Polish-Belarusian Relations: Another crisis
Kamil Klysinski

Summary

Belarusian-Polish relations in 2010 were dominated by two conflicts despite attempts of reconciliation. Firstly, the main source of misunderstanding is the old conflict around minority interest groups. There has been no sign of compromise so far – the parties are firm in their positions. There were some signs of improvement, but even the April disaster at Smolensk did not change the situation. This great tragedy of Poland and its people was met with deep sympathy in Belarus. Secondly, at the end of the year Poland was uncompromisingly severe in its criticism of the Belarusian regime for returning to the policy of repressions against the opposition. As a result, Belarusian-Polish relations are again at the brink of a severe crisis.  

Tendencies:

• Belarusian-Polish relations in 2010 were dominated by two conflicts: the dispute about Polish minority interest groups and after-election events in December 2010; the April tragedy at Smolensk, despite some signs of improvement, did not change the situation;
• At the end of the year Poland criticized the Belarusian regime severely for returning to the policy of repressions against the opposition.

Oppression against activists of the Union of Poles in Belarus headed by Andzelika Borys

In 2005, Belarusian authorities would not recognize the elected chairperson of the Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB) and demanded a new election. Because Andzelika Borys was not controlled by the regime. As a result, already in 2005 there was a new administration elected, under the regime’s control. This led to a split in the Polish minority: since then there have been two societies bearing the identical name of the Union of Poles in Belarus. The first one, supported by Poland and headed by Andzelika Borys (by Anzelika Orechwo since June 2010), is illegal in Belarus. The other one is officially acknowledged by the Belarusian authorities. Alexander Lukashenko’s regime has been oppressing the activists of the illegal UPB for several years: fines, detentions, complications at work, provocations, acts of vandalism, spiteful attacks in state-controlled media, etc. The aim of these methods is to force the Union’s heads to give up their independence: to subordinate to the official UPB and make the members join the pro-regime Union.
Poland’s was an active role in renewing the Belarus-EU dialogue, which resulted in significant slackening of oppressive acts over the last two years, creating prerequisites for understanding in this issue, painful for both sides.
In the meantime, in early 2010 the conflict escalated sharply. On January 21, Belarusian police detained several dozen non-official UPB’s activists, who were driving from Hrodna to Ivianiec (Minsk region) to prevent the official UPB from occupying the local Polish House. Though the detained were soon released and the authorities did not dare intervene, it was a temporary armistice.  Already in early February, Polonica, a company owned by Andzelika Borys that sponsored cultural and educational activities of the independent UPB, received a fine of nearly USD 40 000, which threatened the existence of this business entity. After February 8, the police evicted Andzelika Borys’s activists from the Polish House in Ivianiec. Thus the authorities occupied one of the three Houses that were remaining beyond the pro-regime Union’s control.

Another episode in the conflict around the minority

The attack against UPB put Warsaw in a difficult situation. On the one hand, Polish diplomats had to decisively denounce these actions. On the other hand, the role of the main Belarus-EU dialogue promoter left little room for hasty and radical actions: the strategic goal was to involve Belarus in ever-closer cooperation with the EU. It was even more important to keep the balance as Belarusian Foreign Minister Sergey Martynov was to visit Poland on February 12.
Warsaw’s response to the surge of repression against Andzelika Borys’ UPB was an attempt to combine an adequate but sharp reaction to the essential issue and promote the dialogue with Minsk, both within the EU and in bilateral relations. That is why the Polish Foreign Ministry issued a sharp ultimatum to the Belarusian side listing 14 points, in which Polish authorities could help Belarus, in return for more respect for rights of the Polish minority. The list included, among others, the last tranche of the IMF credit, support on the Council of the Baltic Sea States’ membership, promotion of Eastern Partnership projects, etc.
At the same time, to promote neighborhood cooperation Poland did not cancel the visit of Sergey Martynov, Belarusian Foreign Minister. On February 12, he and Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski signed the long-awaited agreement on local border traffic. The Polish opposition and some media severely criticized this agreement and charged the authorities with inexcusable indulgence towards Minsk.  
Despite these charges, we should emphasize that Poland was the first among Belarus’ neighbors to sign an agreement essential for bordering territories, which must be recognized as a real success in Polish-Belarusian relations. The Polish authorities realized that the best way to solve this perennial conflict was negotiations, and not sanctions or threats.  
During his meeting with Alexander Lukashenko in Kyiv Minister Sikorski suggested establishing a special Polish-Belarusian expert panel to elaborate an agreement on the Polish minority in Belarus.   The proposal was accepted and soon a combined panel was established, headed by the Polish Foreign Vice-Minister Andrzej Kremer and the Belarusian Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs Leonid Gulyako. There have been 2 meetings so far, but none of them was fruitful. The only progress so far has been “exchange of views”, which means “a complete deadlock” in diplomatic language.
The Belarusian side seems not to have been interested in reaching a compromise when it agreed to establish this panel. Its single goal must have been to slacken the tension on the Polish side by demonstrating willingness to negotiate. Since the very first day of the February crisis the Belarusian authorities denied any fact of repression and restrictions against the Polish minority in Belarus.  Any action in this direction was accounted for as a need to enforce the law and protect interests of the only legal UPC headed by Stanislav Semashko. Moreover, responding to complaints from Warsaw, Minsk launched a propaganda counter-offensive to present Andzelika Borys’ fellows as a minor group of out-laws and political adventurers who have nothing to do with the real movement of the minority.
At the same time, the Belarusian authorities charged the Polish side with discriminating the activists of the official Union of Poles by banning them from Poland and denying contacts with Polish diplomats and higher authorities’ representatives. In this situation, another year was passing under the sign of unsolvable conflict, which has become a classical example of the political stalemate in intergovernmental relations. So, in November, when there was no chance that the February fine of USD 40 000 would be repealed, UPB headed by Anzelika Orechwo submitted documents to register a new company Kresowija that would be able to take over duties of Polonica without financial obligations.
In June, great confusion was caused by the unexpected decision of Andzelika Borys, head of the UPC for many years, to resign from her post. She said it was for purely personal reasons but there were a lot of speculations about probable pressure from the Polish authorities that allegedly wanted to convince the Belarusian authorities to register the illegal Union. There is no evidence for these insinuations. After Ms Borys resigned, Anzelika Orechwo became the acting head of the UPC.

