Belarus – U.S.: From dialogue to sanctions
Andrey Fyodorov

Summary

In 2010, Belarusian-American relations were hard to define in a few words because the situation before the presidential election changed dramatically after the election. The ‘before’ period was not something different as compared with the previous year’s inactivity. Belarusian top officials met with a group of American businessmen and the outcome was apparently too insignificant to be speculated about. There was a certain progress however after the Belarusian foreign minister met with his American counterpart in early December. But the events of the post-election period not only ruined everything that could take bilateral relations to the next level, but brought them back to the status observed three years ago or even before.

Tendencies:

• Before December 19:
  - A shaky balance with faintly visible prospects for improvement;

• After December 19:
  - Steep decline of political contacts down to the minimum;
  - Resumption and expansion of the sanctions applied before suspension;
  - Further decline of bilateral economic cooperation, no more backing in international financial institutions;
  - Maintaining of diplomatic representation at the minimum level and threat of severance of relations at any moment.

January-November: Fruitless meetings and minor encounters

The year 2010 was so uneventful – except for the last month, of course – that it is hard to add anything to the history of Belarus-U.S. relations. Nothing special or even noteworthy happened.
Politics. In January, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee introduced a bill on monitoring of Belarus’ arms exports. According to the document, the Department of State is to submit annual reports on the amounts and mechanisms of arms exports by the government and enterprises of Belarus, including information about incomes from such transactions and the likely role of the government and enterprises of Russia in these exports. However, as no information about the fate of the bill has been available ever since, most likely it was regarded non-urgent. Besides, experts believe that Belarus has run out of stocks to supply considerable amounts of weapons, which could seriously affect the situation in this or that region. Therefore, even if the bill would have been passed, no tangible consequences were likely to follow.
In mid-April, Washington’s “selective interaction” policy was manifested once again: Belarus was not invited to the nuclear security summit held in the U.S. capital. Alexander Lukashenko called it “brainlessness and stupid inertia.” He said he was not going to attend the summit anyway, but, at the same time somewhat illogically grumbled that Russia, Kazakhstan, and other CIS states, which sent delegations to Washington, could have insisted on Belarus’ participation.
If there are no actual events to talk about, imagination is often used as a substitute. In the middle of May, the oppositional media claimed that Presidential Administration head Vladimir Makey made a confidential visit to Washington. He allegedly held a series of meetings trying to convince the Americans to reconsider policy toward official Minsk. In exchange, he promised to let the U.S. embassy work at full breath and, more importantly, to open the country for American business and foster bilateral relations to get back on track.
If this had indeed happened, it would be a true sensation. Unfortunately, it was nothing but a newspaper hoax, professionally played, though. Anyway, Belarus’ offers were quite definite. It would not be a problem to fulfill the promise, because the Belarusian government had nothing else to offer, actually, without detriment to itself.
Meanwhile, despite all contradictions, Minsk kept sending out signals for reconciliation. Lukashenko’s interview to Syrian Al-Watan daily in late July is notable in this context. Specifically, the president said “the policy pursued by the Barrack Obama Administration aimed at searching for partners, development of relations based on mutual interests and mutual respect was consonant to our intergovernmental cooperation principles, the multiple-vector approach, integrity, and openness among them.” He recommended the White House to employ these principles while shaping its policy toward Belarus. The president emphasized that Belarus had never triggered deterioration of relations with the U.S. but always wanted normalization. Nevertheless, these statements were not seconded with deeds and Washington, which repeatedly stated concern over the situation and urged Belarus to respect democracy and human rights, just did not buy it.
In early November, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon confirmed that the United States would like to have better relations with the authorities of Belarus but the latter should have made certain steps for that. He said the American sanctions could have been lifted in case the situation with democracy and human rights improved. Gordon gave special priority to the forthcoming presidential election. He promised that flawless election would also result in resumption of the U.S. embassy’s full functioning in Belarus. “We do not think that absence of an ambassador is the way to maintain contacts with the government,” he emphasized.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russell went to Minsk two weeks later to address problems extensively. He met with Foreign Minister of Belarus Martynov to discuss the entire range of bilateral relations, and also with presidential candidates nominated by political parties and civil society representatives. Following the negotiations, Russell said the opportunities for normalization remained limited. “Our financial and visa sanctions against Belarus remain in full force and effect because no progress in the field of democracy and human rights is observed in the country,” he said.
In short, the U.S. suggested the following sequence of events: elections more or less complying with democratic standards – lifting of the sanctions – return of the embassy personnel and subsequent expansion of cooperation on the most relevant matters. However, the Belarusian authorities obstinately refused to take the first step and only released the screws a bit, not improving the uneven conditions for the contenders as a matter of fact. At the same time, the Belarusian government insisted on fulfillment and even over-fulfillment of the terms set by the Americans, and wanted to go further to the next stages.
Economy. The aggravating complications in the interaction with Russia and rapidly growing balance of payment deficit pushed official Minsk to seek economic options in the West. The United States, as the global economic leader, could help Belarus essentially in tackling the pressing problems. Therefore, Belarus made attempts to obtain material aid from its main opponent.
A group of American businessmen visited Belarus March 29 to meet with President Lukashenko and Prime Minister Sidorsky. The hosts promised golden opportunities for the transatlantic business, full-blown support, and the most favorable working conditions. The U.S. embassy in Minsk said it had nothing to do with the visit. One of the diplomats informed that the companies, which delegated their representatives to Belarus, did not address the U.S. government for assistance in arrangement of the trip. It was private and did not “signal any improvement of relations between the two countries or the human rights situation in Belarus.” No information about particular results of the visit was available afterwards.
William Delahunt, Chairman of the U.S. House Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia within the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, went to Minsk in mid-October. He discussed trade, economic, and investment cooperation between Belarus and the U.S. with Premier Sidorsky, chief banker Prokopovich, and Economy Minister Snopkov. He also met with Presidential Administration head Makey.
Sergey Sidorsky expressed his hope for reaching the 2007 figures in the bilateral trade, i.e., as he noted, the volume of mutual trade of over U.S. $700 million. “Counting on your investments into Belarus, we are ready to privatize our economy with the help of American capital,” he said. According to the United States, the amount was much higher (see Table 1). The discrepancy is probably caused by different calculation methods. Anyhow, it is obvious that commodity circulation between the two countries is decreasing drastically. It looks like the sanctions imposed on Belneftekhim state-owned petrochemicals firm by the Treasury Department, which caused such a stir at the time, did not play a pivotal role actually.

