Presidential Administration: Nihil novi

Nikolai Burov

Summary

Throughout 2018, the Alexander Lukashenko Administration was busy preparing for the 2019 election campaign that will generally follow the usual Belarusian scenario, but with less emphasis on ‘buying’ votes than in the previous campaigns.

The Administration still adheres to extremely conservative views in terms of possible political transformations. Presidential chief of staff Natalia Kachanova was growing more and more powerful. Tensions between the Administration and the government were increasing. Shortages of qualified personnel remained a serious problem.

Trends:

“No one holds on to power fingers spread. Clenched fist is what holds it”1

In 2018, the Presidential Administration primarily focused on the preparation for the 2019 election campaign to ensure a trouble-free re-election of Alexander Lukashenko for his sixth term in office by means of (a) a further careful and gradual shift of the emphasis of the propaganda rhetoric from socio-economic development to the preservation of national sovereignty, stability and independence, an issue that, as a matter of fact, has been blown way out of proportion, (b) designing new tools to control the private sector amid the continuing degradation of the public sector and the acute unemployment problem,2 and (c) building a new model of the relationship with the Russian Federation.

The Administration sees a redistribution of roles in the economy between the public and private sectors as one of the main tasks for retaining the vantage ground. However, effective mechanisms for controlling people, who fall out of the public sector, have not been worked out yet. The president instructed to closely monitor how petitions filed by individuals are being handled3 as per Directive No.2. “The Presidential Administration must do this. The people must be duly updated on all developments,” said Lukashenko.

The government failed4 to cope with the increasing unemployment rate and minimize the outflow of workforce from low-paid jobs by means of the notorious decree on ‘social parasites.’ The first version of the decree did not work and even undermined socio-political stability in the country. The second version turned out to be substantially diluted and did not extinguish popular enragement.

The Administration tries to shift responsibility for the inability to work out new tools for controlling the employed to local authorities and the government, which are set impossible tasks. This was most clearly manifested during the ‘Orsha panning’5 in August, when the government was replaced. It is the government, which is to pump money into the economy in the pre-election year and take tough measures, who will be scapegoated for the economic collapse.

Throughout the year, the Administration strictly adhered to an extremely conservative policy regarding any possible political transformation in the country, which is not surprising, since it completely coincides with the position of the president. At the 3rd congress held on January 19, the Republican NGO Belaya Rus (‘White Russia’) finally dropped its long-standing aspiration to obtain the status of political party. It is absolutely clear that the elections to the 7th House of Representatives will be held according to the current laws on elections, and even feeble attempts to initiate the transition to a party system is out of the question.

Despite the persistently circulating rumors about possible amendments to the Constitution, there was no information on any developments in this regard. (The only rationally acceptable change in terms of the transfer of power would be, of course, the establishment of the post of vice-president, rather than a seven-year presidential term or transition to a party system.)

The Presidential Administration initiated significant rearrangements in the management of state-owned media, which, however, are only partly related to changes in information policy. Pavel Yakubovich stepped down as editor-in-chief of newspaper SB Belarus Today following allegations about unscrupulous financial operations. Ivan Eismont was appointed chairman of the Belarusian State TV and Radio Company, obviously thanks to his powerful wife, who heads the presidential press office. The changes in the media sector reflect a tightened information policy of the government, especially in relation to the Internet (in particular, the preparation of a new version of the Law on the Media, the BelTA Case, etc.), which indirectly suggest that the available means of control are very limited, and that the country’s leadership is nervous about the socio-political situation in the country.

Political scientists point at the following important areas that state ideologists use to prioritize anyway: (a) the fierce war on corruption, (b) the reportedly low utility bills, (c) the fight against the ‘construction mafia’, and (d) national cultural and sporting achievements (the active preparation for the 2nd European Games scheduled for June 2019, etc.).

Conflict within the elite

The conservative position of the Presidential Administration cannot but aggravate intra-elite antagonisms. The fact that Alexander Lukashenko had to deal with them publicly suggests that the degree of tension is quite high. During the ‘Orsha panning’, presidential chief of staff Natalia Kachanova tried to launch a counter-offensive, noting that only 87 out of 126 presidential orders on socio-economic development of the Orsha district were fulfilled.

