Media: The state’s Pyrrhic victory
Alexey Medvetsky

Summary

The mass media became a focus for both the Belarusian state and the international community in 2010, a year marked by two election campaigns. The pre-election mobilization once again revealed the main problems in Belarus’ media sector: unequal access to distribution networks, accreditation issues for independent journalists, and availability of information from state employees.

More attention was paid to public opinion in the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections, so state and non-state bodies held several opinion polls. These provided material to draw conclusions about prospects for Belarusian media development, the pros and cons faced by European Union Information Policy in Belarus, and Belarus’ role in the Russo-Belarusian union state.

Trends:

• Belarusian officials still shun public attention, despite relevant directives and non-binding guidelines passed by the state.
• The state is still the main player on the media market, and sees the non-state media as its competitors.
• The public increasingly trusts the independent media, while Belarus’ position in international media freedom ratings is growing worse.
• EU Information Policy in Belarus is not achieving its aims.

If you’re not with us, you’re an “opponent”

Local council elections were held in April 2010, and presidential elections in December. Printed and electronic media on the Belarusian market were regulated by legislation that was already in force.1 However, the hectic political calendar led to high-ranking Belarusian officials making a series of frank statements about the state media’s work during the election campaigns.

In figures, the Belarusian media landscape looked as follows on February 1, 2011: the state media register listed 1347 print media, 399 of which were state-owned, and 948 privately-owned. There were 238 registered electronic media (168 state-owned, 70 private), and Belarus has 9 registered news agencies (2 state-owned, 7 priv3 ate). Compared to the previous year, the number of registered print media titles increased by 138, there were 8 more electronic media, and a new news agency came into being.2

The Belarusian authorities usually cite this type of positive growth of the national media sector as an example of their fully liberal attitude towards the media, freedom of speech, and citizens’ rights to receive objective information. Numerous statements made by presidential administration head Vladimir Makey in 2010 showed a different state position regarding the media, however. One month before the local council elections, during a national seminar for ideological staff on March 19, Vladimir Makey called for its participants to work more actively with the non-state media, since constructive dialogue and gentle persuasion “often lead people to move over to the side of the authorities”.

As to state information policy for the electronic media, Vladimir Makey remarked that, thanks to strong state support, Belarusian channels mostly control the television market, so the state is entitled to expect serious returns. It should be emphasized, however, that Belarusian national television channels have no non-state competitors. Back in April 2007, president Lukashenko declared it illegal to privatize electronic media in Belarus.

Finally, at the same seminar, Vladimir Makey set a strategic state objective – “to arrange things so our newspapers will win in open competition for readership”. According to Makey, the state press can achieve this thanks to its priority access to state bodies, something non-state publications lack.

These statements are vital to understanding the hidden mechanisms of the Belarusian media space. Formally, the state declares that state-owned and private media are equal, and that Belarus is open to the foreign media. In reality, there are several restrictions, however:

• State and non-state media have unequal access to the national distribution networks, which are also state-owned.
• Journalists and foreign media offices are only accredited selectively. This has led to some of them working for years with no clear-cut status, since their applications are still under review (e.g. the Polish satellite TV channel Belsat and Radio Racyja).
• Mandatory accreditation is an extra condition for journalists to work officially, yet it does not entitle them to receive information as a priority.

Directives and their consequences

One of the main unofficial obstacles facing journalists is the general lack of media-contact culture among Belarusian state employees. Admittedly, the reason behind this is not so much the psychological profile of Belarusian state officials, but certain legislation. For example, presidential decree № 630 of December 5, 1997 “on officials’ reactions to critical statements in the state media” makes heads of state bodies and other state organizations personally responsible for assessing and eradicating acute socio-political and socio-economic problems brought up by the media. In turn, decree № 65 of February 6, 2009 puts heads of state bodies personally in charge of work with the media in general.