Table 1. Belarus-U.S. commodity turnover, USD mln1

We remind that the sanctions were imposed in November 2007 and expanded in March 2008 by adding Polotsk Steklovolokno and Lida Lakokraska to the black list. The ban on the two key subsidiaries of Belneftekhim had been under moratorium since autumn 2008 and the suspension was extended more than once. I.e. the situation has not changed considerably over the past two years, but Belarusian exports to the U.S. shrank 6.3 times, whereas the trade surplus went down 17.3 times.
Considering that political relations did not worsen, it most probably happened because the Americans did not see the business environment in Belarus they got used to. The steps made by the government to foster investment were apparently too small.

December: Hint of thaw and sudden disruption

Over the first eleven months of the year, Belarusian-American relations did not suggest any appreciable changes, so it was like “the calm before no wind” on the threshold of the election campaign.
Before December 19. Then changes took place, and they were changes for the better. During the OSCE summit held December 1st in Astana, Hillary Clinton and Sergey Martynov came out with a joint statement. Belarus agreed to eliminate the entire stock of highly enriched uranium by the next nuclear security summit scheduled for 2012. In exchange, the U.S. promised all required technical and financial aid and seconded Belarus’ intention to diversify energy sources by constructing a nuclear power plant.
The second part of the statement was even more important. Both governments recognized that improvements on democracy and human rights issues were essential for bilateral relations and prosperity of the Belarusians. The United States expressed hope that the presidential election would meet international standards.
Belarus most likely wanted to use America’s concern that nuclear materials could fall into the hands of terrorists, and to show Moscow the willingness to straight things out with its ageold foe. It is also clear that the democracy issue was prompted by Washington. This event looked rather promising. Although the expected democratic transformations were vaguely phrased, the first public contact with a high-ranking official of the U.S. Administration was certainly inspiring.
A group of representatives of U.S. research centers arrived in Belarus shortly after. It is noteworthy that it included persons not known to have any warm feelings toward the Belarusian regime. The visit program was extensive. The experts met with the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, heads of foreign affairs commissions of both chambers of the National Assembly, editors-in-chief of governmental media outlets, TV political observers, a number of state-controlled and pseudo-independent research centers, etc. A talk with Alexander Lukashenko was reserved for later. It was strange however that the regime’s opponents were not on the list. That is why nothing is known about the final conclusions of the expert delegation. Nevertheless, the very fact of such a visit taking place, undreamt-of before, kind of confirmed a certain thaw in relations between the two countries.
December 19 and after. Therefore the “Bloody Sunday” and the events that followed were totally unexpected. They shattered all dreams and hopes, and the United States’ reaction was not long in coming. On the next day, the Department of State resolutely condemned the violent incidents on the election day, demanded the release of the arrested persons, and declared non-recognition of the election. The U.S. mission to the OSCE, the Congress Helsinki Commission, and Senators John McCain, Joe Lieberman, and John Kerry seconded the statement.
Hilary Clinton and EU High Representative Catherine Ashton made a joint statement December 23. They urged to release all those in detention, condemned the acts of violence, and highlighted serious problems of the election process and vote count. The politicians emphasized that improvement of relations with the U.S. and EU was not possible without an appreciable progress in the field of democracy and human rights. Although no practical measures were taken by the end of the year, it is clear that Washington will not confine itself to mere generalities.

Conclusion

Belarusian-American relations thus suffered a setback to the status of three years ago, i.e. probably the harshest confrontation. Accordingly, it is time for a policy of sanctions, and they will be toughened. At least the White House will be more persistent pushing Congress, where the Republican Party is much stronger now following the November elections. In particular, the author of the above-mentioned bill on Belarus’ arms export monitoring, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, now heads the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.
It is likely that economy will be in focus this time. It is hard to speak about a strong effect of any restrictions of course, since the direct ties are almost negligible. But Washington has a very strong hold over international financial institutions.
Therefore, remaining solid in its approaches, official Minsk cannot expect credits, which it needs desperately, considering its huge foreign trade deficit.
A large-scale inflow of American business is a utopia now. Besides, the Belarusian authorities will not manage to maintain present living standards without an economic update, and it is not clear how they intend to do it without aid from the West.
Lastly, the Belarusian regime faces major problems caused by the significant reduction in material aid from Moscow. Russia would only agree to provide investment support if Minsk carried out certain requirements, including those in the political sector.
The Kremlin’s goal is to make Belarus its satellite led by a more flexible person. The Belarusian authorities perfectly understand this, but the space for maneuver in the eastern direction has shrunk together with the opportunities to react against this plan. For this reason, it is safe to assume that the Belarusian government will try to reestablish cooperation with the West, including the United States, as soon as possible.

This article used information from BelTA, BelaPAN, and Interfax news agencies.