After Smolensk disaster: solidarity despite everything?

When on April, 10 the Polish president Lech Kaczynski and his wife were killed in a plane crash at Smolensk, Belarusian authorities did all their best to help the Polish side: Polish planes were allowed into the Belarusian airspace and landed in Viciebsk so that delegations could get to Smolensk by land. But the flawless practical help was not followed by symbolic gestures typical for international relations, which are sometimes even more important than effective actions. On April 12, two days after the crash, Russia, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine declared national mourning.  Belarus appeared the only country in the region to stay outside the mainstream and persisted in its position the following days. This provoked a surge of criticism from independent media and opposition; Internet users did not choose their words carefully in their evaluations of the President’s actions.  
But the worst was Alexander Lukashenko’s opinion expressed on April 15, long before the investigation results were announced, when he openly called Lech Kaczynski responsible for the crash. At the same time, Belarusians were very active in offering condolences to their neighbors. People signed books of condolences in Polish diplomatic missions, lighted candles in front of the embassy and consular sections, and spontaneously expressed condolences in private meetings (the author of this article was in Belarus at that time and personally witnessed this).
We must admit that Belarusian services offered great practical help in first days after the crash, but typical for the circumstances symbolic gestures were really missing. The chance to improve Minsk-Warsaw relations, rich in conflicts, was missed. Alexander Lukashenko either did not manage to or did not wish to raise himself above his not always understandable calculations and did not use the paradoxically positive potential of this great tragedy. Moreover, famous for his political intuition, the Belarusian leader did not see a chance to improve his image in Poland and – broader – in the EU by personal participation in the ceremonial burial of Maria and Lech Kaczynski on April 18 in Krakow. It is difficult to imagine that he would have been barred from entering the country. The only political result of the Smolensk tragedy in Belarusian-Polish relations was Ambassador Henryk Litwin’s recall to Warsaw. He substituted Andrzej Kremer, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was killed together with other members of the delegation to Katyn.

“Conditional” policy and its failure

The unprecedented pressure from Russia, trying to limit Minsk’s independence, forced Alexander Lukashenko to start limited political liberalization before the presidential election on December 19, though the authoritarian regime was not changed essentially. By doing so the Belarusian President sent the West a clear signal that he was interested in cooperation and understanding.
Changes in Minsk’s interior policy were noticed in EU capitals, including Warsaw. Polish diplomats made another attempt to be the main figure in the EU-Belarus dialogue. On November 2, 2010, Foreign Minister of RP Radoslaw Sikorski payed his first visit to Minsk in many years. He was accompanied by Guido Westerwelle, Foreign Minister of Germany. During the meeting with President Lukashenko, Mr. Sikorski presented an offer based on the so-called “principle of conditionality”, i.e. that contacts and cooperation would increase with development of democratization. To strengthen the signal, the Polish diplomatic leader openly announced that if the election in Belarus were democratic, in the following three years Belarus would receive nearly USD 3 billion of financial assistance within the Eastern partnership and TACIS. Lukashenko assured his foreign guests that December elections would be “even more democratic than the previous ones”.  
Simultaneously, the Belarusian President met with a group of Polish journalists who interviewed him on the key issues of Belarusian-Polish relations. Despite numerous provisos on both sides, general impression was that a quiet and manipulation-free presidential election would give a new chance for Minsk-Warsaw relations. But the unexpected of the demonstration on December 19 in Minsk destroyed these optimistic hopes. The following days brought news about repression against opposition, civil activists and independent media. The Belarusian regime reverted to repression, and Poland, being the main promoter of democratization, had to take the position of sharp criticism and call to the EU for serious sanctions. The reaction of Minsk was just a question of time. Thus, in late December, Polish-Belarusian relations came into another round of crisis.

Conclusion

In 2010, just like in previous years, the parties involved did not manage to settle disputes around the UPB. Neither Warsaw nor Minsk want that their possible concessions are perceived as weakness or even surrender. Neither should we forget about stereotypes and gossip. It is true that there is no national discrimination in Belarus. But there is mistrust towards Polish organizations, especially when they are financed from Warsaw, as the UPB headed by Anzelika Orechwo is. Hence, this issue is not expected to be quickly resolved, which will be undermining Polish-Belarusian relations.
While the tension around the UPC is just another round of the perennial conflict, the severe criticism of the repression launched in late 2010 is the beginning a new severe crisis in Belarus-Poland relations. In this situation, the only positive and seemingly lasting achievement of 2010 is signing the agreement on local border traffic. When it comes into force, it might intensify social and economic life of the frontier regions of Poland and Belarus.