Religious sphere: In the run-up to the presidential campaign
Natallia Vasilevich

Summary:

The Presidential election was the central event in 2010. In the run-up to the campaign the repressive mechanism, including that in the religious sphere, was relaxed. Nevertheless, despite some liberalization, there were reports about violations of religious freedom; the conflict around the New Life Church has not been resolved.

In 2009, religious life in Belarus was developing under the sign of the Pope. In 2010, the top media event was Lukashenko’s visit to Constantinople and his meeting with the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, which triggered discussions about the probable autocephaly of the Belarusian Orthodox Church. The Belarusian Christian Democratic Party (BChD) inspired believers of different denominations to take part in the Presidential campaign of Vital Rumaseuski (Rymashevsky), who used a lot of religious rhetoric and became popular as an active churchgoer of the Belarusian Orthodox Church (the BOC).

As for the BOC, its activities were not intensive; the probable retirement of the BOC top patriarch Metropolitan Filaret (Vakhromeev) was even discussed. Throughout the year, there were reports that classes on Orthodoxy might be introduced in schools according to the approved syllabus. In reality, no progress on this front was made. Discussions took place around the probable concordat with the Vatican, but there have been no progress here, either. In the first half of 2010 tension developed between the Belarusian regime and the Russian Orthodox Church (the ROC). Nevertheless, in the forerun to the Presidential elections heads of the ROC even tried to mediate the reconciliation between Minsk and Moscow. They also supported the Belarusian regime after the Presidential election, though the Belarusian Exarchate’s attitude to the campaign and the events after it was ambiguous.

Tendencies:
- There is still pressure in the religious sphere: certain religious organizations and foreign citizens are persecuted;
- There is no threat of the BOC’s autocephaly in Lukashenko’s visit to Constantinople; the Moscow Patriarchate, despite many misunderstandings with the Belarusian regime, remains the latter’s supporter;
- Relations with the Vatican are developing much slower than the public and experts have expected: the concordat was to be concluded last year, nevertheless, it is still "being elaborated";
- The BChD introduced religious rhetoric into the broad political discourse; its participation in the Presidential election changed electoral behavior of active churchgoers.

General information

According to the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs, in 2010 the number of registered religious organizations grew from 3263 to 3321, the number of religious communities among them as of January 1, 2011 is 31621 . Significant regional differences can be observed: 719 communities are found in the Brest region, but only 2692 in the Mogilev region. The biggest number of parishes is in the Belarusian Orthodox Church (1545); the Roman Catholic Church has 472 parishes, Protestant – 1005 (including the Pentecostals – 505, the Evangelical Christian Baptists – 275, the Seventh-Day Adventists – 72). The number of believers of each denomination is still estimated by polls, but other statistical data are available as well: according to the Interior Ministry, Christmas masses in Catholic churches were attended by 236 thousand people3 (including 7 thousand in Minsk4 ), whereas 134 thousand people (including 9 thousand in Minsk) attended Orthodox churches5 . Before the Presidential election oppression in all spheres of social life lessened; and, unprecedentedly, two sentences on Ivan Michaylov6 and Dmitry Smyk7 were vacated: the young men were demanding alternative military service because of their religious beliefs. At the same time, Andrej Cianiuta (conscripted for military service) and Jauhien Jakavienka (sentenced to 1 year’s penal labor), who demanded alternative military service on grounds other than religious, were not acquitted. Uladzimir Kachahura, pastor of the New Generation Church (Navahrudak) and BChD activist, was convicted of "conducting divine services without local executive body’s permission" and sentenced to a fine. However, the superior court vacated the sentence, submitted the case to reconsideration and, finally, closed it8 . Vasil Palujanau, leader of Jehovah’s Witnesses group from Babrujsk, was sentenced to a fine for illegal religious activities, but a higher court vacated the sentence9 .