It has been pointed out repeatedly that this new legislation is not bringing about the expected “opening up” of the state towards society. On the contrary, the directives passed by the state have had the opposite effect, pushing officials to keep their contacts with journalists from both state and non-state media to a bare minimum. The year 2010 showed that the state is also aware of this problem. Following presidential administration head Vladimir Makey’s appeals to the ideological department staff in March, the Minister of Information Oleg Proleskovsky in turn was forced to call on officials “not to run away from cameras and microphones” in July.4 The fact that statements of this nature are being made at such a high level confirms that the Belarusian state has exhausted its options for issuing internal information policy directives.

The Belarusian state’s closed attitude goes against citizens’ increasing trust in the non-state media. In December 2010, a poll carried out by the Independent Socio-Economic and Political Research Institute (IISEPS, Vilnius) showed that, over the last five years, Belarusian independent media had become significantly more influential, whereas state media had only remained at its previous level. By the end of 2010, independent media were trusted by 46.3% of respondents (compared to 37.7% in 2006), while the state media were trusted by 52.9% (compared to 53.8% five years ago).5 Improved trust in alternative sources of information has increased the demand for alternative media outlets. According to social research data by Zerkalo-Info, 24% of the adult population of Belarus have already installed satellite dishes, and 31% of those polled did so during the last two or three years. The number of satellite dish owners went up by 19% in 2009, and 11% in 2010.6

The warning policy

The new media law which came into effect on February 8, 2009 gave the Ministry of Information the right to instigate court action to prevent media from operating if they receive two or more warnings. It has been repeatedly criticized by the journalistic community and international organizations, as experts consider the Belarusian state may use it to exert pressure, and rid itself of undesirable independent media.

In 2010, the Ministry of Information issued numerous warnings designed to bring about the closure of certain media: Narodnaya Volya already had four warnings by early autumn, Nasha Niva – three, and Novy Chas – two. One presumes that the only factor preventing these newspapers from being shut down was the close scrutiny of the international community on the eve of the Belarusian presidential campaign. It should be noted that experts did not predict that the Belarusian state would act in this way. As of February 2011, the state has made no attempts to stop the aforementioned print media from publishing based on the warnings received.

Despite this apparent logic, the national television and radio commission decided to ban the station Avtoradio-Minsk from broadcasting on January 12, 2011, even though it had received no warnings in 2010. The commission’s resolution stated that Avtoradio had aired material inciting public extremism on December 16 (four days before the main voting on December 19). Since the commission’s decision to revoke Avtoradio’s licence was not immediate, but came almost a month after the alleged call for extremism was broadcast, its political implications are obvious. Moreover, by law, no media can be shut down by the commission, only by the courts, so Avtoradio’s management filed an appeal with the Supreme Economic Court. The court reviewed the appeal behind closed doors on February 11. Avtoradio has been unable to go back on air since January 12.

Union prospects for the Belarusian media

In October, the Presidential Administration’s Information-Analytical Center, together with the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Studies, carried out a poll on “public opinion about the information space of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus”.7 Its results showed the union state’s information space to be asymmetrical. In Russia, 74% of interviewees considered they were poorly informed about life in Belarus, and 17% felt they were “fairly well” informed. In Belarus, however, 65% believed they were sufficiently well informed about Russia. This asymmetry can also be see the Information-Analytical Center8 , NTV-Belarus, a channel with joint Belarusian-Russian content, was the second most popular among Belarusian viewers after Belarusian channel ONT. The third place was occupied by Belarusian Channel One, with another Russian-Belarusian channel, RTR-Belarus, coming fifth.

The information imbalance between Russia and Belarus is also obvious in the print media, for purely market-related reasons: they have different forms of media ownership, different-sized media markets, differences in media financing, plus extreme competition on the Russian media market means Russian journalists and media managers are more professional and efficient. However, the Belarusian state is attempting to resolve this market problem by issuing directives based on the union state agreement. During bilateral meetings in 2010, deputy information minister Lilia Ananich and minister Оleg Proleskovsky spoke of equalizing “economic relations”. Belarus has proposed an intergovernmental cooperation agreement on TV, radio and the press, to eliminate obstacles that mostly prevent Belarusian media from being distributed in Russia. So far, Russia has yet to make a positive response.9

The international context

Demands to provide equal conditions for state and non-state media to operate, and stop pressurizing independent journalists, have long been part of EU policy concerning Belarus. In 2010, they were among various recommendations, decisions and resolutions passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, European Parliament and OSCE bodies, along with state and non-state bodies from individual EU countries and America.

