Public Opinion: Yearly dynamics and certain results
Nadezhda Yefimova, NOVAK Axiometrical Research Laboratory

Summary

The economic self-perception of the population at the beginning of 2010 was similar to that of late 2009: thoughts about the crisis and anxiety about the nearest future were dominating. However, by the mid-year evaluation of the economic situation became more optimistic. During the year the total amount of monetary income of the population was growing but this growth was leveled off by rising prices for foodstuffs and goods.
The Belarusians traditionally put their trust in the Orthodox Church and the army. Governmental institutions still enjoy high confidence but the fact of growing mistrust should be pointed out. The ratio of trust/mistrust in state-owned mass media, local authorities, and traditional trade unions is nearly fifty-fifty. Such institutions as the OSCE or the NATO arouse a negative attitude.
The geopolitical choice of Belarusians was changing together with the change of "moods" in Russia-Belarus relations, especially among ardent supporters of the "union with Russia". As a result, the number of EU supporters or people skeptical about any kind of union is growing.

Tendencies:

• During 2010 the rate of suspense dropped and optimistic views on the economic situation increased;
• The loans taken by the Belarusian authorities that are extending the foreign debt find ambivalent support among the public;
• During the year the total amount of monetary income only marginally outstripped the growth of prices for foodstuffs and products, which remained the key problem for the majority of Belarusian citizens;
• The percentage of people "hesitant" about Belarus’ geopolitical choice has grown;
• The commitment to "European values" has been revealed in Belarusian society, which ensures that throughout many years there has been a stable amount of respondents supporting accession to the EU.

Economic self-perception of people

In terms of economic self-perception of the population, the beginning of 2010 was similar to that of late 2009. Thoughts about the crisis and anxiety about the nearest future were dominant. Taking part in a sociological survey, more than 80% of respondents answered affirmatively to the question "Is there an economic crisis in Belarus at the moment?" 40% of them mentioned a significant income decrease due to the crisis. The respondents saw the future even gloomier than the present: February-early March survey showed that 65% of respondents expected to reduce consumption, 53% expected income decrease, 28% expressed concern about losing their job.
The actions taken by the authorities that could actually improve the situation in the short-term perspective found support among 50% of the population. For example, the question on foreign loans, which in 2010, by estimates of experts, have increased the external public debt of Belarus by more than 22%, has split public opinion: 40 % of the adult population questioned by sociologists, supports borrowing money by the state, whereas 38 % (practically just as much) are against it (22% of respondents could not give a definite answer). The main arguments of those who see a life buoy in external credits and supports state actions in this direction, are the following: "This is a measure without which we would not have survived during the crisis" (43%); "The loans will help to avoid unemployment and bankruptcy of enterprises during the crisis" (34%). Opponents of the public debt increase put forward their arguments: "People will have to pay off the national debt" (48%); "Belarus will become dependent on foreign creditors" (29%); "We should use internal resources, rather than count on foreign help" (27%).
However, by mid-year, talks about the crisis ceased and public opinion began turning more optimistic about the economic situation, which was especially noticeable during the last months of the year (Tables 1 and 2).
Table 1
Answers to the question: "How would you evaluate the economic position of your household at the moment?" for every month in 2010 (%).

Table 2
Answers to the question: "How did the economic position of your household change over the last month?" for every month in 2010 (%).

The data in the tables show that the public considered their economic position in the first half of 2010 more negative than that in the second half, both statically (the situation at the given moment) and dynamically (changes over the period). For example, in December 2010 twice as many respondents defined the economic position of their household as "good" and "very good" compared with January the same year. The number of those who assessed their position as "bad" and "very bad" reduced by 1.4 times. On average, by the end of the year the percentage of respondents that saw positive dynamics in their economic position tripled.  
These subjective evaluations reflect the official statistics: in 2010 the total amount of monetary income grew by 24.2% compared to 2009. The real income (with account of the consumer price index) grew by 15.2%. In December 2010, the real income grew by 10.6% whereas in November it increased by 6.7% and in October – by 0.7%.1 The evaluations might have been higher but income rise was "eaten" by growing prices. Throughout 2010, rising prices remained the problem that public opinion kept mentioning and calling the sharpest for all groups of population. By the mid-year, the top-10 of the most acute problems looked the following (Table 3).
Table 3
Top-10 of problems in 2010 (public opinion)

As seen above, high and constantly growing prices by far outstrip other problems, taking the first position. This is the only problem mentioned by more than half of respondents.
Therefore, income rise and growing prices were the coordinates for economic self-awareness of people in 2010. Expert Leonid Zlotnikov said that "salaries did grow last year, but it strained the economy. Wages outstripped the growth of productivity and GDP. The prices simply had to grow after this. If the amount of produce grew in the second half of the year by, say, 5% and the wages grew by 35% it means that the income of the population outstripped the growth of the pie that we are eating together"2 .

