The Belarusian Armed Forces: Internal development and international cooperation

Andrei Valodzkin

Summary

The international events of the Arab Spring, in particular NATO operations in Libya, have raised a clear question about the security of regimes that find themselves in a political confrontation with the West, and they have forced the Belarusian leadership to take a more serious approach to the modernisation of the country’s defence system. However, the need to improve the country’s military readiness has arisen during a challenging economic crisis, causing a delay in the planned timeframe for re-equipping the army. In a list of priorities, one ought to include the development of the country’s air defence, air force, and territorial defence forces.

As before, Russia remains as Belarus’ main partner in the military sphere. However, cooperation with Ukraine has been intensified. Relations with its Asian partners, however, have not been particularly active. The West has introduced sanctions against Belarus in the military sphere, while it has also accused Belarus, several times, of illegal arms deals.

Trends:

Internal development of the country’s defence industry

Air defence is the main defence priority

The events in Libya showed just how ineffective ageing air-defence systems are against modern Western weapons. Therefore, the undisputed priorities for the country’s leadership during the period under review were the modernisation and upgrading of the country’s air defence, which they carried out in two ways: by purchasing new military equipment from Russia, and by modernising existing weapons within the national military-industrial complex.

As an example of the first method, we could mention the purchase from Russia of new Tor-M2E anti-aircraft missile systems, the delivery of which began in December 2011. There were numerous reports of Belarus’ intention to obtain Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems (SA-21 Growler), as well as Iskander-E missile systems. However, the realisation of these plans in the near future will be highly problematic since Belarus cannot afford to purchase these weapons at the market price. Russia, for its part, has no intention of offering them at a discount since, as of today, the Russian military-industrial complex is not able to completely meet the needs of its own army.

One could say that the main success of the national military-industrial complex in terms of upgrading its air-defence systems was the creation (on the basis of a major overhaul of the Soviet Osa-AKM [SA-8 Gecko] surface-to-air missile system) of a T-38 Stiletto system, the testing of which was carried out in October 2011.1 According to the deputy head of the State Military-Industrial Committee of Belarus, Igor Bykov, within the framework of the country’s new policy on military equipment, a number of projects are also being carried out for the construction of radar equipment and automated control systems that are in demand not only in Belarus but also on international markets.2

Besides this, cooperation is developing between Belarusian and Russian military-industrial companies. For example, there was a presentation of a modified version of the Buk and Buk-M2 (SA-6 Gainful) surface-to-air missile system on the basis of a wheeled chassis from the Minsk Tractor-Wheel Plant. Earlier, these same chassis were used for the modernisation of the Tor missile system.3

Aviation: individual successes against the backdrop of growing problems

The Belarusian military-industrial complex’s main achievement in the aviation sector in the past year was the development of unmanned drones that were presented at MILEX-2011 and MAKS-2011. According to certain experts, although the Belarusian drones are significantly inferior to those built by the leaders in this field, Israel and the United States, there is nothing similar in the CIS.4

On the whole, however, the situation in the sphere of military aviation in Belarus is rather complicated. The problem of the deterioration of the country’s aircraft is becoming more and more obvious. In June, a representative of the military leadership reported that nearly all of the Su-24 (Fencer) attack aircraft in the Belarusian air force were under repair.5 Problems with aviation equipment have also been frequent. While there was not a single incident between May 1997 and August 2009, the air force has lost four military vehicles over the past two and a half years. The crash of an Mi-24 (Hind) helicopter in the Pruzhany District on October 29, killing the entire crew, had the greatest impact. As a result, all flights of Mi-24s were temporarily suspended on November 30, and all flights by the Belarusian air force were suspended on December 1.6

Aircraft are also being upgraded through the modernisation of existing equipment and through purchases abroad. Because of financial limitations, however, the acquisitions are often of second-hand, rather than new, equipment. For example, it was reported in September that Belarus intended to buy Russian-made Su-30 (Flanker-C) fighter jets from India that that country’s air force has used for several years. Concerning modernisation of national enterprises, the deputy commander of the country’s air force, Vladimir Bashtanenko, announced, in April, plans for the modernisation of existing MiG-29 (Fulcrum-D) fighter jets.7 There has been no further information about the implementation of these plans.

Structural reforms and personnel issues

During the first half of the year, draft laws were introduced in parliament on alternative service and on eliminating the disciplinary battalion in the Belarusian army. On June 24, the House of Representatives adopted a draft law on the elimination of the disciplinary battalion after its first reading.8 There were no reports about the adoption of a decision on alternative service.

