Belarus – European Union: A year of unfulfilled expectations

Denis Melyantsou

Summary

In 2018, Minsk continued coherent efforts to normalize relations with the European Union, both bilaterally with individual Union members and multilaterally at high-level conferences hosted by Belarus. However, almost no progress was achieved in negotiations on the agreements that are most significant and relevant to Belarus, which means that Belarus – EU relations have plateaued since the parties have no political will for a qualitative breakthrough.

At the same time, the practical cooperation agenda continues to expand, and new opportunities for investment and joint projects are arising.

Trends:

Increased intensity of contacts

The year 2018 was quite intensive, both in terms of the number and the level of visits and political contacts between Minsk and Brussels.

Several European Commissioners visited Belarus last year. The Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations came on January 30, June 21–22 and October 30; the Commissioner on Health and Food Safety on August 27–28, and the Commissioner for Digital Economy on June 21–22. Also, Minsk hosted meetings with a delegation of the Eastern Partnership ambassadors-at-large of twelve EU member states (May 21–24) and the leadership of the EaP Delegation for Relations with Belarus (from October 31 to November 2).

Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei held talks with High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn from May 31 to June 2 in Brussels. Vice President of the European Investment Bank Alexander Stubb visited Minsk on November 20–21.

During the meeting with Kahn, President Lukashenko made several statements that more or less explain Minsk’s policy in relations with Brussels. Firstly, he expressed the traditional wish that the Eastern Partnership be “more down-to-earth and pragmatic” and not create any dividing lines in the region. Secondly, he said that Belarus was interested in a strong European Union. “We are dead set against the centrifugal efforts in the European Union, which make it weaker.”1 This statement should be understood as Belarus’ wish to have a second strong player on the continent aside from Russia to continue the successful political maneuvering.

The minister of foreign affairs of Belarus made a visit to Belgium from May 31 to June 1, the first one since 1995. The parties reviewed bilateral relations and considered matters related to international relations and security, Belarus-EU interaction and the capacity for cooperation in international organizations.

The 10th round of the Informal Ministerial Dialogue of the Eastern Partnership was organized in Minsk on June 21–22. It focused on digital markets, cybersecurity, broadband Internet development and the convergence of tariffs for mobile roaming. Summing up the results of the meeting, Vladimir Makei said that over the past few years, Belarus and the European Union had achieved progress in relations that excels the achievements of the previous two decades.2

With respect to cooperation with individual EU member states, the visit of the presidents of Austria and Germany to Minsk should be recognized as most important. On June 29, they took part in the ceremony of commemoration of the victims of Nazism in the former death camp in Trostenets.

On October 15, Makei took part in the 9th annual meeting of the Eastern Partnership foreign ministers in Luxembourg. The participants assessed the implementation of the 20 key deliverables for 2020 approved at the Brussels Summit held in November 2017. On the sidelines of the meeting, Makei held talks with European Commissioner Khan on the partnership priorities and visa facilitation and readmission agreements, and on the planned high-level visits and cooperation with the European Parliament.

Alexander Lukashenko’s speech at the meeting of the Munich Security Conference Core Group in Minsk was indicative from the point of view of Belarus’ relations with the European Union. On the one hand, the president stressed the importance of a strong European Union to Belarus. On the other hand, he criticized Brussels, among other things, for making requirements in the field of democracy and human rights, thus being reluctant to expand economic cooperation with Belarus in exchange.3

The EU-Belarus Coordination Group, which sat on April 26–27 in Minsk and on December 12–13 in Brussels, held sectoral dialogues on economics, finance, trade, customs procedures and environmental protection. In 2018, the sides agreed on delegating a Belarusian customs attaché to the county’s permanent delegation to the European Union.

Projects and investments

In 2018, Belarus and the EU were promoting credit and investment cooperation. Belarus entered into an agreement with the European Investment Bank, and launched new grant mechanisms for the construction and modernization of economically significant facilities, involving the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership and Mobility Partnership.

In March, Vladimir Makei signed an agreement with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) on a EUR 42.45 million loan for the reconstruction of the P-80 highway (a section of the second Minsk Ring Road).

On November 14, the European Union and UNDP started a three-year project to support entrepreneurship in the Belarusian regions worth EUR 8 million. It is one of the largest projects of this kind in Belarus.

On November 20, first investment agreements (EUR 160 million) were signed with the European Investment Bank (EIB), which opened a new page in Belarus-EU relations. EIB Vice President Alexander Stubb said that the first investment package covers two areas: (1) a major project with Minskvodokanal on the reconstruction of the Minsk Waste Water Treatment Plant (co-funded by the EBRD) and (2) support for small and medium enterprises through Belarusian Belarusbank and Belagroprombank. According to Stubb this is just the beginning. Development of the project on the construction of the M7 highway (Minsk – Oshmyany – Kamenny Log) is nearing completion. A number of other projects are under consideration.4

In September, the Institute of Physics of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus signed a grant agreement as part of Horizon 2020, the biggest EU Research and Innovation Program.

