Belarus – EU: Dialogue anticipating the elections
Dzianis Melyantsou

Abstract

In 2010, Belarusian-EU relations continued to develop along the same lines as those outlined in the previous year: a political dialogue developed, the formation of the Eastern Partnership structures proceeded, expert working groups worked in different directions, and the grounds for signing of the basic document which would regulate mutual relations were prepared.

At the same time, there were no breakthrough decisions and events in relations, as the European Union considered the presidential elections in Belarus as a test of the intentions of the Belarusian administration and subordinated further intensification of relations to the progress in the sphere of democracy and human rights. The delay of the Eastern Partnership development and decisions on multilateral regional projects and macro financial aid did not improve the relations between Minsk and Brussels.

The surge of repressions in Belarus after the presidential elections caused a dramatically negative reaction of the European Union and halted the process of enhancement of Belarusian-EU relations.

Tendencies:

- Having reached the outbreak in the western direction in 2009, the official Minsk concentrated on technical problems and the preparation of the legal foundations for relations with the EU;
- The slowdown of the Eastern Partnership program development and absence of fast financial results of cooperation contributed to the decrease of interest of the Belarusian authorities to the European vector in general;
- The presidential elections of December 19th interrupted the process of normalization in relations with the European Union.

Normalization without breakthrough

2010 started with another crisis with the Union of Poles in Belarus, which did not influence greatly the relations with Brussels, but was noticed by the leaders of the European Union. The Chief of European diplomacy Catherine Ashton denounced the actions of the Belarusian authorities against the Union of the Poles and noted that these events undermine EU efforts directed at the strengthening of relations with Belarus1 . This conflict became the background against which the European Parliament mission worked at the end of February.

Due to joint efforts of the Belarusian civil society, experts and lobbying structures it became possible to redirect the problem of visa procedure simplification for Belarusians, away from the political dialogue between Minsk and Brussels. The EU Council approved the mandate of the European Commission for negotiations on the preparation of the Visa Facilitation Agreement and the Readmission Agreement. The Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Fule during his visit to Belarus emphasized that the visa issue would be considered without political conditions2 . This decision can be considered as a token because low-price visas and simple procedures of obtaining them is almost the only instrument of fast creation of a pro-European mood among Belarusians. Earlier, Brussels subordinated a price cut for Schengen visas to the progress of democratization and liberalization in Belarus. However, low-price or free visas must be one of the prerequisites of changes in Belarus, instead of being an award for good behavior of the Belarusian government.

In February news appeared about the preparation by the European Commission of the document under the title the Joint Interim Plan which was supposed to serve as a roadmap of bilateral relations development between Belarus and the EU, and also as a temporary substitute of the Agreement of Cooperation and Partnership (ACP) that had been signed in 1995 but hadn’t come into effect. The Plan embraces cooperation in those spheres that are mentioned in the ACP and is basically directed at the trade and economic sectors and at more profound cooperation between the two sides. According to this document the EU was to help Belarus implementing reforms. As in the case of the Eastern Partnership Belarus was involved in development of the plan, ensuring the interest of Minsk in this project. Also, the plan is not a legally binding document and thus does not provide any sanctions for violation of its terms. It had a framework nature and in November it was presented to Alexander Lukashenko in general terms. In case of a positive assessment of the election process in Belarus the European Union was going to start negotiations with the official Minsk in 2011 about filling in this roadmap with specific contents.

The year 2010 was rich in visits of European official persons to Belarus and Belarusian officials abroad. Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Martynov visited Germany and Poland twice, as well as Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, Belgium and Italy. Moreover, he went to Italy after the presidential elections in Belarus during the early surge of repressions.

It is necessary to mention the most relevant European visitors: first of all, the president of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite who visited Minsk in October, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Fule who came to Minsk twice – in July and November, and also the joint visit of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and his Polish counterpart Radoslaw Sikorski in November.

The majority of Belarusian political analysts tend to connect these visits of high European officials with the presidential elections in Belarus. The top-level meetings touched upon the issue of the elections in any case. The Lithuanian President, Commissioner Fule, and the Polish and German Ministers during their visits to Minsk spoke about the necessity of fair and transparent elections. Only then, the Belarusian government could hope for more profound relations with the European Union and for financial and technical aid in reforms. Dalia Grybauskaite met not only with Alexander Lukashenko but also the oppositional candidates for the presidency and called on them to unite. She also mentioned Lukashenko’s promise to register all candidates who would gather the necessary number of signatures3 . The aim of Westerwelle and Sikorski’s visit was even more transparent – to persuade the Belarusian President into holding transparent elections in exchange for assistance in economic reforms.