It is still too early to say that the state decided to stop oppressing religious organizations. Just to name a few cases: on May 23, in Drahicyn three Baptists were detained for setting up a Christian library in the street; on June 26, in Kobryn Viktar Novik, pastor of the Pentecostal church in Hrusava was sentenced to a fine on charges "violating public events’ regulations" for singing and distributing leaflets10 . The perennial controversy between the authorities and New Life Church entered a new round. The attempt to take away the church’s building took a new turn. The church was sentenced to a BYR 257 million fine (ca. USD 100,000) for alleged contamination of the ground around its building with petroleum-based products, but refused to pay the fine.11 The authorities had to turn to international experts for help. For example, according to ONT, a state-owned TV channel, Thomas Gandow, German expert on religious sects, allegedly called the New Life Church a cult12 . Later, Mr. Gandow denied having characterized the organization in this way13 . This cult expert turned into a big media-figure: besides the New Life, the Belarusian Christian Democratic Party was also presented in a negative light, but this might be a case of unethical journalism.

The civil campaign to protect St. Joseph Church in Upper Town is still running. On March 19, 2011 it has been 5 years since its beginning; 30,000 signatures have already been collected. In 2010, another signature-gathering campaign headed by the BChD, that engaged themselves actively, collected 6.5 thousand signatures for a petition14 , which were sent to state and church administrations.15 Since September 16, during the Presidential campaign, the picketing has been held on a daily basis. Unfortunately, after 20 days the participants had to take a vote whether to continue picketing or not,16 especially after the unfavorable opinion of the Roman Catholic Metropolitan Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz in his interview for state newspaper Belarus Segodnya (‘Belarus Today’).17 The campaign continued in the form of daily meetings with figures of culture, concerts and performances. The Spiritual Heart of Minsk civil committee was established.18 Unfortunately, the campaign has not achieved anything so far.

Two major state-religious events took place in 2010: the 300th anniversary of Minsk Arch Cathedral Church of the Name of the Blessed Virgin Mary and burying of the remains of unidentified soldiers in the Church of All Saints in Minsk. No high-level visit of Patriarch of Moscow Kirill to Belarus took place, except for a transit stop in Vitebsk. Among foreign visits we should mention President Lukashenko’s meeting with the Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew in Istanbul and his meeting with the Cardinal Secretary of State Tarcisio Bertone during the OSCE Summit in Astana. Both meetings were rather ceremonial, albeit the one with the Ecumenical Patriarch stirred speculations, both in Belarus and Russia, about the probable autocephaly of the Belarusian Orthodox Church.

In 2010, media focused on two main topics: the probable introduction of Basics of Orthodox culture into the school curriculum, which is being initiated by the Belarusian Orthodox Church; and a potential agreement with the Vatican, which is still being elaborated.

Legislation and institutions

The law On freedom of conscience and religious organizations has seen no changes in its restricting part. Any religious community has to meet a number of conditions to become legal: compulsory registration; religious buildings in possession (Leonid Gulyako, Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs, paid special attention to this point in his annual report on 2010, because of numerous examples when religious communities exploited buildings being their property but of non-religious character – which violates the law19 ); territorial restrictions on activities.

In late 2009, part 2 of section 9.9 of the civil code (administrative punishment for illegal religious activities) was repealed. But the criminal regulation of the same type of offence was retained. Hence, criminal punishment will be applied immediately, i.e. the legal regulation became more repressive. On the other hand, during 2010 this norm has never been applied against religious activists.

Under the Regulations on foreign citizens and stateless individuals coming to Belarus for religious activities,20 activities of foreigners, mostly Catholic and Protestant activists, have been impeded.

In 2010, the Office of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs elaborated the Regulations on the structure, content and procedure of submitting information for registering a religious community practicing a religion previously unknown in Belarus.21 The goal of the document is to prevent registration of unlawful religious organizations; the Council of Ministers approved it by Ordinance No. 548 as of April 9, 2010.