The creation of a system of territorial defence was identified as the main area for military reforms in 2011. Although, according to official sources, this had already begun in Belarus with the Berezina-2002 tactical exercises, the presidential decree on confirmation of the status of territorial defence of the Republic of Belarus was adopted on 1 February 2011. In 2011, an administration for territorial defence was also created, and a field manual for territorial forces was confirmed.9 A structure for territorial defence was developed and confirmed that includes seven zones, headed by the governors of the six oblasts and the mayor of Minsk. On November 3, the president conferred upon these officials the rank of major-general.

With respect to personnel decisions, we ought to mention the case of the former commander of the air and the air-defence forces, Igor Azaryonok. General Azaryonok was arrested in December 2010 and charged with abuse of office and accepting large bribes. On January 11, the president relieved Azaryonok of his duties and assigned his responsibilities to the first deputy commander, Sergey Lemeshevskiy (who was officially confirmed as commander on May 6). It should also be noted that, prior to his arrest, Azaryonok had been considered a potential candidate for the post of defence minister.10

International military cooperation

Interaction with Russia and CIS countries

As before, Russia remains Belarus’ main partner in the military sphere. The Russian military-industrial complex works with 120 Belarusian factories and engineering firms on some 1600 types of military products. In fact, cooperation in the military sphere is considered the most successful area of cooperation between the two countries.

In the first quarter, the Russian State Duma ratified agreements between Belarus and Russia “on the mutual supply of military, dual-use, and civilian products under conditions of a threat of aggression or war” and “on the establishment and operation of a joint communications system for regional troops”, which had already been signed in December 2009 and January 2008, respectively. Two meetings were held (in April and October) of the Joint Board of Defence Ministries of Belarus and Russia that dealt with the preparation and evaluation of the joint military exercises Union Shield 2011 at Russia’s Ashuluk training ground. In March, there was a meeting of the Joint Consultative Group on Arms Monitoring, at which the parties agreed on positions and joint actions regarding international agreements in this area.

In 2011, Belarus finally agreed to chair the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) (according to the planned rotation, it was supposed to do this in 2010). As the priority of the Belarusian chairmanship, President Lukashenko named the creation of unified standards for the tactical interoperability of the armed forces of the member states of the CSTO.11 In December 2010, at the organisation’s Moscow summit, the Belarusian president proposed that a targeted programme be developed for the rearmament of the CSTO’s Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) with modern weapons and military equipment. Belarus agreed to allocate more than 2000 personnel to the CRRF, thus making it the third such contingent following those of Russia and Kazakhstan.12 In September, Belarusian officers took park in the CRRF’s Tsentr-2011 exercises in Tajikistan (in 2010, Belarus had refused to take part in similar exercises).

There were, however, several controversial issues in relations with some allies from the CSTO. In April, during a visit to Minsk, the chairman of Armenia’s Standing Parliamentary Committee on Defence, National Security, and Internal Affairs, Hrayr Karapetyan, rebuked Belarus for supplying arms to Azerbaijan, stating that allies had to take their mutual interests into account and not be guided purely by commercial considerations.13 According to information from the UN, Belarus has, in recent years, supplied Azerbaijan with a considerable amount of military equipment, at the same time that only one agreement has been signed with Armenia for the supply of 10 howitzers. There was no official reaction from the Belarusian authorities to the Armenian parliamentarian’s statement.

New developments in 2011 included the intensification of military cooperation with Ukraine. Despite the springtime friction between the presidents of the two countries and the spy scandal that played out in April and May, which led to the mutual expulsion of diplomats, the parties strove not to strain relations for the common good. On April 26-27, Belarus’ defence minister visited Kyiv in order to discuss cooperation and the training of personnel, particularly officers for international peacekeeping forces. According to information from the Belarusian Defence Ministry, the plan for bilateral cooperation for 2011 foresaw more than 40 joint activities, including the participation of Belarusian soldiers in the international tactical exercises that took place between July 25 and August 5 at the base of the International Centre for Peacekeeping and Security of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

There was also success in the development of cooperation between the military-industrial complexes of the two countries. For example, at the 10th international exhibition IDEX 2011 in Abu Dhabi, a number of joint advances in the area of anti-aircraft and anti-tank technologies were presented. In fact, Belarus’ leadership sees Ukraine as an alternative to Russia (whose military-industrial complex has seriously diminished) as a supplier to fill technology gaps for the creation of modern armed forces.14