The very fact of such top-level meetings on the eve of the presidential elections signaled the interest of the European Union in further development of relations with Belarus. This interest was even stronger than the fear to be accused of supporting "the last dictator of Europe" just ahead of the elections. The EU interest is clear: using deterioration in the Belarusian-Russian relations to try to solve “the Belarusian problem” and to expand its influence on Minsk. It is quite logical that the mission to convey the European message was given from Germany, which is not only the EU motor, but also has always had a pragmatic attitude towards Belarus. Radoslaw Sikorski's participation can be explained by the fact that Poland presides in the European Union next year and it will have to actively advance its initiative, the Eastern Partnership, in which Belarus is one of key elements.

During the visit the main “reward” that Minsk would receive for carrying out democratic elections was announced – EUR 3 billion within three years through miscellaneous EU programs and instruments. On the one hand, this is a considerable sum, commensurable with the sum that Belarus annually received from its allied relations with Russia. But on the other hand, it was not quite clear how this money would be given: in the form of free aid or as loans.

The two Foreign Ministers made an unambiguous statement that the presidency of Alexander Lukashenko can be recognized by the European Union in case he holds fair and democratic elections: “For us it is the quality of the elections that is important rather than the result”, said Sikorski. At the same time, the key points were highlighted in such a manner that it was clear that the EU could be satisfied with elections that are simply more democratic than the previous ones (parliamentary elections of 2008). In addition to this “reward” Sikorski added that he had lifted the veto on involvement of Belarus in the EU Northern Dimension, which is a bonus both for Belarus’ image and financial plans.

Stefan Fule’s second visit that took place on November 15th, was also limited to the elections. The European Commissioner named those spheres where the EU would like to see progress, such as: registration of candidates, creation of territorial commissions, early voting, vote counting, access to mass-media and freedom of assembly4 . Mr. Fule also introduced the project of the Joint Interim Plan prepared by the European Commission, and publicly announced that the Plan serves not only as an attempt to overcome the lack of official mutual relations between the EU and Belarus, but it also aims at helping Belarus in reforms and modernization. However, neither Fule nor Sikorski mentioned any specific numbers concerning financial assistance.

Despite the quite active exchange of ministerial-level visits, Lukashenka did not visit the EU at all in 2010. Firstly, this can be explained by the absence of such need, given the lack of plans to sign any important international agreements requiring the presence of head of state. Secondly, the visibility of the foreign policy outbreak onto the West had been vividly demonstrated to the Belarusian electorate earlier in 2009. Therefore, the visits of the Lithuanian President, and Foreign Ministers of Germany and Poland to Belarus were sufficient for agitation needs. The Belarusian diplomacy concentrated on practical issues, such as preparation of the thorough grounds for Belarusian-European relations in the form of a basic bilateral agreement, entrance to the European market, and search for additional financial resources.

Still, the Belarusian side did not succeed in realizing its practical aims as much as it had hoped. The problem of allocation of macro financial aid to Belarus of EUR 200 million that had been discussed since autumn 2009 was resolved. Commissioner Fule during his visits to Minsk confirmed the possibility to allocate these means. However, the European Union has apparently linked this assistance to the presidential election in Belarus and its transparent and democratic character as well as the official presentation of the Joint Interim Plan which failed to be negotiated before the earlier stated deadline. In general it is possible to conclude that the European Union during the whole year avoided making decisions about Belarus, waiting for the results of the presidential campaign and their assessment by the OSCE.

All quiet in the Eastern Partnership

The disappointment of the Belarusian authorities by the Eastern Partnership program in 2010 led to an attitude towards this initiative as something marginal in relations between Minsk and Brussels. Entering the Eastern Partnership program, the official Minsk was primarily interested in obtaining financial aid, investments, and in realization of joint infrastructural projects. The political constituent of the program was considered as an annoying supplement to the dialogue with Brussels which unfortunately could not be ignored.

The turn towards the West was regarded by the Belarusian authorities only as an exchange of its geopolitical loyalty for financial aid, which prevented the EU from influencing the internal political situation in the country. However, by the end of 2010 the Belarusian authorities had not succeeded in "capitalizing" on its normalization of relations with the EU and confrontation with the Russian administration. The projects, prepared as far back as at the end of 2009 in the frameworks of the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership, were not considered and the official Minsk did not receive any answer about their fate. At the informal summit of the Eastern Partnership in Sopot (Poland) on May 25th, 2010 Belarusian Foreign Minister Martynov once again called the European Commission to adopt as soon as possible “accurate and transparent regulations” for consideration and further financing of the submitted projects and to fill the whole program with practical contents5 . He also proposed to create the Forum of the Eastern Development in the frameworks of the Eastern Partnership which would ensure direct dialogue of business structures with partner countries.

The development of the projects in the framework of the Eastern Partnership and their further lobbying catalyzed to a certain extent the cooperation of Belarus with Lithuania and Ukraine. In 2009-2010 there were three trilateral working meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the mentioned countries. The last meeting was on September 8th, 2010 in Belarus where it was decided to concentrate on 5-7 main projects which would be promoted within the Eastern Partnership program6 .

