Belarusian Policy in the Developing World in 2010: Cautious money-making
Siarhei Bohdan

Summary:

In 2010 the internal political situation in Belarus changed, and the Foreign Ministry and other state institutions' activities became more West-oriented. Nevertheless, Belarus' cooperation with the developing world remained at the previous level, which testifies that the country's leadership intends to establish and promote an alternative vector of foreign policy in the form of relations with the developing world, which could function regardless of the state of affairs between Minsk and the West or Russia. Besides preserving allegedly1 successful dealings with a number of Asian countries with a significant trade surplus (Vietnam, India, Iran, Syria, Egypt), there is another achievement of Belarus’ policy in the developing countries: alternative oil deliveries from Venezuela.

Tendencies:

• The country's leadership does not take any serious risks by plunging into geopolitical adventures. They confine themselves to cautious verbal support of their often anti-Western Third World partners (except for China).
• Belarus’ "absence" spots on the map of the developing world (as far as its foreign economic relations are concerned) grew even larger: Iraq and Northern Africa practically "dropped out", contacts with Arabic countries of the Persian Gulf and India reduced.

Belarus’ contacts with China, Venezuela, and Iran were as intensive as in previous years. In 2010, good relations with Syria and Vietnam became even more intensive. The main objective of Belarusian policy in the third world seems to be money-making. That is why contacts with less solvent countries (Cuba) were limited. At the same time, political contacts did not always correlate with foreign economic relations.
There are a lot of ambiguities with Belarus’ foreign economic relations. The most important questions concern their actual profitability, potential (what is going to happen to some relations if the political regime changes in this country) and the actual pattern of trade. To a number of countries Belarus does not export technologically advanced products, like, say, those of mechanical engineering, but less advanced, like potash fertilizers (this fact is officially acknowledged, particularly concerning Vietnam and China).

China
Relations with the PRC were most diversified among countries of this group. In January, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Aleynik visited China; in March, deputy governor of the People's Bank of China Yi Gang came to Belarus; in late March, Vice-President Xi Jinping visited Minsk and a Belarusian parliamentary delegation headed by Chairpersons of both chambers visited China. In late April, Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Burya set out to China. In May, a military delegation headed by Chen Bingde, member of the Central Military Commission, visited Belarus; and Belarusian Minister of Defense set off to China (his visits to China have already become an almost annual tradition). Also in May Minsk hosted a delegation of the National Audit Office of the People's Republic of China.
In June, Minsk welcomed Secretary Mayor of Beijing Guo Jinlong and a delegation to attend the 11th meeting of the Belarusian-Chinese Committee on trade and economic cooperation. In July, a delegation of the Academy of Sciences visited China; in September, Minsk hosted a Chinese parliamentary delegation. During the presidential campaign in early October president Lukashenko paid a short visit to China, the 6th in his presidential term of office.
There is a vivid imbalance in Belarus-China relations. Whereas the Belarusian delegation to Beijing was headed by parliament’s chairpersons, the Chinese delegation return visit was led by a Vice Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Whereas the Belarusian part of the Committee on trade and economic cooperation is led by the chairperson of the State Control Committee, the Chinese part is headed a Vice Minister of Commerce of China. This Vice Minister is received by Prime Minister Sergey Sidorsky and First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Semashko. In relations with China Belarus has cooperation committees on provinces’ level, while normally such committees are established at the national level. Anyhow, one should not expect anything different, as the balance of forces is far too uneven. Another thing is that Belarusian officials often pretend that Belarusian-Chinese relations are based on equality.
Relations with China are probably supported by ideological sympathy. The policies of the post-Communist regime are surely more appealing to Belarusian officials and establishment than the more ideologically exotic models of Iran, Libya or Venezuela: they allow Chinese officials to make good money but keep society under control. The last two ambassadors to China were ex-chairpersons of the State Control Committee, which shows the significance of this position. In the 2000s, the function of ambassador to China became a key position in the ambassadorial list (equal to the Ambassador to Moscow or Washington). Having returned to Belarus, former ambassador to China Anatoly Tozik was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in late December, which establishes prerequisites for imitating the Chinese model.
China is in the top ten of Belarus’ foreign trade partners by volume of trade, though a trade deficit is prevailing. In 2010, economic relations with China were developing actively: the official information has it that export to China grew by 6.3 times, import from it – by 4.9 times2 . The bulk – up to half – of Belarusian exports consists of potash fertilizers3 . It should be noted separately that the accommodating Belarusian Foreign Ministry follows the Beijing principle of "one China" and adds up trade figures on the PRC, Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The idea that at least some part of Belaruskali could be sold became the main intrigue of the year: Chinese buyers could be regarded as serious partners. Being a significant player on the world market of potash fertilizers, Belaruskali was excluded from the list of essential national property and prepared for takeover by foreign investors.
The question of best Belarusian enterprises being sold in some form arises in connection with huge credits from China – Belarusian authorities openly express hopes to receive some. The danger is that the sale procedure might be non-transparent. There are property issues in relations with developing countries. For example, it is not clear, what part of JSC "Amkodor" belongs to Nepali businessmen. The procedure of transferring a plot in the historical centre of Minsk to an Omani investor in spring 2010 was also non-transparent.
Military and military-technical cooperation is an important part of Belarusian-Chinese relations. Unlike other developing countries, China is consistently developing this aspect of relations.

