Presidential Administration and Security Agencies: Before and after the presidential election
Pyotr Valuev

Summary

The process of transformation of Belarusian security agencies started after Viktor Sheyman vacated the office of state secretary of the Security Council that also entailed reauthorization and reallocation of duties in other security agencies. As a result, special services and security agencies were actually subordinated to the Presidential Administration, or, to be more exact, to President’s National Security Aide Viktor Lukashenko, the eldest son of the Belarusian president. Control over the strongest and most effective special services is thus concentrated in “one hand.”
The changes above, and also the 19 December events and the crackdown on the opposition that followed, interrupted the dialogue with the European Union, which was one step away from recognition of Lukashenko’s Victory (on certain terms) and aiding him financially. Given the substantial disagreements among Belarus and Russia, Alexander Lukashenko faces not easily soluble problems, first of all economic, caused by the lack of resources to keep the present model functioning. Besides, there were other serious problems inside the country, specifically the dropping popularity rating on the threshold of the election, the opposition backed by the West, functionaries uncertain about their future, special services balled in “one fist”, the lack of a consolidating ideological core, and so on. In 2011, Alexander Lukashenko will keep trying to balance between Russia, the West, and home policy vectors.

Tendencies:

• De jure and/or de facto, security agencies and special services found themselves underfoot of the Presidential Administration, to be more exact, President’s National Security Aide Viktor Lukashenko;

• Inconsistency of actions and misunderstanding throughout the past year (including the pre-election period) within the “opposition-Europe-Lukashenko” triangle resulted in the 19 December events and reprisals that followed, against the background of the frozen dialogue with Europe.

Reform called “Viktor Lukashenko”

In contemporary Belarus, the hierarchy of governmental agencies is less important than the person who controls it all. The Security Council used to supervise special services before 2008. The Presidential Administration or, as a matter of fact, President’s National Security Aide Viktor Lukashenko, took over control. As a result, the Security Council turned into an advisory board. Although Viktor Lukashenko is a member himself, it did not enable the Council to make any particular decisions.
Realignment of human resources began in 2008 and gained momentum in the autumn of the same year after Viktor Sheyman resigned his office of secretary general of the Security Council.
Viktor Lukashenko controlled security agencies single-handedly in 2009 and 2010. He certainly made use of advice from more experienced fellows, who had been building up political muscle for years in top floor offices. However, the 2009 and 2010 personnel reshuffles were initiated by Viktor Lukashenko personally. A few scandals surfaced at that time, namely the criminal charges pressed against officers of the State Control Committee’s Financial Investigations Department and high-ranking KGB officers.
Essential changes occurred in 2010 in Viktor Lukashenko’s backing agency – the Operating Analytical Centre (OAC) formed at the Presidential Administration. Earlier, the Center had the status of a complementary special service, which was not only engaged in investigations, but also had agents in all government institutions from the Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Sports to regional tax offices. In 2010, it was finally assigned the status of the State Center for Information Security, which was earlier subordinate to the Council of Ministers. It was followed by staff changes in the OAC and dismissal of Sheyman’s people.
Today, the OAC performs a lot more functions. In 2009, the Center focused on the fight against corruption and, to a lesser extent, political inquiries. After a year, it was commissioned to monitor streams of information and actually to control the Internet. So, the OAC plays a more important role now, although it has got a bit weaker. The OAC lost fighters, but still has analysts, political technologists with a well-developed infrastructure for high-grade internal political investigations, and information departments capable of controlling the Internet, as well as determining the human resources policy.
Basically, the OAC’s “muscles” were brought out in the outside. Sheyman supervised a simplified command system, which provided for direct subordination of entities like the special rapid response unit (SOBR) to the Security Council. After the reshuffle in security agencies lobbied by Viktor Lukashenko, the whole system was retailored to match his ambitions, specifically to bring him up to a higher level of the political pyramid in view of his more appropriate destination, rather than just the position of a president’s assistant.
After all, a new agency emerged and it had the right to examine any sector of economy, security agencies, human resources, etc.
It concentrates enough resources to pull strings at different levels. However, it is not about the overall control since even Viktor Lukashenko is not omnipotent.
Moving of the president’s son to the forefront complicated the decision-making process in the Presidential Administration to a certain degree. The Viktor Lukashenko team could influence economic decisions heavily. It is enough to mention that his team worked on the sale of Belaruskali, and not only the government, but also the OAC provided its expert opinion.
The system of influence centers in both the government and Presidential Administration downgraded to simple allocation of duties in the Administration. Journalists are groping for striking metaphors and keep writing about “hawks and pigeons”, while it is more appropriate to talk about “hawks and hawks.” The only thing is that some of them are white and the others are black.
Vladimir Makey’s group, which unites foreign policy professionals, can be identified as the “white hawks.” The group was more or less independent, because Viktor Lukashenko was actually too far from foreign policy, although his agencies were involved in 2008, when the idea of a dialogue between the West and Belarus was brought back to life once again, and Viktor Lukashenko prepared several research notes, which helped the president to choose the concept offered by Mr. Makey. It is not improbable that those notes were at least as good as the reports coming from the Foreign Ministry.
However, Viktor Lukashenko’s influence has no feedback as he lacks long-term contacts with foreign politicians. He did not promise anything to anyone personally, except for Javier Solana. But nobody knows what he promised.
Today (and earlier, of course), political weight in governmental circles is determined by personal access to the Belarusian ruler. Viktor Lukashenko has the greatest opportunities, as he meets with the president at least twice a week.