Cooperation with other countries

In 2011, cooperation with the countries of Asia was not particularly active. In March, a delegation from Belarus’ Defence Ministry paid an official visit to Vietnam.15 However, there were no reports of any agreements resulting from the visit. In June and July, delegations from military departments of Belarus and China exchanged visits. Again, there were no reports of any specific agreements. The only thing that is known is that, during the visit of the Chinese delegation to Minsk, the issue of training Chinese soldiers at Belarusian institutions was discussed.16

Relations with the West remained cool. There were several exchanges of inspectors under the OSCE’s Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe. In January, a group of Belarusian inspectors visited a US military base in Germany, and, at the end of March, Polish military officials conducted an observation flight over Belarusian territory. In accordance with the above-mentioned OSCE Vienna Document on planned inspections of military installations, representatives of 27 OSCE states visited Belarus, and, in May, a group of Norwegian inspectors visited, this time in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Contacts with NATO were planned and carried out in accordance with the Individual Partnership Programme between Belarus and NATO for 2010-2011. In January, a Belarusian military delegation visited NATO headquarters in Brussels, and, in May, a NATO delegation responded with a visit to Belarus in order to discuss the Planning and Review Process Assessment Document.

In May, the United States introduced sanctions against the Belarusian companies BelOMO and Beltechexport for their military cooperation with Iran. In June, the European Union placed an embargo on trade with Belarus involving weapons or goods that can be used for the production of weapons. According to some experts, however, these sanctions will not have an impact on maintaining the Belarusian armed forces and may only slightly complicate the fulfilment of orders from Third World countries by the Belarusian military-industrial complex.17

Throughout the year, several scandals flared up involving Belarus and the illegal arms trade. On February 27, the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations accused Belarus of violating the embargo on supplying military equipment to Côte d’Ivoire, and it was even planning to bring the issue before a special session of the UN Security Council. The information could not be confirmed, however, and, on March 2, the UN officially apologised for causing harm to the country’s international image.

Belarus was soon thereafter suspected of supplying arms to Muammar Gaddafi just before the armed suppression of the Libyan opposition. There were reports in August about the sale of Belarusian arms to Pakistani terrorists, and, in September, accusations of violating UN sanctions on the supply of military equipment to Iran. However, none of these reports could be confirmed. According to some experts, Western competitors use such “black PR” to harm Belarus’ reputation in the legal international arms market – in the past, such tactics had already been used against Russia, Ukraine, and China.18

Conclusion

With limited financial resources, Belarus has been forced to shift its focus in terms of re-equipping its army from buying new weapons to modernising existing ones. And there have been a number of successes in this area: by cooperating closely in the technological sphere with the military-industrial complexes of Russia and Ukraine, Belarus was able to create new equipment designs. At the international level, emphasis was placed on the specialisation of the Belarusian military-industrial complex in the production of radar equipment and automated control systems for modernising Soviet military equipment. In an effort to save money and relieve the army of secondary functions (protecting infrastructure, etc.), the country’s leadership intensified measures aimed at creating a system of territorial defence, which had been rather weak in the past.

Belarus’ active involvement in the international arms market led, in 2011, to a number of political scandals, beginning with Armenia’s reprimand for Belarus’ violation of its obligations under the CSTO, and ending with the dissemination by competitors of misinformation about Belarus’ involvement in the illegal arms trade.

The deterioration in its relations with the West led Belarus to become more compliant in its relations with Russia. The main areas of Russian-Belarusian cooperation were the supply of military equipment, joint exercises, and interaction in establishing the CSTO’s Collective Rapid Reaction Force. As it is experiencing hard times, however, the Russian military-industrial complex is unable to meet all the needs of the Belarusian army. In order to make up for the shortage, the country’s leadership sought closer ties with Ukraine. Relations with Asian partners were not particularly active, and appeared to proceed in accordance with earlier agreements.

All signs indicate that the above-mentioned trends will continue for the near future. And given deteriorating relations between a number of countries in the Middle East and the West, the demand for Belarusian military supplies may even increase. However, the political uncertainty in a number of Arab countries, economic problems in the European Union, and the complicated economic situation in Belarus itself, as well as other factors, make it difficult to make any more certain predictions.