People’s confidence in government and public institutions and organizations

Table 4 below shows the level of people’s confidence in government and public institutions and organizations in early 2010.
Table 4
Answers to the question: "What is the degree of your trust in government and public institutions and organizations?"(%)

Top-10 in the ranking of trust is headed by the Orthodox Church and the army, whose authority with the public is traditional: the vast majority of the population trusts them automatically, without considering this issue, whereas the percentage of mistrustful or doubtful about them is small. But from the third position of the ranking the picture turns totally different. The index of trust remains high (though not that high as in previous two) – over 50%, but the percentage of mistrustful respondents grows sharply. More than a quarter of adult population mistrust the National Bank, the President and the Government. More than a third mistrust the judicial system and the police; more than 40% mistrust the state-owned media.
The proportion of respondents trusting the institutions in the second ten of the ranking is lower than 50% but higher than 33%. At the same time, the level of mistrust remains high. Generally, the position of these institutions concerning the ratio of trust and mistrust is much worse than that of the institutions from the first ten. For example, 48.9% of respondents trust local authorities but 40.0% – mistrust them; 40.5% of respondents trust state-controlled trade unions but 38.7% – do not; the Council of Europe enjoys confidence of 34.1% of respondents, 31.3% of people mistrust it. Public opinion is balanced in the trust/mistrust aspect in all the above mentioned positions.  
Starting from privately-owned media the balance shifts towards mistrust: respondents’ trust in independent media, the OSCE, independent trade unions, the Protestant Church, the NATO is lower than mistrust. At the same time, the proportion of respondents with no definite opinion about many institutions increases. It refers even to the UN. Nevertheless, the evaluation stereotype is triggered here: despite lack of awareness, there are organizations towards which public opinion has adopted a steadily positive attitude (the CIS, the UN, the World Bank, the Council of Europe) and organizations with a stable negative reputation (the OSCE, the NATO).
Among public organizations, the Union of Entrepreneurs enjoys the highest degree of trust. State-controlled trade unions have a balanced trust/mistrust position in public opinion. People do not trust independent trade unions rather than trust them, but 37.6% of respondents know nothing about them and, hence, do not have a fixed opinion.
The level of trust in all the media is low (though we should note that, as you know, state and independent media are put into different conditions in terms of accessibility for the audience and positioning). State-owned media have earned their trust (51.5%) and mistrust (41.6%) in total accessibility and intrusive advertising. Non-state media have earned their trust (33.5%) and mistrust (44.6%) in limited accessibility and counter-advertising. So, the difference in trust level is not that big.
As for the influence of gender on the degree of trust, women are more inclined to express confidence in government institutions than men are. Men express mistrust more often. The situation with non-state and international organizations is quite the opposite: men trust them more than women do, whereas women are more likely to express mistrust or find it difficult to give any answer at all.
The influence of age on the degree of trust: support of state authorities increases from younger to older age groups. The situation with international and independent media is the opposite: young and middle-aged people trust them more whereas support among elderly people is minimal.  

Geopolitical preferences

During 2010, Belarus’ relations with Russia and the EU remained the focus of public and media attention, as registered by sociologists. For a number of years NOVAK sociologists have chosen the following question as the key indicator of geopolitical preferences of Belarusians: "What union of states would be preferable for the people of Belarus: the EU or union with Russia?" The answers to this question in 2010 are given in the tables below (Tables 5 and 6).
Table 5
Answers to the question "What union of states would be preferable for the people of Belarus: the EU or union with Russia?" for every month in 2010.  (%)

