Belarus-Ukraine: From privileged to ‘hybrid’ partnership

Gennady Maksak

Summary

In 2017, the political dialogue between Minsk and Kiev can be described as ‘hybrid.’ Despite the intensification of contacts at the highest level, Belarus took a number of unfriendly actions towards its neighbor, some of which were due to the special nature of the Belarusian-Russian interactions, in particular, the specific nature of the army exercise West-2017. A negative public response overshadowed the bilateral dialogue, specifically when it came to national security.

Against this backdrop, trade and economic cooperation was flourishing, being accompanied by frequent interagency contacts. The parties managed to adopt several sectoral roadmaps for the medium term and agree on new institutional forms of cooperation.

Trends:

The presidents maintained stable political contacts; diplomatic interaction became more active;
The mutual distrust was growing due to some actions of Minsk discordant with the public political discourse;
Over time, Belarus lost its status of a neutral state in relation to Ukraine;
The bilateral interdepartmental sectoral cooperation got closer;
The countries stepped up the trade and economic cooperation. As usual, Belarus enjoyed a trade surplus.

Political dialogue

The outlook for strengthening the political dialogue between Belarus and Ukraine was optimistic in 2017. Firstly, in early 2017, Kiev decided to appoint an ambassador to Belarus. The office had been vacant since 2015. In May 2017, President Lukashenko accepted the credentials of new Ambassador Igor Kyzym who started working on the resumption of diplomatic contacts right away.

Secondly, contacts at the level of the heads of state contributed to the restoration of the full-scale diplomatic channel. In April 2017, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko made a working visit to Belarus at the invitation of the Belarusian side. Trade and economic matters topped the official agenda. Unofficially, security issues were addressed behind closed doors. Constructive arrangements made it possible for Lukashenko to make an official visit to Ukraine in July. The presidents met for the third time in November to discuss accumulated problems.

Thirdly, Belarusian-Ukrainian contacts were promoted by Minsk’s efforts in the international arena. In 2017, Belarus chaired the Central European Initiative (CEI), set up several official meetings, and hosted a regular session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Ukrainian official delegations took part in those events.

At the same time, despite certain progress in the political dialogue at the highest level, the year began with some unfriendly steps towards Ukraine on the part of Belarus. In March, amid the crackdown on protests, Belarusian law enforcers tried to find a Ukrainian link in the ‘provocations’ in Belarus.1 Lukashenko claimed that the KGB arrested militants engaged in the preparation of provocations and “training of armed insurgents in boot camps” in Ukraine.2 Kiev responded with a note of protest and summoned the Belarusian ambassador to Ukraine for explanation. Minsk never provided concrete evidence to substantiate the president’s statements.

In the socio-cultural and humanitarian areas, the sides signed a number of interdepartmental documents on the development of physical education and sports, culture, interethnic relations and scientific cooperation, and agreed on symmetrical terms for the stay of Ukrainian nationals in Belarus and the stay of Belarusians in Ukraine without reporting to the migration authorities.

International initiatives

The Eastern Partnership provided opportunities for bilateral task meetings in 2017, but still did not become a venue for mutual understanding. In April, the foreign ministers of Belarus and Ukraine met during the summit of the Visegrad Four and Eastern Partnership in Warsaw. At the November informal meeting in the UAE, the presidents discussed a joint position to be stated at the Eastern Partnership summit. However, at the November summit in Brussels, Minsk, as always, did not support Kiev’s proposal to include statements on the illegal occupation of the Crimea and Russian aggression in the final declaration.

Minsk did not support the resolution on the Crimea in the UN General Assembly, which was important to Ukraine, and voted in favor of Russia, which was supported by several Asian and African nations. As a result, representatives of the Ukrainian government questioned the neutrality of Belarus and the advisability of continuing to use Minsk for meetings of the Tripartite Contact Group on Ukraine.

Defense and security

In this environment, Kiev reacted to Minsk’s proposal to send Belarusian peacekeepers to the Donbas region with a great deal of skepticism. In general, Kiev and Minsk’s views on regional and national security differed fundamentally.

Throughout the year, Kiev repeatedly voiced concern about the strategic military exercise West-2017 in the territory of Belarus. This concern was not unfounded. During the previous exercise, West-2013, Ukrainian security services reported that Russia was working on a plan to invade Donbas in 2014.3

At times, Ukraine’s doubts concerning the harmlessness of the army exercise were articulated so strongly that the president of Belarus had to spend hours giving explanations to his Ukrainian counterpart.

