Cooperation in Arms: Building up new upon old
Alexandr Alessin, Andrey Volodkin

Summary
Russia remained Belarus’ main partner in the military sector in 2010 despite a whole bunch of controversies between the two. Military-political cooperation was however complicated by the Minsk-Moscow conflict over the situation in Kyrgyzstan and certain reluctance of the first during formation of the Collective Rapid Response Forces (CRRF) of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but the disputes paled into insignificance by the end of the year.
Military cooperation with China and the Near East was quite eventful as usual. Belarus’ decision to send its military to contribute to the UN peace-making efforts in Lebanon was something crucially new. As regards interaction with NATO and European states, it was rather limited as always and no considerable progress was made. Certain revitalization of contacts between the Defense Ministries of Belarus and Lithuania is worth attention.
Mapping out of joint plans imply substantial funding for an upgrade of both mutual relations and equipment of the armed forces and the system of troop command and control, i.e. the matters of shared strong interest. The tiny finances that Belarus can allocate to modernize its army make development of rearmament approaches a priority.

Tendencies:

• The economic recession and scarcity of funds compelled to highlight key points and determine particular army modernization targets that slowed down ongoing military projects; efforts are mostly channeled towards upgrading available weaponry rather than its replacement with new equipment;
• Belarusian-Russian relations in the politico-military sector were unprecedentedly energetic yet very unstable with a series of ups and downs in one year connected with political collisions between Minsk and Moscow and ambitions of the Belarusian leaders who wanted to manifest greater independence from Russia in the international arena;
• Military cooperation with Asia and the West basically followed the traditional tendencies of the past few years.

Economic crisis and state arms program

High ranking officers say the Belarusian army is at the stage of implementationof the State Arms Program scheduled for the years2006-2015, which primarily focuses on keeping the available arms and military equipment mission-ready1 . Defense Ministry officials believe actions taken under the new program have enhanced operational efficiency of command and control of the air force and air defense and considerably increased serviceability of arms and materiel of air defense missile units and radio-radar troops.
The military also take the credit for re-equipment of the special operations forces with new kinds of special small arms, optical surveillance and targeting devices, special communication facilities and individual protective gears. The land forces were provided with simulation training systems substantially.
However, the actual situation in the Belarusian army is not that cloudless as the military use to report, which first of all concerns up-to-date arms and equipment supplies. Defense Minister of Belarus Yury Zhadobin had to admit once that the government could not afford a lot of things the army would like to have. The Belarusian armed forces experience shortage of modern simulation systems and cannot even use the ones they already have to the fullest extent. The army is still unable to provide the required amounts of vehicles, ammunition, and fuel for combat training.
It may be a conjecture on our part but the scantiness of financial resources probably explains why the Defense Ministry does not plan on purchasing of new arms and military equipment for the land forces in large quantities for the period of up to 2020. Efforts are mostly channeled towards upgrade of the available weaponry engineered during the Soviet-time. As far as we can judge by the available information, emphasis is put on extra protection of land forces’ vehicles and their maneuvering characteristics, weapon-control systems, extending of the range, higher accuracy, and fire power of weapons used by motor-rifle and armor-heavy units2 .
Meanwhile, the air defense troops have been supplied much more extensively than the land forces in line with the air defense strengthening program3 . These troops form the basis of the joint regional air defense system of Belarus and Russia and they are therefore used as a weighty argument in the never-ending bargaining for privileges and preferences.
The Belarusian army had seen better days in terms of financial provision. The global economic recession hit the entire economy of the country. Since the budgetary performance is far from being perfect, the Defense Ministry had to curtail the defense budget planned for 2010 down to the minimum.
Considering what military officials say now and then, the year 2011 does not give much hope either. The military will keep trying to save as much funds as possible focusing on salary fund payments, satisfaction of accounts payable, transportation and communication charges, food and medical supplies. For this reason, all other plans, including purchase of new weapons and equipment have to be recalibrated at this point (towards reduction of course). President Alexander Lukashenko mentioned this himself in a meeting on financing of the second phaseof the State Arms Program held on November 22, 2010.