On December 13th, in Brussels there was an annual meeting of Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Eastern Partnership. Sergey Martynov once again pointed out the necessity to expand the practical cooperation within the EaP and to intensify the project component of the program. During the preparation for EaP summit in 2011 the Belarusian side made a suggestion to prepare the recount of the strategic projects of the EaP, to start the Eastern Development Forum, and also to develop the roadmap of EaP activity for the nearest two years7 . However, as the main aim of the ministerial meeting was to review current activity and to assess progress made in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, no important decisions were made.

Euronest casus

Euronest remained an additional stumbling block in the program of the Eastern Partnership for Belarus – the inter-parliamentary dimension which was to include parliamentary deputies of the EU six eastern neighbors and European Parliament representatives. It should be noted that from the very beginning of the creation of this organ there was a problem of illegitimacy of the Belarusian National Assembly in the opinion of the European deputies who refused to recognize the right of the Belarusian deputies to represent Belarus. As an alternative the European Parliament proposed to invite Belarusian opposition and civil society representatives to Euronest, which was flatly rejected by the official Minsk, referring to the Prague Declaration according to which Euronest should include the representatives of the legislative authority of the partner countries. Additional doubts appear concerning the representation of civil society, which is already presented in a separate institution – the Civil Society Forum.

Throughout the year from time to time information appeared that Euronest was about to start its work without the participation of Belarusian officials, which caused a negative reaction from Minsk and further undermined the faith of the countries in bilateral relations. The list of victories of the Belarusian diplomacy should also include the demarche of the parliamentary speakers of six member countries of the EaP organized by Minsk who sent a joint letter to the European Parliament with the request to include the Belarusian Parliament equally to Euronest. However, this action did not convince the European parliamentarians and the casus with Euronest remained unsolved. Nevertheless, the EaP Inter-Parliamentary Assembly did not gather in autumn without Belarusian representatives as it had been planned earlier. In this case, like in other initiatives, the EU decided to wait for the election results in Belarus.

19.12 as the end of normalization

There is no doubt that the presidential elections of December 19th marked the end of the political year in Belarus, having stopped those internal and foreign policy trends which had been formed since 2008. The European Union as well as other international actors considered the presidential elections in Belarus as a test of the intentions of the official Minsk in relation to the EU and liberalization of the country as a whole. The European politicians emphasized not once that it was the election campaign and the Belarusian authorities’ behavior during it that would be the focal point that would determine the next stage of Belarusian-European relations. It was Lukashenka’s good behavior during the campaign and on the election day that the allocation of EUR 3 billion promised by Radoslaw Sikorski depended on, as well as the beginning of negotiations on the Joint Interim Plan and renewal of full-fledged relations with the European Union as a whole. The elections should have concluded the test period that started in autumn 2008.

The Belarusian side perfectly understood. Therefore it did its best (in the context of the current system) to receive the acknowledgment from the EU and the international community: it allowed the most free election campaign during the last 16 years, was in touch with foreign journalists, ensured unprecedented safety measures for OSCE observers, abstained from criticizing the opposition and the EU. Few observers and analysts had doubts about the positive reaction of Brussels to the Belarusian elections and further improvement of mutual relations. It was these expectations and the sham results that caused a sharply negative reaction of the European Union to the events of December 19th in Minsk.

On December 20th, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton made a statement in which she denounced “the use of violence following the presidential elections in Belarus, in particular the beating and detention of several opposition leaders, including a number of presidential candidates”8 . The same statements were made by President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek, Foreign Ministers of Poland, Germany, Great Britain and other EU member states. After the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Poland, Sweden and the Czech Republic submitted their condemning article about the Belarusian elections to “The New York Times” under the title “Lukashenko the Loser”9 it became clear that the brief period of improvement of the relations between Belarus and the EU has ended.

Conclusion

The year 2010 in relations between Belarus and the EU can be called the year of waiting for the presidential elections. Without hoping for cardinal political changes in the country, the European Union, nevertheless, considered the election campaign as a test of seriousness of Alexander Lukashenko’s intentions as to cooperation with Brussels. Therefore, no relevant decisions important for Belarus within the Belarusian-European relations throughout the year were made. This fact, in its turn, facilitated the desire of the Belarusian authorities to search for closer relations with Russia, which they, at last, achieved just before the elections.

The European Union returned to the idea of a roadmap facilitating relations with Minsk, reflected in a draft variant of the Joint Interim Plan that however was not presented to the general public and was not approved by the two sides.

The presidential elections, the surge of violence and repression caused a negative reaction of European structures and suspended normalization of relations. Belarusian-European relations were thrown back to where they were in 2006-2007. However, judging by the fact that after the elections Belarus appeared in a very inconvenient foreign-policy situation, and also by the fact that the EU has no other strategy as to Belarus except for the policy of pulling-in, it is possible to predict a gradual normalization of relations during 2011.