Local authorities: Lightning catcher for popular frustration

Summary

The main trends in the local government system were determined by the preparation for the 2018 local elections and mass protests against the ‘decree on social parasitism.’ Most likely, President Alexander Lukashenko was about to complete a large-scale personnel reshuffle in district executive committees started in early 2017 before the beginning of the election campaign. However, because of the protests, he had to take a break for three months.

The local vertical faced staffing difficulties when looking for candidates for village councils that caused a gradual reduction in the number of administrative units in rural areas. Nevertheless, the local administrations managed to provide the required number of nominees to fill the vacancies in local councils, the number of which has been declining in recent years. Although members of the councils do not command much respect in local communities, the Belarusian leadership does not plan on amending the legislation in this area, elevating the status, or enhancing the competencies of the councils. Apparently, local administrations are not eager to change anything, either feeling comfortable when the whole power is concentrated in the higher instances, while the councils remain some sort of clubs, to which representatives of regional elites are elected.

Trends:

• The role of the local authorities is increasing in terms of securing jobs for the population, since this remains the main criteria for assessing the performance of the power vertical;
• A new system of checks and balances is being created in rural areas to counterbalance the influence of large agricultural enterprises given that village councils have little political heft;
• The presence of all sectors of the economy in local councils is maintained proportionate to their influence on the regional economies;
• The liquidation of village councils slows down as it is resisted by the rural communities backed by the local authorities.

Local councils: ideological and economic functions

The government sees local administrations as a kind of lightning catcher for popular discontent. Among other things, the Belarusian leadership tasks the local authorities to reduce the number of people’s appeals. At the same time, after the spring mass protests and in view of the local elections, the government pays much attention to feedback from the population, especially when it comes to open manifestations of public anger.

While the national resource base is shrinking, the Belarusian leadership counts on greater responsibility of the locals for their territories. The national government declares its intention to expand the capacity of territorial self-government agencies, which do not have any power, but stimulate public activity. This, among other things, leads to an expansion of opportunities for local communities’ initiatives within the territorial public self-government councils. In rural areas, the national authorities placed an extra burden on village heads in terms of monitoring of state facilities and public safety. In turn, the delegation of additional responsibilities together with the cuts of budget spending for rural areas causes tension between the local authorities, state organizations and the national leadership.

The local vertical continues efforts to raise funds under EU projects. To this end, local administrations are trying to substitute civil society, the involvement of which is required by EU-funded programs, with pro-government public associations. The administrations are quite successful in imposing their terms on the European Union and preventing the engagement of independent NGOs in grant programs. For example, district executive committees acted as the main organizers of competitions of local projects under the EU-UNDP project and, consequently, influenced the selection of contenders, who, certainly, were only found in pro-government public associations, state-run institutions and local administrations.1 Members of local councils want to participate in international support programs, including that through the formation of associations of local councils. So far, such associations are operating in the Grodno and Mogilev regions, but this practice will most likely spread to other regions in the coming years.

Local administrations of the border regions show interest in increasing the time and areas, to which the visa-free regime applies. Their position is essential for further visa liberalization. In the composition of the local administrations, the police (regional offices of the Interior Ministry), who were initially skeptical of the visa-free regulations, are subordinate to the leadership of the regional executive committees. The visa-free regime brings extra revenues to local budgets and contributes to the infrastructural development and creation of new jobs in the border areas.

President Lukashenko shifted the responsibility for the enforcement of the decree on ‘social parasites’ from the tax authorities to local administrations in order to strengthen the ideological component in the community outreach and greater management coordination in the regions. In 2017, the Belarusian leadership was polishing provisions of the notorious decree. Its updated version was approved in early 2018. The president placed the main burden related to the enforcement of the updated decree on executive committees and councils, although they did not initiate and sometimes even opposed it.

Personnel rotations in the regions of public unrest

Alexander Lukashenko started reshuffling heads of local executive committees early in the year. Mass protests made him stop for three months. Since 2015, one of the main criteria to assess the performance of local administrations has been their ability to keep the unemployment rate low in accordance with presidential decree No.3 on the prevention of social parasitism.2 Most likely, the real rate of unemployment in the regions and popular discontent with the local vertical had been disturbing the Belarusian leadership before the outbreak of anti-decree protests.

Once the protest movement had faded out, the country’s leadership made a personnel rotation in the most troubled districts and regions. In fact, about one third of the personnel of local administrations were replaced in 2017 before the start of the local election campaign.

The reshuffle was made in a quarter of all districts (30 out of 118). Lukashenko replaced heads of administrations in a number of districts in the capital and regional centers–Gomel, Grodno and Brest–and also in Bobruisk. The rotation of chairs of district and regional executive committees will likely continue in 2018 after the local elections.

The head of state appointed ranking officials from the central machinery and his assistants to the most troublesome districts, contrary to the informal personnel policy agreement between the president and regional elites. Usually, the head of the district vertical is selected from among regional functionaries, and the president only approves the appointment. This time, the first deputy minister of housing and public utilities headed the local vertical in Soligorsk, and the presidential assistant, chief inspector of the Vitebsk region headed the Orsha district executive committee.