Operating Analytical Centre vs. State Security Committee

Meanwhile, the relations between the OAC and KGB remain quite intense. The latter is an institutional agency with extensive capacities and resources for full-range activities. Both agencies confront each other now and again and it is usually called “little misunderstandings”, the impacts of which go up to the surface sometimes. But no one sees a real fight between the special services.
The KGB is directly subordinated to the president. The chairman is entitled to come to the president with weekly reports. During such troubled times as now, the KGB chief can report almost every day. Now he plays the biggest role ever. The OAC thus fell by the wayside, as it cannot influence investigative procedures directly. The mutual relations between the KGB and OAC are complicated not because the “vertical” is erected in a wrong way, but because the OAC is not always aware of what the KGB is up to and vice versa. And it is not a fight between the two special services, but simply non-coordination.
As concerns the State Control Committee (SCC), it should not be regarded as a special service. The SCC wields less power despite direct subordination to the president. On the contrary, special services assess all actions of the SCC to be sure that all inspections are conducted “in an appropriate manner.” The SCC’s actions have not always been legitimate and lawful. Special services clamped down on many anti-market attempts of state controllers as they were inconsistent with the liberalization policy, like it happened with the tobacco market, alcoholic beverages, and exports where the SCC overstepped authority not only to replenish the state treasury, but also to satisfy its own appetite.
With security agencies’ reattachment to Viktor Lukashenko, President’s National Security Aide within the structure of the Presidential Administration, the position of the Administration consolidated even more. On the other hand, the struggle for power between the Administration and other government institutions shifted inside the Administration.
In 2010, the primary goal of special services – both the 4th department of the KGB and OAC – was to prepare for the presidential election. A special group was formed in the OAC to work on local, parliamentary, and presidential elections. Preparation for the local elections was started as early as spring 2009. The presidential pre-election campaign was launched at that time as well. The opposition entered the presidential campaign much later.
The second field of concern of the special services in 2008-2010 was fostering relations between the West and Belarus. The OAC and KGB were involved alongside the Foreign Ministry and Presidential Administration. The fight against corruption was the third direction. President Lukashenko still wants to know who steals from him in a wrong way.
Expert examination of investment projects in the economic sector is one more direction. All targeted privatization projects on sales of land plots and production facilities, for example the Belaruskali case, passed through the OAC. The government offered an international investor for Belaruskali (it was a Chinese trader), but following an examination conducted by the OAC, the investor was replaced because “a trader cannot be an investor.” Azot was also sold with the participation of special services, which took a hand in corporatization and stock sale.
Perhaps the only area where special services did not cut in was the supervision over local administrations, community outreach, and inspections directed by Makey as the management quality was what really mattered then. Nevertheless, the fifth line of special services’ activity was personnel policy, and everyone knows that “cadres are all-important.” For this reason, security services are entitled to study personnel files and make decisions on career assignments.
Information security should be mentioned here too. OAC officers worked on the decree on the Internet. Its first draft was much better than the final version, which provoked a burst of criticism on the part of Internet users and Belarusian civil society institutions.
It is safe to assume however that the first half of the year 2011 will pass under the influence of the KGB, which is in charge of all investigatory actions in relation to the opposition. The State Security Committee is assigned the political task to comb out the political field to give way to other, saner and more organized opposition forces. The second task the KGB is supposed to cope with is “to detect” a conspiracy in order to frighten government officials. In fact, a revolution can be successful provided that there are two basic components, namely mass street protest actions and a conspiracy inside the ruling elite. Therefore, these two components should be preventively nipped in the bud.