Dunja Mijatovic, the new OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, was working actively in 2010, making regular statements about problems with freedom of speech in Belarus. An important result of the year for the independent media was an international conference in Warsaw on February 2, 2011, at which four times more donor assistance (up to 87 million euro) was pledged for the development of Belarusian democratic institutions, including independent media.

According to Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press survey 2010, Belarus was in 189th place, with a “non-free” status, for its situation over the previous year. During the past five years, Belarus’ position has been going down steadily: in that time, the country has dropped from 185th place with 88 points in 2006, to 189th place with a total score of 92. Furthermore, for the second year running, Freedom House places Belarus among its ten “Worst of the Worst” countries. In its 2010 ratings, besides Belarus, this group included Burma, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, North Korea, Eritrea and Libya.10 Belarus has shown a similar downward trend in Reporters Without Borders’ annual Press Freedom Index: over five years, it has gone down from 151st place in 2006, to 154th in 2010.11

The failure of EU Information Policy in Belarus

In the first half of 2010, the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) and the NOVAK Axiometrical Research Laboratory carried out a study entitled Belarus and the World: Geopolitical Choice and Security in the Context of the Economy and Culture.12 Concerning EU Information Policy in Belarus, experts concluded that attempts to “Europeanize” public opinion using electronic media (radio and television transmitted from abroad) had been a “total failure”. For example, the study showed that 78% of citizens had never heard of Belarus’ involvement in the Eastern Partnership Program, and 60% knew nothing about the sanctions imposed on the Belarusian authorities by the EU.

The experts determined where Belarusians were receiving information about the EU, and discovered that electronic media designed specially for that purpose (European Radio For Belarus and Belsat TV) were the least popular in Belarus – only 1.2% of respondents had ever listened in or watched. Furthermore, European electronic media were even less popular than the Belarusian “bush telegraph”: 41% of Belarusians heard news about the EU from talking to friends and relatives. The majority of Belarusians chose state electronic and print media as their source of information about the EU.

Education for journalists

In September 2010, Belarusians gained another opportunity to take higher educational courses in “journalism”. A course on “print media” opened at Brest State University’s philology department. In 2010, the Yanka Kupala Hrodna State University saw its first graduates in journalism, who had studied at the philology department. Apart from there, one can also study journalism at the Arkady Kuleshov Mahiliou (Mogilyov) State University (Slavonic philology department), as well as three sites in Minsk: the Belarusian State University (the Institute of Journalism), the Maxim Tank Belarusian State Pedagogical University (the Belarusian and Russian philology department), and the non-state Institute of Enterprise and Parliamentarianism.

These increased opportunities to study journalism in the regions should be seen as an important step forward since, according to both state and independent experts, the Belarusian regional media are desperately in need of new staff. Shortages of personnel and financial resources are taking their toll on local radio stations, for example – according to the Ministry of Information, average broadcasting times range from 30 minutes to one hour a day. However, the 2010 timetable for radio transmission nodes in Belarus made provision for radio stations to extend their airtime to three hours a day.13

Conclusion

There were no substantial changes in the Belarusian media sector in 2010. The state is the most prominent player and chief justice in the media field. It continues to define the official and informal rules of the game, but is still closed to society. Consequently, the public increasingly trusts the independent media, whereas trust in state media has remained at its previous level. Comparing the situation over the last five years, one may conclude that Belarus is consistently dropping in international media freedom ratings, which is bad for the state’s political image abroad.

Assessing the international community’s policies regarding Belarusian independent media, it should be noted that their influence is seriously hampered by the actions of the Belarusian authorities. The worsening situation for freedom of speech in the last five years leads one to doubt that sanctions imposed on the Belarusian authorities (including state media journalists) in January 2011, or increased donor support for the independent media, will really be able to improve Belarus’ monopolized media landscape.