Science: New goals indicate decline
Alexandr Gritsanov

Summary

Throughout 2010 the country’s leadership, as well as heads of research institutions answerable both to the Academy of Sciences and to sector ministries, were working towards narrowing the traditional range of goals for Belarusian science. The first signs that budgetary financing is being reduced appeared in 2010 and have turned more apparent since early 2011; therefore, the officials responsible for "national science and scientific services" kept "specifying" the list of promising research areas and "tailoring" the amount of financing for science.
Relatively long-term research projects were practically excluded from planning and denied financial support. Only short-term projects with guaranteed quick profits could be developed. As a result, researchers focused on trivial topics and applied and technological developments. Generally, the structure and productivity of scientific research in the Republic of Belarus tend to stay at the level of second-rate industrial corporations.

Tendencies:

• The already scanty allocation for budget-supported science is gradually decreasing;
• Reduced financing can cause a kind of debureaucratization, provided that newly appointed executives have to go through less formalities;
• The staff of research institutions (academic, in the first place) is to be reduced; so far they have been functioning as "social security agencies" for nominally highly qualified pre-retirement scientific personnel;
• Budgetary financing for academic science is being radically reduced, hence, running costs of certain research institutions could be optimized or even reduced.

New goals

On 22 July, 2010 President Lukashenko signed decree No. 378 that defines priority areas for scientific and technical development in Belarus in 2011-2015. Financial and human resources are to be concentrated in the following research areas:

• Energy and energy saving;
• Agro-industrial technologies and production;
• Industrial and constructional technologies and production;
• Medical science, medical equipment and technology, pharmacy;
• Chemical, nano- and biotechnologies;
• Information and communication, aero- and space technology;
• New materials;
• Rational nature management, resource saving and emergency protection;
• Defense and national security.

Most of these areas are life-supporting and contribute to a better standard and quality of living and national security. The aim of this decision is to steer science and technology towards implementing projects that will create new economic branches producing high value-added, low energy- and resource-intensive products. These measures are to strengthen the national economy and improve the well-being of people1 , according to officials. At the same time, fundamental research, as well as long-term developments that could be of interest for the military-industrial establishment, are gradually leaving the proscenium of Belarusian science. The "military science" institutions in Russia are on the decline and this tendency affects analogous Belarusian institutions.
In August 2010, amendments to the law On scientific and technical policy took effect. They provide mechanisms for establishing regional techno parks financed from the national budget under the section "science". Even the presidential administration-printed media SB-Belarus Segodnya (SB-Belarus Today) "will not dare to predict that techno parks will generate a stream of effective projects as the process requires an effective legal basis, which is only under construction". As a result, of all techno parks established in all regions of Belarus, only the Technological Park Mogilev (Mahiliou) is functioning to its full capacity and status, with the Scientific and Technological Park of the BNTU "METOLIT" close by, reads the newspaper.2 On 11 August, 2010 the newspaper informed that Valery Tsepkalo, director of the Administration of the Park of High Technology (PHT), reported to President Lukashenko about the PHT's progress in the first half of 2010. He assured that from January to February the volume of software production grew by 140% compared to the same period of 2009.3 Tsepkalo pointed out that the main goal for the PHT is training professionals, both at existing universities and at educational establishments to be founded in future. President Lukashenko was also informed about details of the PHT construction. Director Tsepkalo underlined that PHT residents have accumulated enough finances to be able to invest them into construction of manufacturing and educational buildings. The PHT is to be put into operation by 2014.4 All in all, according to A. Lukashenko, Belarusian "science should be self-supporting and make money"5 . This means that in the future fundamental research will be abandoned. This decision is undoubtedly disputable. However, it signals that the organizational structure of Belarusian science as a heritage of the Soviet model cannot be preserved any more.