Tension in the religious sphere is caused by legal regulations rather than by single cases of persecution: the former are applied selectively, there are no precise or unified mechanisms regulating and protecting freedom of conscience. The Belarusian regime has no resources to control the religious sphere. Therefore, its task is to establish institutional mechanisms for religious organizations so that they limit their activities and do not transgress the limits determined by the state.

On September 10, Minsk hosted an international conference on problems in the sphere of freedom of conscience to solve institutional problems caused by regulations and their enforcement. Representatives of state bodies, religious and international organizations, civil society, and experts passed a resolution on measures to improve the situation22 and presented the Road Map of the Eastern Partnership.23 Both events show that civil society is about to solve the issue of religious liberty, but so far this process involves a limited number of actors.

A special working group of youth and human rights activists worked out suggestions for the law On the alternative military service24 specifying probable refusals to serve because of religious beliefs. The Alternative Civil Service campaign was quite active in 2010 and managed to involve state organs, and yet the bill has not been elaborated.

The adoption of the Education Code25 limits home education. We should note here, that in the USA a great number of Protestants prefer this very type of education: this tendency applies to Belarusian Christians as well, especially Protestants.26 To expand options for home education, the initiated Christian Movement, coordinated by Aliaksej Sein (Shein), BChD co-chairperson, submitted 500 signatures to the House of Representatives.27 Nonetheless, the deputies did not take them into consideration.

There is one more religious issue in the educational sphere: introduction of religion classes in comprehensive schools. Their main promoter is the Belarusian Orthodox Church. They organized several conferences on this topic and elaborated a number of syllabuses, including the much-talked-of optional course Basics of Orthodox culture. The course Orthodox shrines of Eastern Slavs for grades 1 to 11 was elaborated by the Coordinating Council of the Ministry of Education and the BOC28 . But it was not approved by the National Institute of Education as there were no proper workbooks.29 Nevertheless, some educational establishments organize optional courses of this kind, even without proper, i.e. approved, syllabuses. In most cases, the administration decides. Though, in reality, even if both the administration and parents agree, it is difficult to introduce such classes because the course is not on the list of optional courses of the Ministry of Education. The course was improperly advertized (allegedly, it was to be introduced in all schools), which stirred a broad discussion in the media: in Zvyazda daily, Nasha Niva weekly, on the Internet.

The campaign to protect St. Joseph Church proposed a bill On restitution of realty of religious worship from state or community to religious organizations. The bill was proposed as a "BChD" document.30 Nevertheless, the party did not include it into its official program. Moreover, the law is quite "raw": it does not take into consideration the situation in Belarus.

The Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs considers the realty issue very acute for state-confessional relations: Protestant churches "misuse" the property of religious organizations; some organizations, despite receiving help from the state, "fall behind in protecting the buildings". He concludes that "we should pay more attention to the process of restitution of objects that are valuable historical buildings."31 There was a big scandal around St. Boris and Gleb’s Church in Novogrudok, when the reconstruction workers substituted the original domes with onion-like ones (typical of Orthodox churches in Russia).32 The public tried to intervene and protest, but the reconstruction was finished.

In 2011, legal regulation on religious organizations might be changed as there is a law On non-profit organizations to be passed33 . Religious organizations take little part in discussing it.

Orthodox believers regularly submit requests about individual registration numbers. Such initiatives are quite well-organized, though not as numerous as in Russia or Ukraine. These requests receive no answers.

The Council for Morality is still functioning, but its activities are limited: attempts to forbid concerts of Rammstein or Elton John for moral reasons. These attempts have no effect, which shows the actual power of this institution.

Belarusian Orthodox Church: Are autocephaly and independence possible?

