Belarus Ukraine: Neighborly stand-off
Gennady Maksak
Summary
In 2011, Belarusian-Ukrainian relations were as always influenced by external factors linked with domestic political events and multi-vector integration processes in the Eastern European region. As concerns the assessment of the events of December 19, 2010 in Belarus, Kyiv seconded the OSCE and European Union, which refused to recognize the results of the flawed elections, and pointed at violations of human rights and liberties that resulted in a political communications decline down to the level of the foreign ministries.
In spring, dependence of Belarusian-Ukrainian relations on the European Union’s position led to a big public scandal when Lukashenko insulted the Ukrainian government.
At the same time, Ukraine did not support the advocates of sanctions and tight isolation of Belarus taking into account close economic ties between the countries. Despite the downgrade in political contacts, Kyiv did not renounce the idea to act as an intermediary in rectifying relations between Minsk and Brussels.
In 2011, no solutions were found to the major problems including the exchange of ratification instruments for the border agreement. By the end of the year, the parties came back to the usual format with a focus on development of trade and economic relations that resulted in new record-breaking parameters of the bilateral commodity turnover.
Trends:
- The level of political dialogue is being reduced to technicalities and procedural matters.
- No progress was made on the way to the border agreement.
- The bilateral commodity turnover reached the new record level of USD 6.2 billion.
- Oil cooperation with Russia that is favorable to Belarus impedes the Odessa-Brody project.
Political dialogue
The events of December 19, 2010 determined the status and intensity of political dialogue between Belarus and Ukraine throughout the year 2011. Kyiv adopted the assessment made by the OSCE and the European Union as concerns human rights violations and the crackdown on protestors which followed the presidential election in Belarus. Given that Kyiv wanted to sign an association agreement with Brussels in 2011, Ukraine chose the tactics of avoiding active political contacts with the Belarusian leadership.
Nevertheless, President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich was one of the first to congratulate Lukashenko by telephone for winning the election, while the Ukrainian presidential press office withheld comments on that gesture.1 Yanukovich was unable to congratulate his counterpart in person. Ambassador of Ukraine to Belarus Roman Bezsmertny was supposed to attend the inauguration2 but he refused to do it referring to political and moral views.3
The European context of the Belarusian-Ukrainian relations eventually resulted in a conflict situation when Ukraine took a disputed position on participation of the Belarusian president in the event timed to the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident. Initially, Kyiv was going to host a Nuclear Safety Summit on April 19. Leaders of the countries which possess nuclear technologies or have interest in their application were invited and Lukashenko was on the invitation list too. Then Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, said that, given the political situation in Belarus, he would not come if Lukashenko was there.
Kyiv therefore attempted to keep the Europeans and the Belarusian president separated in different social events.4 Representatives of European institutions were supposed to take part in the summit on April 19, and Lukashenko was suggested visiting Chernobyl on April 26 to pay tribute to the memory of the victims together with Victor Yanukovich and Dimitry Medvedev.
In April, the Belarusian president did not show up in Ukraine, explaining his decision to refrain from the visit in a very emotional manner, and while using offensive language. He suggested looking for the reason in Kyiv. “Address this question to Yanukovich: why the Belarusian president is absent from the events. You ask them. Unfortunately, lousiness is typical of their leadership.”5
Ukraine certainly could not pretend it had not heard that. The Party of Regions called the statement hasty and inconsiderate. Opposition parties reacted harshly and called on the prime minister of Ukraine to demand public apologies.
President Lukashenko made an attempt to mollify anger. During a meeting with Ukrainian Premier Azarov on May 19 in Minsk, he tried to downplay tensions and proclaimed willingness to cooperate with Ukraine in all sectors6 but then kept making uncomplimentary comments on Ukraine’s foreign policy in the European arena.7
May and June saw a peculiar diplomatic scandal between Kyiv and Minsk. In the first half of 2011, Ukraine expelled two military attaches of Belarus on suspicion of espionage. Minsk responded by deporting two Ukrainian military diplomats in June. This conflict did not severely affect mutual relations, though.8
In 2011, Ukraine replaced its ambassador to Belarus. Roman Bezsmertny was dismissed after around a year in this position. Victor Tikhonov, former vice premier for regional development, building and housing and communal services of Ukraine, was appointed in early June.9
Roman Bezsmertny, one of Victor Yushchenko’s team-mates, is known for his negative attitude to Belarus’ human rights policy. The Foreign Ministries of Ukraine and Belarus spoke about diplomatic ethics and non-interference in domestic affairs of foreign states more than once10 and Tikhonov, one of the closest associates of President Yanukovich, was most likely expected to mend the diplomatic situation in terms of bilateral dialogue.
The replacement seems to help unblock diplomatic dialogue on the governmental level in 2011. The Belarusian-Ukrainian intergovernmental commission for trade and economic cooperation held the 20th session in mid-December to address a number of agreements which had been waiting to be signed since the end of 2010.
The two MFAs had to act as liaison offices as both countries lacked steady channels for top-level information interchange. Ukraine mostly confined itself to official statements and notes about violations of the rights of Ukrainian citizens in Belarus addressed to the Belarusian Foreign Ministry and declarations regarding Ukraine’s position on the trials of opponents of the Lukashenko regime.