Problems

Administrative controls in the applied sciences and innovation will be given more power.
During the discussion about the PHT, Lukashenko demanded that construction works in Minsk be finished by 2014. In reality, over the past 5 years, i.e. since the Park was established, only 1 building has been overhauled on its territory, consuming the total of BYR 3.8 billion from the national budget and BYR 50.5 billion of investments. President Lukashenko promised to exercise personal control over this project for the period of 2011-2016.
The results of the State program for innovative development in 2007-2010 (SPID) highlight the disturbing tendencies in the Belarusian "high-tech" economy. Just as in Soviet times, administrative methods take the lead in its implementation, i.e. scientific and technological advances are "imposed" on the industry, which is resistant to innovation.
According to the Council of Ministers resolution No. 1713 as of November 23, 20106 , executives guilty of failing to implement innovative programs will be punished. The appendices to this document comprise several lists. Appendix 1 enumerates innovative projects in which the facilities have not been commissioned or the production has not been mastered by the target date. Appendices 2 and 3 present lists of innovative projects where (2) the estimated capacity has not been achieved and (3) working stages have been behind schedule.
According to the State Committee on Science and Technology (SCST), as of October 1, 2010 in 28 innovative projects commissioning the facilities or mastering the production are behind schedule. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food is in charge of 7 projects from this list, Bellesbumprom Concern (forestry and mills) – of 5, Minsk regional executive committee – of 4, Ministry of Industry, Bellegprom Concern (light industry) and Vitebsk regional executive committee – of 2 projects each, Ministry of Trade, Belbiopharm Concern (pharmacy), Belneftechim Concern (oil and chemistry) and Gomiel regional executive committee – of 1 project each.
In 9 innovative projects the estimated capacity has not been achieved: 2 each in those of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Bellegprom, and Vitebsk regional executive committee; 1 each in the Ministry of Architecture and Construction, Belbiopharm, and Mogilev regional executive committee. Working stages were behind schedule in 40 innovative projects.
The Council of Ministers resolution orders the state organs’ executives to take personal responsibility for commissioning the facilities and mastering the production, reaching the estimated capacity and completing the working stages of the innovative projects. These actions should meet the deadlines determined by the plans of innovative development in branches and regions.
Besides, the resolution has provisions that heads of state-level public administration organs, Academy of Sciences, regional executive committees and Minsk city executive committee, the Administration of the Park of High Technology as clients of state programs are authorized to bring disciplinary proceedings against public officers. The penalty range is wide – up to termination of the employment contract for failing to ensure that the facilities are commissioned by the target date. The resolution foresees a penalty if there is an ungrounded refusal to implement innovative projects in the State program.

True demands of the "sci-tech sector" of Belarusian industry
According to experts, the implementation itself of the Program of innovative development will demand until 2015 USD 32 billion7 , with half of the amount to be foreign investments, reported Mr. Voytov, chairperson of the State Committee on Science and Technology (SCST), at the meeting of the Presidium of the Council of the Republic, 1 February, 2011. The SCST initiates an innovation and investment bank and a national technological development fund to be established with the purpose of backing small and medium businesses (SMBs).
In 2011, science is to be financed from the state budget by 30% more compared to 20108 , says Pyotr Vityaz, first deputy chairperson of the Presidium of the National Academy of Science (NAS) of Belarus. "These allocations are insufficient; we are aware of this fact and admit it. However, we agreed on this amount with the head of the NAS so that next year science does not lose more. We are positive about that,"9 said Minister of Finance Kharkoviets.
Commenting the law on the budget for 2011, Mr. Vityaz pointed out that relief from the income tax and taxes on manufacturers are not enough to boost innovative scientific research. Therefore, the Belarusian Academy of Sciences is interested in raising the issue of tax relief for non-budget investments into science, reports BelTA. Mr. Vityaz underlined that at present scientific institutions have to reach a serious goal of drawing all the finances allocated for science development in 2010, though there are certain difficulties in the aspect of upgrading the material and technical basis10 . Belarus: typical deadlocks of modernization and innovative economy11
In 2006, Belarus witnessed a pompous presentation of a 5-year State program of technical infrastructure development. The announced goal was to supply the national banking system with domestically manufactured bank cards. The initial goal was to increase the ratio of non-cash transactions with retail payments up to 30%, while the high-technology enterprises of the Ministry of Industry were to have manufactured 3.4 million bank cards.
What is the result? The amount of non-cash payments has hardly gone beyond 13%. As for bank cards, there have been produced slightly over 400,000: only 5% of the 9 million bank cards that Belarusian banks have issued, are domestically produced. Meanwhile, one of the project contractors, Integral JSC (the second being OJSC "CNIITU"), did not participate in the program. CNIITU's production capacity is 1 million cards of an acceptable quality a year. However, the enterprise was too late and slightly unprofessional to join the marketplace.
Russian and Ukrainian card manufacturers' capacities are 10 million cards a year, with manufacture costs known to be lower than Belarusian ones. Besides, the biggest international payments technology company Visa (est. 1972, USA) holds more than 50% of the world card marketplace; with Master Card, its American-European competitor, holding other 30%. None of the potential Belarusian bank card manufacturers holds a certificate of conformity to international payment systems. The entrance fee is just a few thousand dollars (plus USD 60,000 to be paid annually). No state enterprise will risk this, though comparatively trifling, amount of money.
In 2010, Integral JSC started producing bank cards of a good quality. However, the Belarusian card always "loses" in tenders, as it is 10% more expensive than the Russian one. Even heads of nominal flagships of the "innovation sector" in Belarusian economy are helpless to break through the wall of the stiff administration system.

Conclusion

In the nearest future, we are to expect lively debates between the bureaucratic establishment and the experts about the possibility to integrate scientific institutions into industrial concerns and major manufacturers. Supposedly, this procedure is "to harmonize science and practice" and "to raise innovation and export potential" of enterprises. These debates are sure to end with decisions that meet official expectations and secure "survival" for enterprises, with no room for any long-term, or even mid-term, projects.
The next 5-year plan will end in drastic change and decline of the system of scientific establishments of the 2010 pattern.