Table 6
Choice between Russian and the European Union

The dynamics of public opinion on the geopolitical choice can be commented on in the following way. In the first four months of 2010, more than half of respondents supported union with Russia rather than that with the EU; nearly 30% of respondents chose integration into the EU and less than 17% had no fixed opinion about this question. Starting from May the picture changed, mainly in terms of the opinion on union with Russia. Right up until November the percentage of respondents supporting union with Russia declined linearly while the share of respondents supporting the EU, respectively, increased. At the very end of the year, the tendency halted and started changing in the opposite direction.
But the proportion of those who "haven’t decided yet" and thus "can’t give any definite answer" was increasing even faster than that of supporters of this or that union. In November, their number totaled almost one third (!) of all respondents. One more detail: the percentage of respondents absolutely sure about union with Russia ("No doubt, with Russia") had always been by 1.5-2 times higher than that of those who are absolutely sure that Belarusians should better live in the EU ("No doubt, the EU"). But we see that in the mid-year (June-November) both indicators became equal.  It means that the percentage of supporters of union with Russia decreased and they became less sure about their choice.
To interpret the above-described dynamics we just need to "superimpose" survey results on the vicissitudes of foreign policy and foreign economic relations of Belarus in 2010, about which the media reported actively. In May, a first conflict happened, when Russia demanded that Belarus pay its debt for gas: President Medvedev said that Belarus should pay within a five-day period. After that, the notorious media wars Between Russia and Belarus followed. The whole story ended up with signing documents on establishing the Common Economic Space (CES) and abolition of export duties on Russian oil deliveries to Belarus. These events raised doubts among a part of Belarusians about the advantages of fraternization with Russia, made them think more favorably about cooperation with the EU or inspired skepticism about any kind of closer relations at all. But the results that surveys showed could not have been influenced solely by the media. There must be some other deeper value grounds of the geopolitical choice of Belarusians.
Certain results of the survey "Belarus and the world"3 provide material for verification of this hypothesis. The respondents were asked to agree or disagree with a number of value judgments, which was interpreted as acceptance or rejection of values traditionally defined as "European”. In the sample representing the adult population of Belarus, a group of respondents was singled out identifying themselves as "Europeans" and consistent supporters of closer relations between Belarus and the EU (13% of the sample). This allowed making some comparison.  
The survey results show that 66% of Belarusians think that "the state should promote international contacts of Belarusian students and professors"; 61% consider that "the state should provide more freedom for private entrepreneurs"; 49% share the view that "disagreement with the state policy and public criticism of the authorities cannot lead to ban from the profession, occupied position or expulsion from the educational establishment". More than 40% agree that "the state should respect rights and freedoms of the citizens, even if the latter sometimes abuse them". Almost 40% agree that "people who come to Belarus from other countries have a right to promote their own culture and traditions, different they might be from the Belarusian ones". In the group of "Europeans" the level of political tolerance for all these positions is on average by 15% higher.
At the same time, more than half of respondents (57%) supported tight state restriction on penetration into the country of non-traditional religious denominations. 63% of respondents supported the view that "homosexuality should be prohibited and punished according to the Criminal Code". 42% of respondents would consent to introduction of media censorship if it counteracted spreading extremist ideas. (Among the "European" group these indexes are by 10-15% lower). In general, the answers are contradictory and do not always correspond with the European standards of understanding human rights and political correctness. Nevertheless, we can speak about certain value grounds for the European choice in the Belarusian society. It shows itself in acceptance of corresponding values (it is revealing that "Europeans" show a higher degree of agreement and acceptance).
One of the goals of "Belarus and the world" survey was to find out the degree to which Belarusians consider themselves Europeans. Particularly, how close is the Belarusian national character to the European one. It presupposed comparing stereotypes about the Belarusians and their mentality with those about the Russians and the Europeans (Table 7).
Table 7
Answers to the question: "Which traits of the national character are most typical of (a) the Belarusians; (b) the Russians; (c) the Europeans?"

These findings show that public opinion is unanimous that national traits of the Belarusians are hospitality, kindness, and diligence (the overwhelming majority of respondents pointed them out). The top-10 of the Belarusian national character is constituted by modesty, tolerance, spirituality, thoroughness, inquisitiveness, love of freedom (independence), and discipline. All qualities that respondents attribute to the Belarusian national character are positive ones.
Hospitality and kindness bring Belarusians together with Russians (these qualities have the highest rank value for both nationalities). But the difference is also visible straight away: Belarusians positioned laziness second in the Russian national character. Apart from these, the top-10 of Russian national qualities includes: failure to keep promises, enterprise, and nationalism – qualities not typical of Belarusians. As for tolerance and discipline, which were called basic for the Belarusians, they take last positions in the description of the Russian character (17th and 18th respectively).
Professional qualities in the character of Belarusians are also important; they are all positive and describe diligence and the quality of work. Professional qualities of Russians are more negative: place #2 is laziness, #6 is failure to keep promises; diligence is only on position #7. Therefore, high morality (kindness, hospitality, spirituality) bring Belarusians and Russians together, but Belarusians excel in diligence and discipline.
From the point of view of Belarusians, the Europeans are thorough, disciplined, enterprising and diligent (all the traits are professional ones). Besides love of freedom, inquisitiveness and hospitality, which bring Belarusians and Europeans together, the top-10 of European qualities is constituted by nationalism and greed, money-grabbing. 22.9% of respondents consider nationalism a Russian feature as well. As for greed and money-grabbing, they are obviously European qualities (16.4% of respondents attributed them to the Russians, 5.7% to the Belarusians and 26.3% – to the Europeans).
The Belarusians differ from the Europeans by their moral and socio-psychological positive features: kindness, unselfishness, hospitality, diligence and thoroughness in work. But they lack enterprise and energy. Belarusian public opinion sees Europeans mainly as businesspersons. Just like the Belarusians, they are thorough, obliging and diligent in work. But they are enterprising and show initiative as well (which Belarusians lack).
So, generally speaking, who is closer to whom and to what extent? To answer this question an integral index – the index of rank correlation – was calculated. Its maximal possible value is +1, minimal possible is –1. The index of closeness of the Belarusian to the Russian (in terms of the national character) is +0.3, that of the Belarusian to the European – +0.1. The index of closeness of the Russian to the European is –0.1. Therefore, whereas the stereotypes of the Belarusian and Russian national characters are close, the difference lies in their correlation with the European character: the Belarusians are to some extent similar and close to them, whereas the Russian character has absolutely no resemblance with the European one.