Belarusian-American relations: Long-standing thaw

Summary

Belarusian-American relations continued to normalize in 2017. The pace slacked off, though largely as a result of the new U.S. Administration, which abandoned many of its predecessors’ approaches. Also, against the backdrop of a number of significant events across the world, Belarus was put on the back burner by the global political players. The Russian factor continues to adversely affect Belarus-U.S. rapprochement. As a result, the irreversibility of the normalization remains in doubt.

Trends:

• Belarus seeks normalized relations, but no substantial positive changes were achieved;
• The economic cooperation showed poorer results as compared with 2016;
• Belarus may face serious threats to its sovereignty due to Russia’s foreign policy and the growing confrontation between Russia and the United States.

Event history

March 6: Foreign Minister of Belarus Vladimir Makei meets with Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation. They discuss the relations between Belarus and the United States, the situation in Eastern Europe and possible areas of cooperation between Belarusian and American think tanks.

March 26: The U.S. embassy in Minsk voices concern about the harsh actions of the law enforcers against peaceful street actions timed to the Freedom Day.

March 30: First Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Andrei Yevdochenko speaks about “obviously positive changes” in Belarusian-American relations.

April 3: Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Kravchenko meets with David Baron, co-Chairman of the Belarus-U.S. Business Cooperation Council, to discuss the Belarusian-American trade and investment cooperation.

April 4: The first conference on Belarus titled ‘Revising Relations: Legacy and Outlook for U.S.-Belarus Bilateral Ties’ is held in Washington.

April 5: Four distinguished U.S. senators address Alexander Lukashenko with an open letter urging him to turn the political course toward democracy and the West in order to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Belarus from Russia’s encroachments.

April 6: Kansas City hosts a commemorative ceremony on the occasion of the 100^th anniversary of the U.S. entry into World War I. Alexander Lukashenko is invited, but Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Kravchenko attends the event in his stead.

April 11: During a working trip to the Gomel region, Alexander Lukashenko comments on U.S. domestic and foreign policy.

April 28: Washington extends the suspension of sanctions against nine Belarusian enterprises for half a year.

May 9-11: Oleg Kravchenko makes a working visit to the United States.

June 12-13: A Belarusian delegation headed by Alexander Shumilin, Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology of Belarus, takes part in the eMerge Americas International Exhibition and Conference on high technologies in Miami. Belarusian research centers showcased nearly 80 high-tech and science-intensive projects and exhibits.

June 14: Donald Trump extends U.S. sanctions against a number of high-ranking Belarusian officials for a year.

July 6: Alexander Lukashenko meets with a delegation of the U.S. Congress.

July 21: The U.S. Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) holds the briefing ‘Interaction with Belarus for Human Rights and Democracy’ in Washington.

October 3-6: Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Kravchenko makes a working visit to the United States.

October 24: The U.S. extends the suspension of sanctions against nine Belarusian enterprises.

October 25: Pavel Pustovoy, Director of the Americas Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, meets with Brian Roraff, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State.

November 22: The U.S. Department of Commerce imposes anti-dumping duties on rolled carbon and alloy steel products originating from Belarus.

Processes slow down. Achievements dwindle

There were a little fewer meetings between Belarusian and U.S. officials than in the previous year. In 2016, they were mostly held in Minsk. In 2017, most of them took place in America, basically because of the new U.S. Administration and a significant reshuffle in the Department of State.

Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Kravchenko was quite active throughout the year. He visited Washington twice, and the program of the visits covered much ground. In May, he met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bridget Brink, the leadership of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Affairs, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and attended the conference ‘Between East and West: Belarus at a Crossroads’ organized by the Atlantic Council and the Jamestown Foundation. Six months later, he held talks with Bridget Brink again, and Acting Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Michael Kozak (former U.S. ambassador to Belarus), Deputy Assistant Administrator for Europe at the U.S. Agency for International Development Gretchen Birkle, and other representatives of the State Department, government agencies and NGOs.

This shows that the level of diplomatic contacts did not get lower. It did not go higher either, though.

Anyhow, actions and statements made by the leaders of the nations were in the spotlight. Donald Trump routinely extended sanctions against a number of high-ranking representatives of the Belarusian leadership, and the Foreign Ministry of Belarus no less routinely responded to that.

Unlike his American counterpart, Alexander Lukashenko displayed some enthusiasm. In particular, as contrasted with previous similar situations, he was not critical when commenting on the U.S. missile strikes in Syria. At a meeting with a delegation of the U.S. Congress to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly session in Minsk,1 he once again declared the invariability of Belarus’ interest in full-fledged partnership relations. Moreover, he even expressed his willingness to listen to “legitimate criticism” on the part of the United States and not to avoid a discussion of issues relating to human rights, democracy and elections “regardless of the format and place of the talk.”

At the same time, the Belarusian leader acknowledged that the dynamics of the bilateral cooperation was somewhat decreasing. Indeed, fundamentally, except for some expansion of the range of services provided by the consular department of the U.S. embassy in Minsk, there were no visible, concrete achievements.