The year 2010 was not rich in events for the Belarusian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, some events raise the question of its future. The first one was the news that on May 31, Metropolitan Filaret (Vakhromeev), Primate of the Belarusian Exarchate, submitted an application for retirement. Despite that Metropolitan Filaret remained the ruling hierarch; the question of his successor became topical. The mechanism of election and decision-making is highly non-transparent, that is why we can only discuss potential candidates. One thing is clear: this decision is made in Moscow, by the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, according to the status of the Exarchate. The discussions revolve about two main candidates: Georgy, Archbishop of Nizhny Novgorod and Arzamas, of Belarusian origin, paying often visits to Belarus34 ; and Dmitry, Archbishop of Viciebsk and Orsha. Patriarch Kirill met with the latter in Vitebsk on June 4, 2010, during his transit trip through Belarus (he also visited this eparchy in 2009). Nevertheless, due to the reasons mentioned above discussing the chances of either candidate is futile.

The news of the probable retirement provoked a stormy reaction in the Belarusian Exarchate: archimandrite Alexius (Shinkevich) was dismissed from his position of the media relations executive after publicizing this statute procedure of age retirement. In 2009 the archimandrite unexpectedly denounced a negative report about the BChD on BT, Belarusian TV1. As a result he gained respect among the opposition and suspicion among state functionaries. There seemed to be nothing scandalous in the news about Filaret's probable retirement, but nevertheless, archimandrite Shinkevich lost his media-relations position.35

Why? When Bishop Benjamin (Tupeko) of Borisov, was appointed Vicar of Minsk diocese, it became even more apparent that Metropolitan Filaret cannot fully perform his duties. The young hierarch was also appointed head of the newly established institution: the Publishing Council, which is to coordinate publishing Orthodox literature in Belarus.

Who is managing the Belarusian Exarchate after all, if Metropolitan Filaret is gradually losing his position? At the level of relations with the regime, we can state that degree of Metropolitan's loyalty to it in speeches and addresses is reducing. It is reducing from the opposite side as well: more than once did Lukashenko ignore both traditional services in the Holy Spirit Cathedral and the Metropolitan personally in his relations with the church administration in Moscow. The leading position in state-church relations is being taken by Feodor Povny, an archpriest close to President Lukashenko.36 His authority in the BOC is based on his closeness to the state, the symbol of which was the President’s participation in the pompous burial of remains of unidentified soldiers in the crypt of the Church of All Saints on July 2, 2010. At the annual meeting with the Synod on April 22, 2010, Lukashenko called the harmonious relation between the state and the [Orthodox] Church "a symphony"37 . The President presented his vision of this "symphony": "Strong power is the pledge of confidence of Belarusians, the Orthodox Church has always been and remains its faithful ally".38

But before and during the Presidential election the Belarusian Orthodox church turned out to be not that faithful to the "strong authorities". Metropolitan Filaret gave speeches both at the All-Belarus Assembly and inauguration, but, unlike previous political seasons, they were not that pro-regime. A lot of believers and priests, having an alternative to the "Orthodox atheist" Lukashenko – the active "Orthodox churchgoer" Rymaseuski – started giving preference to the latter. The BChD campaign, addressed to church activists, was successful among the Orthodox.

Unlike the congratulations that Patriarch of Moscow Kirill immediately sent to Lukashenko, the BOC's reaction to the results and the follow-up of the election was not that definite. Archpriest Feodor Povny denounced actions of the protesters on BT (Belarusian TV1), but the events afterwards showed that the Orthodox community of Belarus is showing unprecedented signs of civil identity – with little inclination to "strong authorities". For example, the official BOC’s monthly Carkounaje slova ("Ecclesiastical Word") published a letter from believers concerning the December 19th events39 ; there were letters addressed to the Patriarch expressing bewilderment at his congratulation40 ; in parishes people prayed for the arrested and injured on December 19, etc. These actions were initiated by the middle rather than "the ruling top" of the BOC. Nevertheless, we can talk about certain changes in the BOC's position on the civil and political situation in Belarus, despite the opinion expressed by its superior administration in Moscow. This situation stimulated more active talks about wider autonomy both from the centre and the state.

