Media as an Instrument of Civil Cold War

Summary

In many respects, the events of December 19, 2010 predefined the logic according to which the situation developed in 2011. The authorities opted for strong-arm tactics to rule the country, which resulted in an escalation of the civil cold war in society. Naturally, all this was reflected in the mass media and, as a consequence, both state and independent media were deliberately aggressive in the way they presented their material.

Furthermore, against the general backdrop of decreasing trust in traditional media, one should note the growing influence of alternative online media. In Belarus, Internet penetration has passed the noteworthy 50% mark, which means the target group for Belarusian online media is now comparable in size to that of state television audiences.

Trends:

• Propaganda has shifted its focus: civil society has started becoming the main target for attacks in the state media.
• One of the most relevant forms of presenting news in the Belarusian media is the all but forgotten genre of courtroom coverage.
• Trust in traditional media has diminished, whereas online media have increased in popularity and influence.
• A downward trend has been recorded in the country’s Press Freedom Index.

Prime time

Throughout 2011, the socio-political media were dominated by several subjects. A variety of issues were emphasised, and a range of opinions and assessments were voiced, but the dominant themes remained the same in almost all Belarusian media.

The first quarter was marked by the “December 19 trials”.1 In 2011, the all but forgotten genre of courtroom coverage became one of the most relevant forms of presenting news in the Belarusian media.

The case surrounding the Minsk metro bombing of April 11, 2011 later took over from the December 19 theme. It polarised public opinion into those who believed the official version (spread actively by the state media) concerning this act of terrorism, and those who doubted the official version. The official version was criticised most consistently by online media and the independent press.

Towards the second half of the year, the “top story” became the financial crisis, which subsequently transformed into a full-blown economic crisis (which therefore affected the media too). In all state media, the editorial policy was not to inform, but to seek out the culprits. The basic message in most of the coverage was that the country’s worsening economic situation was the fault of the population itself.

Changing enemies

The general result of state information policy in 2011 was a focus-shift in news wars that were regularly initiated by Minsk. The political opposition ceased to be the main target and, throughout the year, civil society bore the brunt of attacks from the state media. In this respect, the “Bialacki case” was a blatant example of a defined information policy.

Throughout the year, the main foreign enemy was Poland. At the beginning of the year, the presidential administration’s newspaper Sovetskaya Byelorussiya published a piece entitled “Behind The Scenes Of A Conspiracy”, which openly accused the Polish Foreign Ministry of interfering with Belarusian internal policy.

In addition, relations with Moscow continued to be strained on the media scene in 2011. In the summer, at the height of Belarus’ economic crisis, Russian TV channels were regularly critical of Belarus and its leadership. Moreover, half-way through the year, the channel NTV showed part five of the “Godfather” documentaries about Lukashenko.2

These facts illustrate changing trends in Minsk’s propaganda wars. Firstly, Belarusian citizens who disagreed with official policy began to be the subject of media attacks. One could describe Vera Protasevich’s widely-discussed editorial “Lower in rank…”,3 in the Borisov regional newspaper Adzinstva, as the apotheosis of this media strategy. Basically, it said: “If you don’t like the authorities, leave the country!” Secondly, Minsk started to wage a long-term media campaign against Poland, the Belarusian regime’s harshest critic among neighbouring countries.

News skirmishes with Russia did not develop further in 2011, however, and one might describe Minsk’s reaction to media gibes from the Kremlin as rather restrained.

Decreasing trust in traditional media

The aggressive editorial policies of most socio-political media led to an almost 50% reduction in trust in state media in 2011. Trust in the independent media declined as well, but to a lesser extent (see Table 1). Moreover, trust in the media as a whole also decreased proportionally.

In parallel to their reduced trust in traditional media, people’s Internet use is intensifying. In 2011, Internet penetration passed the noteworthy 50% mark in Belarus.5 By the end of 2011, the daily Internet audience, according to Gemius, was 76.35% of Belarusian users. Thus, the daily Belarusian Internet audience and potential audience for new media are now comparable to those of television channels.