Other Asian countries
In January, Belarus hosted Minister of Justice of Vietnam Ha Hung Cuong, in June – president of Vietnam Nguyen Minh Triet and mayor of Hanoi Nguyen The Thao. In October, chairperson of the House of Representatives Vladimir Andreychenko visited Vietnam. In November, Minsk hosted the 8th meeting of the Belarusian-Vietnamese Commission on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, attended by the First Vice Minister of Industry and Trade of Vietnam. In 2010, Belarusian-Vietnamese volume of trade grew up to USD 145.7 mln, with Belarus’ export totaling USD 105.5 mln. It is officially acknowledged that "the chief Belarusian export to the SRV is potash fertilizers"4 .
At the same time, the Belarusian side tried to find other contacts in the region. In first half-year of 2010 Minsk welcomed the Chief of the General Staff of Laos. In May, First Deputy Prime Minister Semashko met Minister of Industry of Indonesia in Tehran; in June, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik set off to Indonesia, Myanmar and Malaysia. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry keeps trying to move national trade into the huge region of Southeast Asia, besides traditionally close Vietnam. In September, Belarus welcomed a delegation of Indonesian businessmen headed by Indonesia’s Minister of Trade Mari Elka Pangestu. Nevertheless, these are just first steps of cooperation. In September, during a UN session in New York, Foreign Minister of Belarus Sergey Martynov met his Bangladeshi colleague; in late September, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik met the Foreign Minister of Indonesia during a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Serious contacts with India were limited: in April the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India K. G. Balakrishnan paid a visit to Minsk (he visited Belarus a year before); in late October, a Belarusian delegation led by First Vice-Minister Semashko visited Delhi. The goods turnover between Belarus and India approximated USD 0.5 billion, with a usual significant trade surplus for Belarus.
Relations with Turkey after usual foreign-ministry level consultations between Deputy Foreign Ministers in May and parliamentary delegation’s visit to Minsk exploded with Belarusian president’s visit to Turkey. The purposes and the format of the visit remained unclear, though Lukashenko met with the Turkish president and Prime Minister.

Iran
In late January, Minsk welcomed Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, head of the Iranian presidential administration and president Ahmadinejad’s companion in arms. In February, Belarus’ Foreign Minister visited Iran. After that Hamid Behbahani, Minister of Roads and Transport, and Ahmadinejad’s former teacher visited Belarus (impeached by the Parliament of Iran in early 2011). In May, Minister of Industries and Mines Aliakbar Mehrabian visited Belarus; and First Deputy Prime Minister Semashko with a delegation of the State Committee for Science and Technologies visited Iran. Minister of Industry Radevich visited Tehran in October. Also in May a Belarusian parliamentary delegation visited Iran; in December, the National Bank Governor Petr Prokopovich visited Tehran.
The Iranian side might be regarding relations with Belarus as a possible way to solve some problems: Iran’s position in the world has worsened because of US and recent UN sanctions against it and Belarus could become its "window to the outside world". Though Minsk does not make haste to risk anything for Iran: no suspicious relations with Tehran have been reported.
It is doubtful that there are good reasons for the permanent topic of some oppositional media ­­­– an alleged military cooperation. But, as Fars News Agency reported, when a delegation of the State Committee for Science and Technologies was visiting Iran, the sides negotiated common PhD programs on military management and control. Another scandal broke out about alleged deliveries to Iran of S-300 missile systems. This topic arises every year and each time it turns out to be a fake. This time the scandal, triggered by Fars in late August, was probably caused by interior political struggle in Iran. Originally, Fars did not report any deliveries at all; the news was a slip of the tongue by the Iranian Associated Press correspondent.
Iranian projects in Belarus have not been remarkably successful. Many of them are located in Homiel region, and most of them are still in the organizational stage. In particular, the project of Samand car production near Minsk still remained obscure in 2010.
It was announced in May that in the second half of 2010 Lukashenko would visit Iran to launch an oilfield allocated to Belarus and to negotiate oil delivery to Belarusian oil refineries. In the end, nothing happened5 . Some problems might have been caused by the peculiarities of the Iranian state machinery, or the fraction structure of Iranian politics, or even the Iranian state itself.
In 2010, the goal set in the early 2000s – to bring bilateral trade up to USD 100 mln ­– was reached. The trade turnover totaled USD 104.8 mln, with Belarusian export being 97.2 mln. The big trade surplus in relations with Iran is a positive point in the general negative picture of Belarus’ total trade deficit. To put it formally, it is a big success, but we need to point out once again – economic relations with Iran are much less intensive than political contacts. This political commitment may negatively influence the economic relations in the future, especially if any shift occurs in Iranian politics.