At the meeting with the Administration leadership held on October 18, Lukashenko even said that the Administration was overly active, intervening in activities of the government and, more importantly, defense and security agencies. The president looked irritated by Kachanova’s attempts to blame the others for the non-fulfillment of presidential instructions. He said that the Administration should have stayed within its jurisdiction and taken care of staffing, screening of proposals submitted to the president, monitoring of their implementation, and ensuring the special role of presidential assistants. The Administration did not oppose the law on countering domestic violence, which fundamentally contradicts pubic sentiments that ideologists are trying hard to nurture in society, and the diligently built image of Alexander Lukashenko as the father of the nation.

A week later, at a meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Turchin, the president insisted that strategizing is not in the government’s job description, and it should mainly deal with everyday routine.

Personnel reshuffles

The authorities still fail to increase the role of the presidential assistants (envoys), chief inspectors of the regions and Minsk city (these positions were established by decree No.305 of August 25, 2017). They analyze and forecast the socio-political and socio-economic situation in their areas of responsibility, identify local problems and contribute to producing possible solutions.

The scandal with Sergei Rovneiko, Presidential Assistant in the Grodno region, discredited the institution of assistants to a certain extent. On May 29, Rovneiko was caught red-handed taking a USD 200,000 bribe in a large-scale redistribution of the alcohol and tobacco market in 2018.

Alexander Turchin was appointed presidential assistant in the Gomel region, and Vladimir Andreichenko took the position of assistant in the Vitebsk region. There was an attempt to counterbalance the power of the so-called “Vitebsk Group” (Andreichenko and Kachanova among them by all accounts) by appointing Vitaly Vovk assistant to the president, chief inspector of the Vitebsk region (the latter was removed from office as minister of industry after a scandal).

Nevertheless, the Vitebsk clan in the Administration was growing stronger. Kachanova managed to retain the president’s trust. Despite harsh criticism voiced in Orsha, Nikolai Sherstnev remained chairman of the Regional Executive Committee, and Vladimir Andreichenko not only continued to perform the functions of presidential assistant in his native region, but was also entrusted to select MPs for the 7th House of Representatives. In 2018, the president visited the Vitebsk region much more often than other regions.

On April 5, the Presidential Administration returned to the traditional composition by reinstating the office of special deputy chief of staff for ideology. Vladimir Zhevnyak, who was little-known to state ideologists, was appointed to this position. The ideological vertical got somewhat blurred. The supervision of education, culture and sports was assigned to first deputy chief of staff Maxim Ryzhenkov, which created some kind of diarchy in the Central Directorate of Ideology headed by Olga Shpilevskaya (also little-known) since September. Unbiased experts say that the ideological branch has never been that weak. Truth be told, the crisis of ideas and the conservative ideology in Belarus have been apparent in the past few years.

The Administration certainly is aware of the staffing problem it has, and makes considerable efforts to resolve it. The strategy is also understandable: to look for most effective solutions to the problems arising from the shortage of resources and preservation of the development model, rather than relying on the strong ideological vertical and the security bloc.

For instance, the Administration tries to make the Presidential Academy of Public Administration an effective institution in terms of public officers’ competences. Gennady Palchik was appointed rector of the Academy in late May. On July 24, the president heard his report for the second time. In August, Kachanova assisted in the formation of a special pool consisting of promising young managers, whose education at the Academy of Public Administration is considered a very serious matter, and the education process (mentorship in particular) is unusual for Belarus.

Meanwhile, the Administration worked on a new version of the Law on Public Service, the essence of which boils down to a significant tightening of its provisions and the actual legislative attachment of applicants to their areas of responsibilities, which indirectly indicates that the staffing problem gets increasingly acute. “The civil service is for special people,” Kachanova said.

Conclusion

As in previous years, the Presidential Administration mainly adheres to conservative views on the possibility of any political changes in Belarus.

Chief of staff Natalia Kachanova became more powerful. So did the Vitebsk clan in the Belarusian political establishment, which, among other things, was manifested by the channeling of significant resources to the Vitebsk region for development of the Orsha district, as well as the project of a large logistics hub in Bolbasovo that looks more like a smuggling hub. At the same time, President Lukashenko firmly curbed the attempts of the Administration to enhance control over other pressure groups, especially defense and security functionaries.

The weakening of the Central Directorate of Ideology continued. The shortage of qualified personnel was growing, which first of all concerns the selection of professional personnel and their legislative anchoring in designated jobs.

Preparing for the upcoming 2019 election, the Presidential Administration once again follows the traditional scenario.