If one assumes that the most active audience prefers online media, then one can say that Belarusian TV channels will be facing a serious challenge in the medium term. As online media grow in popularity, television audience figures and, consequently, the influence of television will decrease proportionally. In 2011, the heads of the state Belarusian TV and Radio Company launched a large-scale rebranding campaign as a preventative measure to tackle this problem.

The “Belarus” package

On November 5, 2011, the new channels Belarus-1 and Belarus-2 began broadcasting to replace Channel One (BT) and the Lad channel. There are also plans to launch a Belarusian-language channel Belarus-3. The channel Belarus TV, which broadcasts for foreign audiences, will become known as Belarus 24. Furthermore, the company plans to launch a fully English-language TV channel. Belarusian TV and Radio Company chairman Gennadiy Davydko stated that this step was an “intentional move towards becoming recognisable on the media market”.

One feature of the new broadcasting concept is to stop relaying Russian television programmes, and place the emphasis on original Belarusian content. According to the Belarusian TV and Radio Company’s plans aired by Gennadiy Davydko, “Channel One must become number one, and the Belarus 24 channel’s tasks include promoting ‘factual information into Russian territory’”.6

Apart from the state’s actions aimed at promoting its own television products, 2011 saw the end of a process designed to “purge” the Belarusian television space. On December 31, Euronews – the only foreign TV news channel available to wide audiences – was removed from cable networks. It had been one of the most popular channels on Belarusian cable networks, and was in third place in the Kosmos-TV ratings. In 2011, the Russian channel TNT was discontinued all over Belarus. Table 2 shows audience figures for channels in Belarus, and might explain the logic behind the “expulsion” of “disloyal” channels.

On the media market, Belarusian content-producers also dominate as far as radio stations are concerned (see Table 3). The only exceptions are Russian radio stations in the entertainment bracket. The cross-border tаlk-news media transmitted from abroad are not very popular.8

Also of note is the fact that the Ministry of Information revoked the FM radio station Avtoradio’s broadcasting licence on January 10, 2011 for spreading information containing what the ministry deemed “public calls for extremist activity”. The ministry considered the phrase “a country’s fate is not decided in the kitchen, but out on the Square” (part of an advert for presidential candidate Andrey Sannikov) to be a call for extremism. Avtoradio’s attempts to appeal against the ministry’s decision all led to nothing. The closure of Avtoradio was therefore a plain signal from Belarus’ highest media regulation body: private FM stations were clearly being told that they should not broadcast any content criticising the official authorities.

More good and varied newspapers

As in the previous year, 2011 saw a formal increase in the number of media in Belarus. According to data from January 1, 2012, the total number of print media registered in Belarus was 1403 (as opposed to 1347 the year before).10 The proportion of state newspapers, magazines, bulletins, catalogues and almanacs grew only slightly – 406, as opposed to 399 in 2010. The independent press expanded somewhat more – 997 titles, as opposed to 948 in 2010. The number of news agencies remained unchanged since 2010 – 9 (2 state and 7 independent). The quantitative growth of registered press titles was mainly due to an increase in advertising, entertainment and specialised publications.

As far as the socio-political press was concerned, there were no serious changes on the market in 2011. The state press maintained its dominance in the news field. The combined print run of the three leading national newspapers was 525 000 copies. As an example, we have taken the print run of the presidential administration’s newspaper Sovetskaya Byelorussiya (398 000 copies), the Belarusian Council of Ministers’ newspaper Respublika (97 000 copies), and the Council of Ministers’ and National Assembly House of Representatives’ newspaper Zviazda (30 000 copies).11 By way of comparison, the combined print run of the three leading independent newspapers was nine times lower, amounting to 57 000 copies (including Narodnaya Volya – 28 500, Belgazeta – 20 920, and Nasha Niva – 8000 copies).