Everything is under suspicion: mutual non-compliance with obligations

December 19 events were a logical consequence of the excessively increased role of security agencies integrated into the political process. They can ensure any result except for electoral support. After the popularity rating report was put on Lukashenko’s desk (and it was only about a half voters who came to the ballot boxes), the force scenario was used and special services came upon the stage.
The work on cordoning the Square (Kastrycnickaja (Oktyabrskaya) Square of Minsk, the usual place for all sorts of rallies) was started long before the election. Enforcers used the methods they had been honing for such occasions. They were free to act as they thought fit in case many people come to protest. Presidential campaign consultant Viktor Sheyman, who actually managed the campaign, was ready at hand. And so happened what had to happen, as special services were preset for a counter play. The scale of actions and their consequences were determined by Lukashenko’s decision and his fear of a probable conspiracy.
All security agencies involved in maintaining of the dialogue with the opposition closely monitored activities of the alternative candidates. The information that they were extracting had not aroused serious concern up to a certain moment. Minsk and the EU initially agreed that European institutions would not supply money for the opposition’s undertakings. If special services did not obtain information that all were supposed to come to the Square at the order of the “donors”, and that Andrey Sannikov and Nikolay Statkevich’s headquarters were entertaining the utopian idea of a “government of national confidence”, probably Alexander Lukashenko would not have resorted to using brutal force against the rioters.
In the TV and radio addresses to the nation, practically all presidential candidates called on people to come to the Square as soon as the polling stations close. It broke the agreements between Radoslaw Sikorski, Guido Westerwelle and the Western Group1 . People were expected to come together in the Square, stand there for a while, and go home. Nobody was supposed to go to Independence Square. There was no common plan. But the police interference was quite predictable. The only question was how the police would react. Nothing sophisticated was needed to provoke mass riots. It was done not only by provocateurs, but also members of the Belarusian Christian Democracy and the Speak the Truth campaign. Young minds are easy to get overexcited.
The Presidential Administration was doing all right coping with the tasks up to 5 p.m. on December 19, the election day. What happened next actually ruined all efforts and successes achieved in negotiations between the Belarusian government and the West. It was reasonable just to stay put doing nothing, because the force scenario would neutralize all efforts of the Western Group in the Presidential Administration. Like many other persons in history, Alexander Lukashenko used security agencies to disperse the peaceful protest rally on December 19.
During the previous election campaign, Lukashenko enjoyed the support of 65% of voters and officials added 15% making up to the boss. On December 19, he won the election not single-handedly but with the help of the entire vertical, which he constructed. Some objective factors throw discredit upon his leadership capabilities. And the officials are not that confident in their future anymore. In turn, it casts doubts upon the officials’ loyalty. President Lukashenko has to either buy them off or intimidate them.
Officials can be paid off by means of privatization, but it would inevitably lead to redistribution of power. Therefore, Lukashenko will most likely approve selective privatization and distribute the targets personally with due gratitude to those who helped him in retaining power. It is certainly not about strategic facilities, but only trade outlets, warehouses, transportation companies and so on. It is even easier to settle accounts with special services: it is enough to raise salaries in their departments.