Arab countries
Syria was a key partner in this region. A parliamentary delegation visited Syria in January and Oman in March. In late April, Damascus hosted a meeting of the Commission for military and technical cooperation. In May, Belarus welcomed Minister of Education of Oman, in June the Foreign Minister of Belarus set off to Syria and Lebanon. In June, Minsk received Speaker of the People's Assembly Mahmoud al-Abrash; in July, during the 3rd World Conference of Speakers of Parliament, Chairperson of the House of Representatives of Belarus met with his Lebanese and Bahraini colleagues.
In late July, the Syrian president visited Belarus. The Syrian side seems to be more interested in geopolitical games than the Belarusian one. That is why Lukashenko was very reserved in commenting the heavy-loaded statement of the Syrian leader: "I assume that relations we are establishing today are not relations between countries but between Eastern Europe and Middle East"6 .
In September, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik met with Omani Foreign Minister during a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. A Belarusian-Emirates business forum in Abu Dhabi was held in October; in November, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik made a working visit to Syria to participate in the trilateral meeting of Foreign Ministers of Belarus, Syria, and Venezuela. Belarus was obviously underrepresented at the forum, which showed Minsk was not ready for significant geopolitical games that could get Belarus involved in risky situations. At the same time, Belarusian authorities would not give up cooperation with
the opponents of the USA, especially since the annual volume of trade with Syria totals several dozen million dollars, with a surplus for Belarus.
The number of contacts with North African countries reduced to almost zero. Nevertheless, in October (just like in 2009) a Belarusian delegation headed by the Belarusian President’s National Security Aide Viktor Lukashenko visited Libya. Also, throughout 2010 delegations of MTZ, Belshina, Belneftechim and Bellesbumprom concerns visited this country. The official data about the volume of trade is presented incompletely and inadequately: it is supposed to be minimal. Running an embassy in Libya must be motivated by hopes for future contracts rather than actual relations.
Contacts with Egypt were limited: Mamdouh Marei, Egyptian Minister of Justice, visited Minsk in October. We should point out that despite rare contacts, Belarusian-Egyptian economic relations are equal to those with Iran, though the latter are promoted by a strong political will.

Latin America
The primary partner was Venezuela. In March, First Deputy Prime Minister Semashko and President’s Special Commissions Aide Sheiman set off to Venezuela, just after president Lukashenko personally paid a working visit. Mr. Sheiman visited Latin America – Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador – once more in late June-early July. In November, the Foreign Minister of Venezuela visited Belarus. Also, Venezuelan President Chavez traveled to Belarus for the umpteenth time.
The key issue of the discussions was oil supplies from Venezuela that were launched early in the year. The arrival of Venezuelan oil – despite its limited volume – provoked a negative reaction from Russia. The economic expedience this oil is disputable, but in 2011 and 2012 annual oil supplies to Belarusian oil refineries might be as high as 10 mln tons, said the Venezuelan ambassador.7
At the same time the Belarusian side managed to get serious contracts within the modernization campaign launched by Chavez. As a result, Belarusian export to Venezuela in 2010 totaled USD 302.3 mln.
Relations with other countries in the region were much more marginal. In March, President paid his first visit to Brazil, but both its format and results remain unclear. In May, Belarus hosted a small delegation of the Brazilian business community. Despite the absence of stable political contacts, the volume of trade between Belarus and Brazil in 2010 totaled USD 862.6 mln, which is more than that of 2009 but still less than the record figure of 2008, when it amounted to USD 1 bln, with a trade surplus for Belarus. Therefore, for the last few years Brazil has been one of Belarus’ top ten trade partners among countries outside the CIS.
During the September session of the UN General Assembly Foreign Minister Martynov met with his Bolivian and Nicaraguan colleagues. In September, Belarus also welcomed a Cuban business delegation headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment.