This pronounced imbalance was caused by unequal economic conditions, as well as constant state subsidies favouring the official press. In 2011, EUR 54 million were allocated to support state media, including around EUR 4.5 million for publishing houses and periodical print media.12

In the near future, the Ministry of Information plans a return to the practice of setting up large publishing conglomerates. In particular, in early 2012, information minister Oleg Proleskovskiy voiced the idea of creating a Zviazda publishing house, which would include the newspaper Zviazda and the editorial/publishing institution Litaratura i Mastactva (including the newspaper Litaratura i Mastactva and the magazines Polymia, Maladosc’, Nioman and Vozhyk). In the regions, the idea of setting up “joint editorial staffs” is being lobbied. This would allow one editorial bureau to release several products simultaneously, thus reducing the number of individual regional staff.

Journalism, what a terrible profession!

As a profession, journalism is gradually losing its impact in society, as well as its prestige. By our reckoning, this trend first arose in the mid-noughties, but was at its most noticeable in 2011.

Firstly, this year saw an ongoing exodus of journalists from leading Belarusian media. In early 2012, foreign policy observer Igor Kolchenko left Sovetskaya Byelorussiya after about five years as part of the “presidential circle”. Previously, political correspondent Irina Yuzvak and deputy editor-in-chief Anna Shadrina had also left the paper. Citing a desire to raise his professional standards, Artashes Antonyan quit ONT (the Belarusian television channel with the highest ratings) to move to Moscow, and another presenter, Tengiz Dumbadze, also left ONT. Following the closure of the programme Vybor (“Choice”), Sergey Dorofeyev left the channel too.

Moreover, according to the Interfax agency,13 jobs with the state Belarusian TV and Radio Company were some of the lowest-paid in 2011. In October 2011, an assistant director at the BTVRC was earning BYR 700 000 (approx. USD 80), a server administrator – BYR 640 000, a designer – BYR 600 000, and a special correspondent – BYR 505 000. Belarusian journalists’ low salaries are just one side of the coin, however. Public opinion about journalists is negative; they are seen as biased and guilty of presenting information one-sidedly (Tables 4, 5).

For a fuller picture, one should definitely add that the journalism profession continues to be “high risk” in Belarus. Those who attempt to maintain professional standards regularly experience pressure and criminal persecution from the authorities. In early 2011, seven members of the Belarusian Association of Journalists were implicated in the December 19 case.15 Some of the journalists were given conditional sentences (e.g. Sergey Voznyak) or suspended sentences (Irina Khalip). Others, like Aleksandr Otroshchenkov, the press-secretary of 2010 presidential candidate Andrey Sannikov, were given actual prison sentences.

Furthermore, 2011 was marked by a court case concerning Article 368 of the Belarusian Criminal Code (“Insulting the President of the Republic of Belarus”). The accused in this case was the Polish Gazeta Wyborcza’s correspondent Andrzej Poczobut. On July 5, a Grodno court found the journalist guilty of slandering the president, and sentenced him to three years’ confinement, suspended for two years (if he breaks the law, Andrzej Poczobut could be sent to a penal colony). The charges of insulting Lukashenko were later dropped.

In 2011, the tragic death of Oleg Bebenin remained uninvestigated. He was a founder of one of the leading opposition news websites Charter‘97. On September 3, he was found dead at his dacha near Minsk. The official cause of death was given as suicide, but Oleg Bebenin’s colleagues and close friends have serious doubts about that explanation.

By way of conclusion: freedom of the press and media ratings

To conclude, let us quote the freedom of the press and media ratings. Compared to last year, Belarus has shown downward trends in all indices.

Worldwide Press Freedom Index16 published by Reporters Without Borders. In 2011, Belarus was in 168th place out of 179 countries. In 2010, Belarus was in 154th place in the ranking. The report also notes that journalists’ working conditions have become even more repressive in Belarus. In the ratings for 2011, Belarus is compared to Uganda.

Freedom of the Press17 published by Freedom House. Belarus showed a downward trend here too. In 2011, Belarus went down one position to occupy 190th place on a list of 196 countries. Its total score was 93, with a “not free” status. These indicators ranked Belarus lower than Iran and Cuba. Right behind Belarus were Myanmar (Burma) and Eritrea. In comparison, Belarus was in 189th place in 2010, scoring 92.