Election Campaign: Background, process and consequences

Piotr Rudkouski

Summary

For the Belarusian regime, the 2020 presidential campaign was very costly, both domestically and internationally. The need to constantly adjust the scenario of the fake election generated a lot of contradictions that could not be concealed. At the same time, opponents of the regime managed to gain an important advantage – a shared understanding in the opposition-minded part of society that it constitutes a majority. Severe repression and rhetorical loyalty to Russia allow the authorities to buy some time, but this does not eliminate the very cause of the crisis–popular wide demand for a new social contract.

Trends:

The 2020 presidential election was held against the backdrop of increased popular demand for a new social contract, in particular, a new culture of public administration, and broader involvement in political decision-making. This demand was preconditioned by changes in the composition of the population in terms of education and economics, as well as a decline in paternalistic expectations. Also, there was a crisis of confidence in such key institutions as the Central Election Commission (CEC)1 and state-controlled media.

The national authorities recognized these trends to some extent, as evidenced by an attempt to improve the image of law enforcement agencies, cautious economic liberalization and the vague promise of constitutional reform. However, society could no longer accept cosmetic reforms or abstract talks about constitutional amendments somewhen in the future. Besides, the Belarusian authoritarian system was not ready for profound systemic reforms.

Election tactics of the authorities

As noted above, the authorities, or rather its intellectual segment, were aware that Belarusian society was changing, and that the absence of reforms might threaten the system itself. This was one of the reasons why economic liberalization was on the agenda in 2015-2016. As the elections were approaching (parliamentary in November 2019 and presidential in 2020), the authorities decided to get rid of one of the major irritants – the arrogance of the police.

The PR campaign aimed at ‘humanizing’ the image of the police began in June 2019, when Yuri Karayev replaced Igor Shunevich as interior minister. One of the tasks of the new minister was to improve the image of law enforcement agencies, so that the people trust them more and no longer associate them exclusively with their punitive functions.

However, in view of the forthcoming election, the campaign to humanize the police collided with measures to ensure a harsh response to the political mobilization of society. Instead of building a positive image of law enforcers, the efforts reversed towards greater repression and coercion.

As part of the chosen tactics, the authorities played the independence card again. In December 2019, the state media announced that “half of Belarusians were against a union with Russia, preferring a partnership instead”.2 When controverting in May 2020 with Lukashenko’s main potential contenders Viktor Babariko, Sergei Tikhanovsky and Valery Tsepkalo,3 the state propaganda highlighted the threat to sovereignty and national identity.4 Lukashenko himself and high-ranking officials used a similar rhetoric.5

This anti-Russian and pro-independence information campaign peaked when 33 mercenaries of the Wagner Private Military Company patronized by the Kremlin were detained in Belarus in late July 2020. (Shortly after the election, all of them were released, and Lukashenko apologized to the Russians through his son.)

It is noteworthy that the president’s regular address to the nation and the parliament was postponed. The event used to be held in the second half of April or early May. This time, it took place on August 4, the first day of early voting. Since Lukashenko considers it beneath him to conduct a standard election campaign with meetings with voters, debates, etc., his campaigns have been disguised over the past two decades as the performance of routine presidential duties. The 2020 address to the nation and the parliament was used as a powerful election tool.

Other pre-election techniques, such as keeping the opposition uncertain about the election date, nomination of sham candidates to disorient the public, and spreading rumors about alleged terrorist attacks, have been applied during presidential campaigns since 2001. The year 2020 stood out, as sham candidates had never pulled out of the race in favor of the incumbent president, and harsh repressions had not started at the stage of signature collection.

In 2020, Lukashenko’s major contenders6 were imprisoned before the registration of candidates. Over 1,200 arbitrary detentions and 23 politically motivated criminal cases were reported during the campaign.7 More than 700 criminal cases against protesters were filed as of late March 2021. Tens of thousands were sentenced to administrative arrests and fines.8

Five presidential candidates were registered on July 14, 2020: co-Chair of the Tell the Truth campaign Andrei Dmitriev, lawyer Anna Kanopatskaya, Alexander Lukashenko, and translator Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, and businessman Sergei Cherechen. Procedural and legal criteria played the least role in selecting the candidates, which is evidenced by anecdotic situations when the Central Election Commission (CEC) validated more signatures collected for some candidates than they actually submitted. For example, Anna Kanopatskaya reported 110,000 signatures, while the CEC registered 146,000. There were similar discrepancies with the signatures collected for the registration of Cherechen. This could not be just an honest mistake, since they would not undercount support they enlisted.

The candidates were most likely selected based on some particular criteria: to keep away popular and strong candidates (Tikhanovskaya was little-known at that time), to disorient opposition-minded voters, and to make Lukashenko look good in the media, including on posters, where his picture was put in the middle between two women, Kanopatskaya and Tikhanovskaya. This looked like a coincidence, as the names were listed alphabetically in Russian and Belarusian.