It looks like the government wanted to reduce powers of the regional elites of the Minsk region when it comes to making personnel decisions after the corruption scandal, which involved the former chairman of the Soligorsk district executive committee. It is worth noting that Chairman of the Minsk regional executive committee Semion Shapiro was dismissed shortly before the criminal case was opened in Soligorsk.

Local elections: personnel reduction

Over the past few years, the government continued to optimize the administrative-territorial division by eliminating township councils and enlarging village ones. The main reason is to reduce costs and trim overlapping functions of the councils. Their total number decreased from 1,328 in 2014 to 1,309 in 2018. Eleven township councils were liquidated together with eight village councils.3

This resulted in a reduction of the number of council members by 3.7%. The number of constituencies in local elections decreased from 18,816 in 2014 to 18,111 in the elections to the local councils of the 28^th convocation.4 The ongoing decrease in population causes a shortage of personnel capable of filling vacant positions in local councils. The national and local administrations regard members of village councils as an ideological outreach channel, but give them so little power and money, that few locals would be interested in sitting in not much respected councils.

The optimization of village councils was slowed down in recent years to reduce tensions among rural residents caused by the large-scale optimization in the previous five-year period. It is possible that village councils will be abolished altogether in a few years, and the number of village councils will continue to decrease.

The national authorities have long been preparing for the dissolution of local governments of the lowest level–village councils. However, along with the resistance on the part of local communities, the Belarusian leadership seems to be uptight about the strengthening of agrarian bosses who, in the event of the dissolution of village councils, will receive additional social welfare functions and total control over the electoral process. In this case, lobbyists from rural areas will require extra financing from the budget.

Private businesses as a counterbalance to the power of large agricultural enterprises in rural areas

The government seeks to counterbalance the power of agrarian heavyweights, whose power in rural areas is greater than that of village councils. The number of representatives of the agricultural sector in regional and district councils is also decreasing following local elections, which means that they have less influence on the distribution of local budgets. This is evident the most at the district level (see Table 1).

The general proportion of representatives of the agricultural sector in local councils continues to decrease, among other things, due to a reduction in the number of village councils. There were 26.6% of them in the councils of the 26^th convocation, 23.4% in the councils of the 27^th convocation, and only 21.37% in councils of the 28^th convocation that corresponds to the proportion of rural residents in the population of Belarus.

A part of the Belarusian political establishment, especially those in charge of election arrangements, has been talking about abolishing the primary-level councils for a few years now. Should this be done, agricultural enterprises can be given additional social functions and arguments in defending their interests before district authorities and the national government. With this in mind, the Belarusian leadership has to take measures to facilitate doing business in rural areas.

In the meantime, the government continues to reduce social guarantees to the rural population and subsidies to the agricultural sector. In return, it liberalizes the business environment in rural areas. The republican budget expenditure for the agrarian sector was cut by almost 25% from 951,469,9177 rubles in 2016 to 719,799,1748 in 2017. This trend towards a decline in support for agriculture continues. In 2018, the government will cut the expenditure for agriculture by almost 30% against 2017 to 511,609,648 rubles.9

In turn, the head of state issued the decree ‘On Creating Conditions for the Development of Trade, Public Catering and Consumer Services’, which focuses on promoting entrepreneurship in rural areas.10 The government also seeks to break the monopoly of the chain of stores of the Belarusian Republican Union of Consumer Societies (Belcoopsoyuz), which, most often, make losses, but emphasize their social significance and, therefore, request budgetary subsidies.

The Belarusian leadership is now thinking how to reduce agrarian bosses’ lobbying capacity, political weight and appetite for state support given that village councils are weak and may be abolished at all. Most likely, the government sees the need to foster private initiative in rural areas and is to reconsider the role of major local groups of influence.

Conclusion

President Lukashenko and regional elites agree to maintain the status quo concerning the powers of local councils fully controlled by local administrations. Regional and district councils play the role of some sort of clubs that coordinate interests of regional actors and reflect their role and power in the regions. The updated pact between the national leadership and local elites also provides for a greater role of local authorities in absorbing the popular discontent at the socio-economic policies of the state based on unpopular decisions.

Personnel reshuffles become more frequent as the country’s leadership attempts to combat corrupt practices and prevent the local bureaucracy from forming long-standing groups of influence. The president reserves the right to intervene in the regional personnel policy in case local administrations fail to suppress protest movements and high-profile corruption scandals, and ensure high employment rates.

The insignificance of village councils, which are unable to oppose the political influence of large agrarian enterprises, urges the government to increase the proportion of private businesses in rural areas. The expansion of the private sector is supposed to curb the power of agrarian bosses, their lobbying capacity and the appetite for state support as budget spending for agriculture is being cut. The government will also continue to gradually reduce the presence of the agricultural sector in regional and district councils.