarus. We’ll be following it very closely.” Unlike Trump, Democratic Party candidate Joe Biden frequently talked tough about the actions of the Belarusian regime.

In practice, however, the White House did not show any particular resolve in the matter. The U. S. declared support for the sanctions imposed on Belarus by its European partners, and urged Cyprus to stop blocking the package of the EU sanctions. However, it took quite a while for the United States to initiate restrictions, and they appeared to be much less severe.

On the whole, as of late 2020, the U. S. Treasury Department imposed restrictions on 25 individuals and 13 legal entities of Belarus, and the Department of State put 63 persons on its sanctions list, mostly officers of the Central Election Commission and security agencies. The U.S. Department of Commerce decided on October 19 to deny Minsk’s request filed in February to revoke Belarus’ remaining non-market economy status.

The Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020, which took effect on December 28, was potentially the most important step made by Washington.2 The Act authorized the U. S. president to impose personal visa sanctions against those involved in election fraud, human rights violations and repression, and every government official responsible for the persecution of independent media. This also applied to nationals of any state, including Russia. The Act calls for

The Belarusian leadership, at first, seemed to be hoping that Washington would not take an extremely tough stance in light of the recent years’ achievements, but when it happened otherwise, Minsk launched a counteroffensive with an emphasis on the geopolitical component and direct military threat.

On August 21, Alexander Lukashenko, for the first time, openly accused the United States of plotting a coup in Belarus to capture a part of its territory. “The United States is planning and orchestrating all this, and the Europeans are playing along... Because they have set the goal to first cut off this territory – Grodno. They have already hanged out Polish flags recently. Our Motherland is in danger. This is not a matter of joke, the more so, as those are not weak troops, NATO,” said Lukashenko.3

He resorted to this narrative more than once. In particular, Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin reported on September 12 that American troops and armaments were being redeployed to the Belarusian border. This rhetoric was basically used to embroil Russia in the confrontation.

Russia did not have to be persuaded for long. President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov were constantly stressing the inadmissibility of foreign interference with the internal affairs of Russia’s “ally.” Russian Foreign Intelligence chief Sergei Naryshkin claimed that the United States played a “key role” in organizing the protests. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu accused “the United States and its satellites” of using color revolution technologies, and purposefully heightening tensions to aggravate the internal political situation in a number of countries.

Mike Pompeo’s phone call to Alexander Lukashenko on October 24 did not improve anything. They mostly negotiated the release of U.S. citizen, political technologist Vitaly Shklyarov, who was detained shortly before the presidential election in Belarus. Minsk made certain concessions in this matter, so some experts assumed that it was willing to enter into a dialogue, but no confirmation followed.

Julie Fischer took the office of ambassador to Belarus on December 24, but the long-anticipated exchange of ambassadors did not happen. Besides, ambassador nominee Oleg Kravchenko passed away the next day.

Meanwhile, political disagreements that grew sharper over that period had almost no effect on economic cooperation. The bilateral trade turnover fell from USD 855 million (USD 470 million in Belarus’ deficit) to USD 735 million (minus USD 335 million), or by 14% year on year, which concurred with the overall contraction of Belarus’ foreign trade. At the same time, sales of intellectual products brought about a much more substantial effect: residents of the Belarusian High-Tech Park boosted exports to the United States in January-September 2020 to USD 816 million.

Conclusion

Belarus’ usual top priority in its relationship with the United States was to enlist support to protect itself from potential encroachments of Russia, of course, without “relinquishing principles.” Although Minsk is worrying about possible changes in U.S. policies, attempts to return to pragmatic relations will definitely continue, and the Russian threat will sure be cited whenever possible, although, under the circumstances, it is highly unlikely that this goal will be achieved.

The United States’ strategic interests with respect to Belarus largely concern the preservation of Belarus’ sovereignty. Therefore, any form of annexation cannot be recognized. Given the fundamental divergence of views on the future of Belarus, especially in the context of aggravated Russian-American confrontation, a compromise with the Kremlin on this point is hardly possible.

The U.S. cannot completely ignore the constant deviations from the norms of democracy and violations of human rights in Belarus. However, there are reasonable concerns that excessive pressure on Minsk may lead to an undesirable geopolitical outcome. For this reason, Washington will avoid a direct conflict with Moscow on this issue.

Since Belarus does not pose a global challenge to the United States, it is doubtful that there will be some special strategy towards the country. Hypothetically, the new Belarus Democracy Act offers significant opportunities to help fight for human rights and democracy. However, it is just a framework document, and its effectiveness will depend on the willingness to apply it, which hardly tops President Biden’s to-do list, regardless of his declared commitments. It will be clear whether the U.S. has not imposed sanctions against the Belarusian economic sector, because it does not want to burn all the bridges once the moratorium on the sanctions against Belneftekhim enterprises has expired at the end of April 2021.

The U.S. accounts for a little over one percent in Belarus’ total trade turnover, so its reduction will not result in significant losses for Belarus, while the massive relocation of IT companies and specialists can cause quite extensive damages.

As a tool of economic influence, the United States can use its leverage so that international financial institutions stop providing assistance to Minsk. However, but radical measures, like the disconnection of Belarus from SWIFT, are virtually impossible.

The reinstatement of the ambassadors is pretty much doubtful. The Belarusian authorities certainly hope for Julie Fischer’s arrival in Minsk, because she would have to present credentials to Lukashenko, which would mean that America recognizes him as a legitimate president, but Washington has already stated that this would not happen.

Besides, the presence of the ambassador in the country would not make her work effective. At present, all Western embassies in Belarus mostly just monitor the developments, and the American embassy would be the most toxic for Belarusian officials.

In general, the Belarusian dilemma arises again, and attempts to find a solution through external influence have not been successful so far.

Perhaps, the events of 2020, most importantly, the awakening of Belarusian civil society, will lead to a different outcome this time. There are reasons to believe that in case of fundamental political changes in Belarus, the United States will provide large-scale economic assistance. Otherwise, the Belarus-U.S. relationship is destined to remain sorrowful.