Lukashenko’s visit to Constantinople, when he met with Bartholomew, Patriarch of Constantinople, provided another cause for discussing autocephaly.41 Some regarded that visit practically as a step to autocephaly. Nevertheless, according to the Greek sources and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the visit was purely ceremonial and the issue of autocephaly could not have been discussed. Moreover, the pan-Orthodox dialogue, preparations for the Inter-Orthodox Council make any drastic changes almost impossible as another Inter-Orthodox meeting in Chambesy (Switzerland) did not arrive at any consensus regarding the mechanism of announcing and recognizing autocephaly.42 For Lukashenko, his visit to Constantinople, just like his visit to Vatican, became another PR-move, though a bit less pompous. This visit drew a much wider response in Russia, where it was regarded in the geopolitical light and against the Ukrainian issue. Closeness to Russia, support of the "canonical" Orthodoxy, i.e. subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate, is welcomed in Lukashenko's policy, whereas support of Catholicism or independent Orthodox Church is not. For Lukashenko this could have been a kind of signal that, together with his pro-Western policy of the recent years, was to have stirred unrest among the Moscow political elite and, hence, secure support at the Presidential election. The "church factor" must have been an important one. The Patriarch could not have taken fright of the "Vatican" and "Constantinople" signals. But having his own geopolitical and geoecclesiastical opinion of "the Russian World", he could have contributed to better relations between the Belarusian regime and the Kremlin.

The Roman Catholic Church: Is a concordat possible?

The issue of the international agreement on cooperation between Belarus and the Roman Catholic Church has been under discussion for several years. The talks began as far back as 2002, after the law On freedom of conscience was passed, stipulating a possible concordat. In 2003, a corresponding agreement with the BOC was signed. But they began to work on the document only in 2007, when Deputy Prime Minister Mikail Kosinets announced the real possibility to sign an agreement. The most heated discussions around a concordat began in 2008, when Cardinal Secretary of State Tarcisio Bertone visited Belarus.

Nevertheless, there has been no progress since 2008, except for numerous loud statements that the document would be signed by the end of that summer or year. Alexandr Kashkevich, Chairperson of the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Belarus (the CCBB), told Radio Vaticana in December that the document is ready and we "should pray that it is signed as soon as possible, but that signing is in jurisdiction of the Apostolic Nunciature."43 According to the documents of the Conference, the issue of the concordat was not even discussed.44

So, what is the actual situation with the document? How do Belarus and the RCC cooperate? Sergey Aleynik, ambassador of Belarus to the Holy See, in his interview for Radio Vaticana said that "the project to restore frescos in the Arch Cathedral Church is an example of fruitful cooperation, initiated by the President."45 He also pointed out that bilateral relations became more active after Cardinal Bertone’s visit to Belarus in 2008. But it turned out that only during Lukashenko’s meeting with the Pope in 2009 "arrangements for the agreement between the Holy See and Belarus were made"; "the agreement is being elaborated" and Belarus hopes that "the work will be finished soon, though the document needs more time," said Mr. Aleynik in the interview. Who is there in the working group? Is the document "ready" or will "the work will be finished soon"? Who represents the Catholic Church – the Secretariat of State of the Holy See, the Apostolic Nunciature, the CCBB? What Belarusian experts are elaborating the document – the Foreign Ministry or the Office of the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs? According to the Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs, "at present an agreement between the Republic of Belarus and Vatican is being elaborated. The Foreign Ministry is the main developer but the Office of the Commissioner is taking part in elaborating the text of the agreement." 46 The issue of the concordat was raised during the OCSE Summit in Astana. The President met with Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone who said that "the main sign of trusting relations between the two countries is the agreement that is being now elaborated."47 The relations between Belarus and the Vatican might really be trusting. Why is then the signing of the document always postponed? Can it be so that, despite the President’s initiative to restore the frescos, the relations between the Catholic Church in Belarus and the Belarusian state are not that trusting? Bishop Kashkevich pointed out that "the Catholic Church is always trying to establish dialogue with authorities". But "the number of foreign priests" reduced (from 85 to 48 in Hrodna diocese). Moreover, "they are issued visas for only half a year", which complicates their work.48