Opposition: a failure of planning and success of spontaneity

The Belarusian opposition began preparing for the presidential election back in February 2019, when the Centre-Right Coalition9 came out with the idea to nominate a joint candidate through primaries. The nomination procedure was elaborated in early 2020. The Coalition candidate was supposed to poll a majority vote in offline voting in the regions and online nationwide. Five contenders – Pavel Severinets (Belarusian Christian Democracy party), Yuri Gubarevich (For Freedom movement), Olga Kovalkova (Belarusian Christian Democracy self-nominee for the primaries), Nikolai Kozlov (United Civic Party) and Alexei Yanukevich (Belarusian Popular Front) – began touring to the regions in February 2020.

In less than a month, a conflict arose within the Coalition over whether the votes of government officials, who began massively attending opposition meetings at some point, should be considered as a ‘voice of the people.’ Besides, the advisability of personal meetings was questioned during the COViD-19 pandemic. It did not take long before the very idea of the primaries was dropped.

The failure of the primaries obviously relaxed the Lukashenko Administration. The usual unhindered scenario was expected with the neutralization of opposition heavy-weights, admission of little-known oppositionists and/or sham candidates, implanting the thought that there is no alternative to Lukashenko, and targeted repressive measures. The election year, however, saw a combination of unpredictable factors that thwarted the initial plan.

The first one was the decision of Belgazprombank Chairman Viktor Babariko and former head of the High Technology Park Valery Tsepkalo to run for office. Both have vast experience of work in government and business institutions; maintain extensive international contacts, primarily in Russia (which was a pain in the neck for the regime); are perceived by senior officials as proponents of a new long-awaited managerial style, and wealthy enough to finance their campaigns without foreign grants.

On July 15, Babariko, Tsepkalo, and Tikhanovskaya’s headquarters united to send a simple and clear message: Belarus must return to the path of democracy through a fair election. Three women came to the fore: Maria Kolesnikova (Babariko’s team), Veronica Tsepkalo (Valery Tsepkalo’s wife) and Tikhanovskaya herself as the central figure.

Lukashenko’s political technologists mocked this trio in every way possible to distract the attention from serious topics and relieve the pre-election tension. In fact, this female alliance not only united the protest-minded electorate, but also mobilized many of those who used to stay away from politics. The authorities had to once again rewrite their scenario, and again with multiple side effects.

Under the pressure, some local election commissions had to rehearse the vote count and announcements of ‘correct’ results, which brought up new risks. Largely exposed to public inquiries, those stunts triggered an even more vigorous response to the fraud.10

The situation deteriorated when the authorities resorted to an unprecedentedly brutal crackdown on the post-election protests. People were tortured in detention prisons, and several demonstrators were killed, which outraged previously apolitical or loyal social groups, such as health professionals, civil servants, journalists of the state media, security officers, the clergy, and blue collar workers.

Although the Kremlin took a supportive position, the international response was extremely uncomfortable for the regime. Most countries and organizations of the western world did not recognize Lukashenko as a legitimate president re-elect, and imposed sanctions, first personal and then economic. A large number of professionals have been resigning from state agencies, and the economic stability of the regime is seriously threatened.

Aftermath: suppressing symptoms

In the post-election period, after some hesitation, the authorities chose to take tough repressive measures to cope with the political crisis. Internationally, the declared attitude to Russia changed pivotally. Before the election, Russia was presented as the main source of threat, whereas after the election, it was called a brotherly nation again, at least rhetorically.

Also, the regime began entertaining two strategic ideas: formation of a party of power and constitutional amendments. Belarus is one of the few autocracies that function without a party of power. Although the regime has so far managed to ensure continuity, the Lukashenko Administration began thinking about such party to diminish the risk of losing control over society and the political establishment amid the political crisis.

As for constitutional reform, there are hesitations about its profoundness and manageability of its effects. Apparently, three options are being considered: (a) to keep the debate over the Constitution away from politics, focusing on traditional values, the death penalty, etc., leaving the governance architecture as it is; (b) to delegate a part of presidential powers to other institutions, and grant a constitutional status and real powers to the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, as it was done in Libya under Muammar Gaddafi; (c) take some powers from the president and grant them to the parliament, government, courts and local councils.

Lukashenko is thus facing a dilemma: to step down as president in the next 3 or 4 years, or cling to power for a decade or more. In case of resignation, the options (b) or (c) seem to be acceptable the most. Should he decide to stay in office, option (a) would be the one. As it is not typical of Lukashenko to make crucial decisions for a distant future, constitutional reform will remain undecided until the last minute. Keeping constitutional reform on the agenda is meant to create a counterbalance to the idea of a transfer of power and to buy some time for the time being.

Conclusion

The last year’s presidential campaign was very costly for the regime, both internally and internationally. The need to revise the scenario of the rigged election all the time generated a lot of contradictions that were impossible to conceal. At the same time, opponents of the regime managed to gain an important advantage, i. e. a common understanding that the part of society that wants changes is in a majority.

In order to reboot the system, the regime needs to command support of professionals, especially experts in economics, IT, management, diplomacy, and law. This did work in some authoritarian states, such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, where autocrats once managed to find a balance between loyalty and professionalism of their people. The Belarusian regime, which has a long history of imposing a social contract through repression in a command and control style, is unlikely to succeed in finding this balance.