Nothing changed in the economic cooperation either, and the information supplied by the sides was, as usual, very contradictory. According to U.S. data,2 the last year’s bilateral trade turnover totaled USD 350 million, Belarus having a 205 million surplus in trade. The Belarusian National Statistics Committee (Belstat) thus reported 604 million in turnover with a 6.5% year-on-year decrease and a deficit of 154 million.3

This makes up less than one percent of Belarus’ entire foreign trade. A year before, it was at 1.2%, which means a setback. In any case, such indicators can hardly be considered desirable in trade with the world’s leading economy.

In late 2017, the U.S. Department of Commerce proposed anti-dumping duties on carbon and alloy rolled metal products produced in Belarus. Rolled metal products are definitely not the biggest item of Belarus’ export to America (potash fertilizers sure are), but this protection measure was still quite discouraging.

Encouraging is that the United States is one of the main consumers of services of Belarusian IT companies. In the light of the Belarusian leadership’s recent efforts towards a digital transformation of the economy, this is the area where a breakthrough is possible someday.

It is also worth noting that the White House is going to cut the assistance to Belarus by almost USD 8 million. Belarus is not the only country that will lose money due to Washington’s new policy, so there is no reason to suspect a particularly biased attitude toward Belarus. The point is that this shows the low degree of Belarus’ relevance for the incumbent U.S. Administration.

Besides, considering that the talks about the return of ambassadors have almost died out, the slowing down of the already not too intensive process of establishing good relations becomes obvious.

Russia’s position is the main obstacle

Meanwhile, the year did not see many usual barriers to increased mutual understanding in the form of drastic deviations from democracy or gross violations of human rights in Belarus. The new U.S. Administration does not seem eager to uphold these values overseas any longer. Its reaction to the harsh measures taken by the regime against peaceful street actions timed to the Freedom Day made that clear: this time, only the American embassy in Minsk expressed concern.

Perhaps the most fundamental attempt to analyze the situation was made by a group of Belarusian experts in the report ‘Role of the New U.S. Administration in International Relations and Security in Eastern Europe.’4 However, some of the presented findings look controversial.

The main obstacles to the normalization are said to be the low awareness of Belarus in American society and political elites, the prevailing perception of Belarus as a strategically insignificant state, insufficient mutual diplomatic presence, Minsk and Washington’s disagreements in the assessment of the domestic political situation in Belarus, and the latter’s generally negative image in the West.

This produces a certain impact, but it is not determinative, at least, the ‘low awareness’ and the absence of ambassadors can hardly be described as such.

It is also not very clear why, as the report says, American foreign policy officers have not managed to correctly assess the strategic significance of Belarus for a quarter of a century. It seems that the authors paid tribute to the present-day views of the Belarusian leader who keeps calling Belarus “a donor of regional security” that has not been convincingly proved yet.

A greater impact results from discrepancies in Belarus’ domestic policy and, consequently, its negative image. At the same time, America’s relations with Saudi Arabia, which even an incurable optimist cannot describe as a beacon of democracy, show that these aspects pale into insignificance when it comes to strategically important matters. The pragmatism, which is typical of Washington’s foreign policy, gives reason to believe that some ideological concepts could well be sacrificed to draw Belarus over to America’s side.

The United States, however, does not basically need Belarus. Probably, Washington would not mind if Minsk behaved like, say, Tbilisi, but the U.S. is not going to exert any extra effort to this end, since the last two decades have convincingly shown that at the present stage, due to the close ideological and economic ties between Belarus and Russia, it is totally impossible to pull Belarus from under its eastern neighbor.

Along with its own profound distrust of the West, the Belarusian leadership reasonably fears that even a slightest shift towards the West will cause Russia’s inadequately harsh response.

It is also quite clear that in the event of an aggravated confrontation between Moscow and Washington, there will be no geopolitical choice for Minsk. There is no doubt, for example, that Russian-American relations will get much worse following new American sanctions against the Russian elite to be imposed in 2018. The Kremlin will strive to consolidate all its resources to the utmost, and Belarus will certainly be unable to stay away.

Some offbeat actions of Minsk, such as the non-recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the annexation of the Crimea, are apparently not considered by Washington as a sincere and settled intention to escape from the Kremlin’s firm grasp. Actions that constantly accompany the steps above suggest otherwise.

So, the policy of Russia remains the main obstacle to the normalization of Belarusian-American relations.

Conclusion

Despite the mentioned difficulties, the past year’s developments can be regarded as positive compared with the tough confrontation observed a little while back. Moscow’s unpredictable behavior prompted the aspiration of the Belarusian leadership to earn support from the West, primarily the United States.

Another strategic goal of Minsk is defined as “achievement of sustainable normalization of ties at a level that would ensure unimpeded trade with America, access to loans, investments and technologies, and participation in industrial cooperation.”5

However, there are not too many objective prerequisites for stronger cooperation. Constraining factors, the main one being the fundamentally different views of the parties on Belarus’ domestic policy and Russian influence, are much more powerful. The first issue can still be more or less resolved, but the second one will likely get bigger in the foreseeable future. In these conditions, the future of the Belarusian-American relations still does not inspire much optimism.