The state is not always happy with the Catholic Church, either. The Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Gulyako pointed out that "Catholic communities tend to erect illegal monuments", some priests "ignore the legal framework prohibiting religious organizations to take part in political activities"49 , which becomes very topical before and after election campaigns. There are priests and lay people in the Catholic Church who take an active part in movements (e.g. the one to protect St. Joseph Church) or parties (the Belarusian Christian Democratic Party), but the administration of the RCC tries to dissociate itself from them. For example, before the Presidential election priest Jury Barok, close to BChD, was commissioned to Israel; Metropolitan Tadeusz Kondrusewicz in his interview for "Belarus Today" daily distanced himself from the activists protecting St. Joseph Church, after BChD had became leader of the movement.50 After the election the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church made no reaction whatever to the events on December 19th. Nevertheless, many priests said masses for the imprisoned, a number of Catholic activists applied to the administration of the bishopric to express their opinion about the situation in the country51 ; one priest published an Internet article "Gloomy Christmas", saying that keeping silent is a sin in this situation.52 Nevertheless, there is still silence, and the document, for which this silence was traded, still remains a bleak prospect.

Belarusian Greek-Catholic Church

In 2010 no significant changes occurred in the life of the Belarusian Greek-Catholic Church. Two issues remained unresolved: absence of a bishop (in 2009 the priests applied to the Vatican to settle this canonical issue) and absence of a proper ecclesiastical building in the capital city (Greek-Catholic intelligentsia addressed a request to the President). Moreover, St. Joseph Centre53 in vul. Ordzonikidze, 6 was threatened to be closed because the building was not in the general layout plan of this district. Masses are celebrated regularly in the chapel of All Belarusian Saints there, the centre hosts cultural and religious events. Negotiations with the authorities were successful and the Greek-Catholic centre was included into the proper plan.

Alternative Orthodoxy

The influence alternative Orthodoxy did not increase in 2010. Structurally, it is comprised by 3 groups of churches.
No. 1 is the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church headed by bishop Sviataslau (Longin), with one parish – "Religious Community of St. Euphrosinia of Polack in Minsk"54 – and one priest, Fr. Leanid Akalovich. The community applied for state registration but was denied it.

Group No. 2 is the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (BAOC) headed by Archbishop Jovan (Puric).55 Its main activist is archpriest Sergey Gorbik (Lviv, Ukraine), who moderates the blog "Belarusian Autocephaly". Fr. Sergey's conflict with the Greek-Orthodox movement, headed by Bishop Basil Kostyuk, continued in 2010 in the form of mutual reproaches.56

Group No. 4 is a parish of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad headed by Metropolitan Agathangelos (Pashkovsky). Archpriest Leonid (Plyats) governs this group of several parishes in Minsk and Brest regions.57 The first three groups support the idea of autocephaly from the Russian Orthodox Church in one way or another, but none of them is recognized by canonical churches. The issue of autocephaly became topical when President Lukashenko visited Constantinople, though the talks were mainly about the Belarusian Orthodox Church. As the results of the meeting in Chambesy in February 2011 show, the issue of autocephaly and its mechanisms is one of the most controversial and unresolved in the inter-Orthodox world: the question was discussed but consensus remained elusive. 58

1. Belarusian Christian Democratic Party

The Belarusian Christian Democratic Party became more active in 2010, which is partially due to the Presidential election: the party nominated its candidate – the Orthodox believer Vital Rymaseuski. This fact was often emphasized and became a kind of symbol. The party also tries to "guide" some civil campaigns, first of all, the one to protect St. Joseph Church, which has been going for more than 5 years.