Africa
Africa remained predominantly undiscovered by Belarus. In February, a delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleynik visited Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, and Mali. Undoubtedly, the issues of trade and payment security are the most serious question in relations with African countries. One of the schemes to secure African contracts might be the strategy to tie Belarusian trade policy to the Russian one. In early August, a mixed Russian-Belarusian delegation visited Ghana, Belarus was represented by Mr. Sheiman. In August, Belarus also welcomed Mamadou Tangara, Gambian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Conclusion
Developing countries remained a remarkable vector of Belarusian foreign policy in 2010. Already in late Soviet times, the share of BSSR foreign trade with partners outside the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was nearly 10%. Hence, trade with Asian, African and Latin American countries is a logical continuation of the earlier cooperation. It is difficult to estimate the trade volume as there are no reliable data, but according to official statements, Belarusian trade with Asian and African countries totals USD 3.9 bln8 (true, such developed countries as Japan, Israel and South Korea have also been included), i.e. nearly 8% of total Belarusian trade. If we include trade with Latin American countries, we will have grounds to suggest that the volume of trade with developing countries remains at the level of BSSR times.
There are many reasons to suggest that this state of affairs will not change in the near future. At the same time, the year 2010 showed again how shaky the basis of Belarusian policy is towards the majority of Third World partners. The number of partners is limited: a dozen countries.
The most lasting, developed and stable relations are with China, which has been in the first ten of Belarus’ foreign economic partners for several years. But these relations are also quite ambiguous: firstly, they might be inadequately perceived by the official Minsk; secondly, they include certain political obligations that make Belarus give up neutrality and adopt politically-loaded and ethically doubtful statements (about events in China itself, Taiwan and Tibet). For example, there is an aggressive statement on the Belarusian embassy to China website: "The Republic of Belarus always supports Chinese initiatives in international organizations; Belarusian authorities have more than once officially supported the "one China" policy, against separatist onslaughts in Tibet"9 . In return, the official Minsk might be expecting that in response the PRC will support Belarus on the issue of economic sanctions by the USA and other members of the international community (as Beijing already did in April 2008).
Vietnam is another stable partner of Belarus, which has its roots in Soviet times. Relations with other countries should be regarded as shaky rather than stable. In numerous cases big political relations do not lead to the promised economic results (Iran); in others short-term achievements could be nullified if the market situation and political circumstances unfavorably change after deeper penetration into a given country (Venezuela for example).
At the same time, the Belarusian side avoids any unnecessary geopolitical or ideological involvements in its foreign relations. Minsk’s participation in the trilateral meeting of Foreign Ministers of Belarus, Syria and Venezuela was minimal; it has no serious projects with Iran, which could stir a negative reaction from the USA; and establishes strictly pragmatic relations even with the traditional partner – Cuba. All the more careful is the Belarusian government with arms trade: despite all the rumors, no evidence of illegal activities in this sphere has ever been provided.
The main problem of Belarus in the developing world is difficulties to expand traditional markets and a number of partners in the developing world. Undoubtedly, the majority of these countries (Africa and less developed Arab countries) are a problematic option for Belarusian enterprises because of high risks for trade: the Belarusian government cannot provide additional guarantees for contracts there.
But there are still countries, "non-problematic" from the point of view of trade security; that are not covered by Belarusian foreign policy. They are more than promising for economic and, to some extent, political cooperation: South East Asia besides Indo-China, Latin American countries and Pakistan. Anyhow, penetration to these markets is probably hindered due to a number of causes: no country expertise on many nations, lack of qualified specialists, discrepancies in technical characteristics of products as well as absence of established contacts with local partners.
Generally, analyzing the topic is immensely complicated by the fact that more or less full information is unavailable. The Foreign Ministry leaves out some events and contacts from its official releases, in particular, it shuns to present the full picture of the Belarusian trade with all countries; some Belarusian embassies update their news pages once in half a year (e.g. the embassy to Syria) 10 .