Relations with Russia and the CSTO

Despite the rapprochement with the West observed throughout 2010, Russia remains the major defense partner of Belarus. This cooperation was developing in two formats: bilateral relations and interaction within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Although the organization unites quite a number of CIS states, Russia is its absolute leader when it comes to both politics and defense. Therefore, Belarus’ attitude to the CSTO and its initiatives depended directly on the relations between Minsk and Moscow, which were rather complicated last year.
In early 2010, Belarus did not assume the CSTO presidency as it was supposed to do on a rotation basis as far back as June 14, 2009 at the summit of the organization hosted by Moscow. The Belarusian delegation headed by the president declined participation in the heat of the “milk war” against Russia. Nevertheless, Belarus signed the agreement on formation of the CSTO Collective Rapid Response Forces October 15, 2009 but was not in a hurry to ratify it. The House of Representatives finally did so at the 26 May session. Last year, the CRRF-related topics were a theme song of the whole military-political component of the Belarusian-Russian relations, the second essential ingredient after formation of the Customs Union.
Buildup and functioning of the joint Belarusian-Russian air defense system was another major point of the negotiations. Minsk and Moscow ratified agreements on creation of the regional air defense system almost simultaneously in 2009, but the scheduled actions grounded to a halt actually. For instance, as of May 2010, the parties had not appointed the steering bodies and joint air defense group commander, although they planned it for March4 .
The situation in Kyrgyzstan and Lukashenko’s hostile opinion on CSTO’s nonintervention during the April revolution in the country was a bone of contention in political relations between Belarus and Russia in spring 2010. Official Minsk granted political asylum to ousted President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiev after Russia refused to shelter the refugee, thus displaying its position on the events. It was more like an explicit act of defiance towards Moscow’s policy. The political conflict certainly affected military cooperation. Russia postponed ratification of the signed agreement on development of military-technical cooperation with Belarus. The session of the joint board of the two Defense Ministries was postponed twice in April and May.
Nevertheless, the tension caused by the attitude to the events in Kyrgyzstan was alleviated by the end of May and the parties got back to military-political questions as a matter of routine. As it was mentioned before, Belarus ratified the agreement on formation of the CSTO CRRF on May 26. In June, the defense minister specified the quantitative and qualitative composition of the Belarusian forces to be delegated to the CRRF5 . Belarus also adopted an action plan aimed at arrangement of the conflict in Kyrgyzstan worked out by the secretaries of the CSTO Security Councils on June 14. Belarus was the last member state to approve the plan one week after the others6 . The package of documents on formation of the CSTO Collective Forces signed by Lukashenko was sent to the organization’s secretariat in August7 . A tactical training exercise of the Belarusian air force and air defense was held the same month at Ashuluk range in Russia.
Autumn saw another cooldown in Belarusian-Russian military cooperation, apparently resulting from the presidential election campaign in Belarus and Lukashenko’s attempt to show both domestic and foreign viewers his independence from Moscow and his intention to build bridges to the West. For instance, the president of Belarus considered it irrelevant to interrupt his working trip to the Brest region to meet with CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha who arrived in Minsk in early September to discuss Belarus’ forthcoming presidency in the organization8 . In October, the mass media informed referring to “a source in Minsk” that Lukashenko allegedly threatened to withdraw Belarus from all post-Soviet integration institutions unless Russian leaders recognize his future election victory9 . On top of this, Belarus refused to send its units to the Interaction-2010 exercise of the CSTO CRRF10 . The joint board of the Belarusian and Russian Defense Ministries did not hold a single session in 201011 .
Some positive trends were observed by the end of the year. A Russian military delegation came to the Belarusian Joint Staff in November to coordinate the schedule of the forthcoming Belarusian-Russian joint operational exercise planned for 201112 . On December 8, the State Duma of Russia ratified the agreement on development of military-technical cooperation with Belarus13 , which among other things envisages license-free import and export of weapons, military equipment, and technology at domestic prices14 .

Military cooperation with other states

Contacts with Asian countries remained quite intensive. Belarus has regarded expansion of military exports and training of military personnel in Third World countries one of its priorities. The format of the “Asian vector” became a little wider last year. Alongside the efforts made to upscale bilateral relations, Belarus pursued establishing ties with multilateral politico-military institutions of Asia and obtained partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in April 2010.  
China has been Belarus’ leading partner in Asia in all sectors including defense for years. However, the past year was not outstanding for both. The parties mainly concentrated on the joint venture engaged in manufacture of hydro-mechanical transmissions and chassis assembled from Belarusian parts. The venture was established by the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant and Belarusian-Chinese Volat-Xingjian enterprise. A Chinese delegation headed by the director general of the Chinese Aerospace Corporation with respect to science and industry (which included representatives of Xingjian) visited Belarus in March 2010 that testifies importance of the project15 .
The Belarusian defense minister went to China in May once again, which has already become a yearly tradition. The two ministries signed an agreement on military cooperation16 . Belarusian ranking officers conducted negotiations with the Chinese throughout the year. Belarusian media outlets did not provide any valuable information about the results achieved, though.
Military-technical aspects were assigned the leading role in military cooperation with the Near East. The Belarusian-Syrian commission for military-technical cooperation held the 9th session in April 2010. The joint military-technical cooperation committee of Belarus and the United Arab Emirates convened the first session in October. The UAE agreed to participate in MILEX-2011 international exhibition of arms and military machinery to be arranged in late May 2011 in Minsk.
Military cooperation with Qatar was somewhat an exception. Alongside the routine questions, the two countries conducted joint maneuvers in July 2010 at the range of the 5th detached special operations brigade of Belarus observed by Qatari Armed Forces Chief of Staff Hamad Bin Ali Al Attiyah, who was visiting Minsk at that time to meet with his Belarusian counterpart. By all appearances, the joint exercise was a reciprocal gesture after the Belarusian military took part in Ferocious Falcon general exercise in October 2008 and March 2010 in Qatar17 .