Moreover, during the election campaign the BChD used Christian rhetoric and appealed to Christian values. They attracted support of active believers, including Orthodox ones, who, for the first time, had an option to vote for a candidate-believer. A similar situation could have occurred in 2001 when Leonid Kalugin, the then director of Atlant Inc. (refrigerators plant) made an attempt to be nominated as a Presidential candidate but did not gather 100 thousand valid signatures. In 2010, thanks to a relatively free campaign, the BChD managed to reach a wide group of believers, which used to be, especially the Orthodox ones, faithful Lukashenko’s supporters. It is difficult to say if the party managed to break the stereotype of supporting the regime and denouncing the opposition among the Orthodox, but its role in this process is obvious.

We want to emphasize that these changes did not affect the people who generally call themselves "Orthodox"; it only applies to active church members, people of the "ecclesiastic subculture", so to say.

It is peculiar that heads of different denominations "keep silent" about the BChD and its leaders. Neither Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant leaders denounce the party that positions itself as "Christian". True, there is some "distancing" from the party, especially on the Catholic side: Metropolitan Kondrusievich in his interview for newspaper "Belarus Today" about St. Joseph Church denounced politicization of its defense; priest Yury Bark, who expressed himself favorably about the BChD, was expelled from Belarus. But we do not consider these facts public dissociation. The state and its media were even forced to substitute "the voice of the Church" with a foreign one: in 2009 BT (Belarusian TV1) used the words of deacon Andrey (Kuraev) to discredit the BChD and show that the Church does not support it. But the BOC media relations executive openly denounced Kuraev. In 2010, the authorities had to use words of the German cult expert Thomas Gandow. His answer concerning the BChD for 7 dniey (‘7 days’) daily was so vaguely formulated that it could be interpreted as criticism.59

Some Protestant activists and religious organizations openly supported the party, e.g. the New Life Church, Pastor Uladzimir Kachahur from Novogrudok (BChD member), and others. We should say that Protestants grew in their general critical attitude towards the regime rather than in support of any particular political force, as we can infer from Sergey Khomich’s, bishop of the Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith (UCEF).60 In general, the critical attitude of religious leaders to the present regime is much stronger than their support of the BChD as a political party: i.e. protests do not necessarily turn into support of a particular political party though there is some correlation here.

Forecast

December 19th and the following repressions show that in 2011 the pressure on the civil society in general and the religious sector in particular will increase. The new law On non-profit organizations, if passed in its actual wording, will become the main legal and institutional tool of oppression of and worsen the position of religious organizations.

On the other hand, the regime will have to look for legitimization in the international arena, and religion can become an easy mechanism for that. Lukashenko has already paid the most scandalous visits – to Rome and Constantinople, he has nothing surprising in reserve. Hence, old issues, especially that of the non-signed concordat, might be raised. During the year it might be in development and "at the last stage", but it is unlikely to be signed.

As for relations with denominations, if Orthodox and Catholic priests dare express any "oppositional" views, state organs will pressure senior clerics with arguments that engagement in political life violates Belarusian law. Nevertheless, it is also probable that pro-regime priests will be exploited as "voice of the Church". For example, Mikhail Morgulis, representative of the Protestant Spiritual Diplomacy Foundation, congratulated Lukashenko on his victory at the post-election press conference on behalf of Protestants.61 Archpriest Feodor Povny might make another attempt to the Council of the Republic; his influence in the BOC will grow during 2011. Lukashenko will try to build relations directly with the Moscow Patriarchate rather than through the Belarusian Exarchate.

The number of church leaders criticizing the Belarusian authorities will grow in all denominations. Civil awareness among believers will grow at the level of religious "civil society" rather than at that of top hierarchs. It will involve not only political but also social, legal and moral issues. The number of grassroots initiatives will grow.

Orthodox culture classes will not be widely introduced into the school curriculum, though this question will be widely discussed in 2011 again.