In October, Minsk hosted a meeting of representatives of local authorities from among the signatories of the Covenant of Mayors initiative of the Eastern Partnership supported by the European Union. Currently, more than 45 cities of Belarus have joined the Covenant of Mayors to reach the EU’s climate and energy targets, being committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 30% before 2030.

In order to stimulate incoming tourism, establish business ties and improve the country’s image in the West, Belarus expanded the period of visa-free stay for foreigners (including EU citizens) to 30 days. This, apparently, was meant as an additional argument in the visa talks with Brussels, but the goal was not achieved.

Unrealized expectations

Despite the increased frequency of visits and the number of joint project in 2018, Minsk did not manage to achieve progress on landmark agreements, particularly the visa facilitation agreement with the European Union and the agreement on partnership priorities. Belarus also failed to convince the European Union to begin negotiations on the partnership and cooperation agreement.

In October, during the next round of visa talks, Belarus achieved the removal of some obstacles, in particular, the request of some EU members to include a provision on suspension of the visa agreement in the event of a change in the situation (for example, an aggravation of the migration problem or imposition of sanctions against Belarus). Minsk strongly opposed this, saying that there is no such article in the agreements with other countries, for example, with Russia and Ukraine. As a result, the European Union agreed to drop this point in the agreement, but still wants it in a general form in the preliminary statement.

The parties failed to agree to expedite the signing of the visa facilitation agreement because Poland proposed to link it with Belarus’ obligation to increase the number of consuls at the European embassies, since, as Warsaw says, the Polish embassy is overwhelmed with visa applications.

Belarus tries to argue that visa facilitation will not lead to a sharp increase in the number of issued visas, since there will be much more multiple-entry and long-term visas and, therefore, there will be even fewer applications to deal with. Besides, the European Union does not meet Belarus halfway regarding the number of consulates. Minsk is reluctant to increase the number of consuls, fearing that they will rush headlong into issuing Polish Cards, rather than more Schengen visas.

The negotiations on the 2018–2020 partnership priorities agreement made no headway either. The partnership priorities are some sort of a roadmap, which describes priority areas of Belarus-EU cooperation before the agreement on cooperation and partnership is signed. It is important to Belarus, as it provides opportunities for profound collaboration with the Union and access to more funding programs.

The signing of the priorities agreement is still blocked by Lithuania, which uses it as leverage trying to stop the construction of the Belarusian nuclear power plant. Vilnius raises the nuclear safety question in almost all formats of negotiations between Belarus and the European Union. At the moment, Lithuania mainly demands that Belarus implements a national plan to improve the NPP safety based on the results of stress tests (which Belarus had already voluntarily carried out) before the plant is put into operation.

The partnership priorities agreement was supposed to be signed more than a year ago. This delay leads, on the one hand, to a growing irritation of the parties (including towards Lithuania on the part of European diplomats) and, on the other hand, to making the Belarusian negotiators sure that if Lithuania’s requirement is met (although less than a year is left before commissioning of the first power unit of the NPP), Vilnius will put forward new demands, since it has set a political task to prevent the functioning of the Belarusian NPP at all.

There is no progress in the talks on the admission of Belarusian agricultural products to the European market. Despite membership in the WTO, European countries pursue a protectionist policy in relation to its agro market. In fact, Belarusian exporters have been kept away from the European market for years. The EU members initiate never-ending audits, European Commission bureaucrats cause lengthy delays, or the EU authorities simply do not respond to Belarus’ requests for months or even years.

No progress has been achieved in this matter for a few years now. The parties only hold numerous meetings and expert consultations. The Coordination Group said at the December session that four European audits on general issues were scheduled for 2019, but the request of Belarus to include poultry meat in this audit remained unanswered again. This means that this audit can be conducted in 2020 at the earliest.

Belarusian negotiators show growing frustration and irritation, and already say without diplomatic courtesies that the European Union uses phytosanitary requirements as a trade barrier.

In turn, the Union is disappointed that Belarus shows no changes, especially political, and even tightens the screws again. Bilateral relations were strongly affected by the notorious BelTA Case, when offices of several independent and state-owned media (including Tut.by and BelaPAN) were searched by the police, and journalists were charged with unauthorized access to information of BelTA state-controlled news agency, which was only available on paid subscription. EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini5 and the German Foreign Ministry6 released statements, condemning this case.

Conclusion

In 2018, the Belarusian leadership continued strenuous efforts to normalize relations with the European Union, using various tools, including intensified bilateral cooperation with a number of EU member states.

However, Belarus was unable to achieve significant progress in the negotiations on the visa facilitation and partnership priorities agreements, the signing of which was repeatedly announced. Belarus failed to set the negotiations on the baseline agreement with the EU in motion either. Both Minsk and Brussels come to the understanding that the bar should not be set too high. The illusions of the past few years are being shattered in the process of substantive talks.

In 2019, the negotiations on visas, partnership priorities and trade will continue. The probability that the agreements will be finally signed is quite high, but, judging by the previous developments, the Union may lay down new demands, requiring new rounds of talks.

As the presidential election in Belarus approaches, the mutual rhetoric of the parties could become sharp due to the mainstreaming of the topic of human rights and the general increase in politicization, without having a noticeable impact on the real level of cooperation between Belarus and the European Union.