Measures taken to facilitate monitoring of the exercise were not particularly helpful. Ukrainian representatives in the international group of observers spoke about “virtual transparency” and non-conformity of the declared defensive nature of the exercise to its actual goals.4

Kiev substantially strengthened border control before and during West-2017. Minsk even tried to accuse the Ukrainian side of air intrusion when its air force was monitoring the border. Ukraine side resolutely refuted the allegation.5

The kidnapping of Ukrainian national Pavlo Gryb from the territory of Belarus by the Russian FSB strained relations. Gryb was found in a pretrial detention facility in Russia shortly after. Kiev was certainly unhappy about Minsk’s lethargy in the investigation into the incident and the very fact that foreign security services apparently feel perfectly at home in Belarus.

The detention of Ukrainian journalist Pavlo Sharoyko by the KGB of Belarus was another high-profile incident. Sharoyko was later officially arrested on the charge of espionage. Minsk accused the Ukrainian side of making it public contrary to the usual practice. A Belarusian citizen was detained in Ukraine in June also on suspicion of espionage, and that case was not given so much publicity.6 The spy scandal with Sharoyko affected the bilateral diplomacy. Ukraine ordered a Belarusian diplomat out of the country after Belarus declared Ukrainian embassy counselor Igor Skvortsov persona non grata.

The year 2017 saw several more detentions of Ukrainian citizens in Belarus followed by exchanges of notes through diplomatic channels and public statements.

During the April meeting at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the Lyaskovichi residence, the presidents spoke about speeding up the demarcation of the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, especially the Ukrainian section, where Ukraine is considerably behind Belarus in this respect. In July, in order to intensify the demarcation, President Poroshenko changed the composition of the Ukrainian delegation to the joint Belarusian-Ukrainian demarcation commission. The commission’s work was given a new impetus. It held two meetings in August and December.

In the area of the military-technical cooperation, Minsk officially announced a reduction of the number of contacts with Kiev referring to the status of Belarus as a place for meetings on the resolution of the conflict in Donbas.7 It can be assumed that the position of Russia influenced the dynamics of the military-technical cooperation as well.

Economics and energy

The intensity of bilateral business contacts and the presence of institutional and contractual bases suggest a considerable potential of the trade and economic cooperation. The ambassador of Belarus to Ukraine said that “the foreign economic relations continue to uphold strategic partnership.”8

Economic diplomacy was an integral part of the contacts at the highest level throughout the year. The 1^st Belarusian-Ukrainian Economic Business Forum took place in July when Lukashenko was on an official visit to Ukraine. The parties signed a number of bilateral documents and contracts for a total amount of over USD 47 million. During the Forum, as part of cooperation between the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Belarusian-Ukrainian Advisory Business Cooperation Council held its 6^th session.

Prior to the visit, at the 25^th session of the Intergovernmental Belarus-Ukraine Joint Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, the delegations signed a memorandum of cooperation, which supplemented and expanded the agreements that are on the Cooperation Development Roadmap for 2017-2020 adopted at the 24^th session in 2016. Under the said agreements, Belarusian-Ukrainian inter-sectoral task groups met eight times at the level of deputy ministers. Roadmaps and action plans for 2018 and 2017-2020 were approved.

In 2017, Belarus and Ukraine achieved the forecast indicators: the total turnover amounted to nearly USD 4.6 billion (a 20% year-on-year increase).9 As usual, Minsk maintained and increased a trade surplus, which was at USD 2.15 billion in 2017. A significant proportion of it consisted of revenues from the export of oil products. Belarus is of strategic importance to Ukraine in terms of energy security and a reduction of the heavy dependence on energy supplies from Russia. In total, Ukraine imported 7.8 million tons of oil products worth around USD 4.2 billion. Belarus’ export of oil products to Ukraine amounted to 1.83 billion. The country topped the list of suppliers to Ukraine. Russia came second, while Lithuania came third.10

Conclusion

The Belarusian-Ukrainian political dialogue is turning ‘hybrid.’ It combines intensified contacts at the highest level and reliance on informal communication, and, at the same time, unfriendly acts and the incoherent position of Minsk in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

Despite the obviously inspiring dynamics of the bilateral political dialogue, there is no reason to believe that a breakthrough is possible in the near future, first of all because Belarus has to prioritize relations with Russia. In this regard, the neutrality of Belarus remains nominal.

Under the circumstances, the increased trade and economic cooperation between Belarus and Ukraine can be considered a return to the situation of the early 2000s, when partial freezing or suspension of the political dialogue was compensated by record-breaking accomplishments in trade.