Value shift and going through the full cycle

Summary

The year 2017 was a period of the most serious social shake-up after 2010. The events that took place in March–mass protests and the following crackdown–reflected a significant shift in the mass consciousness, the scale of which allows calling it a value shift. The reasons were of a natural inner nature. It was an outburst of the nation’s grievous economic self-perception and a hurt sense of justice. However, radical changes did not happen, and, by the end of the year, all main indicators were back within the range of typical markers.

Trends:

• The economic self-perception of the nation (with a negative extreme in February) and geopolitical orientations turned minor cycles with a small amplitude;
• Protest sentiments in February showed the highest values and then returned to the previous indicators;
• The attitude to the annexation of the Crimea by Russia as a general indicator of the perception of a military threat remained at the same level with a certain fluctuation during the September army exercise.

Economic self-perception of the nation. Pre-protest winter peak and subsequent stabilization

The peak of the negative economic self-perception of the nation fell on the period before March 20171 and was followed by a certain stabilization. The lower extreme seen before the mass protests of late February-March passed, and the return of a similarly low perception did not recur. Since September, changes were in the zone of temporary fluctuations without forming a general trend. The number of those who said that the economic situation in households has deteriorated only increased 2.3% from September to December.

Geopolitical orientations: mini-cycle without significant changes

Geopolitical orientations during 2017 passed a small, not strongly pronounced circle. There was a fall of pro-Russian sentiments during the first half of the year, including September, and then they went up a little. At the same time, there was a certain increase in pro-European sentiment from 14.1% to 20%.

The September and pre-September fall can be explained by the army exercise West-2017 and the media campaign that accompanied it. The media coverage of the exercise caused a suspicion towards Russia in popular consciousness. It was manifested in (1) a certain decrease in pro-Russian integration aspirations and (2) a precipitate decline of support for the annexation of the Crimea by 10%.

The annual dynamics of the Belarusians’ attitude to the annexation of the Crimea was as follows: against the backdrop of fairly stable corridors of positive and negative values, a sharp surge occurred in September (Diagram 6). It demonstrates a very interesting phenomenon of mass consciousness both from a theoretical and a practical point of view. This is a phenomenon of independent reflection of public opinion, when it changes without express reference, but only through heating up of the topic in the media.

During the year, a little over 60% of Belarusians positively assessed Russia’s actions (‘legitimate and justifiable’), and 12% to 14% responded otherwise (‘illegitimate’). Both these corridors were relatively constant until September, when there was a 10-percent fall. This can be explained by the impact of the media coverage of the military exercise West-2017. Once it was over, it all returned to its former values.

This strong support for the annexation of the Crimea is a cumulative effect, which combines the influence of the Russian media and some deep-rooted values like the perception of the Crimea as a time-honored Russian land where many generations of Russian soldiers shed blood, and Sevastopol as a Russian city of naval glory.

In general, all changes in geopolitical orientations (except the September surge of the attitude toward the annexation of the Crimea) are small-scale and fluctuational. Similar kinds and scales of fluctuations have been observed many times, and do not indicate a pronounced trend.

Geopolitical romanticism persists

According to the New Year poll (Diagram 7), 12.7% of respondents believed that Russia can apply the ‘Crimean scenario’ in relation to Belarus, while 72.4% said this is not possible. This means that almost three-quarters of Belarusians believe that the annexation of a part of Belarus or its entire territory by Russia is impossible. The all-year dynamics is shown in Diagram 4.

Main event of the year2

Belarusians called the protest actions caused by decree No.3, which affected a large number of people, who basically constitute Lukashenko’s key electorate, the main event of 2017. In this situation, Belarusian independent media outlets and social media also made an impact. The barring of the Russian national team from the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang was called the second most important event. The death of Private Korzhych was the third. Belarusian independent media managed to make a high-profile case of it, although the political establishment made every effort to conceal or ignore the incident. The profile of the White Legion case was not that high.

Belarusians thus did not care much about global events, such as the independence movement in Catalonia and Brexit.

Less happiness, more luck

This is the most paradoxical result of the New Year poll, which, at the moment, is hard to explain. Compared with previous New Year polls, the number of Belarusians who considered themselves not very happy grew by 7.3% from 35.4% to 42.7%. This can easily be explained by the general deterioration of the economy, effects of decree No.3 on ‘social parasites’, social protests, etc. Against this background, the general 6.5% increase in the number of those who believed that the year 2017 was successful for them personally from 43.6% to 50.1% is mysterious.

Conclusion

The economic self-perception (with a negative extreme in February) went through the annual cycle with minor fluctuations. Society is yet to assess the steps taken by the government towards liberalization of the economy. Further measurements will show whether there will be a transition to winter-spring cycle deterioration of the economic self-perception.

Geopolitical orientations also changed insignificantly, and it is still difficult to predict how they will change in 2018.