Policy for outward and in-house use

Over the six months following the election, Lukashenko will take steps to find out terms for reloading the disrupted “dialogue.” The West regards a declaration of political prisoners release to be a fundamental issue. But no one – except (even) Lukashenko – knows how it will occur technologically. Any mitigation of sentences or post conviction pardon for political prisoners can be taken as a step forward. It will serve as proof if some court hearings are postponed till May to have more time to explore possibilities of dialogue with the West.
On the other hand, the opportunity to come to terms with Russia once again playing the burned cards of rapprochement with EU and diversification of raw material supplies still exists. The question is whether the Kremlin rulers will let Lukashenko play this game again.
The president believes he does not need domestic opposition, although, objectively speaking, someone should control the 50-percent electoral field. Otherwise, a new opposition will take the lead of malcontent voters. On the other hand, creation of a controllable opposition is an answer for the West, but not for the Belarusian political establishment. Officials would agree to formation of a pro-governmental party like Belaya Rus (‘White Rus (Ruthenia)’, a pro-presidential NGO). This option is however suitable for just a small part of them, those who will occupy leading positions in the party. A parliamentary opposition would be created with the use of the already available oppositional resources. And such opposition is needed not for in-house, but for outward use.
President Lukashenko cannot tolerate sitting at the negotiating table with the people who used to work for him. They said more than once that no quarter would be given once they come to power. Besides, the president is right indeed when speaking about an opportunity for the opposition to have seats in the parliament provided that candidates (or institutions) really command voters’ support. In fact, formation of Belaya Rus was suspended among other things because it had no ideology and lacked people’s support. None of the existing parties enjoys support. And it is too hard to give these parties the mandates as they always fail to poll at least the 7% required by the law. They will be therefore promoted by local administration that can result in a conflict.
By the way, the incumbent president has a problem with ideology too. Ideology always comes from well-organized ideological groups, i.e. parties. There will be no ideology unless Lukashenko eases control over the political field and provides conditions for unrestricted competition between parties. The ideology department has not employed a single resourceful expert capable to build up ideology, political technologists, or propagandists so far. As a matter of fact, it is a weakness of the president, of which he makes no secret. Neither Alexandr Radkov, nor other so-called governmental ideologists are capable of putting forward an ideology, which would validate the social structure model Lukashenko is seeking to implement. It should not be a bunch of well-formed proclamations and slogans. It must energize. 
Today, Alexander Lukashenko’s strategy is to carry out tactical tasks to retain power. For this purpose he used the Russian vector at first, then suddenly started “to make advances” to the West. After December 19, he has to keep hold of three directions – Russia, Europe and, in addition, the situation inside the country.

Forecast for 2011

A distinct opposition will hardly emerge in 2011. It can only happen if Lukashenko returns to the dialogue with Europe at least at the level of 2010. He has to repay European loans, for instance with some cosmetic changes in the autocratic model.
Alterations of the election system can be adopted depending on how far Lukashenko will go in the western direction. The European Union is presently stressing a few points: preservation of stability in the state, which it neighbors, respect for human rights, and non-alignment with Russia. Special services will therefore play a smaller role, while the OAC will engage in development of strategic targets, goal setting, making contacts, etc. At the same time, in the first half of the year, special services will be busy creating atmosphere of fear: the political establishment will be scared of conspiracy, and society will be scared of large-scale reprisals and tortures. This work should be done thoroughly, and no one knows when the back-to-normal signal will be given.
Belarus has no other choice but to constantly proclaim its multi-vector commitments. Lukashenko can appear face to face with Russia and promise to sign the single currency agreement again. But it is not an option for him because he would not be able to maintain the existing economic model considering the restrictions established by the documents on the Common Economic Space.
On the whole, the 2011 propaganda campaign priorities have been already outlined. Firstly, it is repressive propaganda aimed at intimidation. Secondly, it is propaganda of economic liberalization, which has already proved to be faulty due to mutually exclusive decrees and enactments, or pointless documents, such as Directive No.4. If decisions on systemic reforms are made, their implementation is impeded at the level of local authorities, which find it much more convenient to regulate financial processes using the existing model. Any liberties for business mean less money for functionaries. Thirdly, there can be counter-propaganda in the Europe-Belarus vector. The situation is far from being favorable here since revolutions in the Middle East frighten the world community and distract attention from the events in Belarus.