Belarus’s intention to send a contingent outside the country on a peace-making mission accords with the government’s policy in the Near East. In line with the law of 200318 , Belarusian citizens can only perform nonmilitary tasks in UN and OSCE peace-making operations. Nonetheless, the deputy chief of Joint Staff informed in May 2010 that Belarus was going to send troopers to Lebanon on an UN-led peace-making mission. On August 2, the president signed Decree No. 400 on “deployment of servicemen of the armed forces of Belarus in the Republic of Lebanon for participation in activities aimed at maintenance of international peace and security.” Although the decree only concerned nine people19 , i.e. even fewer than those delegated by the Baltic States, the very fact that the government crossed out the fundamental principle of nonparticipation in combat actions outside the country was staggering. It is means a lot that Belarus chose not a local conflict in the CIS or the Balkan Peninsula, but the Near East.
As regards collaboration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the year witnessed no breakthroughs. Contacts were basically maintained under the NATO Partnership for Peace program (actions specified by the individual Belarus-NATO partnership program 2010-2011) and within the framework of international arms control agreements. According to the program, a delegation of the Belarusian Defense Ministry headed by Chief of Joint Staff Tikhonovsky participated in a session of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Military Committee in January 2010. A delegation of the NATO Headquarters visited Minsk in March to discuss Belarus’ participation in the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process and to evaluate progress in implementation of the objectives set for 2008 and 201020 .
As part of the second component, in August-September 2010, Belarus arranged a training course at the Defense Ministry’s National Agency for Verification and Inspections intended for officers of verification missions of the OSCE and NATO who came to share expertise and brush up their knowledge of the Russian language. A French military delegation visited Minsk in September to address arms control matters.
Among the NATO members, military cooperation with Lithuania was the most extensive. The Foreign Ministry of Lithuania said the country was interested in cooperation with Belarus in the field of transportation to load the Klaipeda port used for NATO supplies to Afghanistan21 in line with the Belarus-NATO agreement on transit of military cargoes. Defense Minister of Belarus Zhadobin was invited to Vilnius in autumn where the parties signed a defense agreement and a cooperation plan for 201122 . Considering that interaction between the two defense agencies was actually at a zero level in late 2009, as Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene said23 , the countries made a breakthrough in 2010.
Military contacts with another neighboring NATO member, Poland, are hardly worth noting. Chief of Joint Staff Tikhonovsky went to Warsaw twice and nothing is known about any agreements. The land and air force commanders of Belarus and Poland held two working meetings in the second half of the year. According to the available information, they focused on airspace use control and reporting of flights in the common border area24 .
There were some sporadic meetings between Defense Ministry officers with military delegations of Germany, Italy, and France.

Conclusion

Some actions aimed at upgrade of the armed forces of Belarus specified by the state program were taken in the previous few years owing to the appreciable economic growth in the pre-crisis period. The global recession slowed the process down. Moreover, a whole series of actions of paramount importance are likely to be frustrated.
In spite of all political contradictions, Russia remains Belarus’ major defense partner in the bilateral format and in the CSTO, which is troublesome for the most part. Over the past year, the bilateral relations in the military sector passed through several stages from stagnation early in the year caused by dragged out ratification of CSTO CRRF protocols and implementation of the joint air defense system arrangements to the spring conflict over the situation in Kyrgyzstan. Then came reconciliation (in early May and August) together with the Belarusian military exercise at the Russian range and support for Russian initiatives addressed to the CSTO. Then it all cooled down again in September-October most likely due to the international anxiety about the future presidential election in Belarus. And finally the temperature went up again at the year end with scheduling of the joint exercise planned for 2011 and ratification of the agreement on development of Belarusian-Russian military-technical cooperation.
It is safe to assume that the military cooperation line will still go up and down in future. In fact, issues remain unresolved. They are just put on the back burner in the situation aggravated by the notorious presidential election in Belarus. At the same time, both countries are motivated to maintain cooperation for objective reasons. Belarus depends on Russian military supplies needed to re-equip the army, and Russia depends on supplies of Belarusian component parts for some enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Also, the territory of Belarus is used for strategic purposes in case of a confrontation with the West.
Given the recent developments in what concerns attitude of the West towards the 19 December events in Belarus, cooperation with NATO will most probably stall for a while. This does not seem to be a huge problem for Belarus, as, in fact, interaction with Europe was limited anyway and largely does not affect the defense potential of Belarus or its neighbors. That is why it is much less dependent on political fluctuations, than on future military relations with Russia.