A high profile incident which required intervention of Ukrainian diplomacy took place in late 2011 when the Belarusian KGB allegedly detained Ukrainian FEMEN movement activists and put them through a humiliating treatment for an unsanctioned picket near the KGB building in Minsk11 on December 19.
Belarus in Ukraine’s foreign policy coordinates
As concerns Ukraine’s foreign policy toward Belarus, Kyiv abided by the European Union’s viewpoint on the situation in the neighboring state, but actually did not follow the mainstream having in mind close trade and economic cooperation with Belarus, thus reserving the role of an intermediary between Belarus and the Union, although Minsk had never articulately agreed to use Ukraine’s conciliatory services.
When introducing Ukraine’s position on the Eastern Partnership in the European Parliament as far back as January 2011, Supreme Rada representatives from the Party of Regions faction said Ukraine did not expect this program to actualize without Belarus.12 In February, Prime Minister Azarov did not sign the statement of the Visegrad Four, Germany and Austria, which condemned civil society harassment in Belarus.13
In September 2011, the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly (September 15, Strasbourg) and the Eastern Partnership summit (September 30, Warsaw) did not adopt final resolutions on the situation in Belarus in many respects due to the dissenting opinion of the Ukrainian delegation. Although Kyiv’s efforts did not improve relations between Minsk and Brussels, the blocking of some international resolutions against Belarus displays Ukraine’s aspiration to stand up for the neighbor in disputes with third parties.
The presidency of Ukraine in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe May through November 2011 did not produce appreciable results for Belarus either. In 2010, Ukrainian government officials and experts stated Kyiv’s intention to put forth strenuous efforts to mend fences between Minsk and the Council of Europe but after the December presidential election in Belarus and before the Council of Europe got to Ukrainian agenda, the “Belarusian issue” was finally rendered irrelevant and unrealistic in terms of the stated objectives.
Trade and economic cooperation
Despite all political misconceptions, the economic sector has always remained beyond the framework of verbal confrontations that made it possible to achieve record-breaking parameters of the bilateral commodity turnover. The Belarusian-Ukrainian intergovernmental commission for trade and economic cooperation held a session in December 2011 with the participation of the first vice premiers. The delegations signed a number of bilateral protocols, including those on implementation of transport infrastructure projects.14
In 2011, the commodity turnover between the two countries exceeded USD 6.2 billion with Belarus’ trade surplus of USD 2,122 billion15 (almost a fourfold increase as compared with 2008) owing to strengthening of Belarusian exporters after the Belarusian ruble devaluation.
Tractors, potash and mineral fertilizers, MAZ cargo trucks, refrigerators, freezers, and agricultural machinery accounted for most of Belarus’ export supplies to Ukraine. Ferrous metals and ferrous materials remained Ukraine’s key exports to Belarus constituting one third of the entire volume alongside agricultural goods (oil cakes, sunflower oil and corn), electric energy, rail cars, sunflower seeds, tobacco, paper, etc. Border zone trade contributed greatly with nearly one third of turnover in 2011.16
Belarus was second among the largest trade partners of Ukraine in the CIS (after the Russian Federation) and fifth worldwide. As of October 1, 2011, Belarus invested USD 41.6 million in Ukraine’s economy and Ukraine answered with USD 4 million.17
Energy: might-have-been strategic orientation
Cooperation in the energy sector was outlined as strategic for both countries. Energy was prioritized in the plan for development of bilateral trade and economic cooperation for the year 2011 signed in December 2010. However, the energy cooperation targets were not achieved.
In 2011, Belarus imported 2,561.6 million kWh of Ukrainian electric energy (down 12.9% year-on-year). The decline in supplies of Ukrainian electric energy resulted from the suspension of the export in May-June 2011 due to the shortage of currency Belarus experienced at that time. The export to Belarus resumed since July.18
The project on transportation of Azerbaijani oil to the Mozyr refinery through the Odessa-Brody main, which was intended to safeguard energy security, fell short of expectation. Belarus and Ukraine agreed on January 17 to deliver four million tons of Azerbaijani oil in 2011-2012, but Belarus only accepted 988,000 tons in 2011.19 Minsk lost interest in the project as Russia provided oil on better terms.
Predictably enough, Belarusian-Ukrainian partnership in constructing the nuclear power plant, transit of Ukrainian electric energy to the Baltic States, and cooperation in the gas sector20 made no progress despite Ukraine’s information and diplomatic efforts.
Conclusion
Participation of Minsk and Kyiv in integration projects of various geopolitical orientations sounded the keynote of Belarusian-Ukrainian relations in 2011. While Belarus was accommodating itself to the Common Economic Area and Customs Union, Ukraine was working on an agreement on association with the European Union. Seeking deeper relations with the EU, Kyiv had to adjust to the common European policy toward Minsk that affected interaction between the two neighbors to a certain extent. In turn, Belarus was guided by the new format of relations with Russia, and a number of joint projects with Ukraine became either economically inefficient or politically inadvisable.
The year was hard for Belarus’ economy. Both countries however managed to reach a new level of economic cooperation, but failed to implement important infrastructural projects and to determine a strategy and tactics to approach markets of third countries. Most of the quite promising energy and transportation projects, some of which have been waiting to be implemented for a few years now, made no progress either.